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• 18 Jun 2024
• Research & Ideas

Central Banks Missed Inflation Red Flags. This Pricing Model Could Help.

The steep inflation that plagued the economy after the COVID-19 pandemic took many economists by surprise. But research by Alberto Cavallo suggests that a different method of tracking prices—a real-time model—could predict future surges better.

• 28 May 2024
• In Practice

Job Search Advice for a Tough Market: Think Broadly and Stay Flexible

Some employers have pared staff and reduced hiring amid mixed economic signals. What does it mean for job seekers? Paul Gompers, Letian Zhang, and David Fubini offer advice for overcoming search challenges to score that all-important offer.

• 21 May 2024

What the Rise of Far-Right Politics Says About the Economy in an Election Year

With voters taking to the polls in dozens of countries this year, could election outcomes lean conservative? Paula Rettl says a lack of social mobility and a sense of economic insecurity are some of the factors fueling far-right movements around the world.

• 11 Apr 2024

Why Progress on Immigration Might Soften Labor Pains

Long-term labor shortages continue to stoke debates about immigration policy in the United States. We asked Harvard Business School faculty members to discuss what's at stake for companies facing talent needs, and the potential scenarios on the horizon.

• 01 Apr 2024

Navigating the Mood of Customers Weary of Price Hikes

Price increases might be tempering after historic surges, but companies continue to wrestle with pinched consumers. Alexander MacKay, Chiara Farronato, and Emily Williams make sense of the economic whiplash of inflation and offer insights for business leaders trying to find equilibrium.

• 29 Jan 2024

Do Disasters Rally Support for Climate Action? It's Complicated.

Reactions to devastating wildfires in the Amazon show the contrasting realities for people living in areas vulnerable to climate change. Research by Paula Rettl illustrates the political ramifications that arise as people weigh the economic tradeoffs of natural disasters.

• 10 Jan 2024

Technology and COVID Upended Tipping Norms. Will Consumers Keep Paying?

When COVID pushed service-based businesses to the brink, tipping became a way for customers to show their appreciation. Now that the pandemic is over, new technologies have enabled companies to maintain and expand the use of digital payment nudges, says Jill Avery.

• 17 Aug 2023

‘Not a Bunch of Weirdos’: Why Mainstream Investors Buy Crypto

Bitcoin might seem like the preferred tender of conspiracy theorists and criminals, but everyday investors are increasingly embracing crypto. A study of 59 million consumers by Marco Di Maggio and colleagues paints a shockingly ordinary picture of today's cryptocurrency buyer. What do they stand to gain?

• 15 Aug 2023

Why Giving to Others Makes Us Happy

Giving to others is also good for the giver. A research paper by Ashley Whillans and colleagues identifies three circumstances in which spending money on other people can boost happiness.

• 13 Mar 2023

What Would It Take to Unlock Microfinance's Full Potential?

Microfinance has been seen as a vehicle for economic mobility in developing countries, but the results have been mixed. Research by Natalia Rigol and Ben Roth probes how different lending approaches might serve entrepreneurs better.

• 23 Jan 2023

After High-Profile Failures, Can Investors Still Trust Credit Ratings?

Rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody's, have been criticized for not warning investors of risks that led to major financial catastrophes. But an analysis of thousands of ratings by Anywhere Sikochi and colleagues suggests that agencies have learned from past mistakes.

• 29 Nov 2022

How Much More Would Holiday Shoppers Pay to Wear Something Rare?

Economic worries will make pricing strategy even more critical this holiday season. Research by Chiara Farronato reveals the value that hip consumers see in hard-to-find products. Are companies simply making too many goods?

• 21 Nov 2022

Buy Now, Pay Later: How Retail's Hot Feature Hurts Low-Income Shoppers

More consumers may opt to "buy now, pay later" this holiday season, but what happens if they can't make that last payment? Research by Marco Di Maggio and Emily Williams highlights the risks of these financing services, especially for lower-income shoppers.

• 01 Sep 2022
• What Do You Think?

Is It Time to Consider Lifting Tariffs on Chinese Imports?

Many of the tariffs levied by the Trump administration on Chinese goods remain in place. James Heskett weighs whether the US should prioritize renegotiating trade agreements with China, and what it would take to move on from the trade war. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 05 Jul 2022

Have We Seen the Peak of Just-in-Time Inventory Management?

Toyota and other companies have harnessed just-in-time inventory management to cut logistics costs and boost service. That is, until COVID-19 roiled global supply chains. Will we ever get back to the days of tighter inventory control? asks James Heskett. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 09 Mar 2022

War in Ukraine: Soaring Gas Prices and the Return of Stagflation?

With nothing left to lose, Russia's invasion of Ukraine will likely intensify, roiling energy markets further and raising questions about the future of globalization, says Rawi Abdelal. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 10 Feb 2022

Why Are Prices So High Right Now—and Will They Ever Return to Normal?

And when will sold-out products return to store shelves? The answers aren't so straightforward. Research by Alberto Cavallo probes the complex interplay of product shortages, prices, and inflation. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 11 Jan 2022
• Cold Call Podcast

Can Entrepreneurs and Governments Team Up to Solve Big Problems?

In 2017, Shield AI’s quadcopter, with no pilot and no flight plan, could clear a building and outpace human warfighters by almost five minutes. It was evidence that autonomous robots could help protect civilian and service member lives. But was it also evidence that Shield AI—a startup barely two years past founding—could ask their newest potential customer, the US government, for a large contract for a system of coordinated, exploring robots? Or would it scare them away? Harvard Business School professor Mitch Weiss and Brandon Tseng, Shield AI’s CGO and co-founder, discuss these and other challenges entrepreneurs face when working with the public sector, and how investing in new ideas can enable entrepreneurs and governments to join forces and solve big problems in the case, “Shield AI.” Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 06 May 2021

How Four Women Made Miami More Equitable for Startups

A case study by Rosabeth Moss Kanter examines what it takes to break gender barriers and build thriving businesses in an emerging startup hub. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 20 Apr 2021
• Working Paper Summaries

The Emergence of Mafia-like Business Systems in China

This study sheds light on the political pathology of fraudulent, illegal, and corrupt business practices. Features of the Chinese system—including regulatory gaps, a lack of formal means of property protection, and pervasive uncertainty—seem to facilitate the rise of mafia systems.

ECONOMIC OUTCOMES PERSIST ACROSS GENERATIONS MORE THAN BELIEVED, RESEARCH SHOWS (2022)

PUBLISHED ON SEP 8, 2022

Economic outcomes persist across generations more than believed, research shows

Chicago, Sept. 7, 2022 —  New research that refines measures of resources and well-being passed from parents to their children shows that current estimates of intergenerational mobility may be substantially overstated. The study from Nobel laureate James J. Heckman and colleagues at the University of Chicago and Rockwool Foundation in Denmark shows that parents’ and children’s economic outcomes are much more tightly linked than previously believed.

The study also documents that previous research may have overstated social mobility most for children from disadvantaged families. Findings are detailed in “Intergenerational Transmission of Family Influence” [add link].

The research team developed new measures of economic welfare across the lifespan, accounting for differences in life-cycle trajectories, uncertainty, and credit constraints. This improves upon traditional measures of social mobility, which examine the association between children’s and parents’ income when both generations are in their 30s.

“There is much more to resources than just average income over a limited age range. First, the life trajectories of individuals differ in ways that a simple average cannot capture. And then uncertainty about what happens tomorrow or next year is also important,” Heckman explains. “We are the first to capture these aspects.”

Analyzing unique data from Denmark spanning the full lifecycles of children and their parents, the study found economic outcomes for parents and children are closely related. The traditional analysis of family resources such as average income may have understated the intergenerational dependence by 50% to 100%.

The findings extend to other dimension of children’s lives. School grades, educational attainment, crime, and teen-pregnancy are all more closely related to parents’ resources than previously thought. The study, from Heckman and Sadegh S. M. Eshaghnia. the UChicago Center for Economics of Human Development, Rasmus Landersø of the Rockwool Foundation, and Rafeh Qureshi of the University of Wisconsin, was released as a National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper in September 2022.

To read the full paper, visit  nber.org  and  cehd.uchicago.edu .  

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What’s the Latest Research in Development Economics? A Roundup from NEUDC 2022

Almedina music, david evans.

What’s the latest in international economic development research? Last weekend was the North East Universities Development Consortium annual conference , often called NEUDC. With more than 135 papers presented (and almost all of them available for download ), it’s a great way to see recent trends in the international development research by economists and to learn about new findings.

The studies come from all over the world, as you can see in Figure 1 below. Just like last year , the plurality of studies take place in India (30 studies). Kenya is next (12), then Bangladesh (8), Brazil (7), China (7), and Indonesia (7). More than 40 countries are represented overall, from almost all regions of the world.

Figure 1: Where are recent development economics studies focused?

Source: This map draws on a sample of 139 studies from the NEUDC 2022 conference. Studies that covered more than three countries (often broad global or regional analyses) were excluded.

Researchers draw on a wide range of empirical methods. Nearly a third of studies reported on the results of a randomized controlled trial (43 studies). Other commonly used methods include difference-in-differences, fixed effects, and instrumental variables.

Figure 2: What empirical methods do recent development economics papers used?

Source: This chart draws on a sample of 139 studies from the NEUDC 2022 conference. Some studies used more than one method.

Below, we provide a quick takeaway from every paper in the conference for which we could find a digital copy. As you read our takeaways, keep the following in mind. First, we can’t capture all the nuance of a paper in a couple of lines. Second, our takeaway may not be the authors’ takeaway. Third, some of the papers are marked as preliminary and not ready for formal citation (you can see which if you follow the paper links). Fourth, we largely take the findings of these papers at face value: most have not yet been through peer review, so feel free to dig into the data and analysis to decide how confident you are in the results.

Our takeways are sorted by topic. If your principal interest is in a country or region, you can also read the takeaways sorted by country . We provide some indication of the empirical method used (for empirical papers) with hashtags at the end of the takeaways. Some papers fit into more than one category: for example, is a paper about the impact of free childcare on mothers’ careers about labor or about gender? It’s about both! In those cases, we’ve repeated studies in multiple sections below so if you’re focused on health, you’ll find all the health-related papers in the health section. The second or third time a paper appears, we put an asterisk after the summary so you can skip it if you’re reading straight through.

Happy learning!

Guide to the methodological hashtags: #DID = Difference-in-differences, #FE = Fixed effects, #IV = Instrumental variables, #LIF = Lab in the field, #PSM = Propensity score matching, #RCT = Randomized controlled trial, #RD = Regression discontinuity, #Other = Other

Households and human capital

Education and Early Childhood Development

·        How critical are family conditions in early years for child development? Better weather (which means more agricultural income and better nutrition) at age 2 in Indonesia leads to higher adult cognitive ability. When households face hard times at earlier ages, they compensate with prolonged breastfeeding. ( Webb ) #FE

·        Data from Indonesia suggest that parental education and parental income are the main drivers of differences in skills once kids grow up. ( Thomas ) #Other

·        “Many teachers [in India and Bangladesh] underestimate the share of low performers in their classrooms, and...they believe that those students will perform better than they actually do. These results are not driven by less educated, trained, or experienced teachers or explained by biases against female, low-income, or lower caste students.” ( Djaker, Ganimian, and Sabarwal ) #Other

·        A 1985 change in Indian law discouraging the payment of dowries led to a 24 percent drop in dowry payments, but it also led to an 18 percent reduction in girls' education attainment (with no impact on boys' education). ( Jha ) #DID

·        Providing information about a learning app in Bangladesh didn't lead more people to use it, but it did lead some parents to arrange more tutoring, resulting in "lasting math learning gains, concentrated among richer households." ( Beam, Mukherjee, and Navarro-Sola ) #RCT

·        Students in Kenya often apply to secondary schools with little information about the available schools. Providing information to students "led them to apply to" schools that were closer to home "without compromising school quality." Adding parents to those information meetings "led students to enroll in lower cost schools." ( Bonds ) #RCT

·        Among students in 9th grade in India, student test scores rose similarly whether they were exposed to "rigidly defined remedial lessons that take time away from the curriculum" and "teacher determined remedial lessons," which allow teachers more flexibility. ( Beg et al. ) #RCT

·        Parental aspirations for their children matter, but they may not be enough on their own. “In rural Gambia, families with high aspirations for their children’s future education and career, measured before children start school, go on to invest substantially more than other families in the early years of their children’s education. Despite this, essentially no children are literate or numerate three years later. When villages receive a highly-impactful, teacher-focused supply-side intervention, however, children of these families are 25 percent more likely to achieve literacy and numeracy than other children in the same village.” ( Eble and Escueta ) #RCT

·        A ten day increase in the overlap between school days and peak farming periods in Malawi translates to children losing about a third of a year of schooling. ( Allen ) #IV

·        Eliminating school fees for secondary school in Tanzania led not only to increased secondary school enrollments; it also increased primary school pass rates. ( Sandholtz ) #DID

·        Indonesia's major school construction program from the 1970s led to eight percent overall higher national output forty years later, and much of that comes through migration from rural to urban areas. ( Hsiao ) #DID

·        Phone call tutorials during COVID-19 were effective at boosting learning in India, Kenya, Nepal, Philippines, and Uganda, whether implemented by government teachers or non-government organization instructors. ( Angrist et al. ) #RCT

·        An affirmative action policy in Brazil was effective at redistributing university spots to low-income students, with little drop in average achievement. "The policy also reduced the gap in applications to selective majors" between poor and rich students by more than 50 percent, but note that those are applications: many of those major-choice changes were among students unlikely to be accepted into a highly selective major. The policy worked, but it could work even better. ( Melo ) #DID

·        Peru shut down a bunch of low-quality universities in 2015. Graduates from surviving universities experienced an increase in wages and higher employment rates. ( Vivar, Flor-Toro, and Magnaricotte ) #DID

·        An influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan reduced school enrollment among Jordanians, particularly boys and kids with less-educated parents. More young Jordanians went to work instead. ( Almuhaisen ) #DID

·        An edutainment program in Bangladeshi schools to trace school-to-home transmission of handwashing find that children are induced to wash more at school but less at home, yielding a net negative effect of the program ( Hussam and Oh ) #RCT

·        Removing English language study from pubic primary schools in West Bengal, India, increased private school enrollment and---for those still in public schools---increased private tutoring among the richest households. ( Nandwani and Sen ) #FE

·        In utero exposure to high ocean salinity levels (induced by climate change) reduces a child’s height-for-age z-score in Bangladesh, and increased prevalence of stunting and severe stunting due to nutritional deficiencies by age five. ( Guimbeau et al. ) #FE

·        In Indonesia, “remittances increase household consumption, reduce poverty, and stimulate growth. Households send more children to school, and district governments increase public schools at the primary and junior secondary levels.” ( Hilmy ) #FE

·        The tariff reduction from the U.S-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement decreased school attendance and increased children’s work, mainly in non-wage and household business jobs. Effects were stronger for boys, older children and households where the head had little education. ( Nguyen ) #DID

·        Giving a widely known award "to top performers on a mandatory nationwide exam in Colombia" boosts their earnings by between 7 and 12 percent, and the effect endures for 5 years after graduation. It helps students graduating from low-reputation colleges the most. ( Busso, Montaño, Muñoz-Morales ) #RD

Health (including mental health)

·        A national vaccine program in Burkina Faso in 1984 boosted the country’s child vaccination rate (against measles, yellow fever, and meningitis) from 17 percent to 77 percent in a few months. Child mortality fell, primary school completion rose, and—when the children reached adulthood—employment and agricultural productivity rose. ( Daramola et al. ) #DID

·        School-based deworming in western Kenya—nearly a quarter of a century later—reduced under-5 mortality of the beneficiaries’ children by 24 percent! ( Walker et al. ) #RCT

·        In Ecuador, letting employees use work time to get a flu vaccine boosted vaccination rates, but employees got sick about as much. Why? Some evidence suggests that employees engaged in “riskier health behaviors after getting vaccinated.” ( Hoffman, Mosquera, and Chadi ) #RCT

·        In Kenya, “both patient subsidies and pharmacy incentives for diagnostic testing significantly increase usage of testing and may encourage malaria positive individuals to purchase high quality antimalarials.” ( Dieci ) #RCT

·        Women who were babies in utero during a cholera epidemic in Peru in the 1990s were nearly 20 percent more likely to die of COVID-19. ( Ritter and Sanchez ) #DID

·        After four years of using iron and iodine fortified salt in school lunches in India, children have lower likelihood of anemia, higher hemoglobin levels, but no differences in cognitive or educational outcomes. ( Grafenstein et al. ) #RCT

·        Gold mining in the Philippines created new bodies of stagnant water, which boosted malaria cases by nearly a third (relative to provinces without gold deposits). ( Pagel ) #DID

·        Giving households a flyer about mobile health services in rural Bangladesh didn't get them to use it more, but offering to save the access numbers in the participants' phone boosted take-up by 22 percent in the succeeding 2 months and reduced health expenditure, since households were less likely to go to "informal providers who usually overprescribe medicines." ( Sardar ) #RCT

·        A drug procurement program in China "brought down the prices of 10 chronic condition drugs by an average of 78" percent. As a result, "drug adherence was improved for the uninsured who had poorer adherence" before the price reduction. ( He and Yang ) #DID

·        In Dakar, Senegal, it can be hard to find someone to desludge your septic pit. Providing subsidies to use a government run call center to connect households with desludgers increases use, and that use continues for a while after the subsidies end. Later, a city-wide subsidy increased adoption most in those communities that had received subsidies earlier. ( Deutschmann ) #RCT

·        How critical are family conditions in early years for child development? Better weather (which means more agricultural income and better nutrition) at age 2 in Indonesia leads to higher adult cognitive ability. When households face hard times at earlier ages, they compensate with prolonged breastfeeding. ( Webb ) #FE *

Fertility and family planning

·        "Learning about government mistreatment of citizens undermines trust in institutions. In Perú, “disclosure of information about illegal sterilization reduced usage of contraceptive methods, prenatal and delivery services, and the demand for medical services, resulting in worsened child health."" ( León-Ciliotta, Zejcirovic, and Fernandez ) #DID

·        During the colonial period in the Congo, greater exposure to Catholic nuns increased women’s fertility (as opposed to exposure to Protestant or male Catholic missionaries). Catholic nuns likely promoted the image of an ideal Christian woman which explains the results. ( Guirkinger and Villar ) #DID

Households and marriage

·        Households in Bangladesh reduced their monthly residential electricity use by 15.8 percent (≈37 kWh) when they switched from postpaid electricity metering system to prepaid metering. ( Das ) #IV

·        A new method to infer causal effects on choices that exploits relationships between choices and hypothetical evaluations “can recover treatment effects even if the treatment is assigned endogenously and standard estimation methods are poorly suited, or if the treatment does not vary.” ( Bernheim, et al. ) #Other

·        In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 73 percent of households provided with access to childcare centers use them.  Both parents “increase their engagement in commercial activities, leading to gains in agricultural productivity, household income and women’s subjective well-being." Women reported increases in their concentration and sense of control.  Using the centers also led to  significant gains in early childhood development outcomes, particularly for younger children.  ( Donald and Vaillant ) #RCT

·        Can commitment-saving ahead of a lean season alter consumption downfalls among the ultra-poor? In Bangladesh, a temporary savings subsidy doubled formal savings, and resulted in increased food and non-food expenditure by 8.6-12.6 percent during the lean season, with no lasting post-lean season impact. ( Takahashi et al. ) #RCT

·        An “edutainment” intervention designed to reduce child marriage in rural Pakistan, significantly reduces marriage of girl adolescents. Targeting men alone reduced child marriage in sample households, while targeting women or men & women jointly reduces child marriage at the village level. ( Cassidy et al. ) #RCT

·        In Kenya, workshops and couples’ therapy sessions to decrease alcohol consumption lowered prevalence of sexual intimate partner violence (IPV) by 0.21 standard deviations, with smaller or no effects on physical and emotional IPV. ( Castilla, Aqeel, and Murphy ) #RCT

Migration and refugees

·        Can temporary foreign work permits “throttle human smugglers’ businesses? “Combining internal and external controls with a regulated market for temporary visas alleviates the policy trade-off between migration control and ending human smuggling.” Data from migration between Senegal & Spain and the Democratic Republic of the Congo & South Africa. ( Auriol, Mesnard, and Perrault ) #Other

·        Massive exodus of Venezuelans in Colombia had a larger negative effect on the lower tail of the natives’ wage distribution, increasing inequality in the host economy. Due to formal restrictions, immigrants ended up working in more routine and low-paying jobs. “A large-scale amnesty program reduced the magnitude of downgrading, mitigating the unequalizing impact of the exodus.” ( Lombardo et al. ) #IV

·        In Mexico, children in households with return migrants (from the U.S.) “benefit from an increase in school attendance and a decrease in the probability of schooling delay relative to children in non-migrant households.” However, females in return migrant households are likely to complete a lower grade relative to non-migrant households. ( Chakraborty, Bucheli, and Fontenla ) #IV

·        An evaluation of a large-scale migration loan program in Bangladesh revealed that capacity constraints at scale lead effort to be directed toward those already planning to migrate without a loan. ( Mitchell et al. ) #RCT

·        A Zambian fertilizer subsidy program led to “some households to intensify their agricultural activity, and others to out-migrate.” The subsidy increased the share of households with outmigrants by 40 percentage points and doubled the number of outmigrants net of in-migrants. ( Diop ) #DID

·        Clearance of slums in Santiago, Chile, and families’ relocation to public housing in low-income areas led to displaced children having 10 percent lower earnings and 0.5 fewer years of education as adults than non-displaced. ( Rojas-Ampuero and Carrera ) #FE

·        In refugee camps and surrounding communities in Uganda and Kenya, refugee children can be up to three times more likely to be poor than adults. Child’s age, household composition, and access to sanitation and clean water, predict child poverty in refugee settlements well, often better than per-capita household expenditure. ( Beltramo et al. ) #ML

·        In Indonesia, “remittances increase household consumption, reduce poverty, and stimulate growth. Households send more children to school, and district governments increase public schools at the primary and junior secondary levels.” ( Hilmy ) #FE *

·        During WWII, nine ethnic groups were entirely deported from the Soviet Union to Central Asia. In the 50s, five returned to their former homeland, while the other four remained marginalized in internal exile. Locals in host regions had significantly higher levels of education two generations later. “A strong positive effect on higher education is found among returnees to origin regions, suggesting that these ethnic groups hedged against further negative shocks.” ( Zimmermann ) #IV

·        An influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan reduced school enrollment among Jordanians, particularly boys and kids with less-educated parents. More young Jordanians went to work instead. ( Almuhaisen ) #DID *

·        Pairing employers in Uganda with a refugee and providing an incentive to offer a free internship to that refugee "improves employers’ beliefs about refugees’ skills, but it does not change their willingness to hire new refugees," but certain types of matches (depending on employer and refugee characteristics) do result in more refugee hires. ( Loiacono and Silva-Vargas ) #RCT

·        In India, Hindu women are subject to caste “purity” norms, while Adivasi, or Indigenous, women are not. “Having more Adivasi neighbors leads to: (i) higher rates of Hindu women’s paid work and lower perceived stigma of such work; and (ii) lesser adherence to a range of purity norms, including the practice of untouchability towards Adivasis.” ( Agte and Bernhardt ) #FE

·        Does free childcare improve mothers’ careers? Yes. In Sao Paulo, Brazil, mothers in sub-districts with above median childcare availability have a persistent increase of 8 percent in earnings, driven by 1 percentage point higher labor force participation and 4 percent longer hours. ( Garcia, Latham-Proença, and Mello ) #FE

·        Can cash transfers influence gender roles? In Chad, cash transfers increased women’s business profits (0.6 SD) as well as marital separation. The program also “led to large improvements (0.3-0.7 SD) in a broad set of women’s subjective well-being, including self-efficacy, depressive symptoms, and perceived social status.” ( Kandpal, Schnitzer, and Dayé ) #RD

·        In Nigeria, women prefer to defer budget allocation decisions to their husband even when deferral is costly and is not observed by the husband; the reverse is true for husbands. A randomized cash transfer receipt increases women’s demand for agency: if the decision is hidden from the husband, women want to make their own budget decisions, even if it is the same as their husband’s. ( Bakhtiar et al. ) #LIF

·        Showing teachers in Pakistan a pro-women’s rights award-winning movie (the 2011 film Bol) increased their own and students’ support for women’s rights, being unbiased in gender Implicit Association Tests, and willingness to petition parliament for greater gender equality. ( Mehmood, Naseer, and Chen ) #RCT

·        Profiles for women who signal on an online Indian matchmaking site that they want to work after marriage receive up to 22 percent less interest from men than those of women who have never worked. Women willing to give up work after marriage face a lower penalty. ( Dhar ) #RCT

·        In Chile, informing outstanding students in mathematics and science about their relative performance and presenting STEM majors as a feasible option, led to women applying more, but only in health-related majors, and not in STEM majors. ( Ramirez-Espinosa ) #RCT

·        In Brazil, union bargaining that prioritized women’s needs increased female-centric amenities (like longer maternity leave with job protection) at work. These led to women queueing for jobs at treated establishments and separating from them less, which are both indicators of firm value. ( Corradini, Lagos, and Sharma ) #DID

·        While both gender barriers to occupational choices and wage penalties persist across countries, the “reduction in wage gaps between 1980-2000 was primarily driven by economic channels while the more recent decline between 2000-2015 was driven by changes in gender barriers.” ( Chiplunkar and Kleineberg ) #Other

·        “A program targeting ultra-poor women in Uganda” paired “business and entrepreneurship skills development with psychological empowerment.” It increased profits by 105 percent. ( Lang and Seither ) #RCT

·        Expansion of the coffee mills in Rwanda led to increased “women’s paid employment, women’s and their husbands’ earnings and decreases domestic violence.” Decline in violence is driven by women’s increased bargaining power and their contribution to household earnings, not exposure reduction between couples. ( Sanin ) #DID

·        Sharing a hyperlocal digital job search platform with couples as well as the wives' social networks in Delhi, India, increased husband's labor market outcomes (including working hours and total earnings), but only home-based self-employment among the women, potentially due to social norms. ( Afridi et al. ) #RCT

·        New data from more than 90 countries demonstrates three things: (1) the shift out of agriculture that happens as countries grow richer is driven by whole households (not just individuals within households), (2) "in the poorest countries, the gap between female and male market employment is only large for married urban women," and (3) "countries where employment rates of urban married women are low relative to their rural counterparts also see low urbanization rates of married men." ( Doss et al. ) #Other

·        In Kenya, workshops and couples’ therapy sessions to decrease alcohol consumption lowered prevalence of sexual intimate partner violence (IPV) by 0.21 standard deviations, with smaller or no effects on physical and emotional IPV. ( Castilla, Aqeel, and Murphy ) #RCT *

·        A 1985 change in Indian law discouraging the payment of dowries led to a 24 percent drop in dowry payments, but it also led to an 18 percent reduction in girls' education attainment (with no impact on boys' education). ( Jha ) #DID *

Working and saving

Banking and credit

·        In India "delinquent borrowers who are offered a debt moratorium by their lender are 4 percentage points (6.9 percent) less likely to default on their loan, while forbearance has no effect on repayment if it is granted by the regulator.” ( Fiorin, Hall, and Kanz ) #RCT

·        What are the household welfare gains from financial inclusion? Applying a new approach using demand estimates from three RCTs (on retirement savings in the United States, commitment savings in the Philippines, and microfinance in Mexico) , welfare gains per dollar lent or saved are small as compensated demand elasticities are large, but still correspond to large aggregate welfare gains from financial inclusion. ( Loeser ) #Other

·        In Ghana, microenterprises receiving joint liability loans reported higher profits six to ten months after borrowing. Effects are driven by borrowers whose applications were not endorsed by political party operatives. ( Boso, Burlando, and Abdul-Rahaman ) #FE

·        A self-help group lending program in rural Bihar, India, “significantly improved risk-sharing in regions where the program had greater institutional capacity and was better implemented.” ( Attanasio et al. ) #FE #IV

·        In Kenya, “performance-contingent microfinance contracts can encourage investment and increase profits – and, as a result, increase household consumption.” ( Cordaro et al. ) #RCT

·        In India, “plants exposed to banking shocks redistribute this liquidity through the supply chain. As a result, firms extending trade credit can increase their own sales as their customers are able to purchase on credit. Downstream firms are able to increase their own sales, employment, and productivity.” ( Chakraborty et al. ) #DID

·        In India, “risk pooling creates a distortion in consumption such that food consumption is better protected from aggregate village shocks than nonfood consumption.” ( Fafchamps and Shrinivas ) #Other

Cash transfers

·        Can cash transfers influence gender roles? In Chad, cash transfers increased women’s business profits (0.6 SD), and marital separation. The program also “led to large improvements (0.3-0.7 SD) in a broad set of women’s subjective well-being, including self-efficacy, depressive symptoms, and perceived social status.” ( Kandpal, Schnitzer, and Dayé ) #RD *

Firms and microenterprises

·        In India, “larger cultural proximity [by way of caste and religion] between a pair of firms reduces prices and fosters trade at both the intensive and extensive margins.” ( Fujiy, Khanna, and Toma ) #FE

·        After close elections in India, entrepreneurs from the same social group as the winning candidate are more likely to start businesses. ( Bhalla et al. ) #FE

·        Politically connected firms in India were more likely to get access to short-term credit from banks and to be able to delay short-term payments to suppliers and creditors during the surprise demonetization of 2016. ( Chen et al. ) #Other

·        Variation of COVID lockdowns over time and across parts of India reveal that inputs delivered by suppliers within the same industry are complements (rather than substitutes), which means that "shocks propagate through supply chains," increasing the shock to overall GDP. ( Fujiy, Ghose, and Khanna ) #FE

·        "Starting in 1997, India dismantled its policy of product reservation whereby hundreds of products had been reserved for exclusive production by small firms." The effect? "entry in the downstream product market increases with no observable decline in quality of entrants." ( Rastogi ) #Other

·        Inviting Zambian farmers to participate in a simple budgeting exercise (i.e., think through their budget and formulate a spending plan) increased how much they expected to spend for the coming year by 20-60 percent and lowered their willingness to pay for a nonessential item of clothing by 34 percent. By the end of the year, farmers decreased their expenditures by 15 percent and ended up with one additional month of savings. ( Augenblick et al. ) #RCT

·        A new way to measure productivity of retailers in low- or middle-income countries captures their three-fold need to attract customers, manage a storefront, and maintain inventory across many products. In Malawi, "the three dimensions of productivity are correlated with one another" but not perfectly, so that a training that focuses on just one may fail to boost overall productivity. ( Huntington ) #Other

·        In Mexico, a rise in gas prices led to an increase in mom-and-pop shops but "their average size and quality fell." ( Ramos-Menchelli and Sverdlin-Lisker ) #IV

·        Waiving competitive bidding for small-value purchases in Brazil led to 23 percent more expensive purchased products. At least half of this overpricing is explained by discretion allowing agencies to purchase higher-quality products. ( Fazio ) #FE

·        “A program targeting ultra-poor women in Uganda” paired “business and entrepreneurship skills development with psychological empowerment.” It increased profits by 105 percent. ( Lang and Seither ) #RCT *

Labor (including child labor)

·        A late 1990s labor market reform in China led to tens of millions of layoffs in a short period. That led to a drop in employment for workers who did not finish high school—by 20 percent in the industrial sector—and a 5 percent increase in the high school completion rate. ( Zhao ) #DID

·        “A 2014 Bolivian law that recognized the work of children as young as 10 years old, whose age placed them below the minimum working age of 14 years old, enabling them to legally work (subject to a work permit) while simultaneously extending benefits and protections to child workers” (such as adult minimum wages) actually decreased work for children under 14. ( Lakdawala, Martínez Heredia, and Vera-Cossio ) #Other

·        A federal policy that set minimum fares for drivers of motorcycle taxis on a ridesharing app in Indonesia led to higher trip prices but not driver earnings, both because more drivers signed on for any given day AND drivers logged onto the app for more hours, meaning that each driver got fewer rides. ( Nakamura and Siregar ) #DID #SC

·        Providing mentorship to vocational students in Uganda to help with their training-to-work transition increased their likelihood of working a few months later by more than a quarter and also boosted their incomes after a year. Why? It's mostly through info about how the entry-level job market works (not through referrals): As a result, mentored youth "turn down fewer job offers." ( Alfonsi, Namubiru, and Spaziani ) #RCT

·        College students in Mumbai, India, were less likely to share information about jobs if they knew they'd have to compete for them, and the men in particular tended not to share the information with the peers they viewed as having high abilities. ( Chiplunkar, Kelley, and Lane ) #RCT

·        Why do "workers in richer countries experience faster rates of wage growth over their lifetimes than workers in poorer countries"? Cross-country data suggest that workers in rich countries received more training from the firms they work for, and that this is a major component of workers' skills. "Firm-provided training accounts for 38% of cross-country wage growth differences." ( Ma, Nakab, Vidart ) #Other

·        Many interventions help workers with job searches. Doing that without increasing the number of jobs could limit the effectiveness of those interventions. On the other hand, "making it easier for firms to find qualified workers could reduce the cost of hiring" and generate more jobs. With an intervention to subsidize job searches for people in Ethiopia, the lack of jobs ends up limiting the effectiveness. ( Van Vuren ) #RCT

·        A survey in Accra, Ghana, showed that lots of job vacancies were not widely circulated, and---as a result---many employers are unable to find qualified workers during six months. But publishing detailed advertisements on a state-operated online portal increases both the likelihood of finding workers and of those workers being suitable for the jobs. ( Lambon-Quayefio et al. ) #RCT

·        The timing of when auctions for public procurement contracts end in Brazil is random, which permits comparison of winners and runners-up. "Winning a government contract increases wages." ( Carvalho, Galindo da Fonseca, and Santarrosa ) #IV

·        In rural Kenya, a “future orientation” workshop that teaches participants techniques to imagine a positive future, lay out concrete short-term steps to achieve their vision, and plan for obstacles, lifted aspirations and expectations. It led to increased labour supply and spending on productive inputs. The “intervention is at least twice as cost-effective as an (unconditional) cash transfer.” ( Orkin et al. ) #RCT

·        Peru shut down a bunch of low-quality universities in 2015. Graduates from surviving universities experienced an increase in wages and higher employment rates. ( Vivar, Flor-Toro, and Magnaricotte ) #DID *

·        Does free childcare improve mothers’ careers? Yes. In Sao Paulo, mothers in sub-districts with above median childcare availability have a persistent increase of 8 percent in earnings, driven by 1 percentage point higher labor force participation and 4 percent longer hours. ( Garcia, Latham-Proença, and Mello ) #FE *

·        Can temporary foreign work permits “throttle human smugglers’ businesses? “Combining internal and external controls with a regulated market for temporary visas alleviates the policy trade-off between migration control and ending human smuggling.” Data from migration between Senegal & Spain and the Democratic Republic of the Congo & South Africa. ( Auriol, Mesnard, and Perrault ) #Other *

·        Pairing employers in Uganda with a refugee and providing an incentive to offer a free internship to that refugee "improves employers’ beliefs about refugees’ skills, but it does not change their willingness to hire new refugees," but certain types of matches (depending on employer and refugee characteristics) do result in more refugee hires. ( Loiacono and Silva-Vargas ) #RCT *

·        Expansion of the coffee mills in Rwanda led to increased “women’s paid employment, women’s and their husbands’ earnings and decreases domestic violence.” Decline in violence is driven by women’s increased bargaining power and their contribution to household earnings, not exposure reduction between couples. ( Sanin ) #DID *

·        Sharing a hyperlocal digital job search platform with couples as well as the wives' social networks in Delhi, India, increased husband's labor market outcomes (including working hours and total earnings), but only home-based self-employment among the women, potentially due to social norms. ( Afridi et al. ) #RCT *

·        Giving a widely known award "to top performers on a mandatory nationwide exam in Colombia" boosts their earnings by between 7 and 12 percent, and the effect endures for 5 years after graduation. It helps students graduating from low-reputation colleges the most. ( Busso, Montaño, Muñoz-Morales ) #RD *

·        New data from more than 90 countries demonstrates three things: (1) the shift out of agriculture that happens as countries grow richer is driven by whole households (not just individuals within households), (2) "in the poorest countries, the gap between female and male market employment is only large for married urban women," and (3) "countries where employment rates of urban married women are low relative to their rural counterparts also see low urbanization rates of married men." ( Doss et al. ) #Other *

Poverty Measurement

·        Poverty is often measured using annual income. But using monthly data from India shows that “experiences of poverty are substantially more common than annual measures suggest; entry into and exit from poverty are much less clear than typically assumed;” and the use of monthly poverty measures “is a stronger predictor of development outcomes – child weight and height – than conventional” annual measures. ( Merfeld and Morduch ) #Other

·        Are poverty lines real? This study articulates social and theoretical underpinnings for such a distinction between the poor and the nonpoor. ( Dutta et al. )

·        Many social programs identify their beneficiaries collaboratively with multiple community members together. Comparing the judgments that the same individuals make about who to target when they’re deciding collaboratively versus individually in Indonesia suggests that gains from collaborative targeting are negligible. “These results suggest that policymakers should think carefully before asking community members to invest valuable time in participating in [community-based targeting] exercises.” ( Trachtman ) #Other

Governments, institutions, and conflict

Conflict and crime

·        A national-level electoral reform in Mexico that increased politicians’ cost of accepting bribes decreased the number of suspicious financial reports by around 4 percent ( ∼ 650 fewer reports), while the number of attacks by violent groups increased by approximately 2 percent ( ∼ 44 more attacks), in places with the presence of criminal organizations. ( Rámon Enríquez ) #DID

·        How does ethnic violence and subsequent segregation shape children’s lives? In India, Muslims perform better in cities that were more susceptible to (Hindu) communal violence in terms of early education outcomes. ( Kalra ) #PSM

·        In India, judges are more likely to convict offenders in cases of sexual crimes (excluding rape) if they are exposed to more media coverage about sexual crimes that are unrelated to the case on trial. A central mechanism behind this result is heightened judicial scrutiny in response to greater media coverage. ( Vasishth ) #DID

·        During WWII, nine ethnic groups were entirely deported from the Soviet Union to Central Asia. In the 50s, five returned to their former homeland, while the other four remained marginalized in internal exile. Locals in host regions had significantly higher levels of education two generations later. “A strong positive effect on higher education is found among returnees to origin regions, suggesting that these ethnic groups hedged against further negative shocks.” ( Zimmermann ) #IV *

·        In Colombia, close family connections in the public administration are pervasive and they weaken performance. “Connected bureaucrats receive higher salaries and are more likely to be hierarchically promoted but are negatively selected in terms of public sector experience, education, and records of misconduct.” A 2015 anti-nepotism legislation had limited effectiveness. ( Riaño ) #RCT

·        In China, after a high-profile corruption inspection, labor “strikes experienced a twofold increase within six months and a threefold increase in two years.” ( Chen ) #Other

·        Reducing corruption in China "induces positive selection for integrity and public-mindedness into the state sector, which remains present even when conditioning on ability and family background." ( Hong ) #DID

·        Do autocrats favor their supporters during economic shocks? The Maduro regime was more likely to exempt regime-supporting regions affected by the Venezuelan blackout from later power rationing. In Sub-Saharan Africa, “droughts magnify differences in development, protests and state-coercion outcomes in favor of leaders’ home regions.” ( Morales-Arilla ) #FE

·        In Brazil, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of Pentecostals increased Evangelical and far-right candidates’ vote share by 18 percent and 16 percent, respectively. These effects are larger in municipalities with less educated, poorer, and more rural populations. ( Solá Cámpora ) #DID

·        During a social media ban at the climax of the Uganda 2021 election campaign, those maintaining access through the use of virtual private networks (VPNs)—who are more likely to be opposition partisans—came to view the dominant National Resistance Mmovement party relatively positively. This is driven by an increase in pro-NRM social media content during the ban. ( Bowles, Marshall, and Raffler ) #DID

Taxes and subsidies

·        Simulations suggest that removing subsidies for electric vehicles in China would raise the effective marginal costs of vehicle production, reducing total welfare by 7.4 billion yuan (RMB) per quarter, amounting to 13.9 percent of the total subsidy expenditure. ( Kwon ) #IV

·        In South Africa, "firms with paid tax practitioners exhibit sharper bunching, driven primarily by a lower lumpiness parameter rather than by a different income elasticity." ( Anagol et al. ) #Other

·        In Liberia, creating a new property database and including identifying information from it (the name of the owner and a property photograph) in tax bills more than quadruples the tax payment rate, from 2 percent to almost 10 percent, when the notice also includes details on the penalties for noncompliance. Compliance goes up even more when the tax bill warns delinquent property owners that they’re in the “next batch” of properties designated for “intensive follow-up.” ( Okunogbe ) #RCT

·        An increase in the subsidy for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in India leads to a surprising decrease in LNG purchases by poor households. Why? The subsidy goes up when the market price rises—i.e., the government keeps the price to consumers stable—but consumers only receive the subsidy as a refund a few days after they purchase the LNG, and “poor households may find it difficult to pay the higher unsubsidized price upfront.” ( Afridi, Barnwal, and Sarkar ) #FE

Regulation and government

·        In Argentina, “serving in the military leads to stronger national identity and openness to fellow countrymen several decades after serving.” ( Ronconi and Ramos-Toro ) #FE

·        In Pakistan, policymakers who received a special training in econometrics are twice as likely to actually choose policies for which there is evidence from randomized controlled trials. They triple the funding for those same policies. ( Mehmood, Naseer, and Chen ) #RCT

·        In Brazil, state judges with higher grades on admission examinations perform better than their lower-ranked peers. ( Dahis, Schiavon, and Scot ) #FE

·        In India, improving the maintenance of fee-funded community toilets improved delivery and reduced free riding, but excludes a share of residents from using the service. ( Armand et al. ) #RCT

·        In, Kenya’s nationwide electrification program, imposing audits improved network size, voltage, household connectivity, and electricity usage at African Development Bank (AfDB) sites. (World Bank sites already had lots of inspections, so random audits didn’t affect those.) The World Bank’s procedures delayed construction at the average site by 9.6 months relative to AfDB sites but improved construction quality by 0.6 standard deviations. ( Wolfram et al. ) #RCT

·        In Bihar, India, instituting a complaint filing system for politicians who run into bureaucratic obstacles in the implementation of their projects led to a 26 percent rise in the implementation of public projects in constituencies run by low-caste local politicians. ( Kumar and Sharan ) #RCT

·        Informing government agents about illegal (gold) mining in Colombia, reduced illegal mining by 11 percent in the disclosed locations and surrounding areas. ( Saavedra ) #ML

·        In India, switching the approving authority of economic development projects that require forest diversion from central to state government “leads to a modestly adverse impact on forest conservation while approving lower quality development work.” ( Chiplunkar and Das ) #DID

·        When two districts in India share groundwater resources, extraction is more likely to be unsustainable and districts are more likely to have defunct wells. ( Bhogale and Khedgikar ) #DID

Agriculture, infrastructure, and the environment

Agriculture and land

·        In Mozambique, contract farming has spillover effects: “both contracted farmers and non-contracted farmers from villages with contracted farmers earn approximately 11 percent more in price per kilogram of maize” than farmers in areas without contract farming. ( Ingram ) #FE

·        The vanilla price boom in Madagascar led to increased asset accumulation and higher informal savings, improved performance on cognitive tests, well-being, and optimism. There were positive effects for smallholder vanilla farmers, but without spillover benefits on non-producing households. ( Boone, Kaila, and Sahn ) #FE

·        In Rwanda, using text messages to remind agricultural extension workers of their self-set goals increased their performance by 0.08 SD. ( Abel et al. ) #RCT

·        How do rural marketplaces shape local development? In Kenya, “while rural population quadrupled, two thirds of weekly markets operating in 1970 no longer do so today.” Population concentrated around markets that were active in 1970, and markets further from large cities saw the most population concentration. ( von Carnap ) #FE

·        If you rely on farmer reports on what seeds they’re using in Ethiopia, you’ll see apparently small, negative returns to using new seed varieties. But that’s because farmers are including “older and genetically diluted varieties, for which” they “may be paying a premium.” If you just look at seed varieties with “higher-purity germplasm, drought-tolerant maize, and newly released varieties,” you do see positive returns. ( Michuda et al. ) #Other

·        How much is one farmer in Uganda willing to pay for their neighbor to use a pest-control technology? A “novel incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism” finds that “a farmer’s willingness-to-pay for one other farmer [to use the technology] is equal to two days’ wage on average, about half the willingness-to-pay for self.” ( Lerva ) #RCT

·        Maybe farmers don’t train their workers in modern planting technologies because they know they won’t get all the benefits of that training: the workers may go and use it somewhere else. In Burundi, providing a contract that guaranteed farmers the benefit from training their workers increased farmers’ willingness to train their workers by about 90 percentage points! ( Cefala et al. ) #RCT

·        In Odisha, India, villages with more variation in castes have lower adoption of flood-resistant seeds. Adoption is more likely to spread within castes and less likely to spread to castes with lower status. ( de Janvry, Rao, and Sadoulet ) #RCT

·        In India, bureaucrats who are assigned to their home states decrease protests or riots in opposition to land acquisition projects by 9-12 percent. ( Tóth ) #DID #RD

·        Lake Chad shrunk by 90 percent between the 1960s and the late 1980s: the reduced water supply had negative effects for neighboring communities in Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger—25 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population—on fishing, in addition to farming and herding which outweighed any positive land supply effects. ( Jedwab et al. ) #DID

Climate and pollution

·        Lake Chad shrunk by 90 percent between the 1960s and the late 1980s: the reduced water supply had negative effects for neighboring communities in Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger—25 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population—on fishing, in addition to farming and herding which outweighed any positive land supply effects. ( Jedwab et al. ) #DID *

·        Households from heavily damaged communities in Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami saw a 75 percent decline in real wealth immediately after the tsunami. The large adverse effects persisted 10 years after the tsunami. ( Lombardo et al.) #FE

·        In India and Pakistan, the incidence of fires from crop burning drops by 10 percent when air pollution is likely to be borne by the bureaucrats’ own constituents. “Reduction in fires is present or larger when bureaucrats can better monitor (due to road proximity) or manage fires (due to changes in experience during a turnover), and when they have incentives to act (e.g., when pollution is most visible).” ( Dipoppa and Gulzar ) #DID

·        In utero exposure to high ocean salinity levels (induced by climate change) reduces a child’s height-for-age z-score in Bangladesh, and increased prevalence of stunting and severe stunting due to nutritional deficiencies by age five. ( Guimbeau et al. ) #FE *

Infrastructure

·        In Kenya and Ethiopia, the “impact of bundled road and electricity investments on reducing the sectoral employment share in agriculture is … 2.5 times larger than the impact of roads alone.” ( Dappe and Lebrand ) #FE #IV

·        Aerial bundled cables (an infrastructure improvement) in Karachi, Pakistan, reduced utility losses and increased revenue recovery, with the greatest gains in the worst-performing areas pre-intervention. Gains come via two channels: the formalization of customers previously informally (illegally) connected and the improvement in payment behaviors among existing, formal consumers. ( Ahmad et al. ) #DID

·        A large-scale roll-out of electric transmission infrastructure in Nigeria from 2009 to 2015 increased individuals’ likelihood of migrating by 6 percent and reduced household size by 0.8 individuals, mainly driven by young adults and older teenagers. ( Budjan ) #DID #IV

·        How does transportation infrastructure investment affect spatial inequality of opportunity in Benin, Cameroon, and Mali? “On average only 6 of the top 10 aggregate opportunity-increasing roads also decrease inequality of opportunity.” ( Milsom ) #IV

·        In Dakar, Senegal, it can be hard to find someone to desludge your septic pit. Providing subsidies to use a government run call center to connect households with desludgers increases use, and that use continues for a while after the subsidies end. Later, a city-wide subsidy increased adoption most in those communities that had received subsidies earlier. ( Deutschmann ) #RCT *

Macroeconomics

Growth and inequality

·        Gaining subnational capital status leads to an influx of public investments, an increased population, skilled migration and foreign investments, with positive spillovers to nearby cities. ( Bluhm, Lessmann, and Schaudt ) #FE #DID

·        In China, state-level special economic zones (SEZs)—"geographically delimited areas targeted by governments to implement” policies like tax incentives, government innovation grants, and policies that favor human capital mobility—"have a positive and significant impact on patent output,” but SEZs established at geographic areas smaller than the state don’t have significant impacts. ( Wu, Lu, and Zhao ) #DID

·        Initial foreign direct investment into China “was mainly driven by the Chinese diaspora,” particularly to prefectures in China that members of the diaspora came from. Later, foreign investment that didn’t come from the diaspora was more likely to enter those same prefectures. ( Chen, Xiong, and Zhang ) #DID

·        “Countries are more likely to enter ‘nearby’ industries, i.e., industries that require fewer new occupations.” Also, “countries are more likely to diversify into products that require fewer new inputs,” which means that countries can get stuck on particular paths in their quest toward industrial development, “with certain routes leading to stagnation and others on a pathway to prosperity.” ( Diodato, Hausmann, and Schetter ) #Other

·        “The construction process of many residential buildings in African cities proceeds very slowly and may take over a decade.” Data from Nairobi plus a new theoretical model suggest that “improvements in credit provision can (a) substantially speed up the expansion of the aggregate housing stock which facilitates rural-urban migration, and (b) increase the city’s density by enabling the construction of taller buildings.” ( Gomtsyan ) #Other

·        Giving information about market prices and official border costs to traders in Kenya increases switches across markets and routes, leading to a large improvement in traders’ profits and significant formalization of trade. ( Wiseman ) #RCT

·        Can temporary trade disruptions lead to a persistent change in domestic trade? Yes. In India, COVID-19 induced lockdowns led to a collapse in trade across states, driven by plants reorienting “trade towards their home states to ... insure against any future disruptions.” ( Chakrabati, Mahajan, and Tomar ) #DID

·        The 2001 US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement reduced US import tariffs from Vietnam, leading to rapid Vietnamese export growth with “entry responses, driven by foreign and Vietnamese private firms. Entrants—rather than incumbents—drive the tariff-induced employment growth, particularly foreign entrants.” ( McCaig, Pavcnik, and Wong ) #FE

·        The tariff reduction from the U.S-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement decreased school attendance and increased children’s work, mainly in non-wage and household business jobs. Effects were stronger for boys, older children and households where the head had little education. ( Nguyen ) #DID *

·        In India, “larger cultural proximity [by way of caste and religion] between a pair of firms reduces prices and fosters trade at both the intensive and extensive margins.” ( Fujiy, Khanna, and Toma ) #FE *

The order of authors on this blog was determined by a virtual coin flip. This blog post benefited from research assistance from Amina Mendez Acosta .

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Advances in Empirical Economic Research

2022 International Conference on Applied Economics (ICOAE), Madrid, Spain, July 7-9, 2022

• Conference proceedings
• © 2023
• Nicholas Tsounis 0 ,
• Aspasia Vlachvei 1

Department of Economics, University of Western Macedonia, Kastoria, Greece

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• Examines applications in microeconomics, macroeconomics, financial economics, agricultural economics
• Features country specific studies with economic policy conclusions

Part of the book series: Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics (SPBE)

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• Empirical Macroeconomics
• Empirical Financial Economics
• Empirical Microeconomics
• Empirical International Economics
• Empirical Marketing

Table of contents (63 papers)

Front matter, strategic agility and success perception of polish smes: an alternative operationalization to pre-covid-19 and covid-19 business conditions.

• Tomasz Sikora, Ewa Baranowska-Prokop

R&D Cooperation of Firms and Product Market Competition: An Overview

• Jacek Prokop

Market Restrictions of Contracting Out the Public Service at the Municipal Level

• Beáta Mikušová Meričková, Daniela Mališová, Kristína Murínová

Description and Categorisation of Agriculture Holdings in the Region of Western Macedonia

• Theodoros Siogkas, Katerina Melfou, Athanasios Ragkos, Apostolos Polymeros

Debt and Taxes as Value-Added Factors for Multinational Enterprises: International Policy Implications

• Juan José Durán-Herrera, Prosper Lamothe-Fernández

Modelling and Forecasting GDP of Greece with a Modified Exponential Smoothing State Space Framework

• Melina Dritsaki, Chaido Dritsaki

Last Mile and Blockchain: Opportunities and Challenges

• Rafael Villa, Marta Serrano, Tomás García

Total Factor Productivity and Entrepreneurship: Creative Self-Destruction

• Jose Maria Sevilla Llewellyn-Jones

Generation Z Intention to Comply with Non-mandatory Government Measures for Self-protection of COVID-19 and SARS-CoV-2 Variants After Restriction Withdrawals

• Irene (Eirini) Kamenidou, Aikaterini Stavrianea, Spyridon Mamalis, Evangelia-Zoe Bara, Ifigeneia Mylona, Stavros Pavlidis

The Spatial Distribution of the Population in Peninsular Spain: An Evolution of a Permanent Nature

• Daniel del Castillo Soto, Thomas Baumert

Food Waste in Greece: An Empirical Study

• Electra Pitoska, Grana Vaya

Success Factors in Public–Private Partnership of High-Speed Railway Infrastructures: Elements for Improvement

• Mario González-Medrano, Tomás García Martín, José-María Rotellar-García

Holistic Evaluation of Technology Transfer Extension Programmes

• Evropi-Sofia Dalampira, Ioannis Tsoukalidis, Dimitra Lazaridou, Smaragda Nikouli, Anastasios Livadiotis, Anastasios Michailidis

E-Banking Loyalty and Its Background: A Bibliometric Analysis

• Natacha López-Hernando, Cristina Loranca-Valle, Pedro Cuesta-Valiño

Evaluating European Climate Policy Impact on the CO2 Emissions Per Capita Convergence Process in the European Union Countries

• Dionisio Ramírez-Carrera, Gemma Durán-Romero, Ana M. López, José Antonio Negrín de la Peña

The Economics of Civil Orders and Medals in Spain: An Update After Ten Years

• Thomas Baumert, Beatriz Luceño-Ramos

‘Ctrl+Supr’ Versus ‘Shift+Comp’ Industrialization and Business Services as Engine of Economic Growth

• Andrés Maroto Sánchez

Measuring Stakeholders’ Influence on Business Performance: Case of Slovakia

• Yaroslav Lysenko, Juraj Medzihorsky, Zdenka Musova

Testing for Sequences and Reversals on Bitcoin Series

• Prodromos Tsinaslanidis, Francisco Guijarro

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Editors and affiliations.

Nicholas Tsounis, Aspasia Vlachvei

About the editors

Nicholas Tsounis is a Professor of Economic Analysis at the Department of Economics, University of Western Macedonia (Greece) and an adjunct faculty member at the Hellenic Open University (Greece). His research interests are on international economics, economics of tourism and computational economics. He has published many articles in international scientific periodicals and conferences proceedings as well as books. He is the co-founder of the International Conference on Applied Economics (ICOAE).

Aspasia Vlachvei is Professor of Marketing at the Department of Economics, University of Western Macedonia (Greece). Her research interests focus on international marketing strategies, competitiveness, wine tourism and wine marketing, e-marketing, social media. She has published many articles in international scientific periodicals and conferences proceedings as well as books. She is the co-founder of the International Conference on Applied Economics (ICOAE).

Bibliographic Information

Book Title : Advances in Empirical Economic Research

Book Subtitle : 2022 International Conference on Applied Economics (ICOAE), Madrid, Spain, July 7-9, 2022

Editors : Nicholas Tsounis, Aspasia Vlachvei

Series Title : Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22749-3

Publisher : Springer Cham

eBook Packages : Economics and Finance , Economics and Finance (R0)

Copyright Information : The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

Hardcover ISBN : 978-3-031-22748-6 Published: 21 July 2023

Softcover ISBN : 978-3-031-22751-6 Due: 29 October 2023

eBook ISBN : 978-3-031-22749-3 Published: 19 July 2023

Series ISSN : 2198-7246

Series E-ISSN : 2198-7254

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : XII, 1011

Number of Illustrations : 22 b/w illustrations, 140 illustrations in colour

Topics : Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods , International Economics , Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics

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Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand which issues the public views as most important for the president and Congress to prioritize in the coming year. For this analysis, we surveyed 5,128 U.S. adults in January 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology .

Here are the questions used for the report , along with responses, and its methodology .

As the coronavirus pandemic enters its third year, more Americans view strengthening the U.S. economy as a top policy priority than say the same about dealing with COVID-19.

This marks a shift from last year , when the economy and the coronavirus both topped the public’s policy agenda.

At a time when Americans rate several issues as lower priorities than they did a year ago, the decline in the share citing the pandemic has been particularly steep: 60% now view dealing with the coronavirus as a top policy priority, down from 78% last year.

Currently, 71% of U.S. adults rate strengthening the economy as a top policy priority, followed by reducing health care costs (61%), addressing the coronavirus (60%), improving education (58%) and securing Social Security (57%) – according to a Pew Research Center survey of 5,128 adults conducted Jan. 10-17, 2022, on the nationally representative American Trends Panel . Smaller shares view seven of the 18 items included in the survey as top policy priorities than did so last year (four items increased).

The public’s policy agenda reflects continued concerns over the economy. With inflation at a four-decade high, large majorities of Americans say prices for food and consumer goods (89%), gas prices (82%) and the cost of housing (79%) are worse than they were a year ago. Only 28% rate economic conditions as excellent or good.

Still, fewer Americans cite strengthening the economy as a top priority than did so in 2021 (71% now vs. 80% then), and there has been a sizable decline in concern about jobs. Only about half of Americans view improving the job situation as a top priority (52%), compared with 67% last year. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, there had been a long-term decline in the shares citing the economy and jobs as top policy priorities.

As in the past, Republicans and Democrats differ on the importance of most policy priorities, but the partisan gaps have widened significantly for 11 of the 18 items included in the survey – including double-digit increases in partisan differences on dealing with immigration, improving the political system, improving the job situation and addressing issues within the criminal justice system.

Among those items that rank near the bottom on the 18-item priorities list today are addressing issues around race (37% top priority), strengthening the military (also 37%), dealing with global trade (35%) and dealing with drug addiction (31%). Notably, majorities rate all of these policy goals either as a “top priority” for the president and Congress or as “an important but lower priority”; for each, relatively small shares say they are “not too important” or “should not be done.” (For a closer look at the top policy priorities of partisan and demographic groups, see the detailed tables accompanying this report ).

Changing public priorities: Economy, coronavirus, jobs

While the economy continues to lead the public’s list of priorities, there has been a decline in the share of Americans, especially Democrats, who view it as a top policy priority. The share of Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party who say strengthening the economy should be a top priority has fallen from 75% a year ago to 63% today.

By contrast, there has been almost no change in views among Republicans and GOP leaners (85% top priority then, 82% today).

Democrats also are less likely to rate improving the job situation as a top priority than they did last January, before President Joe Biden took office. Last year, 71% of Democrats said jobs should be a top priority; today, only about half of Democrats say this (49%). The decline has been more modest among Republicans (from 63% to 55%).

Dealing with the coronavirus outbreak is viewed as a less important priority than last year. A year ago, 78% of the public said it was a top priority; today, that share has fallen to 60%. The decline is steeper among Republicans than Democrats – 60% said the pandemic was a top priority a year ago compared with 35% today – but fewer Democrats also still view it as a major priority (93% last year, 80% now).

Republicans are more likely to rate dealing with immigration and reducing the budget deficit as top priorities than did so last year, while there has been little change in views on the importance of these issues among Democrats.

A year ago, identical shares of Republicans and Democrats (39% each) said dealing with the issue of immigration should be a top priority. Today, two-thirds of Republicans (67%) view immigration as a top priority, compared with just 35% of Democrats.

The share of Republicans who prioritize reducing the budget deficit also increased from 54% to 63%, while holding stable among Democrats (29% then vs. 31% now).

Other issues have declined as policy priorities among members of both parties since last year. The share of Americans who say addressing issues around race should be a top priority for the president and Congress has fallen from 49% to 37%. Currently, 53% of Democrats say addressing issues around race should be a top priority, compared with 72% who said the same last year. Among Republicans, who were far less likely than Democrats to rate this as a priority, there has been a 10 percentage point decline in the share rating it as a top priority (24% to 14%).

Dealing with the problems of poor people has declined as a policy priority as well. Both Republicans (25% now vs. 35% in 2021) and Democrats (58% now vs. 68% then) are now less likely to see dealing with the problems low-income families face as a top priority – though Democrats continue to prioritize this policy area far more than Republicans.

There also has been a decline in the share of the public saying that improving the political system should be a top policy priority, largely driven by Republicans. Last year, there was essentially no difference between the shares in each party who viewed improving the political system as a top priority (64% of Democrats and 60% of Republicans). Now, just 40% in the GOP say this should be a top priority, compared with 61% of Democrats.

Widest partisan gaps on addressing climate change and the coronavirus

While there are wide partisan differences on most priorities, 82% of Republicans and a smaller majority of Democrats (63%) say strengthening the economy should be a top priority for the president and Congress. Among 18 items, the economy is by far the leading priority among Republicans and is among the leading priorities for Democrats.

Comparable shares in both parties also say taking steps to make the Social Security system financially sound (58% of Republicans, 56% of Democrats) and dealing with drug addiction (32% of Democrats, 27% of Republicans) should be top priorities.

On most other issues, however, there are substantial partisan differences – especially on dealing with global climate change and the coronavirus outbreak. Large majorities of Democrats say both should be top priorities (80% coronavirus, 65% climate change) compared with just 35% and 11% of Republicans, respectively.

Beyond the economy, Republicans say the president and Congress should prioritize dealing with immigration (67%), defending against terrorism (65%), reducing the budget deficit (63%) and reducing crime (60%).

Republicans are, on average, about 25 points more likely than Democrats to say each of these issues should be at the top of the national policy agenda.

In addition to strengthening the economy, Democrats’ leading priorities are dealing with the coronavirus (80%), reducing health care costs (69%), improving education (66%) and dealing with global climate change (65%). These issues are far less salient for Republicans: Democrats are on average about 33 points more likely than Republicans to rate each as a top priority.

Policy priorities of Black, Hispanic and White Americans

Across racial and ethnic lines, strengthening the economy ranks near the top of the policy agenda. About seven-in-ten White (72%), Black (69%) and Hispanic (70%) adults say this should be a top priority this year.

But there are significant differences in the importance of a number of other issues, especially addressing issues around race, dealing with the problems of poor people and addressing the criminal justice system.

Black adults (66%) are more likely than either White (27%) or Hispanic adults (47%) to say that addressing issues around race should be a top priority.

In addition, about two-thirds of Black adults say dealing with the problems associated with poverty (68%) and criminal justice reform (67%) should get top priority this year, compared with around four-in-ten White adults who say this for both issues. Hispanic Americans express views closer to Black adults on dealing with poverty (55% of Hispanic adults say it should be top priority), but their views are closer to those of White adults on criminal justice reform (48%).

Among Democrats and Democratic leaners, Black adults are more likely than White or Hispanic adults to rate a number of issues as top policy priorities.

For example, 70% of Black Democrats rate reducing crime as a top priority, compared with 56% of Hispanic Democrats and just 34% of White Democrats. Black Democrats (71%) also are almost twice as like as White Democrats (38%) to say that addressing the criminal justice system should be a top priority; 53% of Hispanic Democrats see this as a major priority.

Dealing with climate change is the only issue which White Democrats (68%) are more likely than Black Democrats (58%) to view as a top priority.

Age and policy priorities

There are wide age differences in views of policy priorities, with older adults more likely than younger people to rate several policy priorities as more important.

There are some exceptions to this pattern, however. For example, adults under 30 (54%) are more likely to say global climate change should be a top priority than older age groups.

The widest gaps between older and younger adults are on strengthening the military and defending against terrorism. About half of adults ages 50 and older (52%) say that strengthening the military should be a top priority. Just 10% of adults under age 30 say the same. Similarly, about three-quarters of adults ages 65 and older say that defending against terrorism should be a top priority, compared with about a third of those under 30. Within both parties, older Americans are more likely to prioritize defense issues ( see detailed tables ).

Older adults are also more likely than younger adults to prioritize dealing with immigration, securing Social Security and strengthening the economy.

While the share of the public who says that dealing with the coronavirus outbreak should be a top priority has fallen in the last year, this decline is larger among younger Americans.

A year ago, three-quarters of adults under 50 said dealing with the coronavirus should be a top priority; today, about half (54%) say the same. There has been a similar decline among adults ages 50 to 64 who view COVID-19 as a top priority (80% in 2021, 61% today).

Older Americans are only somewhat less likely to say that dealing with the pandemic should be a top priority (80% a year ago, 72% today).

While there is a large partisan gap in views of the coronavirus as a top priority, there are also age differences within each party. Older adults in each party are generally more likely to prioritize the coronavirus than younger ones.

Today, Republicans across all ages are at least 20 points less likely than they were a year ago to say that dealing with the coronavirus outbreak should be a top priority. However, Republicans ages 65 and older are somewhat more likely to rate dealing with the coronavirus as a top goal than Republicans under 65 (44% vs. 32%).

While overwhelming majorities of Democrats ages 65 and older are as likely to say that dealing with the coronavirus should be a top priority as they were a year ago, younger Democrats are less likely to say this over the same timespan. Democrats under 50 are 17 points less likely to rate dealing with COVID-19 as a top priority (90% then, 73% now) and Democrats ages 50 to 64 are 14 points less likely to say this (99% then, 85% now).

Gender and policy priorities

Women place a higher priority than men on several policy goals, especially around the coronavirus and dealing with the problems of poor people.

Nearly two-thirds of women (65%) say that dealing with the coronavirus outbreak should be a top priority for the president and Congress this year. A smaller share of men (54%) say the same.

About half of women also say that dealing with the issue of poverty should be a top priority, while men are 10 points less likely to say this.

Larger shares of women than men also say reducing health care costs, improving education, addressing issues around race and dealing with drug addiction should be top priorities in the year ahead.

There are three topics – dealing with global trade issues, reducing the budget deficit and dealing with immigration – that men view as higher priorities than do women.

Education and policy priorities

There are substantial differences in views of policy priorities by education. Adults who do not have a four-year college degree are more likely to view several goals as top policy priorities.

Roughly four-in-ten Americans without a college degree (42%) say that strengthening the military should be a top priority, compared with about a quarter (26%) of those with a college degree.

Similarly, nearly two-thirds of those without a college degree (63%) say securing Social Security should be a top priority for the president and Congress. Less than half of those with a college degree (44%) say that issue should be a top priority.

Adults with less formal education are also more likely to prioritize many of these issues as top priorities, such as defending against terrorism, reducing crime, dealing with drug addiction, improving the job situation and reducing the budget deficit.

There are two issues – dealing with the coronavirus outbreak and dealing with climate change – where those with more formal education are more likely to say this issue should be a top priority.

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Three Key Facts from the Center for Microeconomic Data’s 2022 Student Loan Update

Editor’s Note: The data file linked at the bottom of this post, which summarizes who holds student loans along with characteristics of these balances, has been updated through the fourth quarter of 2022. The text of the blog post has been updated to reflect the latest data. (September   22, 2023 )

Daniel Mangrum, Joelle Scally, and Crystal Wang

Today, researchers from the Center for Microeconomic Data released the 2022 Student Loan Update, which contains statistics summarizing who holds student loans along with characteristics of these balances. To compute these statistics, we use the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel (CCP), a nationally representative 5 percent sample of all U.S. adults with an Equifax credit report. For this update, we focus on individuals with a student loan on their credit report. The update is linked here and shared in the student debt section of the Center for Microeconomic Data’s website. In this post, we highlight three facts from the current student loan landscape.

Fact 1: More borrowers are facing growing balances

On pages 4 and 5 of the 2022 Student Loan Update, we classify student loan borrowers into four mutually exclusive categories, according to the evolution of their balances from the balance a year prior:

• Those who are current on their account and their balance is smaller,
• Those who are current on their account, but their balance is either the same or higher,
• Those with a student loan that is ninety or more days past due, and
• Those with a loan in default.

Over the past decade (but prior to the COVID-19 pandemic), the share of borrowers in each of these categories was relatively stable—around 37 percent of borrowers had declining balances, around 47 percent of borrowers had either flat or increasing balances, and around 15 percent of borrowers were in delinquency or default. However, average balances have not been similar across these categories. In 2019, the average balance of those with a declining balance was smaller ($22,342) than those with an increasing balance ($44,993).

The federal response to the pandemic for federal student loan borrowers upended these proportions. The share of borrowers with flat or growing balances increased from 48 percent at the end of 2019 to 66 percent at the end of 2021. Meanwhile, the share of borrowers with a delinquent or defaulted loan was halved from 15 percent to 7.5 percent as federal borrowers were not required to make payments and most delinquent borrowers were automatically marked current.

To better understand individual borrower behavior, we present a flow chart below that shows the share of borrowers who moved across categories between the end of 2019 and the end of 2021. For simplicity, we restrict attention to borrowers who had a student loan on their credit report at the end of 2019. The share of borrowers with a declining balance reduced from 37.1 percent to 25.5 percent, fueled by a large transition to the flat or increasing category following the pandemic forbearance. However, 10.3 percent of borrowers moved from the flat or increasing category to the decreasing or no reported loan category (this category includes those whose loans were paid in full, forgiven, or charged off). This shift is likely due to borrowers taking advantage of the payment freeze and interest waiver to reduce balances during the pandemic. Additionally, many borrowers who were delinquent or defaulted were able to move to current. For delinquent borrowers eligible for pandemic forbearance, this status change was achieved automatically. Meanwhile, many defaulted borrowers were able to rehabilitate their loans during the pandemic forbearance without having to make monthly payments. On net, the size of the “same or higher” pool of borrowers increased by over 7 percentage points, or roughly 3.2 million borrowers, over the course of the pandemic. Additionally, 12.3 percent of borrowers (5.4 million) who had a student loan at the end of 2019 no longer had a student loan on record at the end of 2021.

More the Half of Student Loan Borrowers’ Balances Are Not Declining

Fact 2: Credit scores for student loan borrowers increased dramatically during the pandemic

Page 6 of the 2022 Student Loan Update shows the total number of borrowers by credit score groups (see also the chart below). Credit scores here are Equifax Risk Scores, which are comparable to FICO credit scores. Borrowers are separated into groups by credit score: below 620, from 620-659, from 660-719, from 720-759, or over 760. Pre-pandemic years saw small declines in the share of borrowers with scores below 620, from 40 percent in 2011 to 36 percent in 2019. Meanwhile, those in the two highest credit score groups increased from 25 percent of student loan borrowers to 29 percent over that period. After the pandemic, subprime borrowers (those with scores below 620) dropped 8 percentage points to 28 percent of the total in 2021, while the share of borrowers with scores of 660-719 increased 2.5 percentage points to 24.6 percent and the share of super-prime borrowers (those with scores of 720+) increased by 5 percentage points to 34 percent. The share of balances held by super-prime borrowers increased over the pandemic from 27.1 percent ($236 billion) of student loan debt in 2011 to 32.1 percent ($482 billion) in 2019, and then to 38.7 percent ($609 billion) by 2021. Meanwhile, the share of balances held by subprime borrowers fell from 35.6 percent ($536 billion) of student loan debt in 2019 to 26.0 percent ($409 billion) in 2021.

Student Loan Borrowers Reached Highest Overall Creditworthiness in 2021

The chart below shows credit score migrations of borrowers with a recorded balance and risk score in both 2019:Q4 and 2021:Q4. For simplicity, we reduce the number of credit score groups to three: subprime borrowers (with credit scores below 620), borrowers with credit scores from 620-719, and super-prime borrowers (with scores over 720). During the pandemic, there were significant flows to higher credit score groups. For example, by the end of 2021, 29.7 percent of formerly subprime borrowers moved to the 620-719 group (with a median risk score increase of 82 points), and 29.4 percent in the middle risk score group moved to the highest group (with a median risk score increase of 54 points). In total, 79.1 percent (30 million) borrowers saw increases to their credit scores during the pandemic, and 21.9 percent (8 million) increased their scores enough to migrate to a higher credit score group as defined here. This shifting of the credit score distribution is greater than for a similar period before the pandemic. Between 2017 and 2019, 71.9 percent (27 million) increased their credit scores, and 16.1 percent (6 million) increased their scores enough to migrate to a higher group. For some, the improvement in risk score stemmed from overall better financial footing; for example, credit card utilization, which influences the score, declined for student loan borrowers from 64.6 percent in 2019 to 58.5 percent in 2021. Student loan borrowers who were delinquent prior to the pandemic saw the largest increases in risk scores when their balances were marked current at the start of the pandemic. The median change among these borrowers was a greater than 100-point increase.

Nearly 80 Percent of Student Loan Borrowers Had Higher Credit Scores by the End of 2021

Fact 3: Student loan balances and delinquency rates vary widely across states with worse outcomes in the South

On pages 9 through 11 of the 2022 Student Loan Update, we report the average balance, median balance, and borrower delinquency rate for student loan borrowers by state for 2019, 2020, and 2021. Median balances vary widely across states with Wyoming having the smallest median balance ($14,660) and Maryland and Georgia having the largest ($22,000), although Puerto Rico has the lowest median balance of $12,210 and Washington, D.C. outpaces all states with a median balance of $28,510. Of the ten states (not including D.C.) with the largest median balance, six belong to the Southern Census region (Georgia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Alabama).

Below , we report the borrower delinquency rate for each state for the end of 2019 and the end of 2021. Prior to the pandemic, the median state had 14.1 percent of borrowers with either a delinquent or defaulted student loan on their credit report. The borrower delinquency rates were the highest in Mississippi (22.1 percent of student loan borrowers) , Puerto Rico (20.2 percent), and Louisiana (19.5 percent) and lowest in Vermont (9.6 percent) and North Dakota (9.7 percent). As with median balances, the South also had the highest borrower delinquency rates, claiming ten of the top twelve states. In fact, every state in the Southern Census region except Virginia had a borrower delinquency rate equal to or higher than the median state.

Due to the automatic forbearance for federal student loans during the pandemic, the borrower delinquency rate dropped dramatically across the country when previously delinquent (but not defaulted) student loans owned by the federal government were marked current. Additionally, borrowers in default could more easily rehabilitate their defaulted loans during the forbearance period. At the end of 2021, the highest borrower delinquency rates were nearly halved (for example, Louisiana to 9.0 percent and Mississippi to 10.8 percent), although the general rank of states was largely unchanged.

Pandemic Relief Drastically Reduced Borrower Delinquency Rates

The student loan landscape is poised to change again dramatically between the end of 2021 and the end of 2022. Most critically, the pandemic forbearance for federal student loans is currently scheduled to end on August 31, 2022. If so, we expect a reduction in the share of student loan borrowers not making progress on their loans as payment requirements resume. While many will decrease their balances, some borrowers will enter delinquency or default. The extent of these shifts will largely depend on the policies that accompany the resumption of payments. If missed payments are not reported to credit bureaus , the rise in delinquency (and corresponding reductions in credit scores) will be delayed. The end of forbearance will have impacts on credit scores, borrowing, and household cash flow over the coming year for the 38 million federal borrowers that have benefitted from the pause, and we will continue to monitor how these dynamics unfold.

2022 Student Loan Update Data

Daniel Mangrum is a research economist in Equitable Growth Studies in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Joelle Scally is a senior data strategist in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Crystal Wang is a former summer intern in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Related reading: 2022 Student Loan Update Center for Microeconomic Data—Student Debt Who Are the Federal Student Loan Borrowers and Who Benefits from Forgiveness (April 2022) What Might Happen When Student Loan Forbearance Ends? (April 2022) Student Loan Repayment during the Pandemic Forbearance (March 2022)

How to cite this post: Daniel Mangrum, Joelle Scally, and Crystal Wang, “Three Key Facts from the Center for Microeconomic Data’s 2022 Student Loan Update,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics , August 9, 2022, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2022/08/three-key-facts-from-the-center-for-microeconomic-datas-2022-student-loan-update/.

Disclaimer The views expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s).

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Tariff Tracker: Tracking the Economic Impact of the Trump-Biden Tariffs

Key finding.

• The Trump administration imposed nearly $80 billion worth of new taxes on Americans by levying tariffs on thousands of products valued at approximately $380 billion in 2018 and 2019, amounting to one of the largest tax A tax is a mandatory payment or charge collected by local, state, and national governments from individuals or businesses to cover the costs of general government services, goods, and activities. increases in decades.
• The Biden administration has kept most of the Trump administration tariffs in place, and in May 2024, announced tariff Tariffs are taxes imposed by one country on goods or services imported from another country. Tariffs are trade barriers that raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for U.S. businesses and consumers. hikes on an additional $18 billion of Chinese goods, including semiconductors and electric vehicles, for an additional tax increase of $3.6 billion.
• We estimate the Trump-Biden tariffs will reduce long-run GDP by 0.2 percent, the capital stock by 0.1 percent, and employment by 142,000 full-time equivalent jobs.
• Altogether, the trade war policies currently in place add up to $79 billion in tariffs based on trade levels at the time of tariff implementation and excluding behavioral and dynamic effects.
• Before accounting for behavioral effects, the $79 billion in higher tariffs amounts to an average annual tax increase on US households of $625. Based on actual revenue collections data, trade war tariffs have directly increased tax collections by $200 to $300 annually per US household, on average. Both estimates understate the cost to US households because they do not factor in the lost output, lower incomes, and loss in consumer choice the tariffs have caused.
• Candidate Trump has proposed significant tariff hikes as part of his presidential campaign; we estimate that if imposed, his proposed tariff increases would hike taxes by another $524 billion annually and shrink GDP by at least 0.8 percent, the capital stock by 0.7 percent, and employment by 684,000 full-time equivalent jobs. Our estimates do not capture the effects of retaliation, nor the additional harms that would stem from starting a global trade war.
• Academic and governmental studies find the Trump-Biden tariffs have raised prices and reduced output and employment, producing a net negative impact on the US economy.

The Trade War Timeline

The Trump administration imposed several rounds of tariffs on steel, aluminum, washing machines, solar panels, and goods from China, affecting more than $380 billion worth of trade at the time of implementation and amounting to a tax increase of nearly $80 billion. The Biden administration has maintained most tariffs, except for the suspension of certain tariffs on imports from the European Union , the replacement of tariffs with tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on steel and aluminum from the European Union and United Kingdom and imports of steel from Japan , and the expiration of the tariffs on washing machines after a two-year extension. In May 2024, the Biden administration announced additional tariffs on $18 billion of Chinese goods for a tax increase of $3.6 billion.

Altogether, the trade war policies currently in place add up to $79 billion in tariffs based on trade levels at the time of tariff implementation. Note the total revenue generated will be less than our static estimate because tariffs reduce the volume of imports and are subject to evasion and avoidance (which directly lowers tariff revenues) and they reduce real income (which lowers other tax revenues).

Section 232, Steel and Aluminum

In March 2018 , President Trump announced the administration would impose a 25 percent tariff on imported steel and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminum. The value of imported steel totaled $29.4 billion and the value of imported aluminum totaled $17.6 billion in 2018. Based on 2018 levels, the steel tariffs would have amounted to $9 billion and the aluminum tariffs to $1.8 billion. Several countries, however, have been excluded from the tariffs.

In early 2018 , the US reached agreements to permanently exclude Australia from steel and aluminum tariffs, use quotas for steel imports from Brazil and South Korea , and use quotas for steel and aluminum imports from Argentina.

In May 2019 , President Trump announced that the US was lifting tariffs on steel and aluminum from Canada and Mexico .

In 2020 , President Trump expanded the scope of steel and aluminum tariffs to cover certain derivative products, totaling approximately $0.8 billion based on 2018 import levels.

In August 2020 , President Trump announced that the US was reimposing tariffs on aluminum imports from Canada . The US imported approximately $2.5 billion worth of non-alloyed unwrought aluminum, resulting in a $0.25 billion tax increase. About a month later, the US eliminated the 10 percent tariff on Canadian aluminum that had just been reimposed.

In 2021 and 2022 , the Biden administration reached deals to replace certain steel and aluminum tariffs with tariff rate quota systems, whereby certain levels of imports will not face tariffs, but imports above the thresholds will. TRQs for the European Union took effect on January 1, 2022; TRQs for Japan took effect on April 1, 2022; and TRQs for the UK took effect on June 1, 2022. Though the agreements on steel and aluminum tariffs will reduce the cost of tariffs paid by some US businesses, a quota system similarly leads to higher prices, and further, retaining tariffs at the margin continues the negative economic impact of the previous tariff policy.

Tariffs on steel, aluminum, and derivative goods currently account for $2.7 billion of the $79 billion in tariffs , based on initial import values. Current retaliation against Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs targets more than $6 billion worth of American products for an estimated total tax of approximately $1.6 billion.

Section 301, Chinese Products

Under the Trump administration, the United States Trade Representative began an investigation of China in August 2017, which culminated in a March 2018 report that found China was conducting unfair trade practices.

In March 2018, President Trump announced tariffs on up to $60 billion of imports from China. The administration soon published a list of about $50 billion worth of Chinese products to be subject to a new 25 percent tariff. The first tariffs began July 6, 2018, on $34 billion worth of Chinese imports, while tariffs on the remaining $16 billion went into effect August 23, 2018. These tariffs amount to a $12.5 billion tax increase.

In September 2018, the Trump administration imposed another round of Section 301 tariffs—10 percent on $200 billion worth of goods from China, amounting to a $20 billion tax increase.

In May 2019, the 10 percent tariffs increased to 25 percent, amounting to a $30 billion increase. That increase had been scheduled to take effect beginning in January 2019, but was delayed .

In August 2019, the Trump administration announced plans to impose a 10 percent tariff on approximately $300 billion worth of additional Chinese goods beginning on September 1, 2019, but soon followed with an announcement of schedule changes and certain exemptions.

In September 2019, the Trump administration imposed “List 4a,” a 10 percent tariff on $112 billion of imports, an $11 billion tax increase. They announced plans for tariffs on the remaining $160 billion to take effect on December 15, 2019.

In August 2019, the Trump administration decided that 4a tariffs would be 15 percent rather than the previously announced 10 percent, a $5.6 billion tax increase.

In December 2019 , the administration reached a “Phase One” trade deal with China and agreed to postpone indefinitely the stage 4b tariffs of 15 percent on approximately $160 billion worth of goods that were scheduled to take effect December 15 and to reduce the stage 4a tariffs from 15 percent to 7.5 percent in January 2020, reducing tariff revenues by $8.4 billion.

In May 2024, the Biden administration published its required statutory review of the Section 301 tariffs, deciding to retain them and impose higher rates on $18 billion worth of goods. The new tariff rates range from 25 to 100 percent on semiconductors, steel and aluminum products, electric vehicles, batteries and battery parts, natural graphite and other critical materials, medical goods, magnets, cranes, and solar cells. Some of the tariff increases go into effect immediately, while others are scheduled for 2025 or 2026. Based on 2023 import values, the increases will add $3.6 billion in new taxes.

Section 301 tariffs on China currently account for $77 billion of the $79 billion in tariffs , based on initial import values. China has responded to the United States’ Section 301 tariffs with several rounds of tariffs on more than $106 billion worth of US goods , for an estimated tax of nearly $11.6 billion.

WTO Dispute, European Union

In October 2019 , the United States won a nearly 15-year-long World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute against the European Union. The WTO ruling authorized the United States to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on $7.5 billion worth of EU goods. Beginning October 18, 2019, tariffs of 10 percent were to be applied on aircraft and 25 percent on agricultural and other products.

In summer 2021, the Biden administration reached an agreement to suspend the tariffs on the European Union for five years .

Section 201, Solar Panels and Washing Machines

In January 2018 , the Trump administration announced it would begin imposing tariffs on washing machine imports for three years and solar cell and module imports for four years as the result of a Section 201 investigation.

In 2021 , the Trump administration extended the washing machine tariffs for two years through February 2023, and they have now expired .

In 2022 , the Biden administration extended the solar panel tariffs for four years , though later provided temporary two-year exemptions for imports from four Southeast Asian nations beginning in 2022 , which account for a significant share of solar panel imports.

In 2024, the Biden administration removed separate exemptions for bifacial solar panels from the Section 201 tariffs. Additionally, the temporary two-year exemptions expired and the Biden administration is further investigating solar panel imports from the four Southeast Asian nations for additional tariffs.

We estimate the solar cell and module tariffs amounted to a $0.2 billion tax increase based on 2018 import values and quantities, while the washing machine tariffs amounted to a $0.4 billion tax increase based on 2018 import values and quantities.

We exclude the tariffs from our tariff totals given the broad exemptions and small magnitudes.

Tariff Revenue Collections under the Trump-Biden Tariffs

As of March 2024, the trade war tariffs have generated more than $233 billion of higher taxes collected for the US government from US consumers. Of that total, $89 billion, or about 38 percent, was collected during the Trump administration, while the remaining $144 billion, or about 62 percent, has been collected during the Biden administration.

Before accounting for behavioral effects, the $79 billion in higher tariffs amount to an average annual tax increase on US households of $625. Based on actual revenue collections data, trade war tariffs have directly increased tax collections by $200 to $300 annually per US household, on average. The actual cost to households is higher than both the $600 estimate before behavioral effects and the $200 to $300 after, because neither accounts for lower incomes as tariffs shrink output, nor the loss in consumer choice as people switch to alternatives that do not face tariffs.

Economic Effects of Imposed and Retaliatory Tariffs

Using the Tax Foundation’s General Equilibrium Model, we estimate the Trump-Biden Section 301 and Section 232 tariffs will reduce long-run GDP by 0.2 percent, the capital stock by 0.1 percent, and hours worked by 142,000 full-time equivalent jobs. The reason tariffs have no impact on pre-tax wages in our estimates is that, in the long run, the capital stock shrinks in proportion to the reduction in hours worked, so that the capital-to-labor ratio, and thus the level of wages, remains unchanged. Removing the tariffs would boost GDP and employment, as Tax Foundation estimates have shown for the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs.

We estimate the retaliatory tariffs stemming from Section 232 and Section 301 actions total approximately $13.2 billion in tariff revenues. Retaliatory tariffs are imposed by foreign governments on their country’s importers. While they are not direct taxes on US exports, they raise the after-tax price of US goods in foreign jurisdictions, making them less competitively priced in foreign markets. We estimate the retaliatory tariffs will reduce US GDP and the capital stock by less than 0.05 percent and reduce full-time employment by 27,000 full-time equivalent jobs. Unlike the tariffs imposed by the United States, which raise federal revenue, tariffs imposed by foreign jurisdictions raise no revenue for the US but result in lower US output.

Trade Volumes since Tariffs Were Imposed

Since the tariffs were imposed, imports of affected goods have fallen, even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of the biggest drops are the result of decreased trade with China, as affected imports decreased significantly after the tariffs and still remain below their pre-trade war levels. Even though trade with China fell after the imposition of tariffs, it did not fundamentally alter the overall balance of trade, as the reduction in trade with China was diverted to increased trade with other countries .

Economic Effects of Proposed Tariffs

Tariffs have become a flashpoint in the 2024 presidential campaign as candidate Trump has proposed a new 10 percent universal tariff on all imports and a 60 percent tariff on all imports from China, as well as potentially higher tariffs on EVs from China or across the board.

In 2023, goods imports totaled $3.1 trillion and imports from China totaled $421.4 billion. With no behavioral effects, the universal tariff would raise taxes by $311 billion, while separately lifting the average tariff rate on Chinese goods to 60 percent would raise about $213 billion. Actual revenue raised would be significantly lower because of avoidance and evasion, falling imports, and lower incomes resulting in lower payroll and income tax revenues.

We estimate the proposed tariffs would reduce long-run GDP by 0.8 percent, the capital stock by 0.7 percent, and hours worked by 684,000 full-time equivalent jobs. The reason tariffs have no impact on pre-tax wages in our estimates is that, in the long run, the capital stock shrinks in proportion to the reduction in hours worked, so that the capital-to-labor ratio, and thus the level of wages, remains unchanged.

Tariffs Raise Prices and Reduce Economic Growth

Economists generally agree free trade increases the level of economic output and income, while conversely, trade barriers reduce economic output and income. Historical evidence shows tariffs raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for US businesses and consumers, which results in lower income, reduced employment, and lower economic output.

Tariffs could reduce US output through a few channels. One possibility is a tariff may be passed on to producers and consumers in the form of higher prices. Tariffs can raise the cost of parts and materials, which would raise the price of goods using those inputs and reduce private sector output. This would result in lower incomes for both owners of capital and workers. Similarly, higher consumer prices due to tariffs would reduce the after-tax value of both labor and capital income. Because higher prices would reduce the return to labor and capital, they would incentivize Americans to work and invest less, leading to lower output.

Alternatively, the US dollar may appreciate in response to tariffs, offsetting the potential price increase for US consumers. The more valuable dollar, however, would make it more difficult for exporters to sell their goods on the global market, resulting in lower revenues for exporters. This would also result in lower US output and incomes for both workers and owners of capital, reducing incentives for work and investment and leading to a smaller economy.

Many economists have evaluated the consequences of the trade war tariffs on the American economy, with results suggesting the tariffs have raised prices and lowered economic output and employment since the start of the trade war in 2018.

• A February 2018 analysis by economists Kadee Russ and Lydia Cox found that steel‐​consuming jobs outnumber steel‐​producing jobs 80 to 1, indicating greater job losses from steel tariffs than job gains.
• A March 2018 Chicago Booth survey of 43 economic experts revealed that 0 percent thought a US tariff on steel and aluminum would improve Americans’ welfare.
• An August 2018 analysis from economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York warned the Trump administration’s intent to use tariffs to narrow the trade deficit would reduce imports and US exports, resulting in little to no change in the trade deficit.
• A March 2019 National Bureau of Economic Research study conducted by Pablo D. Fajgelbaum and others found that the trade war tariffs did not lower the before-duties import prices of Chinese goods, resulting in US importers taking on the entire burden of import duties in the form of higher after-duty prices.
• An April 2019 University of Chicago study conducted by Aaron Flaaen, Ali Hortacsu, and Felix Tintelnot found that after the Trump administration imposed tariffs on washing machines, washer prices increased by $86 per unit and dryer prices increased by $92 per unit, due to package deals, ultimately resulting in an aggregate increase in consumer costs of over $1.5 billion.
• An April 2019 research publication from the International Monetary Fund used a range of general equilibrium models to estimate the effects of a 25 percent increase in tariffs on all trade between China and the US, and each model estimated that the higher tariffs would bring both countries significant economic losses.
• An October 2019 study by Alberto Cavallo and coauthors found tariffs on importsfrom China were almost fully passed through to US import prices but only partially to retail consumers, implying some businesses absorbed the higher tariffs, reducing retail margins, instead of passing them on to retail consumers.
• In December 2019, Federal Reserve economists Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce found a net decrease in manufacturing employment due to the tariffs, suggesting that the benefit of increased production in protected industries was outweighed by the consequences of rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs.
• A February 2020 paper from economists Kyle Handley, Fariha Kamal, and Ryan Monarch estimated the 2018–2019 import tariffswere equivalent to a 2 percent tariff on all US exports.
• A December 2021 review of the data and methods used to estimate the trade war effects through 2021, by Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal, concluded that “US consumers of imported goods have borne the brunt of the tariffs through higher prices, and that the trade war has lowered aggregate real income in both the US and China, although not by large magnitudes relative to GDP.”
• A January 2022 study from the US Department of Agriculture estimated the direct export losses from the retaliatory tariffs totaled $27 billion from 2018 through the end of 2019.
• A May 2023 United States International Trade Commission report from Peter Herman and others found evidence for near complete pass-through of the steel, aluminum, and Chinese tariffs to US prices. It also found an estimated $2.8 billion production increase in industries protected by the steel and aluminum tariffs was met with a $3.4 billion production decrease in downstream industries affected by higher input prices.
• A January 2024 International Monetary Fund paper found that unexpected tariff shocks tend to reduce imports more than exports, leading to slight decreases in the trade deficit at the expense of persistent gross domestic product losses—for example, the study estimates reversing the 2018–2019 tariffs would increase US output by 4 percent over three years.
• A January 2024 study by David Autor and others concludes that the 2018–2019 tariffs failed to provide economic help to the heartland: import tariffs had “neither a sizable nor significant effect on US employment in regions with newly‐​protected sectors” and foreign retaliation “by contrast had clear negative employment impacts, particularly in agriculture.”

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Timeline of Activity

• The update adds import data through 2023, new data on tariff collections, and updated model results for imposed, retaliatory, and proposed tariffs. The modeling updates reflect President Biden’s tariff increases and former President Trump’s tariff proposals. Nicolo Pastrone assisted with the research for this update.
• The update adds a new column to the “Imports Affected by U.S. Tariffs” table, reflecting import data for calendar year 2022, data updates for prior years, and tariff-rate quotas that took effect in 2022 for certain steel and aluminum imports.
• Tariffs on washing machines expired in February 2023 after an initial three-year period and a two-year extension. The Biden administration provided a two-year suspension of solar panel tariffs for four Southeast Asian nations beginning in 2022. The update adjusts the revenue and economic results for imposed tariffs.
• The Biden administration has reached deals to replace steel and aluminum tariffs with tariff rate quotas for the European Union and United Kingdom and steel tariffs with tariff-rate quotas for Japan. The deals also eliminate tariffs on derivative goods from the same jurisdictions and will bring an end to related retaliatory tariffs. The update adjusts revenue and economic estimates for imposed and retaliatory tariffs and adds a new table illustrating how import levels of affected goods have changed since 2017.
• Under President Biden, the U.S. will suspend tariffs on aircrafts and other goods from the E.U. under a five-year pause in the ongoing Boeing-Airbus dispute. We have reorganized the layout of the tracker.
• U.S. to eliminate tariffs on $2.5 billion worth of Canadian aluminum that had been imposed on August 16, 2020, to avoid Canadian retaliatory tariffs.
• U.S. to reimpose tariffs on $2.5 billion worth of Canadian aluminum on August 16, 2020, and Canada to impose retaliatory tariffs.
• U.S. reduces tariffs on $120 billion of Chinese goods by half to 7.5% and China reduces tariffs on approximately $75 billion of US goods in half to 2.5% and 5%.
• U.S. postpones indefinitely the scheduled tariff of 15% on $160 billion worth of goods from China and announces plans to decrease the 15% tariff on $120 billion worth of goods from China to 7.5% (date unknown, will be included in the model when the decrease takes effect). China took corresponding measures and canceled their schedule tariff increase.
• U.S. concludes Section 301 investigation into France's Digital Services Tax, threatens tariffs on $2.4 billion French products. Our analysis now includes tariffs on solar panels and washing machines.
• U.S. imposes 10% and 25% tariffs on $7.5 billion European Union goods under WTO ruling.
• U.S. postpones scheduled tariff hike from 25% to 30% on $250 billion worth of goods from China.
• U.S. announces 10% and 25% tariffs on $7.5 billion European Union goods under WTO ruling, with the authority to raise the tariffs to 100%.
• U.S. delays tariff increase from 25% to 30% on $250 billion worth of Chinese goods from Oct. 1 until Oct. 15.
• U.S. announces the 25% tariff on $250 billion of Chinese goods would increase to 30 percent, effective Oct. 1, after a comment period.
• China announces additional tariffs on $75 billion of U.S. imports, from 5-10%, and will resume tariffs on U.S. cars and car parts suspended earlier in 2019. Tariffs to begin Sept. 1 and end Dec. 15. U.S. announces 10% tariff on $300 billion of Chinese goods to increase to 15%, some beginning Sept. 1, others on Dec. 15.
• U.S. announces 10% tariff on $300 billion of Chinese goods would be delayed from Sept. 1 until Dec. 15.
• U.S. announces 10% tariff on $300 billion Chinese goods, to be levied on Sept. 1, lowered from the previously announced 25% on $325 billion.
• U.S. confirms announced July 5 plans to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports, roughly $500 billion of goods, modeled as a 10% tariff.
• U.S. again threatens additional tariffs on Chinese imports if China further retaliates, increasing threats from levies on $200 billion and another $200 billion to $200 billion and $300 billion.
• U.S. “indefinitely suspended” previously announced tariffs against Mexican products, set to begin at a 5% rate in June and gradually rise to 25%.
• U.S. threatens 5% tariff beginning June 10 on $346.5 billion of imports from Mexico until illegal immigration across the southern border stops. It would rise to 10% on July 1; 15% on Aug. 1; 20% on Sept. 1; and 25% on Oct. 1.
• U.S. announces it will lift steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and those nations will lift their retaliatory tariffs.
• U.S. announces it will raise tariffs on $200 billion of imports from China from 10% to 25%, with threats to impose an additional 25% on $325 billion of goods.
• Tax Foundation separated our automobile tariff estimate to show auto imports from Canada, and made slight estimate adjustments to correct for rounding.
• U.S. doubles the tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Turkey, which responds by doubling its tariffs on 22 U.S. products.
• U.S. threatens a 10% tariff on $200 billion of Chinese goods if China retaliates for the previous 10% tariff, and that would extend to an additional $200 billion of goods. This would amount to a $40 billion tax increase.
• U.S. considers increasing the proposed 10% tariff to 25% on $200 billion of Chinese imports. That would be a $30 billion tax increase.
• U.S. reaffirms plans to impose tariffs on all Chinese imports (roughly $500 billion).
• Russia will begin placing tariffs on U.S. goods, worth about $87.6 million. (Slight adjustments were made to our estimates to correct for rounding.)
• U.S. announces readiness to target an additional $200 billion in Chinese imports, and an additional $300 billion after that—an increase of $100 billion from previous threats.
• Turkey will begin placing tariffs on U.S. goods, worth about $266.5 million.

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Techno-economic feasibility analysis of zero-emission trucks in urban and regional delivery use cases: a case study of Guangdong Province, China

This Report is part of within WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities , and Clean Energy . Reach out to Lulu Xue for more information.

Addressing the demand side, particularly the concerns of cost-conscious and less technology-savvy small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), is critical for the future uptake of zero-emission trucks (ZETs). 

To address the question, this study took Guangdong as an example and assessed the techno-economic feasibility of ZETs from 2022 to 2030 across 14 use cases, considering operational feasibility, purchase cost gaps between ZETs and diesel trucks, and total cost of ownership (TCO) parity years relative to diesel trucks. We identified the use cases with near-term ZET transition opportunities, and explored the roles played by technological development, policy incentives, operational improvements, and business models in advancing ZETs’ TCO (and purchase cost) parity years relative to diesel trucks. We also evaluated the applicability of this study’s conclusions to other Chinese regions.

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Europe’s fintech opportunity

The deteriorating macroeconomic environment in both Europe and the world has hit fintechs hard, with valuations declining and access to financing becoming more difficult. 1 For the purposes of this paper, Europe includes Switzerland and the United Kingdom post-Brexit as well as the EU-27 countries. Viewed from a long-term perspective, however, European fintechs continue to gain in strength and relevance for customers and the economy. In each of the seven largest European economies, as measured by GDP, at least one fintech ranks among the top five banking institutions. 2 Excluding insurance and stock exchanges; valuation of nonlisted European fintechs determined based on latest funding rounds and market capitalization of the largest banks listed in the STOXX Europe 600 banks index as of June 30, 2022; for Switzerland, we used the market capitalization of the largest banks listed in the SMI Expanded index as of June 30, 2022.

About the authors

This article is a collaborative effort by Alessio Botta, Sarina Deuble, Constance Emmanuelli, Fernando Figueiredo, Max Flötotto , Christian Irlbeck, André Jerenz, Timo Mauerhoefer, Tunde Olanrewaju , Alessia Vassallo, Stefanie Vielmeier, and Eckart Windhagen , representing views from McKinsey’s Financial Services Practice.

Strong fintechs offer customers greater choice and convenience. The competition they bring to banking systems is already helping modernize the financial sector ecosystem in several European countries. In this article and the accompanying in-depth report, we focus on three key aspects of Europe’s fintech sector: founding, funding, and scaling—that is, fintechs’ ability to set up in the first place, the ease with which they can access capital, and how well they can grow and thrive.

Our analysis highlights growing fintech activity in every European country. But we also find a wide divergence of maturity and performance among fintech ecosystems by country, with substantial gaps between the top one-third and the rest (Exhibit 1). Two countries in particular stand out for their superior fintech ecosystem performance: the United Kingdom and Sweden.

If fintech ecosystems in all European countries were able to attain the same level of performance as the best in the region, the upside could be substantial. The number of fintech jobs in Europe would grow by a factor of 2.7 to more than 364,000; the volume of funding would more than double to almost €150 billion from €63 billion; and valuations would grow by a factor of 2.3 to almost €1 trillion—almost twice the combined market capitalization of Europe’s top ten banking players as of June 2022.

Fintechs are a force for growth, modernization, and customer satisfaction in Europe’s financial-services sector

Europe’s fintech sector has moved quickly from the fringes of the financial landscape in Europe to its core. In each of the seven largest European economies by GDP—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—there is now at least one fintech among the top five banking services institutions, as measured by market value. 3 Excluding insurance and stock exchanges; valuation of nonlisted European fintechs determined based on latest funding rounds and market capitalization of the largest banks listed in the STOXX Europe 600 banks index as of June 1, 2022; for Switzerland, we used the market capitalization of the largest banks listed in the SMI Expanded index as of December 31, 2021. We define fintechs as digital technology-driven financial-services companies (excluding direct banks) that were launched after 2000, have raised funding since 2010, and have not yet reached maturity.

Underlying this significant growth are the contributions European fintechs make to customers, the continent’s financial sector, and the overall economy and society.

For customers. The growing appeal of fintechs is that they create value with superior service at lower costs. For example, international transfers and the end-customer price of stock trades transacted through fintechs can cost just 10 percent of the rates charged by traditional banking services institutions. 4 Average end customer price for international transfers including 90 percent lower foreign-exchange costs at a leading UK-based payment fintech than at incumbents. In Germany, the average end customer price for stock trades is 90 percent lower at a leading German neobroker than at incumbents. A recent McKinsey retail banking consumer survey in seven large European countries found that 32 percent of respondents listed pricing as a primary reason to use fintechs or digital banks—the same percentage as those who cited easy access (Exhibit 2). 5 McKinsey Retail Banking Consumer Survey 2021. The seven countries in the survey are France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Some fintechs offer financial opportunities to customers who may not have been able to access them otherwise, including asset classes such as private-equity funds, venture capital funds, and infrastructure funds that were previously available only to institutions. Other fintechs focus on previously underserved customer segments, such as small and medium-size enterprises.

For the financial ecosystem. Fintechs are a catalyst for disruptive innovation and growth. With their agility and speed, fintechs are well equipped to accommodate many new trends in the financial sector, including embedded finance and distributed-ledger technology (DLT). They tend to launch new products and services much faster than incumbent banks, with an average time to market of two to six months versus 12 to 18 months for incumbents. Fintechs also act as ongoing challengers and front-runners in providing a unique customer experience and lean-banking processes. Today, many leading European banks rely on various fintech partnerships across a wide range of areas, particularly in operations and payments.

For the overall economy. Fintechs are an important source of potential growth. Across Europe, they have created approximately 134,000 jobs. 6 As of June 30, 2022. Vibrant start-up hubs such as Amsterdam, Berlin, London, Lisbon, Madrid, and Paris attract international talent; fintechs in Europe have scaled up their hiring significantly at a time when incumbent banks in Europe have been reducing their workforces. As of June 2022, from a value creation perspective, fintechs in Europe represent a total valuation of almost €430 billion. That is more than the combined market capitalization of Europe’s seven largest listed banks as of June 2022. 7 Dealroom.co.

Fintech performance in Europe varies widely

Our research highlights a huge variance across European fintech ecosystems. For example, the United Kingdom and Sweden significantly outperform their European peers across all critical performance areas. For our analysis of overall performance, we ranked the EU-27 countries, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland based on the performance of their fintech ecosystems along the three growth stages: founding, funding, and scaling. We measured against five KPIs. For founding, we used the number of fintechs founded per million capita in 2021. For funding, we used two KPIs: fintech funding per capita in 2021 in euros and the number of deals per million capita in 2021. Finally, for scaling, we analyzed the number of fintech unicorns 8 A fintech unicorn is defined here as a technology-based company with a valuation exceeding $1 billion. per capita in 2021 and the size of the fintech workforce as a proportion of the total workforce in 2021. We acknowledge that these KPIs do not constitute a comprehensive analysis of all factors that can contribute to overall performance. Nonetheless, they are indicative of the key strengths and weaknesses of fintech performance.

Exhibit 3 provides an overview of fintech performance based on these metrics. As well as showing clear leadership across all the dimensions by the United Kingdom and Sweden, it also highlights a second tier of countries with strong fintech sectors across most of the dimensions we examine: Switzerland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Together with the top-ranked countries, they constitute the top one-third of fintech performers in Europe.

Performance gaps are evident in each of the three stages of founding, funding, and scaling.

Filling the fintech pipeline. More than half of European countries have fewer than ten fintechs per million capita, creating a significant gap. This compares with 30 fintechs per million capita in Ireland and Switzerland and 26 fintechs in the United Kingdom (Exhibit 4). On average, the top five countries (with a GDP of less than $100 billion) have 25 fintechs per million residents.

Funding growth. The countries in Europe that perform the best have among the highest funding per capita (Exhibit 5). In countries that perform less well, including Greece, Poland, and Romania, per capita funding is significantly lower. While some countries have managed to increase per capita funding by as much as a factor of six in the past three years, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Portugal still lag behind their peers significantly because the total volume of funding is still low.

The growth rate in recent years of fintech funding in some countries—such as Germany, Greece, and Ireland—has slowed or even decreased in comparison with markets such as the Netherlands and France. The United Kingdom is the top country in both early-stage (seed and series A) and late-stage (series B+) per capita funding (Exhibit 6). The United Kingdom led the European market with a total volume of approximately €1.3 billion for early-stage funding and €8.3 billion for late-stage funding in 2021. That performance compares favorably with other countries, including the United States: while US GDP is about ten times larger than the United Kingdom’s, US spending on funding is only four times larger.

Scaling fintechs. As a proxy to judge the ability of countries in Europe to scale their fintech ecosystems, we looked at the prevalence of fintech unicorns. The United Kingdom has the best scaling track record by far with 32 unicorns in total—four times as many as France and the Netherlands, the countries with the next largest numbers of unicorns.

How fintech in Europe compares with the United States

Using the same three life cycle aspects of founding, funding, and scaling, a comparison between Europe and the United States is instructive (Exhibit 7). The United States exceeds the European average across all three dimensions and is in the top third across all KPIs, with particular strength in the contribution of US fintechs to the economy and the workforce.

Many factors could help explain this relative strength of the United States compared with the European average. For example, the United States has a large home market, but it also has just one primary language and largely harmonized banking regulation. Market maturity is also stronger than in various European countries, with the venture capitalist (VC) community in general, especially in the tech sector, perfecting funding mechanisms from earliest seed funding through to IPOs. Access to capital can also be easier: US pension funds and other institutional investors provide venture capital in ways that are restricted in some parts of Europe. Nevertheless, some individual countries, including the United Kingdom, outperform the United States in the funding stage, according to our analysis.

Country-specific market conditions explain some of the differences in ecosystem performance across Europe

Closing the gap between leading European countries and those in the bottom or middle third of the rankings requires an examination of the factors inhibiting the sector’s success. Here we focus on six factors that can have an impact on the ecosystem, and for which strategic improvements can make a difference in both the short term and medium term.

Market structure and maturity. These elements can depend partly on culture, language, and history. For example, having a widely spoken language or a common currency and harmonized regulation can help. One differentiating factor is how long a fintech or broader start-up scene has been present, because markets learn and improve over time. Another factor can be the extent to which a second generation of entrepreneurial founders is emerging that can learn from the previous generation and count on them to be mentors, supporters, advisers, or investors.

Access to capital. Fintech funding in Europe has significantly increased over the past five years, but not uniformly. We find that less than 20 percent of all capital raised goes to early-stage financing. More than one-third of European countries—most of which are in Eastern Europe—did not have any late-stage (series B) funding. Significant European money pools such as pension funds and life insurance tend not to be sufficiently tapped because of more restrictive regulations compared with the United States.

Regulatory and legal landscape. Some European countries, such as France and the Netherlands, see their regulators as an important facilitator of innovation. But in general, existing regulatory frameworks to support the establishment, growth, and the value of fintechs have room for improvement. European payment service directives for data exchanges in financial industries may create new opportunities for fintechs. These directives will enable fintechs to access customer data from all financial players in Europe, giving rise to new business models. This has happened in the United Kingdom, a pioneer in open data for finance.

Mobility and acquisition. Europe has a major skills gap  that needs to be closed, and not just for fintechs. 9 David Chinn, Solveigh Hieronimus, Julian Kirchherr, and Julia Klier, “ The future is now: Closing the skills gaps in Europe’s public sector ,” McKinsey, April 27, 2020. Along with an overall shortage of talent, visa requirements and bureaucratic processes for obtaining work permits in some countries can impede talent acquisition, as can high income taxes.

Fintech in Africa: The end of the beginning

Requirements for scaling and internationalization. To scale up, fintechs in Europe need to be able to expand beyond their home markets. Even within a single market such as the European Union, differences in languages, regulations, cultures, and sometimes currencies can act as barriers.

Customer openness. Different levels of digital maturity, the lack of broadband infrastructure, and other structural challenges in some countries can limit the reach of fintechs. Customers may also have a limited understanding of risks, including data security. Such issues play out in favor of incumbent banks, which tend to have a higher level of trust among the public than fintechs. Regulatory differences can be factors here, too. For example, customer protection laws are tougher in some countries than in others.

Calculating the upside: Europe’s fintech opportunity promises more jobs, larger funding volumes, and higher valuations

What is the potential upside for European fintechs if the lower-performing countries rose to the level of the top third in region and if the leading third could catch up with the United Kingdom? We have built a model that estimates what could happen to fintech jobs, funding volume, and valuations if all the countries in Europe attained the per capita levels of the best-performing countries.

Exhibit 8 shows the result of this hypothetical exercise. The overall number of jobs could grow by a factor of 2.7, to more than 364,000, and the number of jobs in the “follower” countries—those catching up with the leaders—could increase sixfold. Potential funding would grow by a factor of about 2.3 adding about €84 billion in investments. The relative strength of the United Kingdom is evident here—funding volume for the top third of European countries would grow fourfold if lifted to the United Kingdom’s level. Overall valuations in Europe could grow by approximately 2.3 times to €981 billion.

A focused push along six strategic action areas could help European countries catch up with fintech leaders

For lower- and middle-performing countries, catching up with the leaders will require a clearly defined programmatic agenda. We conclude by examining several of the strategic options that fintechs and their stakeholders in Europe can consider as they look to grow and develop the sector.

Drive the alignment of market structures within the European Union

An overall simplification and harmonization of fragmented national country regulation is already taking place in the European Union, enabling fintechs to understand key pillars of legal frameworks and to focus on regional specifics. Cultural exchange among countries can equip fintechs to understand key customer needs outside their home market. Meanwhile customers may catch up with a more digitalized way of living.

Encourage more diverse, ‘homegrown’ capital

Local political players and regulators have an important role to play in shaping restrictions on institutional investors’ access to growth capital. For example, they could create stronger incentives for venture capital and private-equity investments compared with debt investments. Relaxing investment restrictions for capital accumulation institutions could also make a difference. For example, only about 10 percent of German insurers’ investments are currently in alternative assets such as venture or private capital, 10 “Investing in private markets: A road map for insurance companies,” StepStone, October 2021. whereas in the United Kingdom this share is approximately 30 percent.

Foster regulation with an innovative mindset

The aim here is to create a regulatory framework that fosters innovation and provides companies with the necessary conditions to compete domestically and internationally, while ensuring stability and protection of both investors and customers. Programmatic coordination aimed at strengthening fintech ecosystems is particularly important in this context. Specifically, this can mean minimizing the administrative burden and associated costs for fintechs, adapting regulatory requirements where necessary, and making implementation more customer friendly.

Become a magnet for global talent

Fintechs can do their part by offering attractive jobs with excellent development opportunities. They can also commit to creating a modern work culture that responds to a diversity of backgrounds and needs. For example, the ability to work remotely without an in-person office requirement can be a valuable offering for many prospective employees. Political players and regulators can also help establish modern ways of working within their countries and make the tax framework appealing to foreign talent.

Enable fintechs to thrive in target markets

Fintechs may be able to make more informed decisions about future target markets if all stakeholders—from investors and incumbent banks to public players and regulatory bodies—bundled their insights on foreign markets with the respective foreign regulations and industry requirements in one central hub.

Increase customer choices and access

If fintechs put as much focus on product safety and stability as they do on customer experience, they might be able to avoid some regulatory challenges from the start. For example, they could go beyond established data and customer protection norms and be more transparent about securities and the inherent risk to customers before trading. Political players and regulators could also develop Europe-wide initiatives to make it easier for fintech companies to demonstrate their credibility to customers.

Fintechs have made major inroads into Europe’s banking landscape and are becoming central to its core. That is good news for customers, who will benefit from increased choice, and for financial systems, which will become more competitive and modern. But this is just the beginning; while a few countries have already emerged as European leaders in the fintech space, the potential for growth is strong everywhere in the region. If countries could rise to the level of the best in region, the upside could be significant for the economy as well as for fintechs themselves. What will be critical in the coming months and years is for all stakeholders—including public institutions, established financial industry players, and fintechs—to combine their strengths by setting up the enabling structure and mechanisms the sector needs to reach its full potential.

Alessio Botta is a senior partner in McKinsey’s Milan office, where Alessia Vassallo is an associate partner. Sarina Deuble is a consultant in McKinsey’s Frankfurt office, where Timo Mauerhoefer is an associate partner and Eckart Windhagen is a senior partner. Constance Emmanuelli is a partner in the Paris office, and Fernando Figueiredo is a partner in the London office, where Tunde Olanrewaju is a senior partner. Max Flötotto is a senior partner in the Munich office, where Stefanie Vielmeier is a consultant. Christian Irlbeck is an associate partner in the Düsseldorf office, and André Jerenz is a partner in the Hamburg office.

The authors wish to thank Christopher Blaufelder, Pascal Bretländer, Sven Enkirch, Pierre-Matthieu Gompertz, Reinhard Höll, Laura Hofstee, Himanshu Jatale, Matthias Lange, Deepa Mahajan, Fernando Martin del Agua, Mohcine Ouass, Hiro Sayama, Giuseppe Sofo, Dominik Termathe, and Birgit Teschke for their contributions to this article.

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Education Rankings by Country 2024

There is a correlation between a country's educational system quality and its economic status, with developed nations offering higher quality education.

The U.S., despite ranking high in educational system surveys, falls behind in math and science scores compared to many other countries.

Educational system adequacy varies globally, with some countries struggling due to internal conflicts, economic challenges, or underfunded programs.

While education levels vary from country to country, there is a clear correlation between the quality of a country's educational system and its general economic status and overall well-being. In general, developing nations tend to offer their citizens a higher quality of education than the least developed nations do, and fully developed nations offer the best quality of education of all. Education is clearly a vital contributor to any country's overall health.

According to the Global Partnership for Education , education is considered to be a human right and plays a crucial role in human, social, and economic development . Education promotes gender equality, fosters peace, and increases a person's chances of having more and better life and career opportunities.

"Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world." — Nelson Mandela

The annual Best Countries Report , conducted by US News and World Report, BAV Group, and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania , reserves an entire section for education. The report surveys thousands of people across 78 countries, then ranks those countries based upon the survey's responses. The education portion of the survey compiles scores from three equally-weighted attributes: a well-developed public education system, would consider attending university there, and provides top-quality education. As of 2023, the top ten countries based on education rankings are:

Countries with the Best Educational Systems - 2021 Best Countries Report*

Ironically, despite the United States having the best-surveyed education system on the globe, U.S students consistently score lower in math and science than students from many other countries. According to a Business Insider report in 2018, the U.S. ranked 38th in math scores and 24th in science. Discussions about why the United States' education rankings have fallen by international standards over the past three decades frequently point out that government spending on education has failed to keep up with inflation.

It's also worthwhile to note that while the Best Countries study is certainly respectable, other studies use different methodologies or emphasize different criteria, which often leads to different results. For example, the Global Citizens for Human Rights' annual study measures ten levels of education from early childhood enrollment rates to adult literacy. Its final 2020 rankings look a bit different:

Education Rates of Children Around the World

Most findings and ranking regarding education worldwide involve adult literacy rates and levels of education completed. However, some studies look at current students and their abilities in different subjects.

One of the most-reviewed studies regarding education around the world involved 470,000 fifteen-year-old students. Each student was administered tests in math, science, and reading similar to the SAT or ACT exams (standardized tests used for college admissions in the U.S.) These exam scores were later compiled to determine each country's average score for each of the three subjects. Based on this study, China received the highest scores , followed by Korea, Finland , Hong Kong , Singapore , Canada , New Zealand , Japan , Australia and the Netherlands .

On the down side, there are many nations whose educational systems are considered inadequate. This could be due to internal conflict, economic problems, or underfunded programs. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's Education for All Global Monitoring Report ranks the following countries as having the world's worst educational systems:

Countries with the Lowest Adult Literacy Rates

• Education rankings are sourced from both the annual UN News Best Countries report and the nonprofit organization World Top 20

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Which country ranks first in education?

Which country ranks last in education, frequently asked questions.

• Best Countries for Education - 2023 - US News
• Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) - World Bank
• World Best Education Systems - Global Citizens for Human Rights
• UNESCO - Global Education Monitoring Reports
• World’s 10 Worst Countries for Education - Global Citizen
• International Education Database - World Top 20

• Introduction
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• Article Information

Annual firearm homicide fatality rates for the total group and by sex, race, ethnicity, and urbanicity are presented in the body of the heat maps in a graded manner. The coloring scale indicates rates per 100 000 persons per year. Ranges were determined by the minimum and maximum of total homicide fatality rates from panel A. The number of total homicide fatalities is included with the title of each heat map. Urbanicity data were available only from 1999 to 2021. Empty spaces in 2021 indicate that data were not available for those age groups.

Annual firearm suicide fatality rates for the total group and by sex, race, ethnicity, and urbanicity are presented in the body of the heat maps in a graded manner. The coloring scale indicates rates per 100 000 persons per year. Ranges were determined by the minimum and maximum of total suicide fatality rates from panel A. The number of total suicide fatalities is included with the title of each heat map. Urbanicity data were available only from 1999 to 2021. Empty spaces in 2021 indicate that data were not available for those age groups.

Maximum fatality rates are the highest rate for any age group reported annually within a specific demographic stratum. Mean fatality rates are mean rates over the study period calculated each year. The upper limit of the y-axis was set as the highest value of the maximum rate. Urbanicity data were available only from 1999 to 2021.

Comparable county-level data were not available for 2017 to 2021.

eFigure 1. Age- and Year-Specific All-Intents Firearm Fatality Rates Per 100 000 Persons, 1990-2021

eFigure 2. Maximum and Mean Firearm All-Intents Fatality Rates, 1990-2021

Data Sharing Statement

• Firearm Injuries Are a Critical Driver of Health Disparities in the United States JAMA Network Open Invited Commentary November 29, 2022 Michelle Degli Esposti, DPhil; Hsing-Fang Hsieh, PhD; Jason E. Goldstick, PhD

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Rees CA , Monuteaux MC , Steidley I, et al. Trends and Disparities in Firearm Fatalities in the United States, 1990-2021. JAMA Netw Open. 2022;5(11):e2244221. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.44221

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Trends and Disparities in Firearm Fatalities in the United States, 1990-2021

• 1 Division of Pediatric Emergency Medicine, Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, Georgia
• 2 Division of Emergency Medicine, Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia
• 3 Division of Emergency Medicine, Boston Children’s Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts
• 4 Department of Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts
• 5 Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island
• 6 Division of Pediatric Emergency Medicine, Children’s Hospital at Montefiore, Bronx, New York
• 7 Department of Pediatrics, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, New York, New York
• Invited Commentary Firearm Injuries Are a Critical Driver of Health Disparities in the United States Michelle Degli Esposti, DPhil; Hsing-Fang Hsieh, PhD; Jason E. Goldstick, PhD JAMA Network Open

Question   How have firearm fatality rates varied over a 32-year period in the United States?

Findings   In this cross-sectional study of 1 110 421 firearm fatalities, all-intent firearm fatality rates declined to a low in 2004, then increased 45.5% by 2021. Firearm homicides were highest among Black non-Hispanic males, and firearm suicide rates were highest among White non-Hispanic men ages 70 years and older.

Meaning   This study found marked disparities in firearm fatality rates between men and women and by racial and ethnic group, and these disparities increased in recent years.

Importance   Firearm fatality rates in the United States have reached a 28-year high. Describing the evolution of firearm fatality rates across intents, demographics, and geography over time may highlight high-risk groups and inform interventions for firearm injury prevention.

Objective   To understand variations in rates of firearm fatalities stratified by intent, demographics, and geography in the US.

Design, Setting, and Participants   This cross-sectional study analyzed firearm fatalities in the US from 1990 to 2021 using data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Heat maps, maximum and mean fatality rate graphs, and choropleth maps of county-level rates were created to examine trends in firearm fatality rates by intent over time by age, sex, race, ethnicity, and urbanicity of individuals who died from firearms. Data were analyzed from December 2018 through September 2022.

Main Outcomes and Measures   Rates of firearm fatalities by age, sex, race, ethnicity, urbanicity, and county of individuals killed stratified by specific intent (suicide or homicide) per 100 000 persons per year.

Results   There were a total of 1 110 421 firearm fatalities from 1990 to 2021 (952 984 among males [85.8%] and 157 165 among females [14.2%]; 286 075 among Black non-Hispanic individuals [25.8%], 115 616 among Hispanic individuals [10.4%], and 672 132 among White non-Hispanic individuals [60.5%]). All-intents total firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons declined to a low of 10.1 fatalities in 2004, then increased to 14.7 fatalities (45.5% increase) by 2021. From 2014 to 2021, male and female firearm homicide rates per 100 000 persons per year increased from 5.9 to 10.9 fatalities (84.7% increase) and 1.1 to 2.0 fatalities (87.0% increase), respectively. Firearm suicide rates were highest among White non-Hispanic men aged 80 to 84 years (up to 46.8 fatalities/100 000 persons in 2021). By 2021, maximum rates of firearm homicide were up to 22.5 times higher among Black non-Hispanic men (up to 141.8 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) and up to 3.6 times higher among Hispanic men (up to 22.8 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) compared with White non-Hispanic men (up to 6.3 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 30-34 years). Males had higher rates of suicide (14.1 fatalities vs 2.0 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021) and homicide (10.9 fatalities vs. 2.0 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021) compared with females. Metropolitan areas had higher homicide rates than nonmetropolitan areas (6.6 fatalities vs 4.8 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021). Firearm fatalities by county level increased over time, spreading from the West to the South. From 1999 to 2011 until 2014 to 2016, fatalities per 100 000 persons per year decreased from 10.6 to 10.5 fatalities in Western states and increased from 12.8 to 13.9 fatalities in Southern states.

Conclusions and Relevance   This study found marked disparities in firearm fatality rates by demographic group, which increased over the past decade. These findings suggest that public health approaches to reduce firearm violence should consider underlying demographic and geographic trends and differences by intent.

Each day, more than 100 firearm deaths occur in the United States. 1 In 2021, there were 48 953 fatalities from firearms, the highest number of firearm deaths recorded since the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began tracking injury fatalities in 1981. 2 Previous study findings suggested a recent increase in overall firearm-related mortality rates, and firearms are now the leading cause death in youths aged 1 to 19 years, accounting for 20% of adolescent deaths. 3 - 7

In 2019, firearm injuries and fatalities cost an estimated $410 billion in medical costs, work loss, quality of life lost, and total value of life loss. 8 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, an estimated 393 million privately owned firearms were distributed among 40% of US homes. 9 - 11 Firearms sales surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with an estimated 7.5 million new firearm owners, and 5.4 million homes previously without firearms now contain firearms. 12 The increase in firearm ownership was associated with the exposure of more than 16 million people to firearms in the home for the first time. 12

Despite the large burden of firearm fatalities and the ubiquitous availability of firearms in the US, a contemporary analysis, including age, sex, race, ethnicity, and urbanicity of individuals killed by firearms, is lacking, to our knowledge. Moreover, prior studies have not included trends in firearm fatalities during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such understanding may inform interventions to decrease firearm fatalities by targeting populations in specific geographic areas who have higher rates of firearm fatalities from homicide or suicide. To this end, our objective was to use heat maps, novel maximum and mean fatality rate graphs, and choropleth maps of county-level rates to graphically describe the multidimensional evolution of firearm fatality rates across the US stratified demographically and by intent from 1990 to 2021.

We conducted a cross-sectional study using the CDC Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS) Fatal Injuries Reports, Compressed Mortality File (CMF), and Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) databases to evaluate trends in firearm fatalities. 2 , 13 , 14 The Boston Children’s Hospital Institutional Review Board exempted this study from review because it only analyzed fatality data and determined that participant consent was not needed because all data were obtained from deidentified, publicly available sources. We followed the Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology ( STROBE ) reporting guideline.

We extracted the national number of firearm deaths and firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons per year from WISQARS and WONDER in 5-year age groups by sex, race, ethnicity, and metropolitan designation annually from 1990 to 2021. Denominators were the annual number of individuals in each demographic and age group. Race was classified by WISQARS as Black or White using data derived from death certificates. Because the numbers of fatalities by 5-year age group and intent were too low to maintain anonymity, racial categories of American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, and other were excluded. Ethnicity was classified by WISQARS as Hispanic or non-Hispanic. The urbanicity of the location of firearm fatalities (metropolitan vs nonmetropolitan) was classified based on the 2013 National Center for Health Statistics county-based urbanization classifications (available since 1999). 15 We obtained firearm fatality rates stratified by intent (ie, suicide and homicide) per WISQARS and WONDER.

We extracted county-level firearm fatality rates from the CMF from 1999 to 2016 and population data from the US Census. The CMF stopped providing data at the county level after 2016, and data from WONDER at the county level were too incomplete to extract for 2017 to 2021. 16 , 17 Fatality data from WISQARS, WONDER, and CMF were compiled from all available death certificate data collected by state registries and provided to the National Vital Statistics System.

Because counts were intended to capture all deaths in the US population rather than a sample drawn from a population, inferential statistical tests were not performed. Differences between and within groups were interpreted as population-level outcomes. Heat maps have been used to better understand the multidimensional nature of evolving epidemics, including US trends in the opioid epidemic. 18 , 19 We created scaled heat maps of annual firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons per year stratified by 5-year age groups, sex, race, and ethnicity over the entire 32-year study period and urbanicity over a 23-year period based on available data. We mapped intent of firearm fatalities (ie, all intents, suicide, or homicide) to elucidate variations in trends of firearm fatality rates across demographic groups. To make the data comparable across all groups within a particular intent category, we set the highest rate in each intent at the rate of the age group with the maximum annual rate per 100 000 persons for the total population by intent. We plotted year on the x-axis, age group on the y-axis, and annual sex-, race-, ethnicity-, and urbanicity-specific firearm fatality rates in the body of the heat maps in a graded manner with coloring to indicate rates per 100 000 persons. Figures were created using Microsoft Excel for Mac version 16.43 (Microsoft).

While heat maps capture trends over time and across demographic groups by age, their standardization to the total population results in loss of granular data about the magnitude of differences between race and ethnicity groups. To demonstrate these differences, we created maximum crude and mean crude fatality rate line graphs to examine trends in annual firearm fatalities over time by age group, sex, race, ethnicity, and urbanicity of individuals killed. Graphing the maximum crude rate (ie, the age group with the highest fatality rate in a given year) is a novel approach to understanding the extremes of firearm fatalities and better captures disparities between demographic groups than use of mean crude fatality rates. Mean crude fatality rates across age groups were calculated annually for each demographic group.

We created choropleth maps that provided geospatial visualization of trends in firearm fatalities by intent by race, ethnicity, and sex. We created maps of county-level 3-year fatality rates per 100 000 persons. To examine changes over time within intent type, we determined the fifth and ninety-fifth percentile of intent-specific fatality rates from 1999 to 2001 and divided this range by 10 to create a color-coded scale (with <fifth and >ninety-fifth percentiles as additional categories). We applied this scale to the remaining 3-year graphs within each intent. For all-intents maps with rates by race, ethnicity, and sex, we used a similar procedure using White non-Hispanic males and White non-Hispanic females in 1999 to 2001 as reference groups so comparisons across racial and ethnic groups were possible using baseline data from the beginning of the period to track changes over time. Maps were created using STATA statistical software version 16.0 (StataCorp). Data were analyzed from December 2018 through September 2022.

There were 1 110 421 firearm fatalities in the US from 1990 to 2021 (952 984 among males [85.8%] and 157 165 among females [14.2%]; 286 075 among Black non-Hispanic individuals [25.8%], 115 616 among Hispanic individuals [10.4%], and 672 132 among White non-Hispanic individuals 60.5%]). Among all demographic groups combined, all-intents annual firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons per year initially declined from 14.9 fatalities in 1990 to 10.1 fatalities in 2004 (eFigure 1 in Supplement 1 ). Rates then increased beginning in 2005, reaching a 28-year high in 2021 of 14.7 fatalities per 100 000 persons. Within 5-year age groups, fatalities reached an apogee of 28.7 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021 among those aged 20 to 24 years (eFigure 2 in Supplement 2 ). In 2021, this was associated with peaks in homicides among Black non-Hispanic men (141.8 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) and suicides among White non-Hispanic men (45.2 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 80-84 years) and Black non-Hispanic men (24.5 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) ( Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). Homicide and suicide rates per 100 000 persons per year among Hispanic males continued to decrease over 30 years but then increased in 2019 to 2021.

Heat maps of all-intents firearm fatality rates showed declines in firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons per year among those aged 20 to 24 years, from 17.8 fatalities in 1990 to 1995 to a low of 12.3 fatalities in 2006, with a noted increase to 16.8 fatalities in 2021 (eFigure 1 in Supplement 1 ). However, when visualized by urbanization status, annual firearm suicide rates remained high and increased over time in nonmetropolitan areas among individuals aged 35 years or older ( Figure 2 ). In contrast, metropolitan areas had consistently high rates of homicide over time, especially among individuals aged 20 to 29 years ( Figure 1 ). Metropolitan areas had higher homicide rates than rural areas (6.6 fatalities vs 4.8 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021). Comparing all-intents firearm fatality rates over time by sex, males had persistently higher overall annual firearm fatality rates than females, particularly among those aged 20 to 39 years and 70 years or older. Males had higher rates of suicide (14.1 fatalities vs 2.0 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021) and homicide (10.9 fatalities vs 2.0 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021) compared with females. All-intents annual firearm fatality rates were highest among Black non-Hispanic individuals aged 15 to 39 years; the highest rate was 191.2 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 1991, which declined by half to 96.4 fatalities per 100 000 persons per year, then rebounded to 169.8 fatalities per 100 000 persons among Black non-Hispanic individuals aged 20 to 24 years in 2021.

White non-Hispanic men had the highest annual all-intents firearm fatality rates in individuals aged 75 years and older, at 39.6 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021 (eFigure 1 in Supplement 1 ). Black non-Hispanic men aged 15 to 44 years had the highest annual all-intents firearm fatality rates (126.7 fatalities/100 000 persons in 2021), which was mostly attributable to homicides (107.9 fatalities/100 000 persons in 2021). Annual firearm fatality rates from suicide were highest among White non-Hispanic men aged 80-84 years (52.3 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 1990), which decreased to 33.2 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2007 (36.5% decrease) and rebounded to 46.8 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021 (41.0% increase) ( Figure 1 ). Rates of homicide were highest among Black non-Hispanic men aged 20 to 24 years, at 182.7 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 1993, which decreased to 81.4 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2014 (55.4% decrease) and rebounded to 141.8 fatalities per 100 000 persons in 2021 (74.2% increase) ( Figure 2 ). By 2021, maximum rates of firearm homicide were up to 22.5 times higher among Black non-Hispanic men (up to 141.8 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) and up to 3.6 times higher among Hispanic men (up to 22.8 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 20-24 years) compared with White non-Hispanic men (up to 6.3 fatalities/100 000 persons aged 30-34 years). Hispanic males had peak rates of annual firearm fatalities per 100 000 persons in 1992 (71.7 fatalities), which declined to 21.3 fatalities in 2014 (70.3% decrease) but rebounded to 37.5 fatalities in 2021 (76.1% increase).

White non-Hispanic females had increased annual firearm fatality rates over time, associated with increases in suicide, but overall significantly lower rates than males. Black non-Hispanic females had increased rates of homicide per 100 000 persons per year in the 1990s, which decreased from 18.7 fatalities in 1994 to 6.2 fatalities in 2010, then more than tripled to 22.0 fatalities in 2021.

The mean total firearm fatality rate per 100 000 persons per year from all intents peaked at 15.2 fatalities in 1991, declined to 10.1 fatalities in 2004, then increased to 14.7 fatalities in 2021 (45.5% increase) (eFigure 2 in Supplement 1 ). The maximum rate from total all-intents firearm fatalities during that period was 33.8 fatalities per 100 000 persons. Maximum fatality rates per 100 000 persons, the measure of disparities at the extreme ends of fatality rates, showed striking variation between males and females. In 2021, the difference between males and females was 28.4 fatalities vs 4.5 fatalities per 100 000 persons (6.3-fold difference) for homicides and 37.8 fatalities vs. 3.5 fatalities per 100 000 persons (10.8-fold difference) for suicides.

Since 2010, all-intents firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons increased among females (from 4.2 fatalities in 2010 to 7.2 fatalities in 2021, a 71.4% increase), associated with higher annual suicide rates (eFigure 2 in Supplement 1 ; Figure 3 ). White non-Hispanic populations had a decrease in all-intents firearm fatality mean rates per 100 000 persons beginning in the early 2000s (from 11.6 fatalities in 1991 to 9.1 fatalities in 2000), but since 2010, annual mean firearm fatality rates have increased, peaking at 13.1 fatalities in 2021. Black non-Hispanic populations had an overall decrease in annual mean firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons per year by all intents (from 36.8 fatalities in 1993 to 19.8 fatalities in 2000), although starting in 2013, annual all-intents, homicide, and suicide rates of firearm fatalities per 100 000 persons per year increased, with peaks in 2021 (36.7 fatalities, 30.8 fatalities, and 5.2 fatalities, respectively).

Disparities were apparent in firearm fatality rates by sex, race, and ethnicity. From 2014 to 2021, male and female firearm homicide mean rates per 100 000 increased from 5.9 to 10.9 fatalities (84.7% increase) and 1.1 to 2.0 fatalities (87.0% increase), respectively. In 2021, White non-Hispanic males had the highest maximum firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons from suicide (45.2 fatalities) compared with Black non-Hispanic males (24.5 fatalities) and Hispanic males (13.2 fatalities) ( Figure 3 ). In contrast, Black non-Hispanic males had higher mean and maximum fatality rates per 100 000 persons for homicide (mean, 56.2 fatalities; maximum, 141.8 fatalities in 2021) compared with White non-Hispanic (mean, 3.0 fatalities; maximum, 6.3 fatalities in 2021) and Hispanic (mean, 9.7 fatalities; maximum, 22.8 fatalities in 2021) males ( Figure 4 ). The rates were also higher for all-intents fatalities (eFigure 2 in the Supplement ).

There was a more than 2-fold increase in suicide-related annual firearm fatality rates per 100 000 persons per year among Black non-Hispanic females after 2015 (from 1.4 fatalities in 2015 to 3.2 fatalities in 2021). From 1990 to 2007, mean rates per 100 000 persons per year in this group decreased, then increased to 2021 rates. All-intents fatalities decreased from 3.5 to 1.5 fatalities, then increased to 2.4 fatalities. Suicide fatalities decreased from 0.9 to 0.3 fatalities, then increased to 0.8 fatalities. Homicide fatalities decreased from 2.6 to 1.1 fatalities, then increased to 1.5 homicide fatalities. Disparities in maximum fatality rates per 100 000 persons per year among females were highest by homicide, with Black non-Hispanic females dying in 2021 at a maximum rate of 18.2 fatalities, Hispanic females at 3.7 fatalities, and White non-Hispanic females at 2.2 fatalities ( Figure 4 ).

Choropleth maps of county-level firearm fatality rates by all intents demonstrated higher rates beginning in Western states that increased toward the South over time ( Figure 5 ). From 1999 to 2011 until 2014 to 2016, fatalities per 100 000 persons decreased from 10.6 to 10.5 fatalities in Western states and increased from 12.8 to 13.9 fatalities in Southern states. Firearm suicide fatality rates had a similar pattern. In contrast, firearm homicide fatality rates were concentrated in Southern states and Alaska and increased over time.

In this multidimensional, nationally representative cross-sectional study of annual US firearm fatalities over a 32-year period, there were notable disparities in firearm fatalities by sex, race, ethnicity, and geography. Using heat maps, maximum and mean fatality line graphs, and choropleth maps of county-level firearm fatality rates, we were able to visualize this evolution of firearm fatalities over time, its variability by age, and disparities by sex, race, ethnicity, and region. Although all-intents firearm fatality rates initially decreased, we found a recent increase in each intent category. Moreover, stratified analyses demonstrated differential patterns in at-risk subpopulations. Annual firearm homicide fatality rates among Black non-Hispanic and Hispanic men aged 20 to 40 years were substantially higher than other demographic groups. Annual firearm suicide fatality rates were highest among White non-Hispanic men aged 70 years or older and increased over time in females. The choropleth maps of county-level rates demonstrate that all-intents firearm fatalities increased over the study period and increased across the country from the West to the South, whereas homicides remained concentrated in the South.

Our heat maps allow for a novel, multidimensional visualization to provide granular detail of the evolving epidemic of firearm violence in the US across a 32-year period. This type of data representation also facilitates the conceptualization of firearm fatality rates varying by age group, sex, race, ethnicity, and intent in 1 picture over time. Heat maps of the US have been used to visualize the evolution of opioid overdoses 18 , 19 and variations in hypertension, diabetes, and smoking by geographic region, race, and ethnicity. 20 Such an approach has not been used to evaluate the growing firearm epidemic in the US, to our knowledge. We also created maximum and mean fatality rate line graphs given that graphing maximum fatality rates allows one to visualize the severity of the problem in the extremes. In graphing maximum and mean annual firearm fatality rates by sex, race, and ethnicity in the US, we were able to further identify demographic groups that may be in need of targeted interventions for firearm injury prevention.

Although prior studies found that firearm fatality rates among all demographic groups remained fairly constant from 2000 to 2010, 21 , 22 our study showed a 45.5% increase in all-intents firearm fatalities from 2004 to 2021. This aligns with data from the CDC WONDER database reporting a 28% increase in firearm deaths among children and adolescents from 2013 to 2016. 23 The increase in firearm fatalities has not been equally distributed geographically in the US. Prior study findings suggest that firearm-related suicides may be more common in more impoverished counties. 24 - 27 The maps in our study may serve to demonstrate where interventions may be focused at the state and county level.

There were evident differences in firearm fatalities by race and ethnicity from 1990 to 2021. Black non-Hispanic and Hispanic men aged 20 to 40 years had higher rates of firearm homicides than White non-Hispanic men of the same age. This finding expands on previously reported data in which firearm fatalities, particularly homicides, were more common among young and middle-age Black and Hispanic men compared with White men of the same age. 28 - 34 There is increasing evidence suggesting the association of structural racism, individual and community poverty, and the environment with disparities in health outcomes in the US, 35 - 38 which may provide a partial explanation of our findings. The marked recent increase in firearm fatalities among Black non-Hispanic men aged 20 to 24 years is noteworthy and suggests that intervention is required to reduce this concerning recent trend.

In contrast to Black non-Hispanic men, White non-Hispanic men aged 70 years and older had the highest rates of firearm fatalities from suicide. This finding aligns with a study by Conner et al, 39 which found that individuals aged 65 years or older were less likely to attempt suicide than those younger than age 25 years but were more likely to die by suicide. That study did not examine trends by race or ethnicity. These findings suggest that suicide prevention efforts in the US may be most beneficial if they target older men. Our finding of higher rates of firearm-related suicide among males compared with females was consistent with prior studies finding that females were more likely to attempt suicide with poisoning, while males more commonly used a more lethal approach to suicide: firearms. 40 Nonetheless, increasing firearm suicide rates in females over time are concerning. Identifying individuals at risk for suicide who have access to firearms and facilitating lethal means restriction for people with depression or prior suicide attempts may reduce rates of firearm-related suicide. 41 , 42

Combined visualization modalities of demographic trends underscore demographic and geographic areas in need of targeted interventions. State-level legislation is 1 such approach. For example, states with more stringent child access–prevention laws, 43 more comprehensive background checks, and more firearm purchase regulations had fewer firearm-related fatalities. 44 , 45 Choropleth maps of county-level rates also suggested hot spots at the county level that may benefit from community-based interventions, such as violence intervention programs, firearm buybacks, safe firearm storage, and suicide prevention programs. State officials may use this information to understand potential interventions to be implemented at the local level.

This study has several limitations. Although overall rates of firearm fatalities were high for American Indian and Alaska Native individuals and low for Asian individuals, 46 the numbers were too small to report for each group when subdivided by age groups and intent over time and therefore were not addressed in this study. There is the potential for misclassification of intent for firearm fatalities 47 or changes in how firearm fatalities were coded over time. The WISQARS database does not contain information on owners of firearms or types of firearms used in firearm fatalities. Such information would further allow for targeted interventions designed to reduce the large number of firearm fatalities in the US. We were not able to control for multifactorial secular trends, such as increasing mass school shootings, 48 increased firearm ownership, the COVID-19 pandemic, or changes in storage patterns of firearms over time. Additionally, death certificates used in WISQARS may be incomplete, which may have led to underestimates of firearm fatality rates.

Using a multidimensional approach over 3 decades in the US, this cross-sectional study found marked disparities in rates of firearm fatalities by sex, race, ethnicity, and region. Homicides were most common among Black non-Hispanic men aged 20 to 40 years and suicides among White non-Hispanic men aged 70 years or older. Annual firearm suicide rates among females increased since 2010. Heat maps and maximum fatality line graphs may provide a robust perspective for visualizing the evolving firearm epidemic in the US. The geographical evolution of firearm fatalities in the US demonstrated concentrated and increased rates moving from the West to the South over time. Our findings suggest that public health approaches to prevent firearm violence must consider underlying demographic trends and differences by intent to reduce disparities and fatalities.

Accepted for Publication: October 4, 2022.

Published: November 29, 2022. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.44221

Open Access: This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY License . © 2022 Rees CA et al. JAMA Network Open .

Corresponding Author : Chris A. Rees, MD, MPH, Division of Pediatric Emergency Medicine, Emory University School of Medicine, 1405 Clifton Rd NE, Atlanta, GA 30322 ( [email protected] ).

Author Contributions: Dr Fleegler had full access to all of the data in the study and takes responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis.

Concept and design: Rees, Mannix, Barrett, Fleegler.

Acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data: All authors.

Drafting of the manuscript: Rees, Mannix, Fleegler.

Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: All authors.

Statistical analysis: Rees, Monuteaux, Steidley, Fleegler.

Administrative, technical, or material support: Lee, Barrett.

Supervision: Mannix, Fleegler.

Conflict of Interest Disclosures: Drs Lee and Fleegler reported receiving editor royalties from Springer Nature outside the submitted work. No other disclosures were reported.

Funding/Support : Part of this work was supported by the David S. Weiner Leadership Award, Boston Children’s Hospital.

Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The funder had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication.

Data Sharing Statement: See Supplement 2 .

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The Reporter

Program Report: The Economics of Aging, 2022

When the NBER’s Program on the Economics of Aging began in 1986 under the direction of David Wise, the baby-boom generation was between the ages of 22 and 40. Long-run projections at the time forecast that the United States would transition to an older population distribution. Today, with baby boomers ranging in age from 58 to 76, that projected future is the ongoing reality of our nation. One-fifth of the population will be age 65 or older in the next decade.

Since its inception, the Economics of Aging Program’s underlying focus has been the study of the health and financial well-being of people as they age and the larger implications of a population that is increasingly composed of older people. The program continues this broad focus as new and ongoing challenges emerge and evolve.

To illustrate the wide and multidisciplinary scope of research by program affiliates, I briefly describe ongoing work in four areas: the widening health disparities across education and region, a rising number of patients and caregivers struggling with Alzheimer’s disease, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the elderly, and the continuing evolution of the financial, physical, and mental health of retirees. This review is only a partial summary of the wide-ranging research carried out by program affiliates. Since the last program report, in 2014, more than 600 working papers related to the Economics of Aging Program have been distributed. Researchers have also published dozens of studies on aging in scientific and clinical journals, precluding inclusion in the NBER Working Paper series.

Widening Inequality in Mortality by Education and Place

Research by Anne Case and Angus Deaton illustrates the far-reaching effects of “deaths of despair” arising from drug overdoses, suicide, and alcoholism, and the very close association of these deaths with education. 1 These deaths have not only continued to rise, but have largely been among those without a four-year college degree — the majority of American adults. 2 As a consequence, mortality in the US is falling for the college-educated and rising for those without a degree — something not seen in other rich countries. One explanation for this US exceptionalism is the health-care system and the associated approach to financing health care. Another contributor is the drug epidemic and the explosion of prescription opioids after 1996, followed by an epidemic of illegal drug use, including use of diverted prescription drugs, heroin, and fentanyl. Abby Alpert, William Evans, Ethan Lieber, and David Powell find that the introduction and marketing of OxyContin explain a substantial share of overdose deaths over the last two decades. 3

Hannes Schwandt, Janet Currie, and a team of research collaborators drawn from many nations analyze mortality rates in the US and other high-income countries. They compare high-income and low-income regions in the US with similarly high- and low-income regions in nine European countries. This enables them to estimate separately the income gradient of mortality by country; in the US they estimate separate gradients for Blacks and Whites of all ages. 4 While in 1990 White Americans and Europeans in rich areas had similar overall life expectancy, since then even rich White Americans have lost ground relative to Europeans. As shown in Figure 1, on the next page, there was a reduction in the midlife life expectancy gap between Black Americans and Europeans, but life expectancy for both Black and White Americans plateaued or slightly declined after 2012. The comparison with European countries suggests that substantial improvements in mortality rates of both Black and White Americans are still feasible in both high-income and low-income areas.

There are widening geographic disparities in mortality within the US. Benjamin Couillard, Christopher Foote, Kavish Gandhi, Ellen Meara, and I find that geographic inequality in mortality for midlife Americans increased by about 60 percent between 1992 and 2016. 5 This was not simply because states like New York or California benefited from having a high fraction of college-educated residents who enjoyed the largest health gains during the last several decades. Nor was higher dispersion in mortality caused entirely by the increasing importance of deaths of despair or by rising regional income inequality during the same period. Instead, over time, state-level mortality has become increasingly correlated with state-level income. In 1992, income explained only 3 percent of mortality inequality, but by 2016 state-level income explained 58 percent. Figure 2 illustrates this growing association. These mortality patterns are consistent with high-income states during the twentieth century being better able to enact public health strategies and adopt behaviors that, over the next quarter century, resulted in pronounced relative declines in mortality in some but not all states.

The role of place — the set of health factors associated with one’s state, city, or town — has also been a topic of ongoing research. Remarkably, “place” seems to matter even when people aged 65 or older move. Tatyana Deryugina and David Molitor follow Medicare cohorts living in New Orleans to study the long-run effects of Hurricane Katrina. 6 They find that even after including the storm’s initial effects on mortality, the hurricane improved eight-year survival by 2.07 percentage points, with migration to lower-mortality regions explaining most of this increase. Migrants’ mortality is lower in destinations with healthier behaviors and higher incomes; the quality and quantity of health care in a locality appears unimportant.

One advantage of studying those who move is that most individuals’ health does not change much around the time of the move, so it allows for a reliable estimate of the influence of place on health. Amy Finkelstein, Matthew Gentzkow, and Heidi Williams study Medicare movers at the national level and find substantial effects of current location. Moving from a 10th to a 90th percentile location is predicted to increase life expectancy at age 65 by 1.1 years. 7 Places with favorable life expectancy are associated with higher quality and quantity of health care, less extreme climates, lower crime rates, and higher socioeconomic status.

Alzheimer’s Disease, Cognition, and Aging

With support from the National Institute on Aging, research by program affiliates has increasingly focused on the economic and behavioral consequences of Alzheimer’s disease, which affects approximately one in 10 people aged 65 or older and is the most costly disease in the United States. Alzheimer’s is a central concern for patients, caregivers, and healthcare policymakers. Amitabh Chandra, Courtney Coile, and Corina Mommaerts emphasize the defining features of the economics of the disease, including the challenges of choices by cognitively impaired patients that affect their health and financial well-being and the potential importance of dynamic contracts between patients and caregivers that are difficult to enforce. 8 They suggest high returns to focusing on innovation in Alzheimer’s prevention, treatment, and care, given the enormous social cost and present lack of understanding of its causes.

While much of the research on Alzheimer’s has focused on the costs of the late-stage disease, emerging research suggests an important impact of cognition more generally — even prior to diagnosis — on financial health. For example, John Ameriks, Andrew Caplin, Minjoon Lee, Matthew Shapiro, and Christopher Tonetti find that cognitive decline, often unnoticed, can delay the transfer of control over financial matters to someone else in the family, often with important adverse effects on financial well-being. 9

Other research has focused on factors that can potentially increase the likelihood of Alzheimer’s later in life. Kelly Bishop, Jonathan Ketcham, and Nicolai Kuminoff find that long-term exposure to fine-particulate air pollution (PM 2.5 ) increases the risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias. 10 Using the expansion of the Clean Air Act as a shock to the level of fine particulates, they find relatively large effects of reducing PM 2.5 rates. They estimate that federal regulations associated with the Clean Air Act led to nearly 182,000 fewer people with dementia.

The Impact of COVID-19 on Older Americans

It is well understood that COVID-19 led to more than one million lives lost, but it is difficult to measure all deaths that were a consequence of the pandemic, not just deaths caused by the virus. To answer the broader question, Christopher Ruhm analyzes death data from March 2009 through February 2021. He estimates that there were nearly 700,000 excess deaths during the first year of the pandemic, with 83 percent of these attributed directly to COVID-19 and the remainder arising from cardiovascular deaths, motor vehicle accidents, drug overdoses, and homicides. 11

Marcella Alsan, Chandra, and Kosali Simon document the dramatic inequality associated with the health shocks of the early pandemic. 12 They find that in 2020, Hispanic and Black Americans experienced 39.5 and 25 percent increases respectively in excess mortality relative to trend, compared to a less than 15 percent increase for Whites. Losses in potential years of life were three to four times larger among Hispanics and Blacks than among Whites. Individual-level data from a commercially insured population show that otherwise similar Black and Hispanic enrollees were hospitalized due to COVID-19 at a higher rate than White enrollees. Lauren Gilstrap, Weiping Zhou, Alsan, Anoop Nanda, and I also find higher excess mortality for Medicare enrollees age 65 or older. Mortality rose 26 percent for people with Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias (ADRD) in 2020 compared to 2019; this contrasts with an increase of just 12 percent for a comparably aged group without ADRD. 13 In regions with little reported COVID-19 during the pandemic’s early months, mortality declined 2 percent for those without ADRD but increased 6 percent for people with ADRD. Christopher Cronin and Evans offer a potential explanation for this puzzling finding. They discover that mortality rates rose in low-COVID-19 regions for high-quality nursing homes, whose lockdowns were effective in reducing the spread of COVID-19 but may have also increased non-COVID-19 mortality. This may have been particularly true for ADRD patients, who comprise a large fraction of nursing home residents, because their normal caregivers may not have been available. 14

Relatively little is currently known about educational differences in mortality during the pandemic. Because those without a college degree are likely to have been exposed disproportionately to COVID-19 through employment, one might have expected the education mortality gap to have widened since 2019. However, Case and Deaton find that mortality rates increased in 2020 over 2019 in roughly equal proportions for those with and without a college degree, irrespective of age, sex, or race/ethnicity. 15 A college degree was strongly associated with a longer life span before the COVID-19 pandemic, and it continued to be protective in the first wave of the pandemic as well.

It is well known that nursing homes were hit hard in the first year of the pandemic, but why is less clear. Was it simply because nursing home patients were older and more susceptible, or were there other factors that elevated nursing home mortality? Using novel approaches relying on data from more than 30 million US smartphones, M. Keith Chen, Judith Chevalier, and Elisa Long find that nursing homes with staff working at multiple facilities were more likely to experience outbreaks of COVID-19 than those without such links. 16 They track 510,000 phones that were observed to have been in at least one nursing home over the six-week period after March 13, when a nationwide lockdown on nursing homes went into effect; about 7 percent were observed in at least two facilities. Homes with no documented cases of COVID-19 had an average of 11.8 connections to other homes, where a connection means a cellphone observed at that home was also observed in another home. By comparison, homes with confirmed or suspected COVID-19 cases averaged 17.3 connections. The researchers estimate that eliminating staff overlap among nursing homes could have reduced coronavirus cases in nursing homes by as much as 44 percent.

Financial, Mental, and Physical Well-Being during Retirement

Researchers have studied the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution retirement plans and the impact of this shift on retirement security and preretirement behavior. Recent research finds that large groups of Americans have been left behind by this shift. For example, Kai Yuan Kuan, Mark Cullen, and Sepideh Modrek examine 401(k) saving behavior of continuously employed workers over an eight-year period at a single, geographically diverse employer. They find that both Black and Hispanic employees are less likely to participate in the 401(k) plan, and that conditional on participation, Black employees contribute a lower proportion of their income to their 401(k) plan on average, tend to draw down their 401(k) balances more often, and favor safer assets within their plan options. 17 These combined effects have a large impact on 401(k) balances and hence overall wealth accumulation.

Financial literacy — having a basic understanding of aspects of investing such as the power of compound interest — also impacts wealth accumulation. Marco Angrisani, Jeremy Burke, Annamaria Lusardi, and Gary Mottola find that financial literacy has significant predictive power for future financial outcomes, even after controlling for baseline outcomes and a wide set of demographics and individual characteristics that influence financial decision-making. 18

There are clear racial and ethnic disparities in wealth accumulation. Research has also explored differences in earnings and work capacity. Benjamin Berger, Italo Lopez Garcia, Nicole Maestas, and Kathleen Mullen study how functional abilities and potential earnings evolve as individuals age. 19 They find that average functional abilities and potential earnings decline only slightly with age, and that work capacity differences by race, ethnicity, and gender are small. These results imply that health is not a major driver of observed earnings disparities. The researchers find, however, that gaps in work capacity by education are large and increase with age.

Program affiliates have not only analyzed how government incentives affect financial preparedness for retirement, but also how government programs affect the health of retirees. For example, Chandra, Evan Flack, and Ziad Obermeyer examine Medicare’s prescription drug benefit program and find that an increase of approximately $10.40 in out-of-pocket costs per drug prescription leads to a 23 percent drop in total drug consumption and a 33 percent increase in monthly mortality. 20 The mortality effect appears to be the consequence of cutbacks in life-saving medicines like statins and antihypertensives, for which clinical trials show large mortality benefits.

The researchers use the month during which Medicare enrollees become eligible for Medicare Part D as a natural randomization for whether they fall into a gap in coverage, which typically occurs after spending $2,500 on prescription drugs. People who turn 65 later in the year are less likely to end up in the coverage gap simply because they experience fewer months of Part D spending. The first panel in Figure 4 shows this; by December, coinsurance rates are highest for those born in February and fall by an average of 2.3 percentage points in each subsequent enrollment month. The second panel of Figure 4 shows a similar pattern for mortality rates in this group. On average, each month of later enrollment reduces December mortality by 0.0113 percentage points, a 9 percent decrease. The findings suggest that enrollees respond to incentives regarding coinsurance for drug purchases, but do so in ways that may have unintended private and social costs.

Researchers

More from nber.

Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism , Case A, Deaton A. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020.  

“ The Great Divide: Education, Despair and Death ,” Case A, Deaton A. NBER Working Paper 29241, September 2021. Forthcoming in the Annual Review of Economics 14, August 2022.  

“ Origins of the Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring Impacts ,” Alpert A, Evans W, Lieber E, Powell D.  NBER Working Paper 26500, November 2019, and The Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(2), May 2022, pp. 1139–1179.  

“ Inequality in Mortality between Black and White Americans by Age, Place, and Cause, and in Comparison to Europe, 1990–2018 ,” Schwandt H, Currie J, Bär M, Banks J, Bertoli P, Bütikofer A, Cattan S, et al. NBER Working Paper 29203, September 2021, and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences   118(40), September 2021.

“ Rising Geographic Disparities in US Mortality ,” Couillard B, Foote C, Gandhi K, Meara E, Skinner J. Journal of Economic Perspectives 35(4), Fall 2021, pp. 123–146.  

“ Does When You Die Depend on Where You Live? Evidence from Hurricane Katrina ,” Deryugina T, Molitor D. NBER Working Paper 24822, revised December 2019, and American Economic Review 110(11), November 2020, pp. 3602–3633.  

“ Place-Based Drivers of Mortality: Evidence from Migration ,” Finkelstein A, Gentzkow M, Williams H. NBER Working Paper 25975, June 2019, and American Economic Review 111(8), August 2021, pp. 2697–2735.  

“ What Can Economics Say about Alzheimer’s Disease ?” Chandra A, Coile C, Mommaerts C. NBER Working Paper 27760, July 2021. Forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Literature .  

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Rates of distress, depression have doubled among transgender Americans since 2014: Study

by Ernie Mundell

The rate of self-reported mental distress and depression among American adults who identify as transgender or gender-diverse (TGD) has more than doubled between 2014 and 2022, an analysis of federal health data reveals.

During that time, "a record number of enacted laws has threatened the rights and protections of TGD people, including restricting access to gender-affirming care and permitting discrimination in public accommodations," noted a team of researchers led by health care policy investigator Michael Liu, of Harvard Medical School.

The findings are published in the journal JAMA Internal Medicine .

Liu's team tracked survey data from the federal government's ongoing Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, which follows the self-reported physical and mental health of U.S. adults over time.

The analysis started in 2014, the first year in which gender identity was added to the survey, and tracked data through 2022.

Liu's team found that the "prevalence of frequent mental distress increased from 18.8% in 2014 to 38.9% in 2022" among transgender or gender-diverse people.

In contrast, the rise in mental distress was less steep among cisgender people—from 11.2% to 15.5%.

Depression rates among transgender and gender-diverse adults also rose sharply between 2014 and 2022—more than doubling from 19.7% to 51.3%, Liu's group found. Over the same time period, depression rates among cisgender adults rose only slightly, from 18.6% to 21.1%.

Even physical health was affected: During the study period, the percentage of transgender/gender-diverse adults who rated their health as just "fair" or "poor" went from 26.6% to 35.1%, while that number remained stable at just over 17% among cisgender people.

In a linked journal editorial, three experts in health policy say the Harvard findings are not unexpected.

Dr. Carl Streed of Boston University, Kellan Baker of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health in Baltimore, and Arjee Javellana Restar of the University of Washington School of Public Health in Seattle point to hundreds of state bills "explicitly targeting transgender and nonbinary populations" proposed in 2023 and 2024.

"These efforts to exclude transgender and nonbinary people from civic life threaten the well-being of the more than 1.6 million transgender and nonbinary people in the U.S.," the experts said.

Increasing stigma means transgender and gender-diverse Americans are dealing with daily assaults on mental health, including deliberate misuse of pronouns, issues around restroom access, discrimination on the job and even acts of violence, the editorialists said.

It's probably not going to get better anytime soon.

"Given the sociopolitical trajectory of the U.S. regarding increasing discrimination and political attacks on transgender and nonbinary people, we can expect to see worsening mental health in these populations for the foreseeable future," the experts said.

Carl G. Streed et al, Association of Political Assaults With the Health of Transgender and Nonbinary Persons, JAMA Internal Medicine (2024). DOI: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2024.2553

Find out more about the impact of discrimination on health at the Mental Health Foundation .

2024 HealthDay. All rights reserved.

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