thesis of fed 10

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The federalist number 10, [22 november] 1787, the federalist number 10.

[22 November 1787]

Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. 1 The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both antient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administration.

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results: And from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality, yet there is perhaps no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects .

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. 2

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized, and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic, are first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are most favourable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favour of the latter by two obvious considerations.

In the first place it is to be remarked, that however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniencies will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonourable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic—is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. Does this advantage consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied, that the representation of the union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the encreased variety of parties, comprised within the union, encrease this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states: A religious sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any danger from that source: A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state. 3

In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride, we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of federalists.

McLean description begins The Federalist, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution, By a Citizen of New-York. Printed by J. and A. McLean (New York, 1788). description ends , I, 52–61.

1 .  Douglass Adair showed chat in preparing this essay, especially that part containing the analysis of factions and the theory of the extended republic, JM creatively adapted the ideas of David Hume (“‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,” Huntington Library Quarterly , XX [1956–57], 343–60). The forerunner of The Federalist No. 10 may be found in JM’s Vices of the Political System ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——). description ends , IX, 348–57 ). See also JM’s first speech of 6 June and his first speech of 26 June 1787 at the Federal Convention, and his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787 .

2 .  In Vices of the Political System JM listed three motives, each of which he believed was insufficient to prevent individuals or factions from oppressing each other: (1) “a prudent regard to their own good as involved in the general and permanent good of the Community”; (2) “respect for character”; and (3) religion. As to “respect for character,” JM remarked that “in a multitude its efficacy is diminished in proportion to the number which is to share the praise or the blame” ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——). description ends , IX, 355–56 ). For this observation JM again drew upon David Hume. Adair suggests that JM deliberately omitted his list of motives from The Federalist . “There was a certain disadvantage in making derogatory remarks to a majority that must be persuaded to adopt your arguments” (“‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,’” Huntington Library Quarterly , XX [1956–57], 354). JM repeated these motives in his first speech of 6 June 1787, in his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787 , and alluded to them in The Federalist No. 51 .

3 .  The negative on state laws, which JM had unsuccessfully advocated at the Federal Convention, was designed to prevent the enactment of “improper or wicked” measures by the states. The Constitution did include specific prohibitions on the state legislatures, but JM dismissed these as “short of the mark.” He also doubted that the judicial system would effectively “keep the States within their proper limits” ( JM to Jefferson, 24 Oct. 1787 ).

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US government and civics

Course: us government and civics   >   unit 10.

• The Declaration of Independence
• The Articles of Confederation
• The Constitution of the United States

Federalist No. 10

• Brutus No. 1
• Federalist No. 51
• Federalist No. 70
• Federalist No. 78
• Letter from a Birmingham Jail

The Same Subject Continued

The union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection, want to join the conversation.

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AP® US History

Federalist number 10: ap® us history crash course review.

• The Albert Team
• Last Updated On: March 1, 2022

It’s no question that the Founding Fathers played an important role in American history. When it comes to the people who did so much for the founding of our nation, how can you keep track of everything they did? Luckily for you, we have all the tools you need to master the Fathers’ contributions to the American government. In this APUSH crash course review, we will talk about one of the key documents that could appear on the AP® exam: Federalist Number 10.

What is Federalist Number 10?

Federalist No. 10 is an essay written by James Madison, which appeared in The Federalist Papers . The papers were a collection of 85 articles and essays written by Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in 1787 and 1788. They argued for the ratification of the Constitution and were published under the pseudonym Publius (the Roman Publius helped overthrow the monarchy and establish the Roman Republic).

The essay’s main argument was that a strong, united republic would be more effective than the individual states at controlling “factions” – groups of citizens united by some cause “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the… interests of the community.” In other words, they were groups of people with radical ideas that weren’t good for everyone as a whole.

Factions are controlled either by removing the causes or controlling the effects. Essentially, this means that the government can either solve the problem with which the faction is concerned, or wait for the faction to act and repair the damage. Madison believed that removing the causes was impractical. Why? Well, he says, to get to factions’ ideas at the source, you would either have to take away their liberty or make it so everyone has the same opinions.

Taking away liberty was out of the question for Madison – he wrote, “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire.” Fire needs air to exist, but so do humans. Madison means that taking away liberty would destroy the factions, but it would also destroy others’ happiness. The second option – giving everyone the same opinions – is also impossible. As long as humans have the ability to reason, Madison says, they will form different opinions. Therefore, Madison argued instead that factions must be controlled by responding to them. He wanted to do this by giving them representation in a republican government.

The Constitution called for a republic, which elects representatives for the people. This is in contrast to a “pure democracy,” which would use the popular vote. Madison believed a republic would be able to extend the government to more free citizens of greater parts of the country, who wouldn’t necessarily be able to assemble, which would be required under a pure democracy.

According to Federalist No. 10, a large republic will help control factions because when more representatives are elected, there will be a greater number of opinions. Therefore, it is far less likely that there will be one majority oppressing the rest of the people.

Why is Federalist Number 10 Important?

Federalist No. 10 is possibly the most famous of The Federalist Papers , and is even regarded as one of the highest-quality political writings of all time. Some people even called James Madison the “Father of the Constitution” because of his essays’ influence.

Because Federalist No. 10 and the other Federalist Papers were published under a pseudonym, there was controversy surrounding them. You’re right. In fact, an entire group of Americans called the Anti-Federalists spoke out against these writings. In response to The Federalist Papers , Anti-Federalists even published an impressive collection of political writings called The Anti-Federalist Papers .

Anti-Federalists opposed making the government stronger, in the fear that giving more power to a president might lead to a monarchy. Instead, they wanted state governments to have more authority. This policy was outlined in the Articles of Confederation, the predecessor to the Constitution.

Federalist No. 10 may have had an influence on the eventual ratification of the Constitution, especially in New York. However, it is hard to measure its influence for sure. What is for sure is that debaters used many of the Federalist’s writings as a kind of handbook on how to argue in favor of the Constitution.

What You Need to Know for the APUSH Exam – Multiple-Choice

The multiple-choice section of the APUSH exam could ask you either about specific details, like the contents of Federalist No. 10, or about broader implications, like its impact on ratification debates. You should be familiar with no only Federalist No. 10, but The Federalist Papers as a whole and the other authors, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton.

The multiple-choice section of the APUSH exam now asks you to respond to “stimulus material.” This means there will be sets of questions asking you about a primary or secondary source, such as a quote, painting, map, chart, etc.

Federalist No. 10 might be one of those primary documents. Luckily, you won’t have to identify it – the source will be written below the excerpt. However, you should read over Federalist 10 at some point during your studying, so you’re already familiar with the phrasing. That way, you can focus on the questions sooner, instead of having to digest all the material for the first time.

College Board has not released past multiple-choice questions of this type, but here is a question similar to the ones that could appear on the APUSH exam:

According to Federalist No. 10, Madison thought the most effective way to control factions was

(A)  eliminating the source of their grievances

(B)  forming a representative republic that would prevent oppression of their opponents

(C) adhering to the strong state powers outlined in the Articles of Confederation

(D) prohibiting faction assemblies

(E)  installing a pure democracy in which every man had equal political influence

The correct choice is B. Although Madison proposed the strategy in choice A as a potential option, he ultimately discredited it. Choice D is incorrect because Madison opposed taking away the factions’ liberty, as it was like “air is to fire.” Choices C and E directly contradict Madison’s position as a Federalist – instead, they represent the Anti-Federalist side of the debate.

What You Need to Know for the APUSH Exam – Essays and Document-Based Questions

The Free-Response Questions and DBQs on the APUSH exam will ask you to connect founding documents such as Federalist No. 10 with other events in the broader scope of American history. Madison’s essay or one of the other Federalist Papers could even be one of the sources for a DBQ.

Here is an example of a Free-Response Question  where you could tie in Federalist No. 10 into your answer:

Analyze the ways in which the political, economic, and diplomatic crises of the 1780’s shaped the provisions of the United States Constitution.  

If you want to write about Federalist No. 10 and the other essays from The Federalist Papers in your response, you could do so in your discussion of the political crises of the 1780’s. Talk about the debate over the Articles of Confederation between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists , and how Federalist No. 10 was used to convince Americans of the need to ratify the Constitution.

Of course, you will also need to bring in details about economic and diplomatic crises at this time, so Federalist No. 10 is only one piece of the puzzle. For more details on how to bring in those other aspects, check out our other APUSH crash courses and the College Board’s detailed scoring guidelines .

Congratulations – you’ve made it through our APUSH crash course on Federalist No. 10! Now you can feel confident tackling questions about one of the most important founding documents. With these tools in hand, you’re well on your way to a 5 in May.

Let’s put everything into practice. Try this AP® US History practice question:

Looking for more APUSH practice?

Check out our other articles on  AP® US History .

You can also find thousands of practice questions on Albert.io. Albert.io lets you customize your learning experience to target practice where you need the most help. We’ll give you challenging practice questions to help you achieve mastery of AP® US History.

Start practicing here .

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2 thoughts on “federalist number 10: ap® us history crash course review”.

I think it was James Madison who wrote Federalist No. 10, right? There are some points where this article says Hamilton, instead of Madison.

Good catch on the mix up; corrected!

Comments are closed.

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The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 10.

Madison begins perhaps the most famous essay of The Federalist Papers by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions. Madison defines factions as groups of people who gather together to protect and promote their special economic interests and political opinions. Although these factions are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interest and infringe upon the rights of others.

Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact, the situation is so problematic that people are disillusioned with all politicians and blame the government for their problems. Consequently, any form of popular government that can deal successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it.

Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amounts of property, they will continue to fraternize with those people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions, but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property. Men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those of business owners. Governments must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but also must successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property.

To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man, so we must accept their existence and deal with their effects. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions.

The framers established a representative form of government: a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies (countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws) cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict.

If the new plan of government is adopted, Madison hopes that the men elected to office will be wise and good men,­ the best of America. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good for temporary conditions, but the opposite could happen. Men who are members of particular factions or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public offices will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but rather to guard against the rule of the mob.

In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. In this country, leaders of factions may be able to influence state governments to support unsound economic and political policies ­as the states, far from being abolished, retain much of their sovereignty. If the framers had abolished the state governments, then opponents of the proposed government would have had a legitimate objection.

The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capital, but in terms of safety and protection, they stand to gain the most from a strong national government.

Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandoning the idea of coming together in strength—after all, the states still have common interests. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."

James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of Hamilton's. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the states as active political organisms. He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic were set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, then these interests, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor. Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power. Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security. Rather, he wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself to break down the dichotomy of rich and poor, thereby guaranteeing both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."

It is also interesting to note that James Madison was the most creative and philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics in attendance at the Philadelphia Convention. His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular Constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787, was based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in 1787. But Madison's greatness as a statesman also rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience within the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations.

His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United States and its variety of interests constituted a guarantee of stability and justice under the new Constitution. When Madison made this prophecy, the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. It was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in 1752, that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay, Hume decried any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments" which seemed to serve imperfect men so well. Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth "is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world. " At the end of Hume's essay was a discussion that was of interest to Madison. The Scot casually demolished the Montesquieu small-republic theory; and it was this part of the essay, contained in a single page, that was to serve Madison in new-modeling a "botched" Confederation "in a distant part of the world." Hume said that "in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrate, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest." Hume's analysis here had turned the small-territory republic theory upside down: if a free state could once be established in a large area, it would be stable and safe from the effects of faction. Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic.

In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April 1787, eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Starting with the proposition that "in republican Government, the majority, however, composed, ultimately give the law," Madison then asks what is to restrain an interested majority from unjust violations of the minority's rights? Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general . . . good" second, "respect for character" and finally, religious scruples. After examining each in its turn Madison concludes that they are but a frail bulwark against a ruthless party.

When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America. Hume's work was admirably adapted to this purpose. It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. The facile domination of faction had been a commonplace in English politics for a hundred years, as Whig and Tory vociferously sought to fasten the label on each other. But the Scot, very little interested as a partisan and very much so as a social scientist, treated the subject therefore in psychological, intellectual, and socioeconomic terms. Throughout all history, he discovered, mankind has been divided into factions based either on personal loyalty to some leader or upon some "sentiment or interest" common to the group as a unit. This latter type he called a "Real" as distinguished from the "personal" faction. Finally, he subdivided the "real factions" into parties based on "interest, upon principle," or upon affection."

Hume spent well over five pages dissecting these three types; but Madison, while determined to be inclusive, had not the space to go into such minute analysis. Besides, he was more intent now on developing the cure than on describing the malady. He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence. The tenth Federalist reads" "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex ad oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good." It is hard to conceive of a more perfect example of the concentration of idea and meaning than Madison achieved in this famous sentence.

The Federalist Papers Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

how are conflictstoo often decided in unstable government? Whose rights are denied when this happens?

In a typical non-democratic government with political instability, the conflicts are often decided by the person highest in power, who abuse powers or who want to seize power. Rival parties fight each other to the detriment of the country.

How Madison viewed human nature?

Madison saw depravity in human nature, but he saw virtue as well. His view of human nature may have owed more to John Locke than to John Calvin. In any case, as Saul K. Padover asserted more than a half-century ago, Madison often appeared to steer...

How arguable and provable is the author of cato 4 claim

What specific claim are you referring to?

Study Guide for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

• About The Federalist Papers
• The Federalist Papers Summary
• The Federalist Papers Video
• Character List

Essays for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• A Close Reading of James Madison's The Federalist No. 51 and its Relevancy Within the Sphere of Modern Political Thought
• Lock, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers
• Comparison of Federalist Paper 78 and Brutus XI
• The Paradox of the Republic: A Close Reading of Federalist 10
• Manipulation of Individual Citizen Motivations in the Federalist Papers

Lesson Plan for The Federalist Papers

• About the Author
• Study Objectives
• Common Core Standards
• Introduction to The Federalist Papers
• Relationship to Other Books
• Bringing in Technology
• Notes to the Teacher
• Related Links
• The Federalist Papers Bibliography

E-Text of The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers e-text contains the full text of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• FEDERALIST. Nos. 1-5
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 6-10
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 11-15
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 16-20
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 21-25

Wikipedia Entries for The Federalist Papers

• Introduction
• Structure and content
• Judicial use
• Complete list

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What Is Madison’s Thesis in Federalist Paper Number 10?

James Madison’s thesis in Federalist Paper Number 10 is that a strong national government is better able to guard against the destructive effects of special interest groups and factions than smaller republics. Madison wrote the essay to persuade the states to ratify the U.S. Constitution.

Madison defined faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” He believed that factions are natural to human nature and that the best any government can do is to ameliorate their ill effects. Madison argued that this is impossible in a pure democracy, but a representative republic, where voters delegate law making to elected representatives, is better equipped to do this. In small republics, he went on, a smaller pool of voters means a greater probability that factions could form a majority to trample on the rights of the minority. In contrast, a larger republic means a larger pool of voters and candidates, and a smaller probability that any one faction could take power and oppress the minority.

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“Federalist 10” by James Madison: Summary and Analysis

Introduction, summary of federalist 10, analysis of madison’s arguments in federalist 10, works cited.

Federalist 10 is an essay written by James Madison and published in 1787 as a tenth part of The Federalist Papers, emphasizing the need for ratifying the United States Constitution. In this paper, Madison discussed factions, a group of citizens with similar interests and issues emerging in democracy, arguing that they often oppress minorities. As Madison sees factions as a significant problem for the state and interests of minority groups, he suggests a form of the representative republic as the most efficient against major oppressing groups.

In Madison’s essay, he claims that factions are created because of human nature and his tendency to join and organize communities. Moreover, as a crucial cause of factions, the author sees the unequal distribution of property in society, where there are creditors and debtors. Thus, he claims that debtors, for instance, may unite in a faction to try to protect their interests and solve their problems with the help of democracy, willing to redistribute creditors’ money, which will oppress the minority. Therefore, Madison suggests two ways of solving the problem of majoritarianism: either by removing its causes or controlling the effects.

As for removing causes producing factions, Madison also suggests two ways: either by denying the liberty of all the citizens or providing the same interests and values for all the people. However, Madison claims that both suggestions are impossible to be implemented because freedom and the guarantee of rights are crucial to political life. Moreover, no one can provide the same interests to a diverse society. Therefore, only controlling the effects of majoritarianism caused by human nature can be counted as a way to solve the problem of factions, which Madison sees possible only in a representative republic.

To make it clear, James Madison denies democracy as a form of government in which minorities are not oppressed. He sees democracy as a form of rule in which citizens are voting for or against proposed laws. At the same time, a republic for him is a government in which citizens, diverse in terms of their interests, choose a few representatives who will accept or deny laws for them. Therefore, in his essay Federalist 10, Madison argues that with the help of a representative republic, governments will be divided into small districts, avoiding factions.

It is crucial to start the analysis of Federalist 10 by defining its origins, meaning the essay Federalist 9 written by Alexander Hamilton, which addresses critics based on Montesquieu’s arguments of the failure nature of a federal Union. Hamilton writes that there is a “tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection” (para. 14). Thus, as Hamilton in Federalist 9 answers the critique, claiming that Montesquieu’s words were taken out of the context, Madison in Federalist 10 continues the topic of fractions. In other words, Madison suggests a representative republic as a form of government in a Union as a means to avoid majoritarianism and insurrection.

James Madison’s essay number 10 is considered one of the most explanatory to the Constitution. The author provides a clear argument in favor of the republican form of government. McManus states: “Indeed, sheer geographic expanse can itself become an advantage since any leader who wishes to pursue a “wicked” project such as the abolition of debts or equality of property will be unable to gain sufficient traction to enact their “improper” egalitarian project” (29). Therefore, James Manus has successfully continued the discussion started by Hamilton, adding his own crucial arguments to support the federalist view.

Federalist 10 discusses the ways to avoid fractions because of oppressing wealthy citizens, which provides a ground for evaluating arguments’ weaknesses in the essay. According to McManus, “Madison was often far more concerned with the minority rights of the propertied than conventionally marginalized groups” (28). Thus, Madison tried to suggest solutions to protect the rights of people having property, not those marginalized and who need governmental protection. Therefore, the idea lying in the essay can be criticized for its vision of the poor majority as a threat and leading cause of fractions.

Moreover, another weak side of Madison’s arguments can be defined concerning its connection with official documents. Weiner claims: “when he announces at the end of the essay that he has “remedied” the “disease” of faction, Madison has not mentioned a single facet of the proposed Constitution—neither the judiciary nor bicameralism nor the president’s veto” (130-131). This may stand for Madison’s lack of proof to support his philosophical discussion on politics and the insufficiency of actual plans to avoid fractions and insurrections in the federal state.

It is necessary to state that the essay Federalist 10 is considered one of the most important in The Federalist Papers because it explains the US Constitution. In his paper, Madison argues that a representative republic is the best form of government to avoid harming the impact of fractions caused by majoritarianism. The essay continues the discussion started in Federalist 9 by Hamilton and provides clear arguments to support the republic and the federation. However, it does not concern marginalized groups, emphasizing the interests of wealthy minorities.

Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist Paper #9 – The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection . The Federalist Papers, 1787. Web.

McManus, Matthew. Liberal Rights and Their Critics. A Critical Legal Examination of Liberalism and Liberal Rights . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020. 3-65.

Weiner, Greg. After Federalist No. 10. National Affairs 33, 2017. 130-144.

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The Federalist Papers 10 and 51 Introduction Introduction

In a nutshell.

The United States Government, much like the endlessly-rebooting Spider Man franchise, has journeyed through the years with certain fixed features that we've come to expect as iconic and unchangeable.

Things like the three-branch structure, the House of Representatives, the Senate, Aunt May, and Uncle Ben have become timeless facets of our system of Government.

(Hmm. Maybe Aunt May and Uncle Ben didn't actually exist when the Founding Fathers were doing their Founding Father thing…although we think people like James Madison would have given the thumbs up to the phrase "With great power comes great responsibility.")

Nevertheless, the Constitution has proven a stable and flexible foundation for our current government, only really requiring tweaks and edits to persist in the present. But—and this is a big but and we cannot lie—the Constitutional Government was not the first government of the United States.

Mind blown? Mind blown.

The United State's O.G. (that's Original Government) was prescribed by the Articles of Confederation. That government wasn't going so hot though, so the Constitutional Convention was held in 1786 to toss the old one out the window and start from scratch.

The various delegates to the Constitutional Convention had to create a document—and a government by proxy—that would have support from at least nine of the thirteen states in order to come into law. No biggie, right?

To get the support the Constitution needed, Alexander Hamilton rounded up James Madison and John Jay—together three of the MVPs in statecraft—to write a series of newspaper essays in support of the Constitution. (Give this a listen for a quick run-down.)

Basically, the Federalist Papers were a series of commercials for the United States, coming to an America near you.

The nation was brand new, something that its founders viewed as an experimental form of government, and a lot of them strongly disagreed on how it should even look. The Articles of Confederation had been a disaster , giving the federal government the power to make laws but not the power to enforce them, no power to hold a standing army, and a bunch of other serious weaknesses.

People were understandably worried about tyrannical rule after fighting a war to overthrow one, but the government was weak to the point of being ineffectual. It was a Goldilocks situation, with the British Empire in the role of Papa Bear's oatmeal, and the Articles of Confederation in the role of Mama Bear's oatmeal.

While the devs of the Constitution were working on the balance changes for patch 1.786, the authors of the Federalist Papers were working on writing out the patch notes. These Federalist Papers ultimately serve as a pretty essential behind-the-scenes peek at the thought process that went into forming the Constitution.

James Madison wrote Federalist Papers 10 and 51 , two essays in an absurdly long 85-essay series. Both generally had to do with the structure of the United States Government, and how the proposed structure specifically would keep the power of the majority from taking control of the Government, and keeping the power of corruption down.

He argues that the most effective way to do this is to have a Democratic Republic, broken down into a three-branch system. (Rule of three, y'all.)

This was still a touchy idea, and was a stronger government than some of the delegates would have liked. This central conflict, over a strong versus a weak federal government, would fracture American politics irreparably into the two-party system.

The years to follow would have the issue even split the writers of the Federalist Papers apart, with James Madison and Alexander Hamilton going from co-writers to political rivals over the issue. While the papers weren't wildly influential in their own time, today they provide us a window into the mind-sets of some of the people behind the Constitution, flaws and all.

If you ever wanted to get inside the head of James Madison without some Magic School Bus-style trip there, Federalist papers 10 and 51 are a good place to start.

Why Should I Care?

If you're fond of sitting back in your lounge chair, sipping your hot cocoa and muttering to yourself, "Man, that's one good three-branch Federal Government with a bicameral legislature," (because, you know, who doesn't like doing that?) then these documents are partially to thank.

Really, though: if these essays hadn't been as persuasive as they ended up being, it's unlikely that the US Government as we know it would exist.

Yeah. Now we have you attention, right?

When you read the Federalist papers, you'll see that they're are obviously the product of dudes that were insanely hard at work. These papers are working their little papery butts off trying to figure out how to run the dang country—they show the sweat side of the blood, sweat, and tears that went into building America.

Remember, there was a strong camp at the Constitutional Convention that opposed the plans for a strong Federal Government outright. Since the Constitution needed nine states out of thirteen to ratify the document, the writers of the Federalist papers had to defend what was largely their own idea to the country at large.

And the ideas James Madison and the other Federalists put on the table weren't shoe-ins for success. They, like everyone else, were building a government out of nothing in a room of people who were trying to do the exact same thing . And they also all had wildly different ideas on how to do it.

These papers had to be persuasive…or perish.

Today, the Federalist Papers in their entirety give us a glimpse into the thought process behind why the Constitution is set up the way it is, with insights from statesmen who were there while it was being created. It's like a time capsule…except, thankfully, it doesn't contain a grubby CD of Now! That's What I Call Music from 1998.

Reading the Federalist papers also lets us stop thinking about the Constitution and its writers as prophets delivering some kind of perfect tome of wisdom from on high. They were just normal, flawed people who were trying to respond to a series of real problems in the best ways they knew how.

By working the persuasion angle. Hard.

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W hy's T his F unny?

Federalist 10: Democratic Republic vs. Pure Democracy

 by natalie bolton and gordon lloyd, introduction:.

To assist teachers in teaching the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Professor Gordon Lloyd  has created a website in collaboration with the Ashbrook Center at Ashland University on the Federalist and Antifederalist Debates . Professor Lloyd organizes the content of the debates in various ways on the website. Two lesson plans have been created to align with two of the most noted essays high school students are encouraged to read, Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 . Within each lesson students will use a Federalist Paper as their primary source for acquiring content.

Guiding Question:

Why can a republic protect liberties better than a democracy?

Learning Objectives:

After completing this lesson, students should be able to: Define faction in Federalist 10 . Analyze present day issues and determine if they qualify as a faction as defined in Federalist 10 . Explain why Madison advocated for a democratic republic form of government over a pure democracy in Federalist 10 .

Background Information for the Teacher:

The years were 1787 and 1788. Along with the debate over the Constitution that was taking place in the state legislatures, an “out-of-doors” debate raged in newspapers and pamphlets throughout America’s thirteen states following the Constitutional Convention over the Constitution that had been proposed. Origin of The Federalist The eighty-five essays appeared in one or more of the following four New York newspapers: 1) The New York Journal , edited by Thomas Greenleaf, 2) Independent Journal , edited by John McLean, 3) New York Advertiser , edited by Samuel and John Loudon, and 4) Daily Advertiser , edited by Francis Childs. Initially, they were intended to be a twenty essay response to the Antifederalist attacks on the Constitution that were flooding the New York newspapers right after the Constitution had been signed in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787. The Cato letters started to appear on September 27, George Mason’s objections were in circulation and the Brutus essays were launched on October 18. The number of essays in The Federalist was extended in response to the relentless, and effective, Antifederalist criticism of the proposed Constitution. McLean bundled the first 36 essays together—they appeared in the newspapers between October 27, 1787 and January 8, 1788—and published them as Volume 1 on March 22, 1788. Essays 37 through 77 of The Federalist appeared between January 11, and April 2, 1788. On May 28, McLean took Federalist 37-77 as well as the yet to be published Federalist 78-85 and issued them all as Volume 2 of The Federalist . Between June 14 and August 16, these eight remaining essays—Federalist 78-85—appeared in the Independent Journal and New York Packet . The Status of The Federalist One of the persistent questions concerning the status of The Federalist is this: is it a propaganda tract written to secure ratification of the Constitution and thus of no enduring relevance or is it the authoritative expositor of the meaning of the Constitution having a privileged position in constitutional interpretation? It is tempting to adopt the former position because 1) the essays originated in the rough and tumble of the ratification struggle. It is also tempting to 2) see The Federalist as incoherent; didn’t Hamilton and Madison disagree with each other within five years of co-authoring the essays? Surely the seeds of their disagreement are sown in the very essays! 3) The essays sometimes appeared at a rate of about three per week and, according to Madison, there were occasions when the last part of an essay was being written as the first part was being typed. 1) One should not confuse self-serving propaganda with advocating a political position in a persuasive manner. After all, rhetorical skills are a vital part of the democratic electoral process and something a free people have to handle. These are op-ed pieces of the highest quality addressing the most pressing issues of the day. 2) Moreover, because Hamilton and Madison parted ways doesn’t mean that they weren’t in fundamental agreement in 1787-1788 about the need for a more energetic form of government. And just because they were written with certain haste doesn’t mean that they were unreflective and not well written. Federalist 10, the most famous of all the essays, is actually the final draft of an essay that originated in Madison’s Vices in 1787, matured at the Constitutional Convention in June 1787, and was refined in a letter to Jefferson in October 1787. All of Jay’s essays focus on foreign policy, the heart of the Madisonian essays are Federalist 37-51 on the great difficulty of founding, and Hamilton tends to focus on the institutional features of federalism and the separation of powers. I suggest, furthermore, that the moment these essays were available in book form, they acquired a status that went beyond the more narrowly conceived objective of trying to influence the ratification of the Constitution. The Federalist now acquired a “timeless” and higher purpose, a sort of icon status equal to the very Constitution that it was defending and interpreting. And we can see this switch in tone in Federalist 37 when Madison invites his readers to contemplate the great difficulty of founding. Federalist 38 , echoing Federalist 1 , points to the uniqueness of the America Founding: never before had a nation been founded by the reflection and choice of multiple founders who sat down and deliberated over creating the best form of government consistent with the genius of the American people. Thomas Jefferson referred to the Constitution as the work of “demigods,” and The Federalist “the best commentary on the principles of government, which ever was written.” There is a coherent teaching on the constitutional aspects of a new republicanism and a new federalism in The Federalist that makes the essays attractive to readers of every generation. Authorship of The Federalist A second question about The Federalist is how many essays did each person write? James Madison—at the time a resident of New York since he was a Virginia delegate to the Confederation Congress that met in New York—John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton—both of New York—wrote these essays under the pseudonym, “Publius.” So one answer to the question is that how many essays each person wrote doesn’t matter since everyone signed off under the same pseudonym, “Publius.” But given the iconic status of The Federalist , there has been an enduring curiosity about the authorship of the essays. Although it is virtually agreed that Jay wrote only five essays, there have been several disputes over the decades concerning the distribution of the essays between Hamilton and Madison. Suffice it to note, that Madison’s last contribution was Federalist 63 , leaving Hamilton as the exclusive author of the nineteen Executive and Judiciary essays. Madison left New York in order to comply with the residence law in Virginia concerning eligibility for the Virginia ratifying convention . There is also widespread agreement that Madison wrote the first thirteen essays on the great difficulty of founding. There is still dispute over the authorship of Federalist 50-58, but these have persuasively been resolved in favor of Madison. Outline of The Federalist A third question concerns how to “outline” the essays into its component parts. We get some natural help from the authors themselves. Federalist 1 outlines the six topics to be discussed in the essays without providing an exact table of contents. The authors didn’t know in October 1787 how many essays would be devoted to each topic. Nevertheless, if one sticks with the “formal division of the subject” outlined in the first essay, it is possible to work out the actual division of essays into the six topic areas or “points” after the fact so to speak. Martin Diamond was one of the earliest scholars to break The Federalist into its component parts. He identified Union as the subject matter of the first thirty-six Federalist essays and Republicanism as the subject matter of last forty-nine essays. There is certain neatness to this breakdown, and accuracy to the Union essays. The first three topics outlined in Federalist 1 are 1) the utility of the union, 2) the insufficiency of the present confederation under the Articles of Confederation , and 3) the need for a government at least as energetic as the one proposed. The opening paragraph of Federalist 15 summarizes the previous fourteen essays and says: “in pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the pursuance of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the ‘insufficiency of the present confederation.'” So we can say with confidence that Federalist 1-14 is devoted to the utility of the union. Similarly, Federalist 23 opens with the following observation: “the necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic as the one proposed… is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.” Thus Federalist 15-22 covered the second point dealing with union or federalism. Finally, Federalist 37 makes it clear that coverage of the third point has come to an end and new beginning has arrived. And since McLean bundled the first thirty-six essays into Volume 1, we have confidence in declaring a conclusion to the coverage of the first three points all having to do with union and federalism. The difficulty with the Diamond project is that it becomes messy with respect to topics 4, 5, and 6 listed in Federalist 1 : 4) the Constitution conforms to the true principles of republicanism , 5) the analogy of the Constitution to state governments, and 6) the added benefits from adopting the Constitution. Let’s work our way backward. In Federalist 85 , we learn that “according to the formal division of the subject of these papers announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points,” namely, the fifth and sixth points. That leaves, “republicanism,” the fourth point, as the topic for Federalist 37-84, or virtually the entire Part II of The Federalist . I propose that we substitute the word Constitutionalism for Republicanism as the subject matter for essays 37-51, reserving the appellation Republicanism for essays 52-84. This substitution is similar to the “Merits of the Constitution” designation offered by Charles Kesler in his new introduction to the Rossiter edition; the advantage of this Constitutional approach is that it helps explain why issues other than Republicanism strictly speaking are covered in Federalist 37-46. Kesler carries the Constitutional designation through to the end; I suggest we return to Republicanism with Federalist 52 . Taken from the Introduction to The Federalist .

Preparing to Teach this Lesson:

Prior to teaching this lesson the teacher should cover content related to the Articles of Confederation and its weaknesses. The teacher should familiarize her/himself with Madison’s Notes on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the following days outlined below. Gordon Lloyd has presented the content of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 as a Four Act Drama . Additionally, the teacher should cover content related to Federalist and Antifederalist debates that occurred prior to Federalist 10 being published. Three activities are outlined below and should be implemented in order. Activity 1: Define faction in Federalist 10 . Activity 2: Analyze present day issues and determine if they qualify as a faction as defined in Federalist 10 . Activity 3: Analyzing Federalist 10 using APPARTS. For all activities, students will use Federalist 10 . To assist students in reading Federalist 10 , a paragraph-by-paragraph summary has been provided by Gordon Lloyd.

Analyzing Primary Sources:

If your students lack experience in dealing with primary sources, you might use one or more preliminary exercises to help them develop these skills. The Learning Page at the American Memory Project of the Library of Congress includes a set of such activities. Another useful resource is the Digital Classroom of the National Archives, which features a set of Document Analysis Worksheets . Finally, History Matters offers pages on “ Making Sense of Maps ” and “ Making Sense of Oral History ” which give helpful advice to teachers in getting their students to use such sources effectively.

Suggested Activities:

Activity 1: Define faction in Federalist 10

Time required for activity: In class activity 20 minutes.

The teacher will open day one of the lesson by sharing that Federalist 10 is one of 85 essays advocating for the ratification of the United States Constitution. Federalist 10 was written by James Madison and published on November 22, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius. In this essay, Madison addresses the question of how to guard against “factions,” or groups of citizens, with interests that are contrary to the rights of others or the interests of the community as a whole. Madison defined factions as groups of citizens with opinions, passions, or interests contrary to the interests of others or the well-being of others. These groups of citizens saw factions as irreconcilable differences that could not be negotiated or compromised (i.e. war, divorce).

This activity serves as an introduction to the lesson focusing on student understanding of the word faction. The teacher will ask students to move to a designated corner of the room based on their interest in completing one of the following products: illustration/drawing, mime/monument, Public Service Announcement (PSA), and written flyer. Each corner of the classroom will represent a product.

The teacher will tell students they have 10 minutes to create their designated product. All students will respond to the same question, “What is a faction?” Students will answer the question as an individual, in a small group, or whole group based on their interests and readiness. Students should use any resources they have available to assist in completing the activity. Students will then be asked to share their products with the class.

The teacher will then debrief the activity with students as they complete a verbal and visual word association on faction as a reflection activity ( see handout ). The teacher can use this completed task as a formative assessment for student understanding of the meaning of faction.

Activity 2: Factions and Current Issues

Time required for activity: 20 minutes To assist students in understanding factions that are present today, students will evaluate and discuss eight present day issues and determine if they qualify as a faction, as defined by Madison in Federalist 10 . Students will be asked to rate each issue on a three point scale with the anchors agree and disagree. The midpoint of the scale will read, don’t know. Teachers should give students the Current Issues Spectrum handout and ask them to read and rate the eight issues followed by an explanation. The teacher should make a poster for each of the current issues and have students place a mark and determine if the current issue is or is not a faction. Students can mark with a dot, post-it note, or marker. After students make their decisions, the class should discuss why they believe the issue is or is not a faction. The teacher should wrap-up the class discussion by asking students, “If the government has to make decisions on how to address the current issue, is it better to have every individuals voice be heard on every current event issue or is it better to have a representative from each of the anchors on the scale of each issue share their opinion? Are voices more powerful if they come from a large group of people together or from people who share the same ideas but live far apart from one another?

Activity 3: Interpreting and Evaluating Federalist 10

Time required for activity: In class reading assignment and completing an APPARTS graphic organizer, one 45 minute class period. Students may complete individually or in small groups. The teacher should remind students that Federalist 10 is one of 85 essays advocating for the ratification of the United States Constitution. Federalist 10 was written by James Madison and published on November 22, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius. In this essay, Madison addresses the question of how to guard against “factions,” or groups of citizens, with interests that are contrary to the rights of others or the interests of the community as a whole.

APPARTS Graphic Organizer

To help students understand the main ideas that emerged from Federalist 10, ask students to read Federalist 10 and complete the APPARTS graphic organizer handout . Students will use the APPARTS strategy to explain why James Madison advocated for a democratic republic form of government over a pure democracy in Federalist 10. Students may complete this task individually or in small groups.

Note: APPARTS is a strategy often used in Advanced Placement courses to analyze primary sources.

USING APPARTS TO ANALYZE PRIMARY SOURCE DOCUMENTS

To understand history or politics it is essential that you learn to critically examine significant primary source documents.

APPARTS is an “easy to remember” acronym for the following:

AUTHOR Who created the source? What do you know about the author? What is the author’s point of view?

PLACE AND TIME Where and when was the source produced? How might this affect the meaning of the source?

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE Beyond information about the author and the context of its creation, what do you know that would help you further understand the primary source? For example, do you recognize any symbols and recall what they represent?

AUDIENCE For whom was the source created and how might this affect the reliability of the source?

REASON Why was this source produced at the time it was produced?

THE MAIN IDEA What main point is the source trying to convey? What is the central message of the document?

SIGNIFICANCE Why is this source important? What inferences can you draw from this document? Ask yourself, “So what?” What should a student of history or politics take away from the analysis of this document?

Students may read the full-text of Federalist 10 or they can read a paragraph-by-paragraph summary written by Gordon Lloyd.

Depending on student content vocabulary readiness the teacher may need to review vocabulary used in Federalist 10. A teacher resource has been created using the Federalist 10 summary to review vocabulary using a word wall. The teacher will tell students that the class will be adding several words to the word wall today. Word walls are a literacy strategy that may be used before reading (explicit teaching and modeling, during reading (guided practice) and after reading (guided practice).

Assessment:

In 4-5 paragraphs, using your APPARTS analysis, write a reply to James Madison explaining if you agree or disagree with his perspective on the best form of government for the United States to protect individual liberties.

Extending the Lesson:

Extension 1: Compare how Madison discusses factions in Madison’s Vices , his June 6th speech during the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and Federalist 10. Extension 2: Do you think that our government today effectively guards against factions? Why or why not? Explain. Extension 3: Do you think that if a government official went about gaining public support using the methods Madison did to ratify the Constitution, would they work into today’s society? Why or why not? Do you think this is good or bad? Why or why not?

Related EDSITEment Lesson Plans:

• The Federalist Debates: Balancing Power between State and Federal Governments

Selected Websites:

• James Madison, Federalist 10
• James Madison, Federalist 51

Standards Alignment:

• CIVICED (9-12) I What are Civic Life, Politics, and Government?
• CIVICED (9-12) II What are the Foundations of the American Political System?
• CIVICED (9-12) III How Does the Government Established by the Constitution Embody the Purposes, Values, and Principles of American Democracy?
• CIVICED (9-12) V What are the Roles of the Citizen in American Democracy?
• NCSS-10 Civic ideals and practices. Citizenship in a democratic republic.
• NCSS-4 Individual development and identity.
• NCSS-5 Individuals, groups, and institutions.
• NCSS-6 Power, authority, and governance.

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Thinking and teaching the implications of federalist #10 for democracy.

Jeff Schneider is a retired history teacher in the New York City public schools, predominantly at Midwood High School in Brooklyn. He has also taught in the New York City Colleges including Hunter College and City College. This essay is adapted from his  Substack . 

When I picked up my copy of Federalist #10 to begin writing this article, I was stunned by the subtitle: "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection." Despite my 30 years of teaching this document, the emotions that welled up in me upon reading "Insurrection" were a shock. These are hard times. That the present shapes our understanding of the history we study was brought home to me with new force.

Knowing that Shays' Rebellion was a cause of the calling of, and the high attendance at, the Constitutional Convention and the prominence of the phrase "to insure Domestic Tranquility" in the preamble helps explain what the framers thought was at stake in 1787. I always spent 10 or 15 minutes parsing the meanings of the preamble, but even though I taught the Constitution more than 150 times over the years, I never felt the depth of those words as I do at this time. The insurrection by the followers of Donald Trump puts us in a situation James Madison would recognize. Donald Trump and his minions have been frightening us every day for years now. It is time to analyze the most famous of Madison's essays: Federalist #10 . This essay is addressed to teachers.

This article is in two major parts: An analysis of Madison's Federalist #10 on his terms in the first section, which is a pared down student-led lesson, and a second section which builds on the first to critique #10 . Usually historians and political scientists refer to the electoral college as the major anti-democratic feature of the Constitution, but in Federalist #10 Madison, as you will see, had fundamentally no respect for the will of the of the people. He baked this idea into his theory of the republic.

That final section takes on the chimerical idea of the ( single) public good and Madison's outright rejection of “the people themselves” to protect the government from dangerous majorities. In 2022 the white supremacist Republican party has ditched democracy and gerrymandered Madison's constitutional structure. We are on the brink of a fascist takeover.These contradictions could not be compromised away in 1787 and cannot be smoothed over in 2022. “The Miracle in Philadelphia” nearly failed as a system on January 6, 2021. Democracy cannot be defended by depending on a group of men of “wisdom” to lead us to control “the mischiefs of faction.” Instead we need majority rule.

When I assigned Federalist #10 I asked the students to download and read the document.  (1) They were required to choose two sentences from the beginning, three from the middle and two from the end of the document. As I have explained in detail in "The Tarzan Theory of Reading," on my Substack site, the students were to single out sentences with which they agreed or disagreed strongly or those that they thought were important and explain why. The students will lead the discussion with their questions, comments, and the sentences they choose which they will read out loud to the class. In addition I asked them to identify the sentence that was at the logical center of the argument. Federalist #10 has an elegant architecture.

When I began the class, I asked for questions or comments. Students often made comments on the definitions of faction or insurrection, which is now a term many students will encounter in the news. The definition of faction is "a majority or minority... opposed to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." The students will come up with the common term "special interest," but how can that be a majority? This is key problem with Federalist #10 , since Madison's understanding of the term faction is not intuitive. The students may object that the Constitution describes a democracy : does not the majority rule? You should put that idea in a separate list on the board and leave it until the end of the discussion (we will discuss that separate list of ideas in depth in the Part II critique). An insurrection is an attempt at the violent overthrow of a government. The students know that Shays' Rebellion (1786 – 87) was an insurrection.

Majority faction is itself a contradiction that can be addressed by working through Madison's series of subtopics: the climate of disorder in the country, his diagnosis of factions the proposals to eliminate them, or to control them, and a critique of his solution. Although the discussion will jump around the document, as the students volunteer their sentences those subtopics will organize the notes as we go along.

Disorder in the Country

Shays' Rebellion was a major factor in Madison's concerns. The students will know that indebted farmers in western Massachusetts denounced unaffordable taxes and complained that they were losing their mortgages to foreclosure. Daniel Shays was a Revolutionary War captain who led his followers to attempt to close the courts to prevent the foreclosures. In addition, they demanded representation equal to the proportional per capita representation in the east close to Boston. After the rebellion was quashed, Shaysites were elected to the Massachusetts legislature. Another problem was that the rebellion was a protest against unfair taxation reminiscent of the protests in the 1760s and 70s. It reminded many leaders in Massachusetts of the lead-up to 1776 (similarly, some of the insurrectionists in 2022 used 1776 as a threatening slogan). This armed insurrection was a major cause of the convening of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, because the Articles Congress had no power to raise an army directly: the state had to defend itself along with any allies it could muster.

Madison describes how, in his view, the public good was being ignored. "The friend of popular governments" opposes the "violence of faction" which causes "instability, injustice and confusion." There are "overbearing" majorities that cause " governments" to be "too unstable" because they do not respect the "rights of the minority," and governments controlled by "specious (unsupportable) arguments" causing "mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished." He blames the "factious spirit that has tainted our public administrations."

Madison's Definition of Faction

"By faction I understand a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion or of interest adversed (sic) to the rights of other citizens or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." If a student chooses this sentence, you have to be careful to explain each part of the definition. How do you explain this definition, I ask. Eventually the students come to realize that Madison expected that the people would support particular conclusions (how else could he call it a majority faction ?). How could a leader find "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community," I ask. This should also go in the Critique section for discussion. The rest of Federalist #10 discusses how to eliminate factions or how to control them.

Eliminating Factions

This is the first of the methods to secure the government against the "mischief of faction." There are two methods to eliminate factions: destroying liberty or giving everyone the same opinions. The students will come to the conclusion that restricting liberty is not possible in a democratic government because we depend on freedom of thought and action to maintain democracy.

The second method, giving "everyone the same opinions," is also an impossible solution because "as long as man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed." How do you understand that, I ask. Here, students might note Madison’s identification of opinions based on "self-love," the diagnosis that "reason is connected to passion" and the observation that "Diversity in the faculties of man" were factors in the differences of political opinions.

The rights of property and the ownership of different kinds of property and the faculties to obtain those kinds of property all cause divisions. Faculty seems to be an ability, the students will conclude. So, Madison describes it thus: “(t)he latent (underlying) causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man." It soon becomes clear that Madison was not making an argument for the change in distribution or the control of production or property or goods in the US—Madison was not a Marxist! Instead, the students will conclude that Madison was attempting to find ways to manage the political effects of that inequality or those differences. But in whose interest did he want to manage those inequalities: was it  to be a country of the enslaved, the ordinary people, or did he favor his class of the southern gentry?

C ontrolling the Effects of Faction

"The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in controlling its EFFECTS." In the ensuing discussion students will come to the conclusion that this sentence begins the second half of the argument. It is the sentence at the logical center of the argument. Here Madison turns to the idea of controlling the effects of factions instead of eliminating them and eventually introduces the republic as a solution .

"If the faction consists of less than a majority" voting, the "republican principle" is the remedy. There might be disagreements, but majority rule does offer a solution. Therefore, what to do about a majority faction is the most intractable problem. Someone is likely to pick the sentence: "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a (majority) faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed." The ensuing discussion can conclude that it is a thesis sentence pointing to the chief point of the whole article.

The "existence of the same passion in the factional majority" must be prevented or "the majority must be rendered unable to concert. When people “concert” they work together. Madison is actually opposing the rule of the majority here. A pure (direct) democracy in which the citizens are the legislature "can admit of no cure" for "the mischiefs of faction" because "the common passion or interest will in almost every case be felt by a majority of the whole and there is nothing to check... an obnoxious individual" or group from influencing everyone.

In a republic as envisioned by Madison, however, “the representatives refine and enlarge the public views by passing through a medium of a chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country   (my italics)."  He added, “the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people might be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves.” Here Madison added the idea of making the republic cover larger areas. He suggests that by ”e)xtend(ing) the sphere -- you take in a greater variety of parties and interests (and) you make it less possible they will concert... “ The conclusion of this part of the argument can lead to a choice of more famous and experienced statesmen who possess the “wisdom” referred to above, because the a large number of voters would be participating in a larger district, the chances if a more famous or experienced person (i.e. of wisdom) would be greater.

Finally, "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states." He uses religious sects, a rage for paper money, and abolition of debt as examples that are more likely to "taint a particular county or district than an entire State." These are some of Madison's most famous statements. The students will see that the purpose of representation and extending the area of the republic was to elect men of wisdom. The factions may cancel each other out or the men of wisdom will convince the other legislators to follow the "true ideas" of the public good because the ordinary people cannot end the controversy, Madison and his fellow leaders will decide for them.

Madison's essay seems clear as a the ringing of two groups of bells: There are two groups of opposing solutions:

Eliminating Factions or Controlling its Effects. Each has two methods of solution: He moves through the ideas with alacrity going from one solution to another. The logic is stunning and elegant, like a mathematical proof.

Part II: A Critique of Madison's Argument

Now we have to confront the sentences we have put aside or left without exploring thoroughly, in particular the idea of the majority faction:

"By faction I understand a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion or of interest adversed (sic) to the rights of other citizens or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Eventually, the students will conclude that a majority vote is not what Madison is seeking as a solution to the problem of the majority faction. Somehow the government must override the majority.

Another example of Madison's majority problem: The "public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people" might be more consonant "to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves." The students will determine that Madison is counterposing the representatives to "the people themselves." Representatives certainly do not have to vote by taking instructions from their constituents, but it is clear that Madison is trying to circumvent the majority. Why would a legitimate republic be so designed? When we discuss this idea the students reach the conclusion that he does not trust the people to make the right decisions. It is obvious from the sentences that are there for the choosing.

Another of Madison’s sentences expresses the same contradictory view: "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a (majority) faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed." What, students may ask, is the “public good” other than the will of a majority? If you have not yet discussed "public good," it is an opportunity to discuss the major contradiction. When the students analyze this the discussion is not done until the students see that even though Madison seems to be discussing the solutions as benefitting all the people, instead he is claiming the right to decide for the majority which citizens will benefit.

Eventually the students reach the conclusion that everyone does not have the same interests in society or that the public good may change . So it is not clear how to reach the public good, or that the public good can be expressed as a singular rather than a series of public goods. Madison believed, however that the public good was not only attainable, but a key factor in overcoming the mischiefs of the majority faction. Do we really think that the Constitution has been a success for all the people as Madison designed it and the conventional wisdom in the US has always assumed?

Now we have entered a realm of ambiguity and contradiction. Madison's elegant proof, which seemed so clear, becomes murky, and most importantly, unreachable by the majority of ordinary men—or women!! How do you understand this "public good" now, I ask. The students will determine that not all people under the Constitution have the same interests as propertied white men: There are women and Black people and poor and rich. In 1787 these citizens were not formally part of the political community. The First Peoples "not taxed" were thus excluded by the clause on taxing and representation in Article I after the 3/5 clause. The Black underclass in the US has been living without the protection of the law for the vast majority of American History; much of the US seemed to only discover the true level of relentless and widespread violence against Black people on May 25, 2020—the day of George Floyd's murder. Madison had been fine with slavery and its terrible consequences. These actions were not a new development.

The interracial uprising that resulted was unique They were the largest multiracial demonstrations ever in the US .The violence against Blacks has been a dark undercurrent in the US since the ratification of the Constitution. What is the public good? Do you think now that Madison was protecting the whole people as he implied in paragraph after paragraph by calling his goal the public good?

Now we come to the final sentence in the statements we have put aside for critique. When Madison brought up the danger of Shays' Rebellion (see  Disorder in the Country above), he blamed the eastern leaders of Massachusetts for the unequal taxation which caused the rebellion. The western farmers rebelled against the unfair taxatiion as they had in the 1760s and 70s. Madison commented: “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm,"  i.e.  elected to office.

These men on whom Madison depended must convince the other representatives and the senators that they know the public good better than the people themselves. Are these people philosopher kings who see the reality in Plato's cave? Or are they advocating legislation based on the general will in the theory of Rousseau? The general will is discerned outside of debate, and expresses the "true will" of the people. This ability is a "faculty" of enlightened statesmen. It depends not on majority vote but on "the permanent aggregate interests of the community" or the"public good," determined by the men "whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country" in Madison's phrase. (2) These men of the "better sort" must convince other legislators to follow their lead. What in Madison's argument places these statesmen in power, I ask. The students eventually identify the layering that takes the decisions out of the hands of the direct voters who have elected men of deeper perception or who represent more conservative interests that protect the government from the "vexed," the poor or the enslaved, in other words, the factions born of ambition race, and class. These men can find the public good for the benefit of the permanent aggregate interests of their countrymen. But as I stated at the outset such a belief is a chimera.

How can we call the history of the US a long story of a developing public good for all the people when the 3/5 Compromise ruled the House of Representatives until 1818, when the large white population of the North overwhelmed the slaveholders' advantages, and up until the Civil War the small population states controlled the Senate with the help of the “dough-faced” northerners who voted with the South in the Senate and the House. These all acted together to repress democratic solutions to slavery and keep women, the poor and the First Peoples in literal and virtual shackles and chains.

When the slave power was overthrown and the Reconstruction Amendments were passed after the Civil War, there was a brief period from 1866 to 1877 when a fragile interracial democracy existed in the South, which for a time kept the Republican reformers in power. But then violent mobs attacked and killed Black Republican voters, overturned that hard won peace between the races, and Blacks lost suffrage in nearly the whole South. White supremacy ruled again until the Civil Rights Revolution capped by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 produced a second period of Black and minority participation.

Now we are in a different era in which our political life has also been commandeered by white supremacy in the form of Republican re-districting in the states so, despite the large populations in the Democratic-controlled states, the Democrats have only bare majorities in the House and only the tie-breaking vote of the vice president in a 50-50 Senate. Democratic senators represent 41.5 million more Americans than the Republicans. (3) These are problems quite different from Madison's majority factions. It is minority rule that the majority cannot use the "republican principle" to "cure." It is a deadlock caused by the filibuster and the small population states, which have controlled the Senate since they were born in the Great Compromise. Madison's "Machine that Would Go of Itself" has been rejiggered.  (4) There is a fascist threat to democracy led by the followers of the former President. Madison's governmental structure has been under threat by these insurrectionists and the democratic traditions have been undermined to the breaking point. It is unclear whether democracy shall survive the next election, let alone the ones after.

The call in Federalist #10 for the protection of the public good and for the permanent and aggregate interests of the community was based on the will and experience of a minority Madison called the "enlightened statesmen," who protected slavery for the white majority. The white majority in the country is now disappearing and the movements to defend the "historical white republic" are threatening the lives of workers, women and all minorities. This is our problem now, and it is rooted in the ideal of the public good which Madison believed he and other enlightened statesmen could conjure up to protect the true interests of the “whole” community. He fought to maintain the rule of people like him. There was no working compromise between the interests of slavery vs freedom, or today between the evangelical radicals opposed to abortion and advocates of women's rights, or between the refusal of the rights of the poor to health care and advocates of medicare for all, or finally, the interests threatening the rights to clean air, water, food and jobs and the movement for a Green New Deal. The Electoral College and the unrepresentative Senate must not control our politics. We are at a crossroads.

The myth of the "divinely inspired" Constitution has sustained Madison's reputation of infallibility, but the flaws in his reasoning, as we have pointed out, have come to haunt us and brought us to the brink of losing our democracy. What , after all, is the public good if it does not represent a clear majority of the US population? As the students realized in their analysis there is no single or public good. We are a country of classes, races and genders. We should not be controlled by the rich white men or their MAGA insurrectionists. We are still being ruled by the magical thinking of former centuries, from ancient Greece to the early modern concepts of the virtue of the white landed aristocracy. All this is embodied the persons of senators from states with populations smaller than assembly districts in New York or the city of Washington DC. These modern day conservatives talk about the Constitution as a document describing a republic, not a democracy. They believe that the proper leaders of this republic are the whites: the real Americans. This idea brings us back to the earlier argument concerning the dangers of reaching for the single public good or the "permanent aggregate interests of the community." The chimera of the public good turns out to be a smokescreen for white supremacy—as it always was. No amount of leisure or learning can motivate the white supremacists to discern true interests of our country. They are in it for themselves.

(1) You can find Federalist #10 at:

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp

(2) For example see passim

https://www.britannica.com/topic/general-will

https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity

(3) https://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2021/02/u-s-senate-representation-is-deeply-undemocratic-and-cannot-be-changed/

(4) See The Machine that Would Go of Itself , a book about the Constitution by Michael Kammen published in 1986 which shows that the understanding of the Constitution is weak, but Americans believe it is inspired by God and unchangeable.

Bond Market Views of the Fed

This paper uses high frequency data to detect shifts in financial markets' perception of the Federal Reserve stance on inflation. We construct daily revisions to expectations of future nominal interest rates and inflation that are priced into nominal and inflation-protected bonds, and find that the relation between these two variables-positive and stable for over twenty years-has weakened substantially over the 2020-2022 period. In the context of canonical monetary reaction functions considered in the literature, these results are indicative of a monetary authority that places less weight on inflation stabilization. We augment a standard New Keynesian model with regime shifts in the monetary policy rule, calibrate it to match our findings, and use it as a laboratory to understand the drivers of U.S. inflation post 2020. We find that the shift in the monetary policy stance accounts for half of the observed increase in inflation.

The views and opinions in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank, its staff, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. We thank Davide De Bortoli, Luca Fornaro, Jordi Gali, Rohan Kekre, Juanpa Nicolini, Jon Steinsson and seminar participants at Stanford, Duke, University of Pennsylvania, the Federal Reserve Banks of Minneapolis, Philadelphia and Saint Louis for very useful comments. Tomas Tapak and Javier Tasso provided excellent research assistance. All errors are our own. Luigi Bocola thanks the National Science Foundation for generous funding.

MARC RIS BibTeΧ

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The Federalist No.10 (1787) James Madison The drafting of the Constitution -- even by so distinguished a gathering as those who participated in the Philadelphia convention -- did not ensure its adoption. In each state there were groups and interests opposing as well as supporting ratification. And as they had done in the years leading up to the Revolution, Americans took to their newspapers to express their views and to argue the merits and faults of the proposed new scheme of government. Those who supported the Constitution took the name "Federalists," although it would have been more accurate to have called them "Nationalists," since their main argument centered on the need for a strong national government. Their opponents, known as the "Anti-Federalists," were in fact, the more truly federalist of the two, since they argued for a government based on a confederation of states. Because the Federalists won, history did not treat their opponents kindly, and until recently the Anti-Federalists were treated, in the words of one famous essay, as "men of little faith." More recently, historians have re-examined the Anti-Federalist arguments, and discovered that they raised significant issues, such as the lack of a Bill of Rights and questions of limiting power so as to avoid tyranny. In fact, it was the Anti-Federalist arguments against the Constitution, as much as the advantages that the Federalists saw in the new scheme, that led the latter group to mount their own campaign to influence the people in favor of ratification. The best known arguments in the debate appeared in a series of eighty-five newspaper essays published in New York and written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay under the pseudonym of "Publius." These essays are considered the most authoritative interpretation of the Constitution ever written, and even today are cited by scholars and jurists in their efforts to understand the meaning of the document. The most famous of the essays was "The Federalist No.10," written by James Madison, in which he set forth the classic analysis of the republic. Opponents had argued that the United States was too large, and had too many groups, or "factions," to be ruled democratically by a single government. Madison acknowledged that there were in fact many groups in the country, and he lamented that they often seemed to be at each other's throats. Under classic constitutional theory, majoritarian rule should govern, and at the expense of minority rights. Madison argued that the republican remedy embodied in the Constitution allowed the various factions sufficient room to express their views and to attempt to influence the government. Instead of the majority putting down minorities, the different interests would negotiate their differences, thus arriving at a solution in which the majority would rule but with due care and regard given to minorities. The very number of factions would preclude any one from exercising tyrannical control over the rest. And the medium in which this give and take would occur would be politics, the art of governing. For further reading: Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969); George Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist (1981); S. Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey through Time in Quest of Meaning (1978); Charles R. Kesler, ed., Saving the Republic: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding (1987); Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (1981); and the classic Douglas Adair, "The Tenth Federalist Revisited," William & Mary Quarterly 8 (1951): 48. The Federalist No.10 Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, nonedeserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American Constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, usually the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. . . . These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of Government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results: and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. . . . The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed: Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure Democracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of Government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure Democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first, the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest: secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand to refine and the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive Republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations. In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the Republic may be, the Representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of Representatives in the two cases, not being in proportion to that of the Constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small Republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters, be not less, in the large than in the small Republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. In the next place, as each Representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters. It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniencies will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The Federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular, to the state legislatures. The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of Republican, than of Democratic Government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, a communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary. . . . The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States: a religious sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national Councils against any danger from that source: a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride, we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of Federalists. Publius Source: Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (1961), 77-84. Table of Contents

Federalist No. 10

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Federalist No. 10 Friday, November 23, 1787 by James Madison

SUMMATION: Federalist No. 10 is the classic citation for the belief that the Founding Fathers and the constitutional framers did not intend American politics to be partisan and the ways in which to control and/or eliminate the concept of factions.

Madison believed that the root cause of the emergence of factions was the unequal distribution of property. He explained that those who held the most property also displayed the greatest interest in government; those who did not have property were disinterested.

The Federalist No. 10 also describes how the republic as they have designed it, is meant to balance the interest of multiple factions, as well as prevent any one faction from completely subverting the rights of another.

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