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A generational gap in American patriotism

Characterized by fireworks, barbecues and a trio of American colors, Independence Day commemorates United States history and celebrates patriotism. But a 2011 Pew Research report identified a significant generation gap in views about American exceptionalism and patriotism.

When Americans were asked if they think the United States is the greatest country in the world, there were sharp differences in the responses across generations. In total, 48% of Americans believe the United States is the greatest country in the world and 42% believe it is one of the greatest countries in the world, but a significant portion of the Millennial generation responded differently.

Just 32% of Millennials believe the U.S. is the greatest country in the world. That number progressively increases among the Gen X (48%), Boomer (50%) and Silent generations (64%). Millennials were also the most likely generation to say America is not the greatest country in the world (11%).

Millennials also are less likely than their elders to express patriotism. A majority of Millennials (70%) agreed with the statement “I am very patriotic.” But even larger percentages of Gen Xers (86%), Boomers (91%) and Silents (90%) said the same. This generational gap is consistent and has been identified in surveys dating back to 2003.

Despite their comparatively low level of patriotism, Millennials are more optimistic about the nation’s current state of affairs as well as its future. Compared to Boomers and Silents, a slightly greater percentage of Millennials (55%) and Gen Xers (55%) think the country’s best days are ahead. In total, half of Americans (51%) say that’s the case.

The survey also found a cross-generational common ground in views about the factors that have led to America’s success. More than 90% of respondents from each generation said the country’s freedoms – more than any other factor – have been very important in contributing to America’s success.

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Katie Reilly is a former editorial intern at the Pew Research Center .

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Patriotism raises questions of the sort philosophers characteristically discuss: How is patriotism to be defined? How is it related to similar attitudes, such as nationalism? What is its moral standing: is it morally valuable or perhaps even mandatory, or is it rather a stance we should avoid? Yet until a few decades ago, philosophers used to show next to no interest in the subject. The article on patriotism in the Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , reviewing the use of the term from the 16 th century to our own times, gives numerous references, but they are mostly to authors who were not philosophers. Moreover, of the few well known philosophers cited, only one, J. G. Fichte, gave the subject more than a passing reference – and most of what Fichte had to say actually pertains to nationalism, rather than patriotism (see Busch and Dierse 1989).

This changed in the 1980s. The change was due, in part, to the revival of communitarianism, which came in response to the individualistic, liberal political and moral philosophy epitomized by John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971); but it was also due to the resurgence of nationalism in several parts of the world. The beginning of this change was marked by Andrew Oldenquist’s account of morality as a matter of various loyalties, rather than abstract principles and ideals (Oldenquist 1982), and Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument that patriotism is a central moral virtue (MacIntyre 1984). Largely in response to MacIntyre, some philosophers have defended constrained or deflated versions of patriotism (Baron 1989, Nathanson 1989, Primoratz 2002). Others have argued against patriotism of any sort (Gomberg 1990, McCabe 1997, Keller 2005). There is now a lively philosophical debate about the moral credentials of patriotism that shows no signs of abating. A parallel discussion in political philosophy concerns the kind of patriotism that might provide an alternative to nationalism as the ethos of a stable, well-functioning polity.

1.1 What is patriotism?

1.2 patriotism and nationalism, 2.1 patriotism and the ethics of belief, 2.2 the moral standing of patriotism, 3. the political import of patriotism, other internet resources, related entries, 1. conceptual issues.

The standard dictionary definition reads “love of one’s country.” This captures the core meaning of the term in ordinary use; but it might well be thought too thin and in need of fleshing out. In the first philosophical book-length study of the subject, Stephen Nathanson (1993, 34–35) defines patriotism as involving:

• Special affection for one’s own country
• A sense of personal identification with the country
• Special concern for the well-being of the country
• Willingness to sacrifice to promote the country’s good

There is little to cavil about here. There is no great difference between special affection and love, and Nathanson himself uses the terms interchangeably. Although love (or special affection) is usually given expression in special concern for its object, that is not necessary. But a person whose love for her country was not expressed in any special concern for it would scarcely be considered a patriot. Therefore the definition needs to include such concern. Once that is included, however, a willingness to make sacrifices for one’s country is implied, and need not be added as a separate component. Identification with the country, too, might be thought implied in the phrase “one’s country.” But the phrase is extremely vague, and allows for a country to be called “one’s own” in an extremely thin, formal sense too. It seems that if one is to be a patriot of a country, the country must be his in some significant sense; and that may be best captured by speaking of one’s identification with it. Such identification is expressed in vicarious feelings: in pride of one’s country’s merits and achievements, and in shame for its lapses or crimes (when these are acknowledged, rather than denied).

Accordingly, patriotism can be defined as love of one’s country, identification with it, and special concern for its well-being and that of compatriots.

This is only a definition. A fuller account of patriotism is beyond the scope of this article. Such an account would say something about the patriot’s beliefs about the merits of his country, his need to belong to a group and be a part of a more encompassing narrative, to be related to a past and a future that transcend the narrow confines of an individual’s life and its mundane concerns, as well as social and political conditions that affect the ebb and flow of patriotism, its political and cultural influence, and more.

Discussions of both patriotism and nationalism are often marred by lack of clarity due to the failure to distinguish the two. Many authors use the two terms interchangeably. Among those who do not, quite a few have made the distinction in ways that are not very helpful. In the 19 th century, Lord Acton contrasted “nationality” and patriotism as affection and instinct vs. a moral relation. Nationality is “our connection with the race” that is “merely natural or physical,” while patriotism is the awareness of our moral duties to the political community (Acton 1972, 163). In the 20 th century, Elie Kedourie did the opposite, presenting nationalism as a full-fledged philosophical and political doctrine about nations as basic units of humanity within which the individual can find freedom and fulfilment, and patriotism as mere sentiment of affection for one’s country (Kedourie 1985, 73–74).

George Orwell contrasted the two in terms of aggressive vs. defensive attitudes. Nationalism is about power: its adherent wants to acquire as much power and prestige as possible for his nation, in which he submerges his individuality. While nationalism is accordingly aggressive, patriotism is defensive: it is a devotion to a particular place and a way of life one thinks best, but has no wish to impose on others (Orwell 1968, 362). This way of distinguishing the two attitudes comes close to an approach popular among politicians and widespread in everyday discourse that indicates a double standard of the form “us vs. them.” Country and nation are first run together, and then patriotism and nationalism are distinguished in terms of the strength of the love and special concern one feels for it, the degree of one’s identification with it. When these are exhibited in a reasonable degree and without ill thoughts about others and hostile actions towards them, that is patriotism; when they become unbridled and cause one to think ill of others and act badly towards them, that is nationalism. Conveniently enough, it usually turns out that we are patriots, while they are nationalists (see Billig 1995, 55–59).

There is yet another way of distinguishing patriotism and nationalism – one that is quite simple and begs no moral questions. We can put aside the political sense of “nation” that makes it identical with “country,” “state,” or “polity,” and the political or civic type of nationalism related to it. We need concern ourselves only with the other, ethnic or cultural sense of “nation,” and focus on ethnic or cultural nationalism. In order to do so, we do not have to spell out the relevant understanding of “nation”; it is enough to characterize it in terms of common ancestry, history, and a set of cultural traits. Both patriotism and nationalism involve love of, identification with, and special concern for a certain entity. In the case of patriotism, that entity is one’s patria , one’s country; in the case of nationalism, that entity is one’s natio , one’s nation (in the ethnic/cultural sense of the term). Thus patriotism and nationalism are understood as the same type of set of beliefs and attitudes, and distinguished in terms of their objects, rather than the strength of those beliefs and attitudes, or as sentiment vs. theory.

To be sure, there is much overlap between country and nation, and therefore between patriotism and nationalism; thus much that applies to one will also apply to the other. But when a country is not ethnically homogeneous, or when a nation lacks a country of its own, the two may part ways.

2. Normative issues

Patriotism has had a fair number of critics. The harshest among them have judged it deeply flawed in every important respect. In the 19 th century, Russian novelist and thinker Leo Tolstoy found patriotism both stupid and immoral. It is stupid because every patriot holds his own country to be the best of all whereas, obviously, only one country can qualify. It is immoral because it enjoins us to promote our country’s interests at the expense of all other countries and by any means, including war, and is thus at odds with the most basic rule of morality, which tells us not to do to others what we would not want them to do to us (Tolstoy 1987, 97). Recently, Tolstoy’s critique has been seconded by American political theorist George Kateb, who argues that patriotism is “a mistake twice over: it is typically a grave moral error and its source is typically a state of mental confusion” (Kateb 2000, 901). Patriotism is most importantly expressed in a readiness to die and to kill for one’s country. But a country “is not a discernible collection of discernible individuals”; it is rather “an abstraction … a compound of a few actual and many imaginary ingredients.” Specifically, in addition to being a delimited territory, “it is also constructed out of transmitted memories true and false; a history usually mostly falsely sanitized or falsely heroized; a sense of kinship of a largely invented purity; and social ties that are largely invisible or impersonal, indeed abstract …” Therefore patriotism is “a readiness to die and to kill for an abstraction … for what is largely a figment of the imagination” (907).

Some of these objections can easily be countered. Even if full-fledged patriotism does involve a belief in one’s country’s merits, it need not involve the belief that one’s country is better than all others. And the fact that a country is not a collection of “discernible individuals” and that the social ties among compatriots are “largely invisible or impersonal,” rather than palpable and face-to-face, does not show that it is unreal or imaginary. As Benedict Anderson, who coined the term “imagined community,” points out, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact … are imagined.” “Imagined community” is not the opposite of “real community,” but rather of community whose members have face-to-face relations (Anderson 1991, 6).

However, there is another, more plausible line of criticism of patriotism focusing on its intellectual, rather than moral credentials. Moreover, Tolstoy’s and Kateb’s arguments questioning the moral legitimacy of patriotic partiality and those highlighting the connection of patriotism with international tensions and war cannot be so easily refuted.

When asked “why do you love your country?” or “why are you loyal to it?”, a patriot is likely to take the question to mean “what is so good about your country that you should love it, or be loyal to it?” and then adduce what she believes to be its virtues and achievements. This suggests that patriotism can be judged from the standpoint of ethics of belief – a set of norms for evaluating our beliefs and other doxastic states. Simon Keller has examined patriotism from this point of view, and found it wanting.

Keller argues that whereas one’s love of and loyalty to a family member or a friend may coexist with a low estimate of the person’s qualities, patriotism involves endorsement of one’s country. If the patriot is to endorse her country, she must consider her beliefs about the country’s virtues and achievements to be based on some objectively valid standards of value and an unbiased examination of the country’s past and present record that leads to the conclusion that it lives up to those standards. However, the patriot’s loyalty is not focused on her country simply because it instantiates a set of virtues a country can have. If that were the case, and if a neighboring country turned out to have such virtues to an even higher degree, the patriot’s loyalty would be redirected accordingly. She is loyal to her country because that country, and only that country, is her country; hers is a loyalty “in the first instance.” Thus the patriot is motivated to think of the patria as blessed by all manner of virtues and achievements whether the evidence, interpreted objectively, warrants that or not. Accordingly, she forms beliefs about her country in ways different from the ways in which she forms beliefs about other countries. Moreover, she cannot admit this motivation while at the same time remaining a patriot. This leads her to hide from herself the true source of some of the beliefs involved. This is bad faith. Bad faith is bad; so is patriotism, as well as every identity, individual or collective, constituted, in part, by patriotic loyalty. This, in Keller’s view, amounts to “a clear presumptive case against patriotism’s being a virtue and for its being a vice” (Keller 2005, 587–88).

This portrayal does seem accurate as far as much patriotism as we know it is concerned. Yet Keller may be overstating his case as one against patriotism as such. When queried about one’s loyalty to one’s country, couldn’t one say: “This is my country, my home; I need no further reason to be loyal to it and show special concern for its well-being”? This might not be a very satisfactory answer; we might agree with J.B. Zimmermann that “the love for one’s country … is in many cases no more than the love of an ass for its stall” (quoted in Nathanson 1993, 3). But however egocentric, irrational, asinine, surely it qualifies as patriotism. (In a later statement of his argument (2007a, 80–81), Keller seems to be of two minds on this point.)

Many think of patriotism as a natural and appropriate expression of attachment to the country in which we were born and raised and of gratitude for the benefits of life on its soil, among its people, and under its laws. They also consider patriotism an important component of our identity. Some go further, and argue that patriotism is morally mandatory, or even that it is the core of morality. There is, however, a major tradition in moral philosophy which understands morality as essentially universal and impartial, and seems to rule out local, partial attachment and loyalty. Adherents of this tradition tend to think of patriotism as a type of group egoism , a morally arbitrary partiality to “one’s own” at odds with demands of universal justice and common human solidarity. A related objection is that patriotism is exclusive in invidious and dangerous ways. Love of one’s own country characteristically goes together with dislike of and hostility towards other countries. It tends to encourage militarism, and makes for international tension and conflict. Tolstoy’s and Kateb’s moral objections to patriotism, mentioned above, are in line with this position.

What, then, is the moral status of patriotism? The question does not admit of a single answer. We can distinguish five types of patriotism, and each needs to be judged on its merits.

2.2.1 Extreme patriotism

Machiavelli is famous (or infamous) for teaching princes that, human nature being what it is, if they propose to do their job well, they must be willing to break their promises, to deceive, dissemble, and use violence, sometimes in cruel ways and on a large scale, when political circumstances require such actions. This may or may not be relevant to the question of patriotism, depending on just what we take the point of princely rule to be. A less well known part of Machiavelli’s teaching, however, is relevant; for he sought to impart the same lesson to politicians and common citizens of a republic. “When the safety of one’s country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious” (Machiavelli 1998 [1518], 515). The paramount interests of one’s country override any moral consideration with which they might come into conflict.

This type of patriotism is extreme, but by no means extremely rare. It is adopted much too often by politicians and common citizens alike when their country’s major interests are thought to be at stake. It is encapsulated in the saying “our country, right or wrong,” at least on the simplest and most obvious construal of this saying. Not much needs to be said about the moral standing of this type of patriotism, as it amounts to rejection of morality. “Our country, right or wrong ” cannot be right.

2.2.2 Robust patriotism

In his seminal lecture “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” Alasdair MacIntyre contrasts patriotism with the liberal commitment to certain universal values and principles. On the liberal view, where and from whom I learn the principles of morality is just as irrelevant to their contents and to my commitment to them, as where and from whom I learn the principles of mathematics is irrelevant to their contents and my adherence to them. For MacIntyre, where and from whom I learn my morality is of decisive importance both for my commitment to it and for its very contents.

There is no morality as such; morality is always the morality of a particular community. One can understand and internalize moral rules only “in and through the way of life of [one’s] community” (MacIntyre 1984, 8). Moral rules are justified in terms of certain goods they express and promote; but these goods, too, are always given as part and parcel of the way of life of a community. The individual becomes a moral agent only when informed as such by his community. He also lives and flourishes as one because he is sustained in his moral life by his community. “… I can only be a moral agent because we are moral agents … Detached from my community, I will be apt to lose my hold upon all genuine standards of judgment” (10–11).

If I can live and flourish as a moral agent only as a member of my community, while playing the role this membership involves, then my very identity is bound up with that of my community, its history, traditions, institutions, and aspirations. Therefore,

if I do not understand the enacted narrative of my own individual life as embedded in the history of my country … I will not understand what I owe to others or what others owe to me, for what crimes of my nation I am bound to make reparation, for what benefits to my nation I am bound to feel gratitude. Understanding what is owed to and by me and understanding the history of the communities of which I am a part is … one and the same thing. (16)

This leads MacIntyre to conclude that patriotism is not to be contrasted with morality; it is rather a central moral virtue, indeed the bedrock of morality.

The object of patriotic loyalty is one’s country and polity; but this does not mean that a patriot will support any government in power in her country. Here MacIntyre’s position is different from a popular version of patriotism that tends to conflate the two. The patriot’s allegiance, he says, is not to the status quo of power, but rather to “the nation conceived as a project ” (13). One can oppose one’s country’s government in the name of the country’s true character, history, and aspirations. To that extent, this type of patriotism is critical and rational. But at least some practices and projects of the patria , some of its “large interests,” must be beyond questioning and critical scrutiny. To that extent, MacIntyre grants that what he considers true patriotism is “a fundamentally irrational attitude” (13). But a more rational and therefore more constrained loyalty would be “emasculated,” rather than real patriotism.

This account of patriotism is exposed to several objections. One might question the communitarian foundations of MacIntyre’s case for patriotism: his view of the moral primacy of the community over the individual. One might find fault with the step from communitarianism to patriotism:

Even if his communitarian conception of morality were correct and even if the process of moral development ensured that group loyalty would emerge as a central virtue, no conclusion would follow about the importance of patriotism. The group to which our primary loyalty would be owed would be the group from which we had obtained our moral understanding. This need not be the community as a whole or any political unit, however. It could be one’s family, one’s town, one’s religion. The nation need not be the source of morality or the primary beneficiary of our loyalty. (Nathanson 1989, 549)

Yet another objection would focus on the fundamentally irrational character of robust patriotism: its insistence that “large interests” of the patria must be beyond questioning.

MacIntyre concedes that “on occasion patriotism might require me to support and work for the success of some enterprise of my nation as crucial to its overall project … when the success of that enterprise would not be in the best interests of mankind” (14). If so, this type of patriotism would seem to involve the rejection of such basic moral notions as universal justice and common human solidarity.

Tolstoy and other critics have argued that patriotism is incompatible with these notions – that it is egoism writ large, an exclusive and ultimately aggressive concern for one’s country, and a major cause of international tensions and war. This is not a fair objection to patriotism as such. Patriotism is defined as a special concern for one’s country’s well-being, and that is not the same as an exclusive and aggressive concern for it. But the objection is pertinent, and has considerable force, when brought up against the type of patriotism advocated by MacIntyre. MacIntyre’s patriot may promote his country’s interests in a critical, and therefore non-exclusive way, over a range of issues. But when it comes to those “large interests” of his country that are beyond criticism and must be supported in an irrational way, his concern will inevitably become exclusive, and most likely aggressive too. If justice is understood in universal, rather than parochial terms, if common human solidarity counts as a weighty moral consideration, and if peace is of paramount importance and war is morally permissible only when it is just, then this kind of patriotism must be rejected.

2.2.3 Moderate patriotism

Rejecting robust patriotism does not entail adopting sweeping impartialism that acknowledges no special obligations, and allows no partiality, to “our own.” Nor does it entail adopting the more restricted, cosmopolitan position, that allows no partiality to our own country and compatriots. There is considerable middle ground between these extremes. Exploring this middle ground has led some philosophers to construct positions accommodating both the universal and the particular point of view – both the mandates of universal justice and claims of common humanity, and the concern for the patria and compatriots.

One such position is “patriotism compatible with liberal morality,” or “liberal patriotism” for short, advocated by Marcia Baron (1989). Baron argues that the conflict between impartiality and partiality is not quite as deep as it may seem. Morality allows for both types of considerations, as they pertain to different levels of moral deliberation. At one level, we are often justified in taking into account our particular commitments and attachments, including those to our country. At another level, we can and ought to reflect on such commitments and attachments from a universal, impartial point of view, to delineate their proper scope and determine their weight. We can conclude, for example, “that with respect to certain matters and within limits, it is good for an American to judge as an American, and to put American interests first” (Baron 1989, 272). In such a case, partiality and particular concerns are judged to be legitimate and indeed valuable from an impartial, universal point of view. This means that with respect to those matters and within the same limits, it is also good for a Cuban to judge as a Cuban and to put Cuban interests first, etc. Actually, this is how we think of our special obligations to, and preferences for, our family, friends, or local community; this kind of partiality is legitimate, and indeed valuable, not only for us but for anyone.

In MacIntyre’s view, the type of partiality in general, and patriotism in particular, that is at work only at one level of moral deliberation and against the background of impartiality at another, higher level, lacks content and weight. For Baron, on the other hand, MacIntyre’s strongly particularistic type of patriotism is irrational and morally hazardous. Baron also finds problematic the popular understanding of patriotism which focuses on the country’s might and its interests as determined by whatever government is in power. She emphasizes concern for the country’s cultural and moral excellence. By doing so, she argues, our patriotism will leave room for serious, even radical criticism of our country, and will not be a force for dissension and conflict in the international arena.

Another middle-of-the-road view is “moderate patriotism” propounded by Stephen Nathanson (1989, 1993). He, too, rejects the choice between MacIntyre’s robust patriotism and cosmopolitanism, and argues that impartiality required by morality allows for particular attachments and special obligations by distinguishing different levels of moral thinking. A good example is provided by the Ten Commandments, a major document of Western morality. The wording of the commandments is for the most part universal, impartial; but they also tell us “honor your father and your mother.”

The kind of patriotism defended by Nathanson and Baron is moderate in several distinct, but related respects. It is not unbridled: it does not enjoin the patriot to promote his country’s interests under any circumstances and by any means. It acknowledges the constraints morality imposes on the pursuit of our individual and collective goals. For instance, it may require the patriot to fight for his country, but only in so far as the war is, and remains, just. Adherents of both extreme and robust patriotism will consider themselves bound to fight for their country whether its cause be just or not. Extreme patriots will also fight for it in whatever way it takes to win. Whether adherents of MacIntyre’s robust patriotism, too, will do so is a moot point. If they do not, that will be because the morality of their own community places certain constraints on warfare, whether of a particularistic type (“a German officer does not execute POWs”), or by incorporating some universalistic moral precepts (“an officer does not execute POWs”).

Moderate patriotism is not exclusive. Its adherent will show special concern for his country and compatriots, but that will not prevent him from showing concern for other countries and their inhabitants. Moreover, this kind of patriotism allows for the possibility that under certain circumstances the concern for human beings in general will override the concern for one’s country and compatriots. Such patriotism is compatible with a decent degree of humanitarianism. By contrast, both extreme and robust patriotism give greater weight to the (substantial) interests of one’s country and compatriots than to those of other countries and their inhabitants whenever these interests come into conflict.

Finally, moderate patriotism is not uncritical, unconditional, or egocentric. For an adherent of this type of patriotism, it is not enough that the country is her country. She will also expect it to live up to certain standards and thereby deserve her support, devotion, and special concern for its well-being. When it fails to do so, she will withhold support. Adherents of both extreme and robust patriotism, on the other hand, love their country unconditionally, and stand by it whatever it does as long as its “safety” or its “large interests” more generally are concerned.

Baron and Nathanson have found a middle ground between sweeping cosmopolitanism that allows for no attachment and loyalty to one’s country and compatriots, and extreme or robust patriotism that rejects universal moral considerations (except those that have become part and parcel of one’s country’s morality). They have shown that the main objections usually advanced against patriotism as such apply only to its extreme or robust varieties, but not to its “liberal” or “moderate” versions. The latter type of patriotism need not conflict with impartial justice or common human solidarity. It will therefore be judged morally unobjectionable by all except some adherents of a strict type of cosmopolitanism .

However, both Baron and Nathanson fail to distinguish clearly between showing that their preferred type of patriotism is morally unobjectionable and showing that it is morally required or virtuous, and sometimes seem to be assuming that by showing the former, they are also showing the latter. Yet there is a gap between the two claims, and the latter, stronger case for moderate patriotism still needs to be made.

2.2.4 Deflated patriotism

What is the case for the claim that moderate patriotism is morally mandatory – that we have a duty of special concern for the well-being of our country and compatriots, similar to special duties to family or friends?

Gratitude is probably the most popular among the grounds adduced for patriotic duty. Echoing Socrates in Plato’s Crito (51c-51d), Maurizio Viroli writes: “… We have a moral obligation towards our country because we are indebted to it. We owe our country our life, our education, our language, and, in the most fortunate cases, our liberty. If we want to be moral persons, we must return what we have received, at least in part, by serving the common good” (Viroli 1995, 9).

Both Socrates and Viroli are exaggerating the benefits bestowed on us by our country; surely any gratitude owed for being born or brought up is owed to parents, rather than patria . But there are important benefits we have received from our country; the argument is that we are bound to show gratitude for them, and that the appropriate way to do so is to show special concern for the well-being of the country and compatriots.

One worry here is that considerations of gratitude normally arise in interpersonal relations. We also speak of gratitude to large and impersonal entities – our school, profession, or even our country – but that seems to be an abbreviated way of referring to gratitude to particular persons who have acted on behalf of these entities. A debt of gratitude is not incurred by any benefit received. If a benefit is conferred inadvertently, or advisedly but for the wrong reason (e.g. for the sake of the benefactor’s public image), gratitude will be misplaced. We owe a moral debt of gratitude (rather than the mere “thank you” of good manners) only to those who confer benefits on us deliberately and for the right reason, namely out of concern for our own good. And we cannot talk with confidence about the reasons a large and complex group or institution has for its actions.

Perhaps we can think of compatriots as an aggregate of individuals. Do we owe them a debt of gratitude for the benefits of life among them? Again, it depends on the reason for their law-abiding behavior and social cooperation generally. But there is no single reason common to all or even most of them. Some do their part without giving much thought to the reasons for doing so; others believe that doing so is, in the long run, the most prudent policy; still others act out of altruistic motives. Only the last group – surely a tiny minority – would be a proper object of our gratitude.

Moreover, gratitude is appropriate only for a benefit conferred freely, as a gift, and not as a quid pro quo . But most of the benefits we receive from our country are of the latter sort: benefits we have paid for by our own law-abiding behavior in general, and through taxation in particular.

The benefits one has received from her country might be considered relevant to the duty of patriotism in a different way: as raising the issue of fairness . One’s country is not a land inhabited by strangers to whom we owe nothing beyond what we owe to any other human being. It is rather a common enterprise that produces and distributes a wide range of benefits. These benefits are made possible by cooperation of those who live in the country, participate in the enterprise, owe and render allegiance to the polity. The rules that regulate the cooperation and determine the distribution of burdens and benefits enjoin, among other things, special concern for the well-being of compatriots which is not due to outsiders. As Richard Dagger puts it:

Compatriots take priority because we owe it to them as a matter of reciprocity. Everyone, compatriot or not, has a claim to our respect and concern … but those who join with us in cooperative enterprises have a claim to special recognition. Their cooperation enables us to enjoy the benefits of the enterprise, and fairness demands that we reciprocate. … We must accord our fellow citizens a special status, a priority over those who stand outside the special relationship constituted by the political enterprise. […] [Our fellow citizens] have a claim on us … that extends to include the notion that compatriots take priority. (Dagger 1985, 446, 443)

This argument conflates the issue of patriotism with that of political obligation , and the notion of a patriot with that of a citizen. Unlike informal cooperation among tenants in a building, for instance, cooperation on the scale of a country is regulated by a set of laws. To do one’s part within such a cooperative enterprise is just to obey the laws, to act as a citizen. Whether we have a moral duty to obey the laws of our country is one of the central issues in modern political philosophy, discussed under the heading of political obligation. One major account of political obligation is that of fairness. If successful, that account shows that we do have a moral duty to abide by the laws of our country, to act as citizens, and that this duty is one of fairness. To fail to abide by one’s country’s laws is to fail to reciprocate, to take advantage of compatriots, to act unfairly towards them. But whereas a patriot is also a citizen, a citizen is not necessarily a patriot. Patriotism involves special concern for the patria and compatriots, a concern that goes beyond what the laws obligate one to do, beyond what one does as a citizen; that is, beyond what one ought, in fairness , to do. Failing to show that concern, however, cannot be unfair – except on the question-begging assumption that, in addition to state law, cooperation on this scale is also based on, and regulated by, a moral rule enjoining special concern for the well-being of the country and compatriots. Dagger asserts that the claim our compatriots have on us “extends to include” such concern, but provides no argument in support of this extension.

Some philosophers seek to ground patriotic duty in its good consequences (see the entry on consequentialism ). The duty of special concern for the well-being of our country and compatriots, just like other duties, universal and special, is justified by the good consequences of its adoption. Special duties mediate our fundamental, universal duties and make possible their most effective discharge. They establish a division of moral labor, necessary because our capacity of doing good is limited by our resources and circumstances. Each of us can normally be of greater assistance to those who are in some way close to us than to those who are not. By attending first to “our own,” we at the same time promote the good of humanity in the best way possible.

Patriots will find this account of their love of and loyalty to their country alien to what they feel patriotism is all about. It presents the duty of special concern for the well-being of one’s country and compatriots as a device for assigning to individuals some universal duties. Patriotic duty owes its moral force to the moral force of those universal duties. But if so, then, as a proponent of this understanding of patriotism concedes, “it turns out that ‘our fellow countrymen’ are not so very special after all” (Goodin 1988, 679). They merely happen to be the beneficiaries of the most effective way of putting into practice our concern for human beings in general. The special relationship between the patriot and the patria and compatriots – the relationship of love and identification – has been dissolved.

There is also a view of patriotic duty that, in contrast to the consequentialist account, does not dissolve, but rather highlight this relationship. That is the view of patriotism as an associative duty (see the entry on special obligations , section 4). It is based on an understanding of special relationships as intrinsically valuable and involving duties of special concern for the well-being of those we are related to. Such duties are not means of creating or maintaining those relationships, but rather their part and parcel, and can only be understood, and justified, as such, just as those relationships can only be understood as involving the special duties pertaining to them (while involving much else besides). For instance, one who denies that she has an obligation of special concern for the well-being of her friend shows that she no longer perceives and treats the person concerned as a friend, that (as far as she is concerned) the friendship is gone. One who denies that people in general have a duty of special concern for the well-being of their friends shows that she does not understand what friendship is.

Andrew Mason has offered an argument for the duty of special concern for the well-being of compatriots based on the value embodied in our relationship to compatriots, that of common citizenship. By “citizenship” he does not mean mere legal status, but takes the term in a moral sense, which involves equal standing. Citizenship in this sense is an intrinsically valuable relationship, and grounds certain special duties fellow citizens have to one another. Now citizenship obviously has considerable instrumental value; but how is it valuable in itself?

Citizenship has intrinsic value because in virtue of being a citizen a person is a member of a collective body in which they enjoy equal status with its other members and are thereby provided with recognition. This collective body exercises significant control over its members’ conditions of existence (a degree of control which none of its members individually possesses). It offers them the opportunity to contribute to the cultural environment in which its laws and policies are determined, and opportunities to participate directly and indirectly in the formation of these laws and policies. (Mason 1997, 442)

Mason goes on to claim:

Part of what it is to be a citizen is to incur special obligations: these obligations give content to what it is to be committed or loyal fellow citizen and are justified by the good of the wider relationship to which they contribute. In particular, citizens have an obligation to each other to participate fully in public life and an obligation to give priority to the needs of fellow citizens. (442)

The first of these two special duties can be put aside, as it is not specific to patriotism, but rather pertains to citizenship. It is the second that is at issue. If we indeed have a duty of special concern towards compatriots, and if that is an associative duty, that is because our association with them is intrinsically valuable and bound up with this duty. The claim about the intrinsic value of our association might be thought a moot point. But even if it were conceded, one might still resist the claim concerning the alleged duty. If someone were to deny that she has a duty of special concern for the well-being of her country and compatriots, beyond what the laws of her country mandate and beyond the concern she has for humans and humanity, would she thereby cease to be a citizen (in the sense involving equal standing)? If she were to deny that citizens generally have such an obligation, would that betray lack of understanding of what citizenship (in the relevant sense) is? If she came across two strangers in a life-threatening situation and could only save one, would she have a prima facie moral duty to save the one who was a compatriot? Mason’s position commits him to answering “yes” in each case, but all three claims are implausible (Primoratz 2009).

All the main arguments for the claim that patriotism is a duty, then, are exposed to serious objections. Unless a new, more convincing case for patriotism can be made, we have no good reason to think that patriotism is a moral duty.

If not a duty, is patriotism morally valuable? Someone showing concern for the well-being of others well beyond the degree of concern for others required of all of us is considered a morally better person than the rest of us (other things equal), an example of supererogatory virtue. Patriotism is a special concern for the well-being of one’s country and compatriots, a concern beyond what we owe other people and communities. Isn’t a patriot, then, a morally better person than the rest of us (other things equal)? Isn’t patriotism a supererogatory virtue?

One standard example of such virtue is the type of concern for those in an extreme plight shown by the late Mother Theresa, or by Doctors Without Borders. But they are exemplars of moral virtue for the same reason that makes a more modest degree of concern for others a moral duty falling on all of us. The same moral value, sympathy for and assistance to people in need, grounds a certain degree of concern for others as a general moral duty and explains why a significantly higher degree of such concern is a moral ideal. This explanation, however, does not apply in the case of patriotism. Patriotism is not but another extension of the duty of concern for others; it is a special concern for my country because it is my country, for my compatriots because they are my compatriots. Unlike Mother Theresa and Doctors Without Borders, whose concern is for all destitute, sick, dying persons they can reach, the concern of the patriot is by definition selective; and the selection is performed by the word “my.” But the word “my” cannot, by itself, play the critical role in an argument showing that a certain stance is morally valuable. If it could, other types of partialism, such as tribalism, racism, or sexism, would by the same token prove morally valuable too.

If patriotism is neither a moral duty nor a supererogatory virtue, then all its moral pretensions have been deflated. It has no positive moral significance. There is nothing to be said for it, morally speaking. We all have various preferences for places and people, tend to identify with many groups, large and small, to think of them as in some sense ours, and to show a degree of special concern for their members. But however important in other respects these preferences, identifications, and concerns might be, they lack positive moral import. They are morally permissible as long as they are kept within certain limits, but morally indifferent in themselves. The same is true of patriotism (Primoratz 2002).

2.2.5 Ethical patriotism

All four types of patriotism reviewed so far seek to defend and promote what might be termed the worldly, i.e. non-moral, interests of the patria : its political stability, military power, riches, influence in the international arena, and cultural vibrancy. They differ with regard to the lengths to which these interests will be promoted: adherents of extreme and robust patriotism will ultimately go to any length, whereas those whose patriotism is moderate or deflated will respect the limits universal moral considerations set to this pursuit. Marcia Baron also calls for expanding patriotic concern for the flourishing of one’s country to include its “moral flourishing” (see 2.2.3 above).

Thus Baron’s position is half-way between the usual, worldly kind of patriotism, and what might be described as its distinctively ethical type. The latter would put aside the country’s well-being in a mundane, non-moral sense, and would focus instead on its distinctively moral well-being, its moral identity and integrity. A patriot of this sort would not express his love for the patria by seeking to husband the country’s resources and preserve its natural beauty and its historical heritage, or make it rich, powerful, culturally preeminent, or influential on the world scene. Instead, he would seek to make sure that the country lives up to moral requirements and promotes moral values, both at home and internationally. He would work for a just and humane society at home, and seek to ensure that the country acts justly beyond its borders, and shows common human solidarity towards those in need, however distant and unfamiliar. He would also be concerned with the country’s past moral record and its implications for the present. He would support projects exploring the dark chapters of the country’s history, acknowledging the wrongs perpetrated in the past and responding to them in appropriate ways, whether by offering apologies or making amends, and by making sure such wrongs are not perpetrated again.

A patriot of this, distinctively ethical type, would want to see justice done, rights respected, human solidarity at work at any time and in any place. But her patriotism would be at work in a concern that her country be guided by these moral principles and values which is more sustained and more deeply felt than her concern that these principles and values should be put into practice generally. She would consider her own moral identity as bound up with that of her country, and the moral record of the patria as hers too. Unlike a patriot of the more worldly type, she might not feel great pride in her country’s worldly merits and achievements. She would be proud of the country’s moral record, when it inspires pride. But her patriotism would be expressed, above all, in a critical approach to her country and compatriots: she would feel entitled, and indeed called, to submit them to critical moral scrutiny, and to do so qua patriot.

While we have no moral reason to be patriots of the more usual, mundane kind, we do have reason to show special concern for our own country’s moral well-being. As a rule, when someone is wronged, someone else benefits from that. When a country maintains an unjust or inhumane practice, or enacts and enforces an unjust or inhumane law or policy, at least some, and sometimes many of its citizens reap benefits from it. Sometimes such a practice, legislation or policy affects people beyond the country’s borders; in such cases, the population as a whole may benefit. The responsibility for the injustice or lack of basic human solidarity lies with those who make the decisions and those who implement them. It also lies with those who give support to such decisions and their implementation. But some responsibility in this connection may also devolve on those who have no part in the making of the decisions or in their implementation, nor even provide support, but accept the benefits such a practice, law or policy generates.

A degree of complicity may also accrue to those who have no part in designing or putting into effect immoral practices, laws or policies, do not support them or benefit from them, but do benefit in various ways from being citizens of the country. One may derive significant psychological benefit from membership in and identification with a society or polity: from the sense of belonging, support and security such membership and identification afford. If one accepts such benefits, while knowing about the immoral practices, laws or policies at issue, or having no excuse for not knowing about them, that, too, may be seen as implicating him in those wrongs. To be sure, he makes no causal contribution to those wrongdoings, has no control over their course, and does not accept benefits from them. But in accepting benefits from his association with the wrongdoers, he may be seen as underwriting those wrongs and joining the class of those properly blamed. His complicity is lesser and the blame to be laid at his door is lesser too – but he still bears some moral responsibility and deserves some moral blame on that account. He cannot say in good faith: “Those wrongs have nothing to do with me. I am in no way implicated in them.”

If this is correct, we have reason to develop and exercise a special concern for the moral identity and integrity of our country. By doing so, we will be attending to an important aspect of our own moral identity and integrity. While patriotism of the more usual, worldly kind is neither morally required nor virtuous, but at best morally permitted, ethical patriotism can, under certain fairly common circumstances, be a moral duty (Primoratz 2006).

While moral philosophers debate the standing of patriotism as an instance of the problem of reconciling universal moral considerations with particular attachments and loyalties, political theorists are primarily interested in patriotism as an ethos of the well-ordered polity and an antidote to nationalism. Since the rise of the nation-state, it has been widely held that some form of nationalism is indispensable as a pre-political basis of the unity of the state that makes for solidarity among citizens and provides them with motivation to participate in public life and make sacrifices for the common good. As Roger Scruton put it, “for a liberal state to be secure, the citizens must understand the national interest as something other than the interest of the state . Only the first can evoke in them the sacrificial spirit upon which the second depends” (Scruton 1990, 319). But in the course of the 20 th century nationalism was deeply compromised. That has led political theorists to look for alternatives. Some have argued that an emphatically political patriotism could perform the unifying function of nationalism while avoiding its perils. This “new patriotism” puts aside, or at least de-emphasizes, pre-political ties such as common ancestry, language, or culture, and enjoins love of, and loyalty to, one’s political community, its laws and institutions, and the rights and liberties they make possible.

In view of the disastrous record of national socialism, it is not surprising that German thinkers in particular should be suspicious of patriotism as long as it has not been dissociated from nationalism. As early as 1959, political theorist Dolf Sternberger called for a new understanding of the concept of fatherland. “The fatherland is the ‘republic,’ which we create for ourselves. The fatherland is the constitution, to which we give life. The fatherland is the freedom which we truly enjoy only when we ourselves promote it, make use of it, and stand guard over it” (Sternberger 1990, 12). In 1979, on the 30 th anniversary of the Federal Republic, he coined the term “constitutional patriotism” ( Verfassungspatriotismus ) to describe the loyalty to the patria understood in these terms (13–16). The term was later adopted by Jürgen Habermas in the context of a case for overcoming pre-political, i.e. national and cultural, loyalties in public life, and supplanting them with a new, postnational, purely political identity embodied in the laws and institutions of a free and democratic state. Habermas argues that this identity, expressed in and reinforced by constitutional patriotism, can provide a solid foundation for such a state, given the ethnic and cultural heterogeneity characteristic of most countries in western Europe. It can also facilitate further European integration, and provide an antidote to the “chauvinism of affluence” tempting these countries (Habermas 1990).

Constitutional patriotism is the most widely discussed, but not the sole variety of “new patriotism.” Another is “covenanted patriotism” advocated by John H. Schaar as appropriate for countries whose population is much too ethnically and culturally heterogeneous to allow for “natural patriotism.” Schaar’s paradigmatic example is the United States, whose citizens “were bonded together not by blood or religion, not by tradition or territory, not by the walls and traditions of a city, but by a political idea … by a covenant, by dedication to a set of principles and by an exchange of promises to uphold and advance certain commitments” (Schaar 1981, 291). Still another variety is the “patriotism of liberty” propounded by Maurizio Viroli, who calls for a return to what patriotism used to be before it was harnessed in the service of the nation-state and submerged in nationalism: love of the laws and institutions of one’s polity and the common liberty they make possible (Viroli 1995).

This new, emphatically political version of patriotism has been met with both sympathy and skepticism. Those sympathetic to it have been discussing the prospects of a European constitutional patriotism (see Müller 2007, 93–139). Skeptics have argued that patriotism disconnected from all pre-political attachments and identities can generate only much too thin a sense of identity and much too weak a motivation for political participation – that, thus understood, “patriotism is not enough” (Canovan 2000).

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

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communitarianism | consequentialism | cosmopolitanism | egoism | impartiality | loyalty | nationalism | obligations: special | political obligation | responsibility: collective

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Simon Keller, Stephen Nathanson, and Thomas Pogge for helpful comments on a draft of this article.

Copyright © 2020 by Igor Primoratz < igorprim @ gmail . com >

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The paradox of black patriotism: double consciousness

This study explores the double consciousness of black American patriotism in the modern era marked by publicized police killings of blacks, widespread antiracism protests, and concern for racially motivated violence. This analysis provides timely ethnographic insights into black identities that vividly captures black voices; fuses classical and contemporary race theories and extends them into the literature on patriotism; and proposes a model for understanding how double consciousness is negotiated in personal identity construction. I conducted twenty-two in-depth interviews of black Americans. I explored three questions: (1) how they interpret patriotism; (2) whether their interpretations affirm or defy their black identity; and (3) how tensions between race and nation manifest in their patriotic identity development. Many denounced hegemonic patriotism and constructed alternative patriotic brands. These brands are situated on an “Axis of Identities”, which is comprised of four profiles: the bystander, the sycophant, the subverter, and the conscious patriot.

Introduction

On 4 July 2016, America celebrated Independence Day, a national holiday featuring patriotic symbols and rituals that valorize the history, traditions, and ideals of the nation. Shortly after midnight, with fireworks bursting throughout the country, Alton Sterling, a thirty-seven-year-old black man, was forcefully tackled to the ground and shot multiple times at point-blank range by two white police officers in Baton Rouge, Louisiana ( Berlinger, Valencia, and Almasy 2016 ; Fausset, Pérez-Peña, and Robertson 2016 ). He died wearing a patriotic red polo shirt. Less than forty-eight hours later, on 6 July 2016, Philando Castile, a thirty-two-year-old black man, was fatally shot multiple times in front of his fiancé and four-year-old daughter by a Hispanic police officer in Minnesota ( Domonoske and Chappell 2016 ). Both men were allegedly killed for circumstances involving the possession of a firearm in states where citizens have the right to carry concealed firearms ( Domonoske and Chappell 2016 ). The videos of their deaths were publicized, drawing international attention, and triggering widespread protests.

On 7 July 2016, at the close of a peaceful protest against the killings of Sterling and Castile, Micah Xavier Johnson shot twelve police officers and two civilians, killing five of the officers in Dallas, Texas. Johnson was an Army Reserve Afghan War veteran who was reportedly incensed over the recent police shootings of black men ( Karimi, Shoichet, and Ellis 2016 ). According to sources, the shooting was the deadliest incident for U.S. law enforcement since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Given that a black war veteran, an icon of patriotism, would target and kill white police officers, another patriotic figure, as an alleged act of retaliation against racism exposes the potential tensions and nuances between allegiance to race and allegiance to nation.

The preponderance of race scholarship diagnoses contemporary American society as one marked by systemic racism, which is encrypted in the mainstream framing of citizenship and patriotism ( Collins 2001 ; Feagin 2013 ; Omi and Winant 1994 ). Du Bois (1903) proposed that blacks internalize racism in their identity development, experiencing a double consciousness: one soul striving to be American, one soul striving to be black. This study ethnographically explores the paradoxes of black patriotism – loyalties, service, and other American patriotic sentiments expressed by blacks and/or African Americans – in the present era of publicized police killings of black Americans, and how this double consciousness is negotiated in identity construction. I find that the double consciousness is negotiated on an Axis of Identities , which defines a typology of patriotic profiles.

The era of protest on police killings

The deaths of Sterling and Castile, as well as several subsequent publicized police killings – including Alfred Olango in El Cajon, California; Keith Lamont in Charlotte, NC; Terence Crutcher in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and others – deeply affected American society. The year 2016 was marked by: publicized acts of police violence, commonly against black Americans; widespread domestic and international antiracism collective actions and protests ( Tharoor 2016 ), many under the “Black Lives Matter” banner (BLM); a controversial Super Bowl 50 Halftime Show that was widely interpreted as a nod to the BLM movement and the Black Panther Movement of the 1960s ( Zaru 2016 ); the Summer Olympic Games, in which black athletes achieved record-breaking success, some in predominantly white sports ( Workneh 2016 ); the infamous national anthem protest by San Francisco 49ners quarterback, Collin Kaepernick, who declared, “I am not going to stand up to show pride in a flag for a country that oppresses black people and people of color” ( Hauser 2016 ); and a racially polarized election season in which the republican candidate struggled with unprecedented low support from black Americans ( Bump 2016 ), while democrats adopted a political strategy that simultaneously embraced both the BLM movement ( Bradner and Scott 2016 ) as well as patriotic expressions traditionally associated with conservatives ( Hohmann 2016 ). This period contextualizes the tensions between allegiance to race and allegiance to nation among black Americans.

America’s legacy of anti-black racism persists and is evident in the modern framing of American identity. The interdependency between racial and national identity construction is well documented ( Collins 2001 ; Du Bois 1903 ; Feagin 2013 ; Omi and Winant 1994 ). According to Collins (2001) , intersecting social hierarchies of race and ethnicity foster racialized perspectives of American national identity which assign African Americans an inferior status with inauthentic, temporary, or partial membership. Feagin (2013) refers to this as the White Racial Frame (WRF), a mechanism of cultural hegemony that vindicates and maintains the racial order. According to Du Boisian double consciousness (Du Bois 1903 ), blacks suffer psychological conflict when they internalize the dominant frame, which impacts their identity development.

American patriotism

Patriotism typically describes an attachment to America as a homeland, a commitment to American values, or a sense of pride in the journey, progress, and/or ideals of the nation. Since the early 1980s, national pride has been in decline among American men and women of all races, yet Americans are still considered highly patriotic ( Sorek and White 2016 ). According to a 2015 Gallup Poll, eighty-one per cent of Americans reported being either “extremely proud” or “very proud” to be an American ( Swift 2015 ). Though commonly measured by national pride, the definitions of patriotism vary by language and context (for distinctions between patriotism and nationalism, see de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003 ). Patriotic sentiments are typically heightened among older Americans, southerners ( Swift 2015 ), and members of socially dominant groups ( Ishio 2010 ). Sorek and White (2016) examined historical trends in national pride and found that patriotism has been consistently lower for blacks than whites for over 30 years.

The prevailing conception of patriotism, that I call hegemonic patriotism, is drenched in whiteness and hegemonic masculinity ( Ferber 1998 ; Gerstle 2001 ; Wingfield and Feagin 2010 ). It casts whites as exclusively the true Americans, responsible for all of the nation’s greatness and none of its failures. These meanings imply that blacks are abnormal, illegitimate, uncivilized, and un-American (Du Bois 1903 ; Gerstle 2001 ). For example, the Birther Movement, which catapulted Donald Trump’s political career, served to delegitimize and degrade President Barack Obama by alleging that he was not a natural-born U.S. citizen nor a real American, but rather an un-American, un-patriotic, Islamic African ( Wingfield and Feagin 2010 ). Hegemonic patriotism expunges black contributions and signals that blacks are outsiders, parasitic companions, merely by-catch in the nets of European conquest (For illustrations, see Bonilla-Silva 2001 ; Collins 2001 ; Feagin 2013 ; Wingfield and Feagin 2012 ).

Exclusion from this symbolic citizenship is not benign. Patriotic identities can be a source of psychological and social capital, with consequences for the individual and collective: efficacy, civic engagement, grassroots political mobilization, challenges to oppressive systems, and/or the re-traumatization of witnessing perceived racially motivated police killings ( Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999 ). This frame is protected by an embedded ideology of colour-blindness and meritocracy in which blacks and minorities make exaggerated or false claims of racism and oppression ( Wingfield and Feagin 2012 ). The pre-judiced and meritocratic notions that are encoded in mainstream patriotism essentially oppose a black identity.

Double consciousness

Du Bois (1903) proposed that blacks continually perceive themselves through the lens of the dominant society, creating an internal psychological conflict that he called double consciousness. “Is it my duty to cease to be a Negro as soon as possible and be an American?” he asked (Du Bois 1897 , 22). As blacks internalize the WRF, they experience self-inquiry, multiple identities, internal conflict, and constant negotiations ( Collins 2001 ; Du Bois 1903 ; Feagin 2013 ). The American identity – a soul that yearns for the fulfillment of full social inclusion and is attached to American history, values, and spaces – contradicts the black identity – a soul that is the victim of Americanism, systemic racism, and hegemonic patriotism (Du Bois 1903 ). The manner in which they negotiate this identity dilemma is manifested in their interpretations, expressions, and brands of patriotism.

Despite the pervasiveness of the dominant frame, blacks traditionally construct counter frames (see Devos and Banaji 2005 ; Feagin 2013 ), including alternative brands of patriotism that influence social action ( Hoyt and Goldin 2016 ; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999 ). For example, James Baldwin described a brand of patriotism that allowed affection and critique to coexist. Baldwin said, “I love America more than any other country in this world, and, exactly for this reason, I insist on the right to criticize her perpetually” ( Baldwin 1984 ). Further, Du Bois himself described a brand of patriotism in which protest is patriotic and benefits all “true Americans”. He said:

The battle we wage is not for ourselves alone but for all true Americans. It is a fight for ideals, lest this, our common fatherland, false to its founding, become in truth, the land of the thief and the home of the slave, a byword and a hissing among the nations for its sounding pretensions and pitiful accomplishments. ( Du Bois 1906 )

The current study

The current study ethnographically explores how conflict between two seemingly irreconcilable allegiances, one to race and one to nation, are negotiated in black American identity development. I suspect that individuals may abandon one identity to embrace the other, remain in a state of contradiction, or construct an identity that allows the two souls to harmonize. To appease the double consciousness, individuals may lean away from or abandon one identity for the perceived social benefits of the opposing identity. Some individuals may remain in a state of identity contradiction where they compartmentalize their life, emphasizing, and/or deemphasizing different identities in different contexts. Identity contradiction may produce anxiety, antipathy, and/or apathy towards both nation and race discourse. Lastly, individuals and communities could also achieve identity harmonization. Through embracing counter frames, they may mitigate the internal conflict.

Research on American patriotism is lacking, and black patriotism has been particularly neglected. The current literature is moving towards understanding diverse brands of patriotism ( Ishio 2010 ; McClay 2003 ; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999 ; Shaw 2004 ) and illuminating the social and ideological foundation of patriotic forms and expressions ( de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003 ; Hoyt and Goldin 2016 ; Huddy and Khatib 2007 ). But there has not yet been a mechanism proposed by which patriotic identities are constructed. This study makes three critical contributions: (1) it provides foundational ethnographic insight into timely questions of black citizenship in the critical contemporary moment that vividly captures their experiences; (2) fuses classical and contemporary race theories and extends them into the literature on patriotism; and (3) proposes a model for understanding patriotic identity construction and a typology of patriotic identities.

For over two years, I engaged in multiple site fieldwork to inductively explore patriotism among black Americans. To capture a broader variety of perspectives, I collected data from varied community meetings, collective actions, and university events at multiple locations in the southeast. I served a hybrid role: as group member and outsider. I implicitly presented myself as an ordinary participating group member (usually a community member or student), and secondarily, as student researcher. Participants typically assumed that I was an ordinary member of their particular group. For example, some Muslims greeted “As-salamu alaykum” and I replied, “Wa alaykumu as-salam, brother”. Some youth greeted me, “what’s good bruh”, to which, I replied, “nothin’ much, fam”.

Multiple informants assisted in accessing these spaces and groups; I recruited informants from social networks and from the field. Attempting to achieve a diverse sample, I employed purposive sampling techniques. I set a general quota to recruit a least one participant from five groups: law enforcement, university students, Black Nationalist community, activist community, and the underclass community. I continually amended the criteria to recruit underrepresented groups. The resulting sample comprised of twenty-two black Americans: fifteen were males and seven were females. Their ages ranged from eighteen to fifty-six, with a mean age of thirty-two. Their occupations varied, but ten of them either served in the military or in law enforcement (see Table 1 ).

Description of the sample.

Notes: N = 22, 7 females and 15 males. CP: conscious patriot ( n = 15); SUB: subverter ( n = 3); BYS: bystander ( n = 2); and SYC: sycophant ( n = 2).

I employed content analysis, participatory observational research, questionnaires, and in-depth interviews to collect data. I recorded data using field notes, survey software, and audiovisual equipment. I watched twenty lectures and debates from leaders in the black community as well as coverage of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. I also examined various online groups including “Black Patriots & Supporters of the National Tea Party Movement” and “The Nation of Islam”. I engaged in participatory observational research at five Police Community Dialogue events at a major university in the southeast, two BLM rallies in the southeast, two police training sessions, two federal law enforcement graduation ceremonies, a large black nationalist rally in Detroit, Michigan, and the twentieth Anniversary of the Million Man March entitled Justice or Else, in Washington, D.C.

Once I recruited participants from the field, I obtained their consent and then administered fifteen-minute anonymous online surveys. In addition to demographic and socioeconomic information, the surveys asked twenty-four questions about patriotism, racism, and social inequalities. Participants completed these surveys on laptops and smart devices. Then, I conducted 60–120-minute semi-structured interviews. The core questions included: “What does patriotism mean?” “What does patriotism mean to you, personally?” “Describe the moment in your life when you were proudest of your country or felt deep national pride?” “Describe the moment in your life when you were proudest of your race or felt deep racial pride?” All data, including field notes and interview transcriptions, were examined using selective thematic coding techniques. Four main themes were identified: “inequality and/or struggle”, “meritocracy and/or colourblindness”, “attachment and/or pride”, and “detachment and/or animosity”.

I strengthened internal validity through triangulation, crosschecking the interview data against the field notes and other data sources. In addition, three participants were randomly selected to conduct respondent validation. They reviewed the codes, patterns, and interpretations and provided feedback on authenticity, particularly assessing the interpretive validity of the results. Generalizability was inherently limited by the design and sample size. While these data are not generalizable to the broader black population in the U.S., the sampling techniques aimed to capture a wide range of black American experiences.

Findings and discussion

To understand black American patriotism, I investigated the participants’ interpretations of patriotism, whether these meanings contradicted the meanings of blackness, and how potential contradictions were negotiated in their identity development. Policing and protesting was a key topic of conversation throughout my investigations. Interpretation of police conduct was intricately related to patriotic identities. Renee, a thirty-year-old female sailor, said, “the police shootings only highlight already known issues. It is extremely difficult for an African American to maintain patriotism in this country knowing what we deal with on a daily basis”.

Nineteen participants perceived two forms of patriotism: mainstream patriotism and their personal brand of patriotism. There were strong tensions between race and nation that manifested in opposing patriotic identities. Eighteen respondents described the black community as a “nation within a nation”, with many experiences, perspectives, and customs that contradict the broader society. Twenty respondents defined blackness as ancestry, social heritage, and lived experiences rooted in racial struggle and oppression, which directly conflicts with the post-racial and meritocratic ideologies that permeate mainstream America. These conflicts were evident in (1) their definitions of blackness that contradicted the WRF; (2) the naturalization and exile policies of the symbolic black nation that were largely predicated upon sub-stantiations of black oppression; and (3) the use of oppositional pronouns among those who identified as patriotic. Thirteen participants denounced patriotism (see Table 1 ), yet, ironically, nineteen conveyed sentiments that embodied the ideals of patriotism and constructed alternative patriotic identities. An individual’s position on two intersecting philosophical spectrums that I call the “Axis of Identities” determined an individual’s brand of patriotism as one of the following: the bystander, the sycophant, the subverter, or the conscious patriot.

The findings are organized into three subsections. In the first subsection, A Nation within A Nation , I discuss the meanings of blackness and conditions of symbolic dual citizenship. Then, in the second subsection, Hegemonic Patriotism , I describe how the participants perceived the mainstream brand of patriotism. In the third subsection, Axis of Identities , I present mechanisms by which blacks mitigate the double consciousness in their identity development and the brands of patriotism they construct.

A nation within a nation: Dion, Shawn and Lionel

Defining blackness.

Understanding how blacks define and experience blackness is essential for understanding double consciousness. The black community, or nation, refers to a symbolic collectivity that encompassed a variety of groups including the Black Nationalist community, Afrocentric community, black religious organizations, the black conscious community, and other imagined communities associated with blackness or African ancestry. I asked, “what does it mean to be black” and “how do you define blackness?” For the respondents, blackness was obvious, but many grappled with explicitly defining it. Many suggested that blackness could not be explained but rather one had to possess, feel, or experience it to understand. Blackness was a metaphorical phenomenon. It was deeply rooted in visible skin colour, but not exclusively. As Du Bois proposed, blackness referred to a social heritage. In defining their blackness, many individuals referenced African enslavement and personal experiences with black oppression. Dion, a twenty-eight-year-old black male said:

For a sec, I had nothing, really, to be honest. But if I could try to explain it I would say blackness to me is mostly an experience. Based off the history of this country and the world entirely, my skin color or being black has created many experiences that create a subculture separate from those who are not black. Oppression doesn’t entirely separate the two [races] but that’s huge portion.

Dual citizenship

The overwhelming majority of the participants described belonging to two, often opposing nations: the American nation and the black nation. Corroborating Du Bois (1903) , the participants felt accountable to two communities. Most of them aimed to assimilate into mainstream America, yet maintain a degree of authenticity among blacks. The connection between blackness and struggle was so strong that invalidating black oppression could mean exile while possessing empathy for black oppression and cohabitating in black spaces could grant non-blacks social capital that acts as a credibility passport to navigate the black “nation”.

Black respondents in the study reported lower levels of solidarity with co-racials who were perceived to be detached from black culture, black identity, and oppression in pursuit of white acceptance. While code switching was permitted, blacks that are alleged to have fully and permanently abandoned their blackness to assuage whites, inhabit white spaces, and/or enjoy upward mobility could completely lose credibility with the community indefinitely. Participants branded such abandoners as “coon”, “green”, “uncle Tom”, and “house nigga”.

While observing a mentor meeting between black males in the southeast, I met Aton, a twenty-eight-year-old black male. He explained,

a coon describes a black person who sold themself out for another culture. Their entire identity and personification does not represent the group they were born into. Some Coons do not identify as black. They work against the body of their race.

Shawn, a thirty-five-year-old black male, explained:

We live in a nation within a nation. Choosing the recognition of the American side in favor of any other [is what we call] Shambos or Coons. The Uncle Tom title use to work but now it does not apply. Uncle Ruckus does though, or ya boy from Django [the house slave, Stephen]. They have many names for those dudes.

These social controls served to ensure that blacks “know what time it is” and “don’t forget where you come from”, in fear that blacks will succumb to the treasures of mainstream America and aid in divesting the black community for personal gain, or even internalize anti-black racism. Aton explained, “A coon [black] cop will shoot a brother [black man] faster than a white boy.” He described this internal conflict as the “I versus the We”. The “I” was the desire for acceptance by whites and upward social mobility. The “We” was the attachment to black identity, history, and oppression. He explained,

If you are only worried about the “I”, then be a coon, it will work for you. But if at some level, you are concerned with the “We”, it hard to be a coon because it will hurt you or bring some sort of consequence to the I.

In certain contexts, I observed non-blacks that relished honorary membership; some even had more credibility within the community than certain blacks. These whites were referred to as “light skin brothers” or “John Brown types”. Aton explained,

These are not white folks who act black or even want to be accepted by blacks. We need less acting black and more empathy from whites. White people don’t even fuck with some lower class white people, so we like come join the club dog, they don’t fuck with us either.

This naturalization policy emphasizes oppression as a fundamental condition of membership, which conflicts with a meritocratic ideology.

Hegemonic patriotism: Donnie, Trent, and Lionel

Despite the pervasiveness of the WRF, there were clear deviations from the mainstream patriotic meanings and expressions. This divide was more than mere differences in interpretations, but rather a profound clash of two allegiances. I asked participants, “what is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word ‘patriotism’?” The participants linked patriotism to attachment, duty, pride, and national symbols (American flag, national anthem, etc.). These findings align with results from national studies ( Ishio 2010 ; Sorek and White 2016 ).

As Wingfield and Feagin (2010) posited, most blacks connected the mainstream personifications of patriotism to whiteness and masculinity. I asked, “What is patriotism? Are you patriotic?” Respondents typically conveyed distance from patriotism. Some used terms such as “ridiculous” and “asinine”, and related patriotism to political ideology, gender, race, and racism. Though five conveyed positive emotions, such as “grateful” and “love”, fifteen had negative reactions and thirteen respondents described patriotism using terms such as “conservative”, “white men”, and “white supremacy”. Those who used possessive pronouns or expressed positive or neutral views on patriotism, typically used oppositional conjunction terms such as “but” or “however” to acknowledge or validate realities that contrasted conventional perspectives. I spent two days with Lionel, a twenty-eight-year-old, black male cyber security expert and veteran of the U.S. Coast Guard. He explained, “Yes, I am patriotic. I love this country but at times it’s hard to see this country loving me back.”

Thirteen respondents did not identify as patriotic, which aligns with the national data ( Ishio 2010 ; Sorek and White 2016 ). Donnie, a thirty-two-year-old, black male federal law enforcement officer, lamented, “patriotism is white men being proud of their country. I’m not patriotic because I don’t really embrace the cultural values of America. I salute the flag but I’m not proud of our history”. Shawn put it more plainly, he said, “A patriotic black man loves America and sides with the officer. A black man cannot be patriotic because police are known for routine senseless killings of black people.”

Trent, a fifty-one-year-old Pharma-marketing representative, explained, “patriotism refers to the people that think they are superior or better than other inhabitants of the planet”. Trent and his wife are members of the Nation of Islam. I first interviewed him at the twentieth Anniversary of the Million Man March. Months later, we met up in his hometown, Lafayette, LA. I interviewed and observed him and his wife over the course of three days. For Trent, there was a fundamental contradiction between mainstream patriotism and his version of patriotism. He explained,

Patriotism is a false sense of identity to something that is not real. A denigration of other cultures, ideas, and customs. A right to harm others because they are considered lesser. Patriotism means egotism, denial of all others. No I am not based on America’s version of it. I value all original peoples of this earth. I am not better than them. I want to be my brother’s keeper and live in peace.

Ironically, though thirteen participants did not identify as patriotic, nineteen people possessed a profound attachment to their homeland and conveyed patriotic sentiments. As discussed in the subsequent subsections, many blacks articulated aspirations to contribute to American society, safeguard the constitution, and illuminate the brilliance of black Americans. Many even served in occupations that are trademarks of American patriotism. For instance, six were police officers, three served in the military, two had military families, and two worked at the white house. To negotiate conflict between their allegiance to America and allegiance to the community, blacks embraced diverse identities, some of which countered mainstream narratives.

Axis of identities

To resolve the fundamental contradiction between mainstream American identity and black identity, blacks construct diverse patriotic identities that may conquer, contradict, or comply with their blackness. The type of patriotism that they embraced was contingent upon their location on two intersecting ideological spectrums: one measuring attachment – to American history, progress, values, etc. – and another measuring awareness of racial inequalities – and/or attachment to the black experience.

Intersecting spectrums

Attach/detachment spectrum..

An individual’s level of attachment to America naturally shaped their patriotic perceptions and expressions. On one end of the spectrum were those who felt completely attached to America, which was often expressed as loyalty, pride in progress, and/or faith in America’s ability to advance. On the other end of the spectrum were those who felt completely detached, which manifested as expressions of numbness, rejection of patriotic sentiments, or a connection to another homeland. Ethnic and cultural backgrounds, family philosophies, and personal experiences typically influenced an individual’s positioning on the attached/detached spectrum.

Inequality/meritocracy spectrum.

Social philosophies shape an individual’s patriotic perceptions and expressions. Individual philosophies ranged from a belief that America is characterized by historical and systemic inequality, to a belief that America operates on a system of equality and meritocracy. Individuals closer to the social inequalities pole prioritized critique, while individuals on the meritocracy pole prioritized assimilation. Knowledge, experiences, and/or personal philosophy generally influenced an individual’s positioning on the inequality/meritocracy spectrum. These two spectrums intersect, creating four quadrants, categorizing distinct profiles in which individuals negotiate and attempt to resolve the double consciousness. I refer to these four quadrants, or profiles, as the bystander, the sycophant, the subverter, and the conscious patriot (see Figure 1 ). Circumstantial shifts, such as aging, new experiences, ideological changes, and upward social mobility may cause individuals to consciously or unconsciously shift from one quadrant to another. These shifts may occur instantaneously or over the course of several decades.

Axis of identities. Location on these intersecting philosophical spectrums determined the participants’ patriotic profile.

The bystander: Camille and Willie

I observed individuals that were disconnected from America and refrained from any patriotic sentiments, yet adopted a meritocratic view of society. These individuals usually express little affection towards the United States and are personally detached from U.S. history, values, and ideology. They either reject the notion of patriotism altogether, or are attached to another nation. I refer to this profile as the bystander. These individuals, though refraining from reinforcing mainstream patriotic expressions, tend to dismiss or diminish accusations of social inequalities. The bystanders often perceive individual interpersonal experiences with systems of oppression as mere stressful life events. I met Camille, a twenty-one-year-old black female student, while travelling to attend the twentieth Anniversary of the Million Man March. She worked as a Clerk at a convenience store along the route to Capitol Hill. Camille was not aware of the event or that hundreds of thousands of black Americans had entered the city to attend the event. She expressed a detachment from the black community, internalizing the racist framing of blacks. Camille said,

I like parties, don’t get me wrong. I just don’t enjoy being around African Americans. So it’s not a matter of me loving whites, blacks, reds or yellow. Its me loving whoever deserves my love, respecting whoever deserves my respect independently of his race.

Camille conveyed the hegemonic racial framing of blacks and professed the colourblind ideology. Further, she also expressed a detachment from America. “I would definitely say that I am not patriotic at all. I definitely think that it is a country where everybody can make it, not because I love this country but because of the opportunities.” Camille represents the bystander Profile: those who lack a sense of attachment to America, are detached from blackness, and yet echo a colourblind, meritocratic framing of society.

I met Willie, an eighteen-year-old male student, at a major university in the southeast while attending a Police Community Dialogue – events initiated by police intended to foster positive relationships with community members. Willie first discussed patriotism in saying, “patriotism means pride for the American country. I wouldn’t say I’m patriotic because I wouldn’t sacrifice my life for this country”. Willie further explained that he was “uncertain of institutional and interpersonal discrimination”. He harshly criticized the BLM movement, and stated, “it is stupid to be afraid of police and people should just follow orders”. Bystanders are typically detached from race and nation, yet may perceive that America is post-racial, meritocratic, and exceptional.

The sycophant: Patrice and Dennis

The sycophant engages in obedient flattery, prioritizing assimilation. Sycophants are deeply connected to America and adopt a meritocratic perception of America. Blacks that fall into this category, who according to Du Bois engage in “tasteless sycophancy”, often distort or suppress their own realities to align with mainstream narratives. Sycophants downplay social inequalities and recite mainstream expressions of American exceptionalism and minority deficiency. Some alleged that Raven-Symoné Pearman and Dr. Ben Carson mimic this behaviour, denouncing black oppression for mainstream appeal and personal gain. At a law enforcement community outreach event, I met Patrice, a forty-year-old, black female police officer. Throughout the several hours that I observed and conversed with her, she expressed a mainstream framing of society and echoed American exceptionalism. She said, I am “uncertain” if minorities experience interpersonal or institutional racism and discrimination, but “I am blessed to be living in America who fought for our freedoms. Our country has come a long way.” While attending a Police Community Dialogue at a major university in the southeast, I also met Dennis, a fifty-four-year-old black male law enforcement officer. Dennis expressed “love for the U.S.” and “love for America”. Dennis suggested that minorities are arrested more because they commit more crimes and disagreed that minorities are victims of institutional and interpersonal discrimination. He disagreed with the notion that “police officers needed more training on gender and race issues”. Whether conscious or unconscious, sycophants prioritize assimilation and acceptance by mainstream America. These individuals employ a mainstream racial framing of themselves and the world around them.

The subverter: Bridget and Spence

A third profile describes those who are detached from America, yet aware and connected to social inequalities, particularly injustices concerning the black community. These individuals are typically attached to an alternative homeland, such as Africa, Caribbean countries, or a metaphorical nation. This profile, which I refer to as the subverter, typically advocates for radical change in American society. They may embrace a wide range of philosophies, communities, and movements, such as Black Liberation Theology, BLM, black power, Black Nationalism, the Nation of Islam (NOI), the conscious community, and others. Minister Luis Farrakhan, the leader of the NOI, embodies the subverter profile.

For the subverter, any American patriotic identity is a paradox. As Du Bois predicted, some factions expressed “hatred of the pale world about them and mocking distrust of everything white” ( Du Bois 1903 ). Some countered white supremacy by adopting a black supremacist ideology. Their activities range from passive activism such as social media commentary, to fulltime active participation in protests and social action organizations. The subverter may reject and/or critique any concept or cultural item coopted, adopted, or created by white America. Like sycophants, they may also engage in distortion and delusions but to combat and critique mainstream America rather than assimilate. They are highly critical and reject notions of American benevolence or progress. During a Black Lives Matter rally in the southeast, I met Bridget, a twenty-seven-year-old female student and member of the Dream Defenders ( Defender (n.d.) ). She said:

American patriotism glorifies a world that doesn’t exist. The idea is that all Americans benefit from their rights to liberty, life, and justice for all, but this is a false ideal because everyone isn’t allotted to those rights in America. I’m not patriotic because I don’t feel there is anything to love about this country that globalizes imperialism and capitalism crippling every nation it comes across.

Through key informants, I also met Spence, a thirty-one-year-old male rap artist. Over the course of several days, I observed and conversed with him. Despite lacking any formal postsecondary education, Spence had a reputation among his social circles for possessing exceptional knowledge of black history and social inequalities. He explained,

American patriotism means believing and protecting as well as willing to kill and die for the ideologies and makings of America, therefore I am not and cannot be patriotic when America itself tells me and shows me that my belief and trust in America would be without merit and oxymoronic.

I asked, “What do you mean by ‘tells me and shows me’?” He replied:

At what point in time in Americas history has America given the black man reason to be patriotic? On the contrary, America continuously shows the black man he has no rights that the white American has to respect … how can a black man be Patriotic when acts of patriotism could be deemed as a criminal act by his fellow Americans and contemporaries alike. White America has shown the black man past present and future that without hesitation or confirmation or validation, his life can be taken and the particulars can and will be sorted out later regardless of age, size, social status, economical status, or political party.

Spence, a self-proclaimed black revolutionary, embodies the subverter profile: completely detached from America, fully alert of social inequalities, and intimately connected to black oppression. Even among overt black revolution-aries who vehemently denounced patriotism, after thoroughly interrogating the data, I found that they possess essential aspects of patriotism: attachment to the homeland, service and social action, and faith that a better America can be forged. Instead of American patriotism, they expressed similar sentiments towards their community, family, religious group, organization (fraternity, sorority, etc.), or native land. For instance, black power was a brand of patriotism in the symbolic black nation among certain collectivities such as the Nation of Islam and the Conscious Community.

The conscious patriot: Jacob, Aton, Victor, and Maurice

Many blacks negotiate the double consciousness by constructing identities that counter hegemonic patriotism. They are equally connected to both America as a homeland, and the realities of black oppression in America. These individuals, called conscious patriots, are keenly aware of social inequalities, and actively critique what they deem to be a society characterized by historical and systemic social inequalities. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was attached to both nation as well as race, personifies the conscious patriot profile. They tend to possess a profound sense of tradition and duty, connectedness to the homeland and pride in African contributions, and faith that a more just America can be forged. Over the course of several days, I spent many hours with Jacob, a twenty-eight-year-old black male. We connected at the Justice or Else Rally in Washington D.C. Jacob, a federal law enforcement officer, described his loyalty to both his race and country. He explained, “ the most patriotic moment of my life was going to Cuba with the president, making history not only for my family name, but making history for our nation”. Jacob explained,

Patriotism is when someone has an emotional connection to their homeland, for example America. To a certain extent I feel patriotic. The reason I feel somewhat patriotic is because there are days I don’t feel connected to my country because of my beliefs in reference to racial issues. In addition, the interactions with law enforcement and black males.

As an act of solidary, Jacob autographed his name on a thirty foot “Justice or Else” banner at the twentieth Anniversary of the Million Man March. For many conscious patriots, it is a fallacy to consider it a contradiction to be both patriotic and critical of inequality. On the contrary, they believe that social awareness, social action, and social reform are the byproducts of true patriots. This American duty – to engage, critique, and reform America society – is heightened for Americans that are attached to black history, which includes an ancestry of black patriots who petitioned and protested for racial equality. Victor, a thirty-year-old Adjunct Professor, said, “patriotism is the blood, sweat, and tears of my ancestors. I am somewhat patriotic due to my ancestors building this country”. Aton defined patriotism as a “fight for freedom and justice”. He explained:

I am patriotic but not blindly. I don’t place the policies and principals over the people. In my patriotism, I strongly honor my ancestors who believed in this country and chose to fight for it. Patriotism includes military service, but also contributions to American society.

Maurice, a thirty-two-year-old sales representative explained further:

What patriotism means to me is to have a fondness or enthusiasm about those ideals of democracy and justice that America supposedly stands for based on the words in the constitution. How it’s defined to me through the actions and words of a particularly zealous demographic [whites], is to blindly love and give recognition to only those seemingly positive aspects of American life while simultaneously ignoring any negative implications of an increasingly disproportionate social hierarchy based in race and class. Am I an American patriot? Ideologically, yes. I believe in freedom of speech, free press, democracy, equality, social justice, etc. But because I recognize the hypocrisy behind the actions of the American government as it concerns its dealings with foreign nations and its own citizens, I’m called unpatriotic.

From this perspective, all “true” Americans must embrace conscious brands of patriotism that require active dissent because it is their heritage and duty to directly combat social inequalities the distorted mainstream framing of American society.

This study provides novel ethnographic insight into black American patriotism in the critical contemporary moment of unprecedented publicized police killings and international antiracism protests. This study is the first to leverage Du Boisian Double Consciousness and contemporary race theories to propose a model for understanding patriotic identity construction in America and submit a typology of patriotic profiles. These profiles, the bystander, the sycophant, the subverter, or the conscious patriot, are methods to satiate two contradicting strivings.

The blacks in the study had symbolic dual citizenship, in the black community and the broader American society. There were clear contradictions between these memberships. In an era of publicized police killings of blacks, for many it is absurd to embrace hegemonic patriotism, which is associated with aspects of meritocracy, conservatism, masculinity, and racism that contradicts their realities and vision of America. Hence, despite any notions of progress, the conscious patriot and subverter profiles may be more prevalent in modern society. Since the double consciousness is a condition predicated to some degree upon internalizing the racial order, naturally, it might be remedied through these counter frames. At this critical point in history, with black excellence and oppression on full display, identifications that serve to actively combat inequalities may become more prevalent.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Drs. Tamir Sorek, Nicholas Vargas, Joe Feagin and Charles Gattone, as well as the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their encouragement and quality feedback. Also, this work was only made possible by the incredible support of Jandy Gu. Thank you.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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• Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Patriotism

patriotism , feeling of attachment and commitment to a country , nation, or political community . Patriotism (love of country) and nationalism (loyalty to one’s nation) are often taken to be synonymous, yet patriotism has its origins some 2,000 years prior to the rise of nationalism in the 19th century.

Greek and especially Roman antiquity provide the roots for a political patriotism that conceives of loyalty to the patria as loyalty to a political conception of the republic. It is associated with the love of law and common liberty, the search for the common good , and the duty to behave justly toward one’s country. This classical Roman meaning of patria reemerges in the context of the Italian city republics of the 15th century. Here, patria stands for the common liberty of the city, which can only be safeguarded by the citizens’ civic spirit. For Niccolò Machiavelli , the love of common liberty enabled citizens to see their private and particular interests as part of the common good and helped them to resist corruption and tyranny . While this love of the city is typically intermixed with pride in its military strength and cultural superiority, it is the political institutions and way of life of the city that form the distinctive focal point of this kind of patriotic attachment. To love the city is to be willing to sacrifice one’s own good—including one’s life—for the protection of common liberty.

In contrast to the classical republican conception of patriotism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Considerations on the Government of Poland can be seen as an early example of the link between nationalism and patriotism. While Rousseau advocated the love of the nation and the celebration of national culture , he believed that national culture is valuable primarily because it helps foster loyalty to the political fatherland. Thus, Rousseau’s nationalism stemmed from and served his typically republican emphasis on securing citizens’ loyalty to their political institutions.

A more explicit link between nationalism and patriotism can be found in the work of German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder . In Herder’s view, patriotism refers not to a political virtue but to a spiritual attachment to the nation. In this context, fatherland becomes synonymous with the nation and its distinct language and culture, which give it unity and coherence . Thus, instead of linking patriotism to the preservation of political liberty, Herder associates love of one’s country with the preservation of a common culture and the spiritual unity of a people. While in the classical republican tradition, “fatherland” is synonymous with political institutions, for Herder, the nation is prepolitical and love of one’s national culture is a natural inclination that allows a people to express their distinctive character. On this account, patriotism is associated with the exclusive attachment to one’s own culture and thus stands in opposition to cosmopolitanism and cultural assimilation. Freedom is equated not with the fight against political oppression but with the preservation of a unique people and patriotic sacrifice with the desire to secure the long-term survival of the nation.

This association between patriotism and the exclusive attachment to one’s nation has led critics to view the sentiment of patriotic pride as morally dangerous, giving rise to a chauvinism that is incompatible with cosmopolitan aspirations and the recognition of the equal moral worth of all human beings. More sympathetic approaches to patriotism have sought to ground it in new forms of loyalty that are compatible with universal values, respect for human rights , and tolerance of ethnic and national differences. At the heart of this renewed interest in patriotism lies the belief that to be stable, democratic societies require a strong sense of allegiance on the part of their citizens. Not only does the high degree of pluralism that characterizes contemporary societies potentially give rise to tensions and disagreements among citizens that may destabilize the polity, modern democratic states committed to a degree of equality rely on the willingness of citizens to make sacrifices for the common good, be it in terms of the everyday redistribution of income to meet welfare needs or the provision of collective goods and services such as education or health care. Hence, in the eyes of advocates of new forms of patriotism, stable democratic societies require a strong sense of solidarity.

The most prominent example of this search for new forms of solidarity is German philosopher Jürgen Habermas ’s notion of Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism), which seeks to ground the loyalty of citizens not in the idea of a prepolitical, homogeneous community but in a commitment to universal liberal principles as enshrined in the constitution of the modern liberal state. To ensure that citizens who subscribe to different cultural, ethnic, and religious forms of life can coexist in and identify with their own country on equal terms, Habermas argues that the modern constitutional state must ensure that its political culture does not favor or discriminate against any particular subculture. To achieve this, it is vital to differentiate the majority culture from a shared political culture grounded in respect for fundamental constitutional principles and basic law . On this account, membership of a nation of citizens no longer rests on an appeal to a shared language or a common ethical and cultural origin but merely reflects a shared political culture based on standard liberal constitutional principles. Habermas’s attempt to ground patriotism in an attachment to universal liberal principles is also associated with what is at times referred to as cosmopolitan patriotism, which seeks to construct a postnational identity based on the recognition of democratic values and human rights as conceptualized within a particular constitutional tradition.

Such cosmopolitan patriotism is said by advocates such as British-born American philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah to give rise to a rooted cosmopolitanism that couples attachment to one’s homeland and cultural particularities with an appreciation of different places and different people and a robust respect for the equal moral worth of all human beings. Advocates of forms of constitutional patriotism often cite the United States as an example of a nonnational polity held together by an expressly political patriotism. American political theorist John Schaar, for instance, referred to American patriotism as “covenanted patriotism,” a form of patriotic attachment characterized by a commitment to the principles and goals set out in the founding covenant and the duty to carry on the work of the Founding Fathers . Another strand of contemporary thought appeals to the classical republican principles of love of liberty, active citizenship, and self-sacrifice for the common good in their attempt to formulate new forms of solidarity that do not depend on the idea of a prepolitical, ethnically homogeneous nation.

However, critics of such attempts to generate new, nonexclusionary forms of solidarity have expressed doubts about the extent to which patriotic sentiments can be reconciled with a commitment to universal principles. While critics of constitutional patriotism have questioned the feasibility of Habermas’s attempt to decouple the political culture from the wider majority culture, pointing to the extent to which the political culture of even as culturally diverse a society as America draws on national symbols and myths that are laden with prepolitical meanings, commentators such as British philosopher Margaret Canovan have argued that classical republican patriotism was much more illiberal and hostile to outsiders than modern proponents of the republican tradition suggest. According to Canovan, not only is the patriotic virtue celebrated in the classical republican tradition primarily a military virtue, the republican preoccupation with the education and socialization of citizens to systematically instill loyalty and commitment to the state is liable to be seen by many contemporary liberals as an unacceptable form of manipulation and indoctrination. Furthermore, advocates of both constitutional and modern republican patriotism typically presuppose the existence of established political boundaries and common political institutions that have their origins in the rise and consolidation of the nation-state. Thus, the extent to which patriotism can be reconciled with a commitment to universal values, respect for human rights, and tolerance of ethnic and national differences remains contested.

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How People View Patriotism: The Evidences from Cross-National Surveys

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Numerous studies have examined the level of patriotism across countries, the factors that shape patriotic feelings, and the ways in which diverse dimensions of patriotism are related to a broad set of attitudes and behaviors. Citizen evaluation of patriotism, in particular in the context of majorities and minorities, has seldom been investigated, however. Exploring this issue, this paper discusses the ways in which majorities and minorities view the consequences of patriotism and whether their attitudes are affected by inclusive state policies. Analyzing public views of patriotism across countries, it found that (a) patriotism is viewed more positively than negatively in nearly all the countries included in the survey; (b) on average, majorities hold more positive views of patriotism than minorities; (c) minorities in countries governed by more exclusive policies tend to regard patriotism more negatively than those in countries governed by more inclusive policies; and (d) the more inclusive the policy, the more negatively majorities perceive patriotism. These findings are discussed in light of the normative debate regarding patriotism.

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We tested a series of discriminant associations, investigating how dimensions of patriotism (i.e. blind and constructive) differently relate to value orientations, and to ideological attitudes such as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Using an Italian student sample (N = 146) we found that blind patriotism correlated positively with tradition and negatively with universalism, whilst constructive patriotism correlated negatively with tradition and positively with universalism. Both RWA and SDO correlated negatively with universalism, whilst only RWA was associated with security and tradition and only SDO related positively to power and self-direction. Mediation analyses revealed that most of the effects of value orientations on patriotism were mediated by SDO and RWA.

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The Sources of Patriotism: Survey and Experimental Evidence

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Miroslav Nincic, Jennifer M. Ramos, The Sources of Patriotism: Survey and Experimental Evidence, Foreign Policy Analysis , Volume 8, Issue 4, October 2012, Pages 373–388, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00175.x

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Patriotism, as attachment to country, is the value on which most foreign policy attitudes ultimately hinge, yet very little in the academic literature addresses the implications of the way in which the foundations for this attachment are conceived. Two variants of patriotism can be identified: one absolute, the other contingent. For those holding the latter conception, patriotism must be justified by one's country's actions: the greater the approval of one's country's policies, the greater the degree of patriotic attachment that is warranted. For those holding the former conception, patriotism is an absolute and a constant value, and it is reflected in support for one's country when the going gets tough. We seek to understand the circumstances that determine how critical or uncritical a patriot a person would be, given both specific conditions related to the individual and the international situation more generally. Moreover, we are interested in accounting for overall levels of patriotism. We use survey data from the PEW, as well as experimental data, to examine these matters. We find that factors internal to the individual, and not external conditions, determine the kind of patriot one is; at the same time, overall patriotism is found to be influenced by both internal and external circumstances.

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Loving America Means Expecting More From It

By Esau McCaulley

Contributing Opinion Writer

Patriotism did not bring my grandfather to the Army recruiter’s office in 1956. Poverty did. A youth spent picking cotton and working odd jobs to help feed his family meant that he was a good way from graduating from high school as his 18th birthday approached. He wanted a better life for himself and saw the Army as a way to make it happen.

He ended up staying three years beyond his initial three-year commitment. A sepia-toned photograph of him in his uniform still hangs proudly in his bedroom in Huntsville, Ala.

For my grandfather, military life was not without challenges. He recalls that he and other Black soldiers were consistently addressed as “boys” until he stood up to his commanding officer and told him that there were nothing but men in their unit. After this tense and even dangerous exchange, the officer addressed them respectfully — a small triumph that my grandfather never forgot.

I asked him why he continued on and he replied, “I guess I loved America more than I thought. I definitely liked it more than Russia.”

The military was the first integrated space he encountered. “We served together, marched together, slept in the same barracks and learned to respect each other,” he said. During his six years of service, he finished high school and took extra classes. He returned to civilian life equipped with certifications to be a fireman, a merchant seaman and a bookkeeper. But in Alabama in the 1960s no one would hire him to do any of those things. His first job was as a janitor.

My grandfather’s feelings about America are by turns fond and critical. He loved his unit and the moments when the white men he served with treated him as an equal. He also laments those times when he wasn’t, especially in the civilian years that followed. Now, at age 86, he gets animated talking about how he never got to be a fireman.

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Belt and Road Initiative is the concrete embodiment of Four Confidences of the Communist Party of China, and cultural confidence is the most crucial support for the implementation of the Belt and Road. As the backbone in the future, college students ...

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Opinion How to be patriotic in today’s America

Post columnists on how to build a new sense of belonging.

The Fourth of July is inextricably tied to patriotism. But what does patriotism mean today? What are modern American values, and can we agree on any of them? Three of our columnists, Theodore Johnson , Karen Attiah and Jason Rezaian , look for a hopeful path forward.

Use the audio player or The Post’s “Impromptu” podcast feed to listen to the entire conversation.

Podcast episode

Karen Attiah: I still remember when my parents finally got naturalized back in the ’90s. My mom in particular really did adopt the form of patriotism that people think of today — adopting these ideas of what it means to be American culturally: being really interested in football, the Dallas Cowboys, super into NASCAR, country music. And also, we grew up evangelical Christian in Texas, where patriotism is very much entwined with what it meant to be Christian.

I think that the word “patriot” has come to symbolize a kind of White male defending America blindly at all costs from any and all criticism — as opposed to America as this idea where difference is celebrated and encouraged, where people have the freedom to self-actualize. I think America has beautiful ideals. But whether patriotism is the way to reach those ideals, I don’t know.

Jason Rezaian: For me, what it means to be American is not only an opportunity to self-actualize but an opportunity to intermingle with people from all over the world, and to do so in a way that is not necessarily validating of differences, but accepting of them. That’s what America is to me. And you can’t tell me that it was set up to be something else. I’ve experienced that in my life in many ways — though admittedly in diminishing ways in recent years. So while I agree that in some spaces the idea of patriotism has turned into this other thing, I just don’t think that that’s what it actually means. And I’m not gonna let anybody take away and redefine for me what it means to be patriotic.

Theodore Johnson: For me, being American is the only thing I can be. And I am proud of who I am and how I was raised, and of the people that raised me and the cultures that I belong to, so I’m extremely proud to be an American. And there’s not any other thing I would rather be. On the question of patriotism, my struggle there is a lot of patriotism is often uncritical.

It’s as if you are patriotic because you think your country is perfect or because you think your country is so exceptional that everyone else should get out of its way and allow America the spotlight. I’m not that kind of patriot. I’m the kind of patriot that very much loves the country that I was born in, belonged to, wore the uniform for. But I also recognize it has fallen very short. As a Black man who’s been pulled over 40 times by police in the 30 years he’s been driving, I know where the work this country needs to do is.

Listen to the full conversation here:

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What is the difference between nationalism and patriotism?

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During his presidency, Donald Trump said, “We’re putting America first … we’re taking care of ourselves for a change,” and then declared, “ I’m a nationalist .” In another speech , he stated that under his watch, the U.S. had “ embrace[d] the doctrine of patriotism .”

Trump is now running for president again. When he announced his candidacy, he stated that he “ need[s] every patriot on board because this is not just a campaign, this is a quest to save our country.”

One week later he dined in Mar-a-Lago with Nick Fuentes , a self-described nationalist who’s been banned from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube and other platforms for using racist and antisemitic language .

Afterward, Trump confirmed that meeting but did not denounce Fuentes, despite calls for him to do so .

The words nationalism and patriotism are sometimes used as synonyms, such as when Trump and his supporters describe his America First agenda. But many political scientists , including me , don’t typically see those two terms as equivalent – or even compatible.

There is a difference, and it’s important, not just to scholars but to regular citizens as well.

Devotion to a people

To understand what nationalism is, it’s useful to understand what a nation is – and isn’t.

A nation is a group of people who share a history, culture, language, religion or some combination thereof.

A country , which is sometimes called a state in political science terminology, is an area of land that has its own government.

A nation-state is a homogeneous political entity mostly comprising a single nation. Nation-states are rare , because nearly every country is home to more than one national group. One example of a nation-state would be North Korea , where almost all residents are ethnic Koreans.

The United States is neither a nation nor a nation-state. Rather, it is a country of many different groups of people who have a variety of shared histories, cultures, languages and religions.

Some of those groups are formally recognized by the federal government, such as the Navajo Nation and the Cherokee Nation . Similarly, in Canada, the French-speaking Québécois are recognized as being a distinct “ nation within a united Canada .”

Nationalism is, per one dictionary definition, “ loyalty and devotion to a nation .” It is a person’s strong affinity for those who share the same history, culture, language or religion. Scholars understand nationalism as exclusive , boosting one identity group over – and at times in direct opposition to – others.

The Oath Keepers and Proud Boys – 10 of whom were convicted of seditious conspiracy for their role in the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol – are both examples of white nationalist groups, which believe that immigrants and people of color are a threat to their ideals of civilization.

Trump has described the events that took place on Jan. 6, 2021, as having occurred “ Peacefully & Patrioticly ”. He has described those who have been imprisoned as “ great patriots ” and has said that he would pardon “ a large portion of them ” if elected in 2024.

There are many other nationalisms beyond white nationalism. The Nation of Islam , for instance, is an example of a Black nationalist group. The Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center have both characterized it as a Black supremacist hate group for its anti-white prejudices.

In addition to white and Black racial nationalisms , there are also ethnic and lingustic nationalisms, which typically seek greater autonomy for – and the eventual independence of – certain national groups. Examples include the Bloc Québécois , the Scottish Nationalist Party and Plaid Cymru – the Party of Wales , which are nationalist political parties that respectively advocate for the Québécois of Québéc, the Scots of Scotland and the Welsh of Wales.

Devotion to a place

In contrast to nationalism’s loyalty for or devotion to one’s nation, patriotism is, per the same dictionary, “ love for or devotion to one’s country .” It comes from the word patriot , which itself can be traced back to the Greek word patrios , which means “of one’s father.”

In other words, patriotism has historically meant a love for and devotion to one’s fatherland , or country of origin.

Patriotism encompasses devotion to the country as a whole – including all the people who live within it. Nationalism refers to devotion to only one group of people over all others.

An example of patriotism would be Martin Luther King Jr.’s “ I Have a Dream ” speech, in which he recites the first verse of the patriotic song “ America (My Country ‘Tis of Thee) .” In his “ Letter from Birmingham Jail ,” King describes “nationalist groups” as being “ made up of people who have lost faith in America .”

George Orwell, the author of “ Animal Farm ” and “ Nineteen Eighty-Four ,” describes patriotism as “ devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life.”

He contrasted that with nationalism, which he describes as “the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests.”

Nationalism vs. patriotism

Adolf Hitler’s rise in Germany was accomplished by perverting patriotism and embracing nationalism. According to Charles de Gaulle , who led Free France against Nazi Germany during World War II and later became president of France, “ Patriotism is when love of your own people comes first; nationalism, when hate for people other than your own comes first .”

The tragedy of the Holocaust was rooted in the nationalistic belief that certain groups of people were inferior. While Hitler is a particularly extreme example , in my own research as a human rights scholar , I have found that even in contemporary times, countries with nationalist leaders are more likely to have bad human rights records.

After World War II, President Harry Truman signed the Marshall Plan , which would provide postwar aid to Europe. The intent of the program was to help European countries “ break away from the self-defeating actions of narrow nationalism .”

For Truman, putting America first did not mean exiting the global stage and sowing division at home with nationalist actions and rhetoric . Rather, he viewed the “principal concern of the people of the United States” to be “the creation of conditions of enduring peace throughout the world.” For him, patriotically putting the interests of his country first meant fighting against nationalism.

This view is in line with that of French President Emmanuel Macron , who has stated that “ patriotism is the exact opposite of nationalism .”

“ Nationalism,” he says, “is a betrayal of patriotism .”

This article is republished from The Conversation , a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Joshua Holzer , Westminster College

National parks – even Mount Rushmore – show that there’s more than one kind of patriotism

Fueled by virtually unrestricted social media access, white nationalism is on the rise and attracting violent young white men

How pardoning extremists undermines the rule of law

Joshua Holzer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

An 'I love America' bumper sticker doesn't make you a patriot. Sacrifice for others does.

Patriotism isn't a term bestowed solely on service members, police officers or those with 'i love america' bumper stickers. patriotism also is not owned by any one political party or ideology..

As a military spouse , the word " patriot " is an intrinsic part of my daily life. On a military base, we start our days with reveille and end them with a retreat. In between are the matching red, white and blue outfits, military exercises and ceremonies, overseas deployments and desserts decorated with American flags.

Patriotism, to us, is the daily sacrifice of our own ideas for our nation’s ideals.

However, lately, hate, segregation and bullying have reinvented the patriot as someone who cares more about political affiliations and partisan beliefs than people.  

No political party has a lock on patriotism

A patriot , as defined in Merriam-Webster dictionary, is one who loves and supports their country. Patriotism isn't a term bestowed solely on service members, police officers or those with "I love America" bumper stickers. Patriotism also is not owned by any one political party or ideology. Patriot is a term conveyed to all who love and support their country and its citizens.  

In our nation's 248-year history, millions of service members have enlisted in America’s armed forces. Some enlisted because they loved our country and wanted to defend it, but others because of higher education benefits and employment stability. In other cases, entering the military could have been an individual's only path to becoming a productive member of society, and that too is OK. 

'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' was wrong: Biden rectifies injustice of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell.' But policy never should've existed.

Who do I think of when I hear the phrase "American patriot"? 

Civil rights leader Melanie L. Campbell , Native American influencer Charlie Amaya Scott , retired Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley , Barack and Michelle Obama, Admiral Rachel L. Levine and comedian Jon Stewart, to name a few. 

They are the patriots who are preserving life, fighting for equality and advocating for less fortunate citizens.

But we don't hear enough about them. Why? Because our country's focus too often is not on the individuals uplifting our communities. Our focus is on those who bring the noise.

By noise, I mean those who promote divisive ideals, gaslight or misinform our country's citizens, pit Americans against one another and incite violence in our communities. The noise drowns out those fighting for equality, proposing solutions to our nation's most significant problems and sacrificing for the greater good of all our countrymen.  

Patriotism is about sacrifice for others

America's true patriots are the men and women who sacrifice much more than we can fathom for our rights, for community and for the very life of another human being.

Why is patriotism so imperative in our country ? Our country can persevere only through the strength of a community. 

Happy birthday, America! Why this aging millennial still loves America, even if Gen Z doesn't get it

Redefining patriotism is simple but not effortless. It will take all of us admonishing and advocating for equity and equality. It will require using our resources to uplift communities in need and standing up to division.

Redefining patriotism means allowing reformed felons to earn their complete place in society without restriction, affording them the American dream that they, too, are worthy of. It means offering a chance to build something from nothing, with a hand up, not a handout. It means giving children who have nothing the support of a community who believes in them. It means taking resources into impoverished neighborhoods and using them to educate, build and sustain something greater than what they once had. It means speaking up against racism, injustice and hate in any form.  

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So, let's redefine patriotism. How? By committing acts of service that will advance underserved communities. By educating and strengthening communities that, in turn, will improve our nation.  

But before we can redefine patriotism, we must look inward. We must be honest with ourselves and ask: Was our former demonstration of patriotism a display of love for all of our countrymen and our country or did we withhold that love from people with different ideals, religions and abilities? Were we satisfied with ourselves as we ignored the pleas of those less fortunate? From children aging out of foster care into homelessness to innocent protesters being gunned down for proposing equality. Are we satisfied with the state of insecurity and chaos we live in? 

Let's lead by example and prove our true patriotism by accepting, teaching and exuding love, kindness and concern for our fellow citizens. It’s our opportunity to build, to redefine and to realign our families, our communities and our nation. Justice for all.

Marla Bautista is a military fellow columnist for USA TODAY Opinion.

You can read diverse opinions from our USA TODAY columnists and other writers on the Opinion front page , on X, formerly Twitter, @usatodayopinion and in our Opinion newsletter .

A Review and Integration of Research on Blind and Constructive Patriotism

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• First Online: 02 February 2018
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• Robert T. Schatz 2  

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This chapter examines theory and research on “blind” and “constructive” patriotism . Blind patriotism is characterized by staunch and unquestioning allegiance to the nation and rejection of ingroup criticism. Constructive patriotism is characterized by critical loyalty, questioning, and criticism of current group practices that are intended to better the nation. The two patriotic orientations represent distinct modes of ingroup identification and allegiance that predict different attitudes toward outgroups . Individuals high in blind patriotism fuse their personal identity with their social identity as an ingroup member. They are motivated to evaluate national attributes favorably to maintain positive group identity. Blind patriotism is rooted in symbolic attachment to an idealized image of the nation. It engenders exclusive group boundaries, negative attitudes toward outgroups, and refusal to acknowledge the nation’s transgressions against others. Individuals high in constructive patriotism gain positive identity from group membership while maintaining personal independence and a capacity to stand apart from the group. They are motivated to evaluate national attributes realistically to identify and correct the group’s shortcomings. Constructive patriotism is rooted in instrumental attachment to the nation’s systems and institutions. It engenders relatively inclusive group boundaries and positive attitudes toward outgroups and willingness to take responsibility for the nation’s transgressions against others.

I would like to thank Steve Glickman and Linda Arons for their helpful feedback on an earlier version of this manuscript.

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Department of Psychology, Metropolitan State University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA

Robert T. Schatz

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Schatz, R.T. (2018). A Review and Integration of Research on Blind and Constructive Patriotism. In: Sardoc, M. (eds) Handbook of Patriotism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30534-9_30-1

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30534-9_30-1

Received : 03 January 2017

Accepted : 22 January 2018

Published : 02 February 2018

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-319-30534-9

Online ISBN : 978-3-319-30534-9

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