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Collection Hannah Arendt Papers

Totalitarianism, the inversion of politics.

When Hannah Arendt published The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951, World War II had ended and Hitler was dead, but Stalin lived and ruled. Arendt wanted to give her readers a sense of the phenomenal reality of totalitarianism, of its appearance in the world as a terrifying and completely new form of government. In the first two parts of the book she excavated hidden elements in modern anti-Semitism and European imperialism that coalesced in totalitarian movements; in the third part she explored the organization of those movements, dissected the structure of Nazism and Stalinist Bolshevism in power, and scrutinized the "double claim" of those regimes "to total domination and global rule." Her focus, to be sure, is mainly on Nazism, not only because more information concerning it was available at the time, but also because Arendt was more familiar with Germany and hence with the origins of totalitarianism there than in Russia. She knew, of course, that those origins differed substantially in the two countries and later, in different writings, would undertake to right the imbalance in her earlier discussion (see "Project: Totalitarian Elements in Marxism").

The enormous complexity of The Origins of Totalitarianism arises from its interweaving of an understanding of the concept of totalitarianism with the description of its emergence and embodiment in Nazism and Stalinism. The scope of Arendt's conceptual objectives may be glimpsed in the plan she drew up for six lectures on the nature of totalitarianism delivered at the New School for Social Research in March and April of 1953 (see " The Great Tradition and the Nature of Totalitarianism "). The first lecture dealt with totalitarianism's "explosion" of our traditional "categories of thought and standards of judgment," thus at the outset stating the difficulty of understanding totalitarianism at all. In the second lecture she considered the different kinds of government as they were first formulated by Plato and then jumped many centuries to Montesquieu's crucial discovery of each kind of government's principle of action and the human experience in which that principle is embedded. In the third lecture she explicated three important distinctions: first, between governments of law and arbitrary power; secondly, between the traditional notion of humanly established laws and the new totalitarian concept of laws that govern the evolution of nature and direct the movement of history; and, thirdly, between "traditional sources of authority" that stabilize "legal institutions," thereby accommodating human action, and totalitarian laws of motion whose function is, on the contrary, to stabilize human beings so that the predetermined courses of nature and history can run freely through them. The fourth lecture addressed the totalitarian "transformation" of an ideological system of belief into a deductive principle of action. In the fifth lecture the basic experience of human loneliness in totalitarianism was contrasted with that of impotence in tyranny and differentiated from the experiences of isolation and solitude, which are essential to the activities of making and thinking but "marginal phenomena in political life." In the final lecture Arendt distinguished "the political reality of freedom" from both its "philosophical idea" and the "inherent 'materialism'" of Western political thought.

In addition to its complexity the stylistic richness of The Origins of Totalitarianism lies in its admixture of erudition and imagination, which is nowhere more manifest than in the particular examples by which Arendt brought to light the elements of totalitarianism. These examples include her devastating portrait of Disraeli and her tragic account of the "great" and "bitter" life of T. E. Lawrence; other exemplary figures are drawn from works of literature by authors such as Kipling and Conrad (see The Origins of Totalitarianism , chapter 7). A single, striking instance of the latter is Conrad's Heart of Darkness , which Arendt called "the most illuminating work on actual race experience in Africa," her emphasis clearly falling on the word "experience." Engaged in "the merry dance of death and trade," Conrad's imperialistic adventurers were in quest of ivory and entertained few scruples over slaughtering the indigenous inhabitants of "the phantom world of the dark continent" in order to obtain it. The subject of Conrad's work, in which the story told by the always ambiguous Marlow is recounted by an unnamed narrator, is the encounter of Africans with "superfluous" Europeans "spat out" of their societies. As the author of the whole tale as well as the tale within the tale, Conrad was intent not "to hint however subtly or tentatively at an alternative frame of reference by which we may judge the actions and opinions of his characters." 1 Marlow, a character twice removed from the reader, is aware that the "conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing." It is in the person of the "remarkable" and "eloquent" Mr. Kurtz that Marlow seeks the "idea" that alone can offer redemption: "An idea at the back of [the conquest], not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea."

As Marlow's steamer penetrates "deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness" in search of Kurtz's remote trading station, Africa becomes increasingly "impenetrable to human thought." In a passage cited by Arendt, Marlow observes the Africans on the shore:

The prehistoric man was cursing us, praying to us, welcoming us--who could tell? We . . . glided past like phantoms, wondering and secretly appalled, as sane men would be, before an enthusiastic outbreak in a madhouse. We could not understand because we were too far and could not remember, because we were traveling in the night of the first ages, of those ages that are gone leaving hardly a sign--and no memories. . . . The earth seemed unearthly . . . and the men were . . . No, they were not inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it--this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would come slowly to one. They howled and leapt and spun and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity--like yours--the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar.

The next sentence spoken by Marlow consists of one word, "Ugly," and that word leads directly to his discovery of Kurtz, the object of his fascination. He reads a report that Kurtz, who exemplifies the European imperialist ("All Europe contributed to [his] making"), has written to the "International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs." It is a report in the name of progress, of "good practically unbounded," and it gives Marlow a sense "of an exotic Immensity ruled by an August Benevolence." But at the bottom of the report's last page, "luminous and terrifying like a flash of lightning in a serene sky," Kurtz has scrawled "Exterminate all the brutes!" Thus racism is revealed as the "idea" of the mad Kurtz and the darkness of his heart becomes the counterpart of the not inhuman but "uncivilized" darkness of Africa. The horrific details follow, the decapitated heads of Africans stuck on poles, facing inward toward Kurtz's dwelling. Marlow rationalizes Kurtz's "lack of restraint": "the wilderness . . . had whispered to him things about himself which he did not know," a whisper that "echoed loudly within him because he was hollow at the core." It is questionable whether Marlow is less hollow when, at the end of the work, he attempts in "fright" to lie about Kurtz's last words, "The horror! The horror!" The experience of race is now complete; even the shadowy narrator of Marlow's story is left before "the heart of an immense darkness" in which the image of Kurtz's racism looms in the consciousness of Conrad's readers and of the world.

Arendt, however, is not saying that racism or any other element of totalitarianism caused the regimes of Hitler or Stalin, but rather that those elements, which include anti-Semitism, the decline of the nation-state, expansionism for its own sake, and the alliance between capital and mob, crystallized in the movements from which those regimes arose. Reflecting on her book in 1958 Arendt said that her intentions "presented themselves" to her "in the form of an ever recurring image: I felt as though I dealt with a crystallized structure which I had to break up into its constituent elements in order to destroy it." This presented a problem because she saw that it was an "impossible task to write history, not in order to save and conserve and render fit for remembrance, but, on the contrary, in order to destroy." Thus despite her historical analyses it "dawned" on her that The Origins of Totalitarianism was not "a historical . . . but a political book, in which whatever there was of past history not only was seen from the vantage point of the present, but would not have become visible at all without the light which the event, the emergence of totalitarianism, shed on it." The origins are not causes, in fact "they only became origins- antecedents--after the event had taken place." While analyzing, literally "breaking up," a crystal into its "constituent elements" destroys the crystal, it does not destroy the elements. This is among the fundamental points that Arendt made in the chapter written in 1953 and added to all subsequent editions of The Origins of Totalitarianism (see "Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government"):

If it is true that the elements of totalitarianism can be found by retracing the history and analyzing the political implications of what we usually call the crisis of our century, then the conclusion is unavoidable that this crisis is no mere threat from the outside, no mere result of some aggressive foreign policy of either Germany or Russia, and that it will no more disappear with the death of Stalin than it disappeared with the fall of Nazi Germany. It may even be that the true predicaments of our time will assume their authentic form--though not necessarily the cruelest--only when totalitarianism has become a thing of the past.

According to Arendt the "disturbing relevance of totalitarian regimes . . . is that the true problems of our time cannot be understood, let alone solved, without the acknowledgment that totalitarianism became this century's curse only because it so terrifyingly took care of its problems" (see "Concluding Remarks" in the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism ). The rejection of the totalitarian answer to the question of race, for instance, does not solve but reveals the problem that arises when race is viewed as the origin of human diversity. Totalitarianism's destruction of naturally determined "inferior" races or historically determined "dying" classes leaves us on an overcrowded planet with the great and unsolved political perplexity of how human plurality can be conceived, of how historically and culturally different groups of human beings can live together and share their earthly home.

Defying classification in terms of a single academic discipline such as history, sociology, political science, or philosophy, The Origins of Totalitarianism presents a startling interpretation of modern European intellectual currents and political events. Still difficult to grasp in its entirety, the book's climactic delineation of the living dead, of those "inanimate" beings who experienced the full force of totalitarian terror in concentration camps, cut more deeply into the consciousness of some of Arendt's readers than the most shocking photographs of the distorted bodies of the already dead. Such readers realized that there are torments worse than death, which Arendt described in terms of the longing for death by those who in former times were thought to have been condemned to the eternal punishments of hell. She meant this vision of hell to be taken literally and not allegorically, for although throughout the long centuries of Christian belief men had proved themselves incapable of realizing the city of God as a dwelling place for human beings, they now showed that it was indeed possible to establish hell on earth rather than in an afterlife.

Arendt added totalitarianism to the list of kinds of government drawn up in antiquity and hardly altered since then: monarchy (the rule of one) and its perversion in tyranny; aristocracy (the rule of the best) and its corruption in oligarchy or the rule of cliques; and democracy (the rule of many) and its distortion in ochlocracy or mob rule. The hallmark of totalitarianism, a form of rule supported by "superfluous" masses who sought a new reality in which they would be recognized in public, was the appearance in the world of what Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism , called radical and absolute evil. Totalitarian regimes are not the "opposite" of anything: the absence of their opposite may be the surest way of seeing totalitarianism as the crisis of our times.

Totalitarianism has been identified by many writers as a ruthless, brutal, and, thanks to modern technology, potent form of political tyranny whose ambitions for world domination are unlimited. Disseminating propaganda derived from an ideology through the media of mass communication, totalitarianism relies on mass support. It crushes whoever and whatever stands in its way by means of terror and proceeds to a total reconstruction of the society it displaces. Thus a largely rural and feudal Russian Empire, under the absolutist rule of czars stretching back to the fifteenth century, was transformed first by Lenin after the October Revolution of 1917 and then by Stalin into an industrialized Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; a Germany broken after its defeat in World War I was mobilized and became the conqueror of most of Europe in the early 1940s less than a decade after Hitler's assumption of power; and in China the People's Republic, by taking the Great Leap Forward in 1958 followed by the Cultural Revolution beginning in 1966 and ending with Mao Zedong's death in 1976, expunged much of what remained of a culture that had survived for more than three thousand years.

Such achievements require total one-party governmental control and tremendous human sacrifice; the elimination of free choice and individuality; the politicization of the private sphere, including that of the family; and the denial of any notion of the universality of human rights. In diverse areas of the world where political freedom and open societies have been virtually unknown or untried, totalitarian methods have been seen to exert an ongoing attraction for local elites, warlords, and rebels. Such well-known phenomena as "brain washing," "killing fields," "ethnic cleansing," "mass graves," and "genocide," accounting for millions of victims and arising from a variety of tribal, nationalist, ethnic, religious, and economic conditions, have been deemed totalitarian in nature. Totalitarianism, moreover, is frequently employed as an abstract, vaguely defined term of general opprobrium, whose historical roots are traced to the political thought of Marx or in some instances to Rousseau and as far back as Plato. But because of what has been called its "inefficiency," which Arendt attributes to its "contempt for utilitarian motives," totalitarianism rarely occurs in the political analyses of those who consider the function of politics in terms of "utilitarian expectations." Recently, however, prominent political theorists such as Margaret Canovan in England and Claude Lefort in France have seen in the decline of communism and the diminished intensity of left and right ideological debates an opportunity for an impartial and rigorous reassessment of the concept of totalitarianism. Although Arendt may have experienced a similar need to understand Nazism after its defeat in World War II, for her impartiality was the condition of judging the irreversible catastrophe of totalitarianism as "the central event of our world."

When Arendt noted that causality, the explanation of an event as being determined by another event or chain of events which leads up to it, "is an altogether alien and falsifying category in the historical sciences," she meant that no historical event is ever predictable. Although with hindsight it is possible to discern a sequence of events, there is always a "grotesque disparity" between that sequence and a particular event's significance. What the principle of causality ignores or denies is the contingency of human affairs, i.e., the human capacity to begin something new , and therefore the meaning and "the very existence" of what it seeks to explain (see " The Difficulties of Understanding " and " On the Nature of Totalitarianism "). It is not the "objectivity" of the historical scientist but the impartiality of the judge who perceives the existence and discerns the meaning of events, of which the antecedents can then be told in stories whose beginnings are never causes and whose conclusions are never predetermined. 2 The rejection of causality in history and the insistence on the contingency, unpredictability, and meaning of events brought about not by nature but by human agency inform Arendt's judgment of the incomprehensible and unforgivable crimes of totalitarianism. In regard to such crimes the old saying " tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner " (to understand everything is to forgive everything)--as if to understand an offense, say by its psychological motive, were to excuse it--is a double "misrepresentation" of the fact that understanding seeks reconciliation. What may be possible is reconciliation to the world in which the crimes of totalitarianism were committed (see " The Difficulties of Understanding "), and a great part of Arendt's work on totalitarianism and thereafter is an effort to understand that world. But it should be noted that the outrage that pervades her judgment is not a subjective emotional reaction foisted on a purportedly "value free" scientific analysis. 3 Her anger is impartial in her judgment of a form of government that defaced the world and "objectively" belongs to that world on whose behalf she judged totalitarianism for what it was and what it meant.

Even before she wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt spoke of the desperate need to tell the "real story of the Nazi-constructed hell":

Not only because these facts have changed and poisoned the very air we breathe, not only because they now inhabit our dreams at night and permeate our thoughts during the day -- but also because they have become the basic experience and the basic misery of our times. Only from this foundation, on which a new knowledge of man will rest, can our new insights, our new memories, our new deeds, take their point of departure. (See "The Image of Hell.")

The beginning called for here, if there were to be one, will arise from individual acts of judgment by men and women who know the nature of totalitarianism and agree that, for the sake of the world, it must not occur again--not only in the forms in which it has already occurred, which may be unlikely, but in any form whatsoever.

The significance of the story Arendt went on to tell and retell lies entirely in the present, and she was fully aware that her "method," a subject which she was always loath to discuss, went against the grain not only of political and social scientists but also, more importantly to her, of those reporters, historians, and poets who in distinct ways seek to preserve, in or out of time, what they record, narrate, and imagine. Reflecting later on the moment in 1943 when she first learned about Auschwitz, Arendt said: " This ought not to have happened ." That is no purely moral "ought" based in ethical precepts, the voice of conscience, or immutable natural law, but rather as strong as possible a statement that there was something irremissibly wrong with the human world in which Auschwitz could and did happen.

Reconciliation to that world requires understanding only when totalitarianism is judged , not by subsuming it under traditional moral, legal, or political categories but by recognizing it as something unprecedented, odious, and to be fought against. Such judgment is possible for beings "whose essence is beginning" (see " The Difficulties of Understanding ") and makes reconciliation possible because it strikes new roots in the world. Judgment is "the other side of action" and as such the opposite of resignation. It does not erase totalitarianism, for then, thrown backward into the past, the historical processes that did not cause but led to totalitarianism would be repeated and "the burden of our time" reaccumulated; or, projected forward into the future, a never-never land ignorant of its own conditions, the human mind would "wander in obscurity." 4 A quotation from Karl Jaspers that struck Arendt "right in the heart" and which she chose as the epigraph for The Origins of Totalitarianism stresses that what matters is not to give oneself over to the despair of the past or the utopian hope of the future, but "to remain wholly in the present." Totalitarianism is the crisis of our times insofar as its demise becomes a turning point for the present world, presenting us with an entirely new opportunity to realize a common world, a world that Arendt called a "human artifice," a place fit for habitation by all human beings.

Arendt's papers provide many interesting opportunities to study the development of her thought. For instance, in "The Difficulties of Understanding," written in the early 1950s, judgment is conjoined with understanding. As late as 1972, in impromptu remarks delivered at a conference devoted to her work, she associated it with the activity of thinking. But Arendt was working her way toward distinguishing judgment as an independent and autonomous mental faculty, "the most political of man's mental abilities" (see " Thinking and Moral Considerations "). Although the activities of understanding and thinking reveal an unending stream of meanings and under specific circumstances may liberate the faculty of judgment, the act of judging particular and contingent events differs from them in that it preserves freedom by exercising it in the realm of human affairs. That distinction is critical for her view of history in general and totalitarianism in particular and has been adhered to in this introduction.

Arendt's judgment of totalitarianism must first and foremost be distinguished from its commo identificatio as a insidious form of tyranny. Tyranny is a ancient, originally Greek form of government which, as the tragedy of Oedipous Tyrannos and the historical examples of Peisistratus of Athens and Periandros of Corinth demonstrate, was by no means necessarily against the private interests and initiatives of its people. As a form of government tyranny stands against the appearance i public of the plurality of the people, the condition, according to Arendt, i which political life and political freedom--"public happiness," as the founders of the America republic named it--become possible and without which they do not.

I a tyrannical political realm, which ca hardly be called public, the tyrant exists i isolatio from the people. Due to the lack of rapport or legal communicatio betwee the people and the tyrant, all actio i a tyranny manifests a "moving principle" of mutual fear: the tyrant's fear of the people, o one side, and the people's fear of the tyrant, or, as Arendt put it, their "despair over the impossibility" of joining together to act at all, o the other. It is i this sense that tyranny is a contradictory and futile form of government, one that generates not power but impotence. Hence, according to Montesquieu, whose acute observations Arendt drew o i these matters, tyranny (which he does not eve bother to distinguish from despotism, malevolent by definition, since he is concerned with public rather tha private freedom) is a form of government that, unlike constitutional republics or monarchies, corrupts itself, cultivating withi itself the seeds of its ow destructio (see " On the Nature of Totalitarianism "). Therefore, the essential impotence of a tyrannically ruled state, however flamboyant and spectacular its dying throes, and whether or not it is despotic, and regardless of the cruelty and suffering it may inflict o its people, presents no menace of destructio to the world at large.

I their early revolutionary stages of development, to be sure, and whenever and wherever they meet opposition, totalitaria movements employ tyrannical measures of force and violence, but their nature differs from that of tyrannies precisely i the enormity of their threat of world destruction. That threat has ofte bee thought possible and explained as the total politicalizatio of all phases of life. Arendt saw it, and this is crucial, as exactly the opposite: a phenomeno of total depoliticalizatio (i Germa Entpolitisierung [see " Freiheit und Politik "]) that appeared for the first time i the regimes of Stali after 1929 and Hitler after 1938. Totalitarianism's radical atomizatio of the whole of society differs from the political isolation, the political "desert," as Arendt termed it, of tyranny. It eliminates not only free action, which is political by definition, but also the element of action, that is, of initiation, of beginning anything at all, from every huma activity. Individual spontaneity--i thinking, i any aspiration, or i any creative undertaking--that sustains and renews the huma world is obliterated i totalitarianism. Totalitarianism destroys everything that politics, eve the circumscribed political realm of a tyranny, makes possible.

I totalitaria society freedom, private as well as public, is nothing but a illusion. As such it is no longer the source of fear that i tyranny manifests itself not as a emotio but as the principle of the tyrant's actio and the people's non-action. Whereas tyranny, pitting the ruler and his subjects against each other, is ultimately impotent, totalitarianism generates immense power, a new sort of power that not only exceeds but is different i kind from coercive force. The dynamism of totalitarianism negates the fundamental conditions of huma existence. I the name of ideological necessity totalitaria terror mocks the appearance and also the disappearance, both the lives and the deaths, of distinct and potentially free me and women. It mocks the world that only a plurality of such individuals ca continuously create, hold i common, and share. It mocks eve the earth insofar as it is their natural home. The profound paradox that lies betwee the totalitaria belief that the eradicatio of every sig of humanity, of huma freedom, of all spontaneity and beginning, is necessary , and the fact that its possibility is itself something new brought into the world by huma beings is the core of what Arendt strove to comprehend.

According to Arendt the nature of totalitarianism is the "combination" of "its essence of terror and its principle of logicality" (see " On the Nature of Totalitarianism "). As "essence" terror must be total, more tha a means of suppressing opposition, more tha a extreme or insane vindictiveness. Total terror is, i its ow way, rational: it replaces, literally takes the place of, the role played by positive laws i constitutional governments. But the result is neither lawless anarchy, the war of all against all, nor the tyrannical abrogatio of law. Arendt pointed out that just as a government of laws would become "perfect" in the absence of transgressions, so terror "rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way" (see The Origins of Totalitarianism , chapter 12). Just as positive laws in a constitutional government seek to "translate and realize" higher transcendent laws, such as God's commandments or natural law, so totalitarian terror "is designed to translate into reality the law of movement of history or nature," not in a limited body politic, but throughout mankind.

If totalitarianism were perfected, if the entire plurality of human beings were to become one with the sole aim of accelerating "the movement of nature or history," then its essence of terror would suffice as its principle of motion (see The Origins of Totalitarianism , chapter 13). So long as totalitarianism exists in a non-totalitarian world, however, it needs the processes of logical or dialectical deduction to coerce the human mind into "imitating" and becoming "integrated" into the "suprahuman" forces of nature and history. In other words, the logic of the idea of an ideology forces the mind to move as inevitably as natural and historical processes themselves move, and against this movement "nothing stands but the great capacity of men" to interrupt those processes by starting "something new." It is not the political isolation that always prevents action, however, but the loneliness of socially uprooted, "superfluous" human beings, their loss of common sense, the sense of community and communication, which attracts them to logical explanations of all that has happened, is happening, and ever will happen. Thereby relieved of any responsibility for the course of the world, world-alienated masses are unwittingly, beneath the crust of their lives, prepared for totalitarian organization and, ultimately, domination.

Arendt concluded that Hitler and Stalin discovered that the eradication of the unpredictability of human affairs, of human freedom, and of human nature itself is possible in "the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power," the concentration camp. In concentration camps the combination of the practice of terror with the principle of logicality, which is the nature of totalitarianism, "resolves" the conflict in constitutional governments between legality and justice by ridding human beings of individual consciences and making them embodiments of the laws governing the motion of nature and history. On the one hand, in the world view of totalitarianism the freedom of human beings is inconsequential to "the undeniable automatism" of natural and historical processes, or at most an impediment to their freedom. On the other, when "the iron band of terror" destroys human plurality, so totally dominating human beings that they cease to be individuals and become a mere mass of identical, interchangeable specimens "of the animal-species man," that terror provides the movement of nature and history with "an incomparable instrument" of acceleration. Terror and logicality welded together equip totalitarian regimes with unprecedented power to dominate human beings. How totalitarian systems accomplish their inversion of political life, above all how they set about destroying human conscience and the plurality of unique human individuals, staggers the imagination and confounds the faculty of understanding.

By Jerome Kohn, Trustee, Hannah Arendt Bluecher Literary Trust

• As Chinua Achebe says he ought to have done (C. Achebe, "An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness" in Heart of Darkness , ed. Robert Kimbrough, 3rd ed. [New York, 1998], 256). [ Return to text ]
• The concept of history derives from the Greek verb historein , to inquire, but Arendt found "the origin of this verb" in the Homeric histor , the first "historian," who was a judge (see Thinking , "Postscriptum"; cf. Illiad XVIII, 501). [ Return to text ]
• Such a view, as Arendt points out, accurately describes many historical accounts of anti-Semitism, none more so than D. J. Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York, 1996). [ Return to text ]
• The Burden of Our Time is the title of the first British edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1951). Arendt frequently cited Tocqueville's remark in the last chapter of Democracy In America : "As the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity" (see " Philosophy and Politics: The Problem of Action after the French Revolution " and Between Past and Future , "Preface" ). [ Return to text ]

12 October 2023

politicalsciencesolution.com

Political Regimes: Democratic and Non Democratic Systems of Government

Democratic government , Non Democratic System , Political Philosophy , Political Regimes , Political Science , Politics , Society

Political regimes encompass democratic and non-democratic systems, profoundly influencing a nation’s governance, rights, and well-being. This exploration will illuminate their fundamental differences and impact on a country’s trajectory.

Introduction

Political regimes play a pivotal role in shaping the governance, power distribution, and overall dynamics of a nation.  Roy Macridis defines “Political regime as the embodiment of a set of rules, procedures and understandings that formulate the relationship between the governors and the governed”. Political Regimes are the systems that define how a country is run, and they come in two primary forms: democratic and non-democratic. These regimes represent fundamentally distinct approaches to governance, each with its own set of principles, values, and practices that have far-reaching implications for the rights, freedoms, and well-being of a nation’s citizens.

In this exploration, we will delve into the fundamental differences between democratic and non-democratic political regimes, shedding light on the various characteristics and features that define each system, and how they influence the course of a nation’s history, development, and the quality of life for its inhabitants.

Table of Contents

The fundamental meaning of democracy.

The word ‘democracy’ has its origins in two Greek words: ‘demos,’ meaning people, and ‘kratia,’ meaning rule. Thus, in its literal sense, democracy is defined as the ‘rule of the people.’ Abraham Lincoln’s famous quote, “government of the people, by the people, and for the people,” succinctly captures this idea. A.V. Dicey’s definition states that democracy is a form of government where a significant portion of the entire nation constitutes the governing body. Lord James Bryce further clarifies that democracy implies that the ruling power of a state is vested not in a particular class but in the community as a whole.

The Evolution of Democratic Forms

The initial form of democracy involved free and adult males in city-states participating directly in political affairs. This direct form of democracy is often considered the purest. However, as societies grew in complexity and size, direct democracy became impractical. The Glorious Revolution in England, the American Declaration of Independence, and the French Revolution led to the emergence of indirect or representative democracy. This form of democracy relies on elected representatives to express the will of the public. Thus, John Stuart Mill calls it ‘representative form of govt.’ and Henry Maine has called it a ‘popular govt.’

Participation and Elections are Fundamental to democracy, they empower citizens to influence policy and choose their representatives. While most democracies are representative, some, like Switzerland and the United States, use direct democracy devices such as referendums, initiatives, recalls, and plebiscites.

The four devices of direct democracy are:

a) Referendum is a procedure whereby a proposed legislation is referred to the electorate for settlement by their direct votes. 

b) Initiative is a method by means of which the people can propose a bill to the legislature for enactment. 

c) Recall is a method by which the voters can remove a representative or an officer before the expiry of his term, when he fails to discharge his duties properly. 

d) Plebiscite is a method of obtaining the opinions of people on any issue of public importance. It is generally used to solve territorial disputes.

Additionally, Landszemeinde is also an instrument of direct democracy. It is primarily used in Switzerland. It is an assembly of all the citizens of the cantons.

Democracy assumes individuals are free, with clear limitations and responsibilities defining their interaction with the state. All democratic regimes have a constitution that establishes the functions, powers, and responsibilities of state organs, including the legislature, executive, and judiciary.

Types of Democracy

In terms of operations, democracy is either direct or indirect, but in respect of its nature, it has many forms such as Liberal Democracy, Electoral, Social, Majoritarian, participatory etc. 

Liberal Democracy

Liberal democracy, often synonymous with Western societies, boasts several distinguishing features. It operates on the principle of limited government, advocating for individual liberty and rights with minimal state intervention. It perceives government as a necessary evil, recognizing the potential for tyranny, and thus, incorporates checks and balances such as a constitution, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and the separation of powers. Liberal democracies typically coexist with capitalist economic systems, emphasizing the rule of law.

Furthermore, these democracies are characterized by a robust and critical civil society , a multi-party political system, and a presence of numerous interest and pressure groups. They prioritize free and fair elections, ensuring political equality , and provide mechanisms for the accountability of representatives to the people. Liberal democracy is essentially a blend of elite rule and popular participation, fostering political pluralism and open competition between various political ideologies, social movements , and political parties .

Radical or Social Democracy: Focusing on Societal Welfare

Radical or social democracy follows the same democratic mechanisms as liberal democracy but places a stronger emphasis on societal interests over individual concerns. While individuals have the right to vote, reasonable restrictions are imposed on economic freedom to combat poverty and exploitation at the societal level. Social democracy aims to establish a ‘welfare state’ where the government plays a more significant role in the development of society and its people.

Presidential and Parliamentary Forms of Democracy

The nature of executive authority in a democracy can take one of two primary forms: presidential or parliamentary. In a presidential democracy, the president serves as both the head of state and the head of government. The United States serves as a prime example of a presidential system, where the president fulfills multiple roles, including Commander-in-Chief, foreign policy negotiator, party leader, and spokesperson for the public interest. The executive branch, led by the president, operates independently, ensuring a total separation of powers among the three branches of government.

Conversely, in a parliamentary democracy, the legislature holds supreme power to make laws, control finances, and appoint or dismiss the head of government, typically the Prime Minister and their ministers. In practice, the cabinet and the Prime Minister have evolved into quasi-independent policy-making entities. Parliamentary systems feature both nominal and real executives, adhering to the principles of majority party rule and collective responsibility of the executive to the legislature. The cabinet, in such systems, holds the entirety of executive power.

It’s important to note that some countries, like France , adopt a semi-presidential and semi-parliamentary regime. In this scenario, the French president holds supreme executive power in reality, with a cabinet responsible for conducting the nation’s policies before the parliament.

Additional Forms of Democracy

In addition to the above forms, there are other types of democracy worth mentioning:

• Electoral Democracy: This type of representative democracy is based on elections and electoral votes, characteristic of modern Western democracies.
• Participatory Democracy: It involves increased citizen participation in decision-making and offers greater political representation than traditional representative democracy. It empowers citizens to have more control over the decisions made by their representatives.
• Majoritarian Democracy: This form of democracy relies on majority rule, often criticized for excluding the voice of the minority. It carries the risk of turning into a ‘tyranny of the majority.’ In response, consensus democracy emphasizes rule by as many people as possible to ensure inclusivity and prevent the dominance of the majority.

Three Waves of Democratization by Samuel Huntington

In his book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century 1991 , S.P Huntington has talked about the three waves in the world that democratized the different types of countries in the world i.e. it led to the popularization of features of democracy in different parts of the world in three waves/stages. 

Democratization waves have been linked to sudden shifts in the distribution of power among the great powers, which creates openings and incentives to introduce sweeping domestic reforms. Let’s look at them one by one:

First Wave: The initial wave of democracy, spanning from 1828 to 1926, marked the emergence of democratic principles. This wave began in the early 19th century when suffrage was extended to the majority of white males in the United States. Following this, countries like France, Britain, Canada, Australia, Italy, and Argentina adopted democratic systems, with a few more nations joining their ranks before 1900. The peak of this first wave occurred after the disintegration of empires like Russia, Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire in 1918. At this point, the world witnessed the establishment of 29 democracies in the aftermath of World War I. However, this wave faced a setback in 1922 when Benito Mussolini came to power in Italy, initiating a reversal. 

The collapse of the first wave was mainly felt by newly formed democracies, which struggled against the rise of expansionist communist, fascist, and militaristic authoritarian or totalitarian movements that systematically opposed democratic ideals. The nadir of the first wave was reached in 1942 when the number of democracies worldwide dwindled to a mere 12.

Second Wave: The second wave of democracy commenced following the Allied victory in World War II and reached its zenith nearly two decades later in 1962, with 36 recognized democracies across the globe. However, the second wave began to recede at this point, and the total count decreased to 30 democracies between 1962 and the mid-1970s. Yet, this “flat line” was a temporary phase, as a new surge was on the horizon with the advent of the third wave. It’s worth noting that India was part of the second wave .

Third Wave: The third wave of democracy, initiated in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, encompassed significant democratic transitions. This wave included historic transitions to democracy in Latin America during the 1980s, as well as in Asia-Pacific countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan from 1986 to 1988. It further extended to Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union and encompassed sub-Saharan Africa, beginning in 1989. In Latin America, only Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela had achieved democracy by 1978, while Cuba and Haiti remained under authoritarian rule by 1995, as this wave swept across a total of twenty countries.

Samuel Huntington pointed out that three-fourths of the new democracies that emerged in these waves were predominantly Roman Catholic. Most Protestant countries had already embraced democratic governance. Huntington emphasized the significance of the Vatican Council of 1962, which transformed the Catholic Church from a defender of the established order into an opponent of totalitarianism.

Overall, Democratic regimes are multifaceted, evolving with time and adapting to the complexities of society. The essence of democracy lies in the empowerment of the people and the rule of law. The different forms of democracy, including liberal, social, and majoritarian, cater to various societal needs and values. Understanding the waves of democracy, as described by Samuel Huntington, provides insights into the global progression of democratic values. In an ever-changing world, the essence of democracy remains constant: government for and by the people.

Non-Democratic Regimes

In the ever-evolving landscape of global politics, non-democratic regimes have played a significant role. These regimes, including totalitarianism, authoritarianism, patrimonialism, military dictatorship, and fascism, differ in their characteristics, power structures, and ideologies. 

Totalitarian Regimes: The Power of Ideology

Totalitarian regimes are characterized by their unwavering commitment to a specific ideology. The central idea behind these regimes is to tightly organize the general public in the name of their ideology and disseminate it to gain complete control. Typically, they operate under a single-party system led by an all-powerful leader. The state monopolizes mass communication and armed forces while controlling all aspects of economic life.

Two prominent categories of totalitarian regimes exist: communist totalitarian regimes (like the former Soviet Union) and non-communist totalitarian regimes (such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy). Common features shared by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes include concentrated political power, a lack of accountability, disregard for the rule of law, and limited attention to individual rights. To maintain control, these regimes employ various tactics, including suppressing interests and associations, utilizing police forces, and establishing new institutions to control societal forces.

Authoritarian Regimes: A Wide Spectrum of Control

Approximately half of the world’s political regimes fall under authoritarianism. These regimes vary from personal regimes (e.g., Saudi Arabia) to single-party regimes and bureaucratic and military regimes. Centralized control and repressive mechanisms are key features, with the military often wielding significant influence. These governments are not constitutionally responsible to the people, who have little to no role in selecting their leaders. Individual freedom is often restricted, and political rights are either nominal or non-existent.

Authoritarian regimes may be institutionalized or legitimate, with an absence of a unifying ideology to mobilize the masses. The creation of critical opinions and interest and pressure groups is discouraged.

Four types of authoritarian regimes exist: tyrannies, dynastic regimes, military regimes, and single-party regimes.

Patrimonialism: Rule by Personal Power

This form of government was first described by Max Weber in his book “Economy and Society” written in 1922. Patrimonialism as he described is a form of political organization where authority is primarily based on the personal power of a ruler. This ruler may act alone or with the help of a powerful elite group. The legal authority of the ruler is largely unchallenged, and the entire government authority is treated as privately appropriated economic advantages.

These autocratic or oligarchic regimes typically exclude lower, middle, and upper classes from power. Military loyalty is directed toward the leader rather than the nation.

Military Dictatorship

Military dictatorship is a form of political organization where the military holds substantial control over political authority and institutions. Typically, the dictator is a high-ranking defense official. These regimes often emerge through coups d’état, forcibly overthrowing existing governments.

Military rule can be direct or indirect, with some pseudo democratic countries witnessing military control despite democratic processes. Notable examples include Argentina, Pakistan, Brazil, Peru, and others.

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

Guillerno O’Donnell , the famous political scientist from Argentina introduced the concept of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. This type of Government is characterized by a powerful group of technocrats using the state apparatus to rationalize and develop the economy. This form of rule was prevalent in South America during the 1960s and 1980s. Leadership is often dominated by individuals who rose to prominence through bureaucratic careers.

Decision-making in these regimes is typically technocratic, accompanied by intense repression. The emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism challenged the idea that socioeconomic modernization would support democracy.

Fascism 

Fascism is an ultra-nationalistic and authoritarian ideology characterized by dictatorial power, suppression of opposition, regimentation of society, and contempt for democracy and liberalism . It glorifies a single leader or ideology, promoting extreme militaristic nationalism and the rule of elites.

Fascist regimes seek to create a ‘people’s community’ in which individual interests are subordinated to the nation’s good. These regimes are marked by a strong belief in the authority of the state. The main authority meaning of Fascism originates from Benito Mussolini , the organizer of fascism, in which he traces three standards of a rightist theory:” Everything in the state”, “Nothing outside the state” and “Nothing against the state”.

Opposition to Marxism and parliamentary democracy is fundamental, and they support corporatism . The fascist economic theory corporatism called for organizing each of the major sectors of industry, agriculture, the professions, and the arts into state- or management controlled trade unions and employer associations, or “corporations,” each of which would negotiate labor contracts and working conditions and represent the general interests of their professions in a larger assembly of corporations, or “corporatist parliament.” Corporatist institutions would replace all independent organizations of workers and employers, and the corporatist parliament would replace, or at least exist alongside, traditional representative and legislative bodies. 

In conclusion, the choice between democratic and non-democratic political regimes has profound and lasting effects on the destiny of a nation and the lives of its people. Understanding the distinctions between these systems is crucial for individuals, societies, and the global community as a whole, as it enables us to appreciate the values, principles, and consequences associated with the governance of nations, and encourages informed discussions on the future of political systems.

Regionalism in India: A Comprehensive Examination

Language and identity politics in india: exploring the complex interplay, religion and identity politics in india, tribal politics and movements, dalit movements, latest articles, caste-based identity politics in india, reorganization of states in india, political parties in india, labor movements, farmers’ movements in india, women’s movements in india: a holistic exploration, civil society in india, new economic policy , five year plans: blueprints for india’s economic development, india and sadc (south african development community), sovereignty, the arctic council: navigating cooperation in a changing arctic landscape, the new development bank: fostering sustainable development and multilateral cooperation, the new international economic order (nieo): a vision for global economic justice in the 1970s, the bretton woods system: architectural pillar of post-war economic order, the international criminal court: a comprehensive overview and recent developments, regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep): a landmark trade agreement shaping the asian economic landscape, the permanent court of arbitration: a pillar of international dispute resolution, human rights: from origins to evolution and beyond, international terrorism: origins, characteristics, and in-depth analysis of terrorism types, migration: a comprehensive exploration, opec: managing global oil supply for economic stability, brics: forging a new path in global politics and economics, “india and the gulf cooperation council: nurturing a comprehensive partnership”, world trade organization: a comprehensive exploration of structure, functions, and recent milestones”, world health organization’s (who) foundations and functions, power: a thorough examination of its definition and constituent elements, security in international relations, important international war treaties and agreements, structural marxism in the international arena, social constructivism in international relations, postmodernism in international relations, feminist perspectives in international relations, idealism in international relations: a vision for transformative global governance, nafta: the evolution and criticisms of north american economic integration, raisina dialogue: navigating global challenges through diplomacy and discourse, shanghai cooperation organization (sco): a comprehensive exploration of its evolution, structures, and global impact, african union: shaping unity, prosperity, and progress across the continent, roads to resilience: navigating the bbin initiative for seamless connectivity in south asia, the quadrilateral security dialogue (quad), gujral doctrine: india’s approach to neighboring relations, india’s strategic evolution from look east to act east policy, bimstec: a comprehensive exploration of regional integration and cooperation, indo-russian relations: a nuanced exploration of a time-tested alliance, cold war: a detailed exploration of political complexities from inception to resolution, world bank: components, functions, and global influence, international monetary fund (imf), state: definition, history, figures & facts, the united nations: quest for global peace and cooperation, european union: origins, structures, and achievements, india-eu relations, asean: unity, collaboration, and regional prosperity, south asian association of regional cooperation (saarc), india’s nuclear policy: historical evolution, strategic framework, and global implications, india-us relations, india – china relations, non-alignment movement: historical roots, objectives, and global significance, neoliberalism in international relations, realism and neo-realism  in international relations: an in-depth exploration, india’s foreign policy: a comprehensive exploration, m.n. roy: a revolutionary visionary shaping india’s destiny, feminism: from origins to the third wave, marxism: a dive into its origins and streams, liberalism: from individualism to democracy, rights: meaning, types, generations and theories, right to information act: a comprehensive overview, social movements: types and stages, constitutionalism: comparative study of constitutions around the world, dependency theory: theory of underdevelopment, modernization theory: western approach to development, nationalism: european and non-european, colonialism and decolonization: a historical overview, motivation-hygiene theory by frederick herzberg: understanding employee satisfaction and dissatisfaction, the evolution of development administration: from post-colonial aspirations to neoliberal reforms, the bargaining approach to decision-making by charles lindblom, bureaucratic theory by max weber : structure, function, and criticisms, diverse approaches of public administration, public and private administration: differences and similarities, john rawls: architect of justice and fairness, mary wollstonecraft: pioneer of feminism and women’s rights, mao zedong: the revolutionary leader of communist 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10.4 Advantages, Disadvantages, and Challenges of Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes

Learning outcomes.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Compare and contrast the advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential regimes.
• Distinguish between government stability and policy stability.
• Explain what a coalition government is and how these governments potentially work within each regime.
• Define political gridlock and political polarization and explain how they may impact public policy.
• Summarize how minor parties are more viable in a parliamentary regime than they are in a presidential regime.

Each system has its advantages and disadvantages. This section will primarily focus on the systems’ effects on policy: stability, coalition governments, divided government, and representation of minor parties.

Governmental Stability versus Policy Stability

Any discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of presidentialism and parliamentarianism begins with the hypothesis, first posited by Yale University professor Juan Linz , that parliamentary regimes are more stable than presidential regimes and that “the only presidential democracy with a long history of constitutional continuity is the United States.” 38 To Americans, the claim that parliamentary regimes are more stable may appear strange. As already noted, while parliamentary regimes have regular elections, they are not necessarily fixed-term elections. This means an election can happen at any time, opening up the possibility for multiple elections within a relatively short period of time. From 2018 to 2021, there were four separate elections in Israel. 39 In April 2020, Benjamin Netanyahu again was given the opportunity to form a new coalition government. 40 Ultimately, however, he was unable to do so and was ousted as prime minister. 41

To Americans, this may seem like the very definition of instability. Within this context, stability refers to the stability of the political system itself and not the stability of any particular government within that system. Parliamentary regimes may experience multiple elections in a short space of time, but that does not mean the system itself is unstable. It could simply reflect current electoral politics. In that respect, the current demographics of a particular country could work against a majority emerging and encourage coalition governments. Deep divisions within the Israeli electorate have made the formation and maintenance of a coalition government difficult. Nevertheless, the political system remains stable and in place, even if the ramifications of Israel’s crisis in determining its leadership do raise some concerns for aspects of the system. Any instability provides the opportunity for political change.

Instability can also take the form of policy change. Policy swings are more likely in parliamentary regimes. Because there are no set elections, elections could take place at any time. While public opinion does tend to move rather slowly, it changes over time and when triggered by events that cause the public to rethink key issues. Within a parliamentary regime, changing demographics or changing attitudes among the public could bring in a new government that has a very different majority than the old government. That new government could bring sweeping policy changes. Whether an individual sees the changes as a sign of political instability or a sign that the government reflects the will of the people may depend upon whether that individual agrees with the new policies. What one person might view as instability, someone else might see as needed policy change.

Coalition Governments

Generally, coalition governments are shorter-lived than majority governments. 42 The sheer duration of a government provides no indication as to its efficiency or its effectiveness in enacting public policy. The stability of a system can also be interpreted as policy change because the electorate may interpret the system as responsive and adaptable. Georgetown University visiting researcher Josep Colomer found that governments with more parties experienced greater stability with respect to policy change. 43

Israeli Opposition Parties Strike Deal to Form New Government

In this clip, DW News reports on the deal opposition parties struck to form a coalition government, resulting in the ouster of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Forming a new government within the existing parliamentary structure does not require a fundamental change to that structure or its institutions. Consider what happens when a new US president is elected. That president forms a new administration. Similarly, after congressional elections, there may be new leadership in either or both of the houses if there have been significant partisan shifts, with one party losing majority status and the other party gaining it. The 2020 presidential election illustrates the point well. Joe Biden won the presidency and chose a cabinet. Similarly, Democrats gained a slim majority in the Senate and put in place a new majority leader, Senator Charles (Chuck) Schumer . The government was new, but the structure of the branches of government and its institutions did not change.

Coalition governments can be considered a disadvantage of parliamentary regimes, but they can also be a potential advantage. One argument in favor of a parliamentary regime with proportional representation is that more parties are represented. While presidential regimes do not inherently result in a two-party system, there is no doubt that the presidential regime in the United States works that way. Indeed, in the United States, no third-party candidate has ever won the presidency. Theodore Roosevelt came closest in 1912. While he managed to finish second and collect 88 Electoral College votes, he effectively split the Republican vote and helped to ensure the election of Woodrow Wilson , who received less than 45 percent of the popular vote. In a parliamentary regime, it is conceivable that Theodore Roosevelt would have been able to build a coalition with the Republican Party and form a government. So, not only is one more likely to have viable third parties in a parliamentary regime, but those third parties could hold significant power within a government.

One of the primary disadvantages of presidentialism is the possibility of gridlock. Political gridlock is when governments are unable to pass major legislation and stalemates between competing parties take place. Certainly, gridlock can occur within parliamentary regimes, but because presidential regimes have separate institutions, they often result in divided government and are biased against coalition building. Generally speaking, neither of those conditions is typical of a parliamentary regime. These conditions in presidential regimes appear to make them more conducive to gridlock.

Over the years, there has been considerable debate over whether divided government causes gridlock. Yale Emeritus professor David Mayhew argues that gridlock is not inevitable in divided government and that important legislative productivity takes place within both divided and unified governments. 44 That is not to suggest, however, that gridlock does not take place. Brookings Institution fellow Sarah Binder notes that the 2011–2012 Congress ranked “as the most gridlocked during the postwar era.” 45 When gridlock does happen, it tends to be highly visible, with each side publicly posturing and blaming the other side for the impasse, and gridlock eventually ends. That gridlock ends suggests a self-correcting aspect; the two political parties do not diverge from each other all that much or for all that long. 46 At the same time, presidential regimes carry a risk of polarization . While political polarization is not unique to presidential regimes, they are prone to its development.

The last 30 years in particular have seen an increase in political polarization. 47 The extent to which it exists both within political parties and within the electorate has been the subject of heated debate. 48 Political polarization is a disadvantage of presidential regimes that presents a cause for concern for the enactment of public policy. But does polarization cause a systemic breakdown in the legislative process? The short answer is that perhaps it can. Dodd and Schraufnagel have demonstrated a curvilinear relationship between polarization and legislative productivity. 49 Higher levels of polarization tend to be more likely to interfere with the policy-making process. But interestingly enough, low levels of polarization also result in low levels of productivity. It is when polarization is somewhere in the middle that legislative progress is most likely to occur. Indeed, Dodd and Schraufnagel note that attention should be given to the “virtues of divided government.” So, while presidential regimes work against coalition building, Manning J. Dauer Eminent Scholar in Political Science at the University of Florida Lawrence C. Dodd and Northern Illinois University professor Scot Schraufnagel conclude that divided government may provide both parties “some incentive to embrace sincere negotiation, timely compromise, and reasonable, responsive policy productivity by government, since each is responsible for one branch of government and could be held accountable by the public for obstructionist behavior by its branch.”

Show Me the Data

Viable third parties.

In any democracy, third parties or minority parties play important roles. Presidential regimes tend to encourage the formation of a two-party system, resulting in a weaker role for third parties than in most parliamentary regimes that have proportional representation. The reasons presidential regimes are more prone to result in a two-party system are twofold. The first is due to voting procedures. While there is considerable variation in how elections are held across countries, a common approach is plurality voting (also known as “first-past-the-post”). With plurality voting and single-member districts (one person being elected per geographic area), a two-party system is likely to emerge (this is known as Duverger’s law and was covered in Chapter 9: Legislatures ). The presidency is “the most visible single-member district.” 50 While Duverger’s law is not determinative because it does not guarantee a two-party system, it encourages its development. In addition to voting procedures, presidents have to appeal to voters across groups and form a coalition. Political parties are simply coalitions of varied groups. In order to appeal to as many voters as possible, political parties are more likely to broaden their scope of appeal rather than to define themselves more narrowly.

Third parties are much more viable in a parliamentary regime—that is, they have actual representation and voice within the national government. The 2018 elections in Italy resulted in over a dozen parties being represented in its parliament. Generally, this is a positive because voters are much more likely to vote for their first choice. Within a two-party system, however, voters may vote for their second choice because they do not wish to waste their vote. In a parliamentary regime with proportional representation, the threshold for representation within the parliament can be quite low at less than 5 percent. Once elected, the minority party could potentially find itself holding some power. In a parliamentary regime, a minority party may find itself with a disproportionate amount of power as it aligns itself with one of the larger parties. While it is possible to exaggerate the power the minority party holds in the partnership, it cannot be dismissed out of hand.

In a presidential regime, however, large numbers of voters face the unenviable task of voting for a candidate who is less than their first choice, and voters often frame that choice as voting for the “lesser of two evils.” In the 2016 US presidential election, 46 percent of Republicans indicated that neither of the major-party candidates would make a good president. For Democrat respondents, that percentage, while lower, was also substantial at 33 percent. 51 In recent presidential elections, the percent of voters indicating satisfaction with the candidates has never been higher than 72 percent and has been as low as 33 percent. See Figure 10.8 .

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• Authors: Mark Carl Rom, Masaki Hidaka, Rachel Bzostek Walker
• Publisher/website: OpenStax
• Book title: Introduction to Political Science
• Publication date: May 18, 2022
• Location: Houston, Texas
• Book URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-political-science/pages/1-introduction
• Section URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-political-science/pages/10-4-advantages-disadvantages-and-challenges-of-presidential-and-parliamentary-regimes

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• < Previous chapter

Authoritarian Regimes

Oliver Schlumberger is Professor of Comparative Politics in the Institute of Political Science at Tübingen University and is head of department of Middle East and Comparative Politics.

• Published: 06 December 2017
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This article first discusses the term “authoritarian regimes” and makes a claim for studying such regimes. An overview of the young but burgeoning research on authoritarian regimes structures the field in eight thematic clusters: (1) typological efforts and regime characteristics such as coalition formation and origins, (2) institutionalist approaches, (3) state-society relations beyond formal institutions, (4) repression, (5) political economy approaches, (6) international dimensions, (7) performance, and (8) linking the concepts of regimes and states. Although this wave of research has been extremely prolific, it still remains unsystematic and disparate in various regards. It is therefore necessary for this field of research to consolidate and thereby to contribute to genuine knowledge accumulation.

This article does not intend to contribute to the very broad literature on authoritarian regimes. 1 Rather, its first section aims at clarifying some basics (What are authoritarian regimes? Why study them?), and the second section, the bulk of this article, is divided into eight subsections to present a structured overview of the field and a critical discussion of the main debates. This rough and cautiously commented on overview of the evolving field demonstrates the extent to which research has not only increased output dramatically but also broadened thematically since the early 2000s. On this basis, the conclusions take a step back and reflect on the state of the art. I argue that there is a need for some emerging challenges to be addressed by future scholarship, as we otherwise risk producing research output without necessarily deepening our understanding. Working to address such challenges will thus shape the future research agenda for students of authoritarian regimes—or at least it should.

Some Basics

What are authoritarian regimes.

In political science, authoritarian regimes, since roughly the mid-twentieth century and along with democratic and totalitarian regimes, have constituted one of three classical types of political rule. Authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and democracy have been referred to as “the classical triad” of systems of governance or political regimes. 2

Unlike the essentially contested concept 3 of “democracy,” the definition of authoritarian regimes advanced by Juan Linz more than half a century ago is still broadly accepted by the scholarly community. According to Linz, authoritarian regimes are characterized by four defining traits: (1) limited, nonresponsible, political pluralism; (2) the absence of an elaborate and guiding ideology, having instead “distinctive mentalities”; (3) the absence of both intensive and extensive political mobilization; and (4) the exercise of power within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable, limits by a leader or a small group ( Linz 1964 , 297; for a more elaborate discussion, see Linz 1975 , 275–411). This characterization of authoritarian regimes captures them as one type of autocracy, a broader term that also includes other nondemocratic political regimes that are nonauthoritarian such as totalitarianism or, in Linz’s (and Chehabi’s) understanding, sultanism ( Chehabi and Linz 1998 ).

Although some authors have suggested alternative definitions of authoritarianism, none has achieved the scholarly consensus that Linz’s classical definition has reached. It will probably take much more time for new and potentially more conceptually sound propositions to stand a chance of arriving at similar levels of agreement within the academic community.

Authoritarian regimes must be distinguished from “authoritarianism,” which is a significantly broader concept. The latter comprises not only a specific type of political regime, but also a broader understanding of “authoritarian” individual (human) and collective (social) traits, themes, situations, behaviors, modi , and practices that can be found across a range of academic disciplines beyond political science, such as psychology, business administration, management, sociology, media and mass communication, cultural studies, or anthropology.

Beetham (2015 , 12) draws this distinction between authoritarian regimes and authoritarianism, in which the latter for him depicts a “mode of governing which is intolerant of public opposition and dissent.” If that is the case, an “authoritarian mode of governing is possible within a democratic system, though it only remains democratic so long as elections are genuinely ‘free and fair’, and formal civil and political rights are respected” (12). Whether or not this holds up against Linz’s definition need not be discussed here, as this article focuses on the study of political regimes only.

Why Study Authoritarian Regimes?

Contrary to the frame that dominated late twentieth-century research on political regimes—that is, the assumption that the world faced a democratic “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989 , 1992 ; cf. also Fukuyama 2014 )—authoritarian polities seem to be here to stay for the foreseeable future. Fukuyama’s hypothesis triggered a wave of almost immediate and often fundamental criticism, 4 which suggests that his hypotheses have proven short lived, and that the “end-of-history” hypothesis marks not an end to, but only a by now long-passed point in, academic debates about political rule and how it is exerted. For the past ten years Freedom House’s analysts have decried every single year a further weakening of democracy and/or a backlash of authoritarian regimes. In a nutshell, thus, one compelling reason for studying authoritarian regimes is the sheer empirical necessity : we need to study authoritarian regimes because they exist.

A theoretical necessity is the second—and until now largely neglected—reason: While authoritarian regimes continue to exist in no small numbers and historically have been the rule rather than the exception, academic debates on the topic and scholarly interest have been overwhelmingly dominated by research agendas established (and by research conducted by scholars residing and publishing) within democracies .

Among the consequences of this fact is that while the systematic study of authoritarianism can be said to have started more than half a century ago with Linz’s seminal 1964 article, this older literature was dwarfed by the vast conceptual, theoretical, and empirical literature on democracy. Linz’s 1964 piece on Spain under Franco, when he first conceptualized the authoritarian regime, was followed by a number of works written mostly by specialists on Latin American politics (cf., e.g., O’Donnell 1973 ; Malloy 1977 ; Collier 1979 ; and Perlmutter 1981 ). Along with the four volumes edited and in part written by Linz and Stepan (1978) , the Breakdown of Democratic Regimes , this older literature can be seen as the “formative” or “constitutive phase” of research on authoritarian rule. However, comparatively very little time and effort were invested in researching authoritarian rule after this formative period and through the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Another effect of the preoccupation of scholars with democracy rather than autocracy was that students of authoritarian regimes were mostly concerned with either the question of how to best get rid of them and transform them into normatively more desirable democracies (e.g., O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986 ; Di Palma 1990 ; as well as large parts of the “transitology” literature) or the question of why certain countries and regions had not been reached by Huntington’s famous “waves of democratization” (cf. Huntington 1991 ); that is, what puzzled scholars was the fact that “yet they persist” ( Brownlee 2002 ).

After the “constitutive phase” of research on authoritarianism (from the 1960s to the early 1980s), however, little effort was devoted to examining authoritarian regimes in their own right, to conceptualizing and analyzing such regimes as a distinct form of political rule and a specific mode of governance. The teleological lens of democracy as the ultimate point of reference seems to have been necessary to justify academic interest in nondemocratic regimes.

More recently, new research on authoritarianism has emerged. At least in major parts, this new research promises to overcome the persistent, albeit latent, democracy bias that has long existed even in studies on authoritarianism. 5

Twenty-First-Century Research on Authoritarian Regimes

Apart from the constitutive phase’s limited writings on authoritarian regimes, the new century saw the proliferation of a by now extremely broad and comprehensive body of literature. In fact, “the study of authoritarian regimes has recently become one of the hottest subfields in comparative politics” ( Art 2012 , 351). By 2017 it still was the fastest growing area in the subdiscipline.

What follows is a structured overview of some of the most important research themes of the past two decades: (1) typologies and regime characteristics; (2) institutionalist approaches to the study of authoritarianism, which have been for the most part focused on formal state institutions; (3) state-society relations beyond state institutions, including questions of legitimacy, civil society, and the media; (4) repression; (5) political-economic arguments for the survival or breakdown of authoritarian rule; (6) international dimensions of authoritarianism; (7) the performance of authoritarian regimes; and (8) the nexus between the authoritarian regime and the state.

Typologies and the Nature of Regimes

Typological questions.

In any new field of research, taxonomic efforts come first. In the case of authoritarian regimes, this has been particularly complicated because of a conceptual uneasiness with the empirical “grey zone” between democracies and nondemocracies. To analytically capture this grey zone of regimes that fit common definitions of neither democracy nor authoritarianism required extensive efforts at “disentangling political regimes” ( Munck 1996 ). One attempt at sub-typologizing democracies that are found to be less than “fully” democratic is through the invention of “diminished subtypes” (conceptually, see Collier and Levitsky 1997 ; cf. also Collier and Levitsky 2009 ; Zakaria 1997 ; and O’Donnell 1994 as early contributions along this methodological approach; for an alternative conceptualization, see Merkel 2004 ; for a critique, see Møller and Skaaning 2010 ). A similar method of typologizing consists of classifying grey zone regimes as “authoritarianisms with adjectives” rather than as democracies (competitive, liberalized, semi, etc.; see Levitsky and Way 2002 , 2010 ; Brumberg 2002 ; Ottaway 2003 ; and Schedler 2002 , 2006 ). 6 Diminished subtypes do not comprise all the definitional characteristics of the superordinate class. Rather, the adjective that is added in front of the regime type (or “root concept”) specifies what these democracies lack in comparison to “full,” “real,” or “liberal” democracies, or what makes such autocracies with adjectives stand out from other authoritarian regimes.

Rather than subsuming grey zone regimes under the root concept of either democracies or authoritarianisms, the concept of “hybrid regimes” inserts a fourth basic type of political rule into a previously tripartite regime typology (totalitarianism, authoritarianism, democracy). It locates such “hybrid regimes” between democracy and authoritarianism as a distinct regime type ( Karl 1995 ; Rüb 2002 ; Zinecker 2004 ; Wigell 2008 ; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011 ). All these discussions take place on a macro level of the “root concepts” of political regimes ( Sartori 1970 ) and deal with (a) the question of how to grasp the grey zone and (b) the question of where exactly the boundary between democracies and nondemocracies is to be drawn.

It was with Geddes’s (1999) distinction among different subtypes of authoritarian regimes (military, personalist, and single-party) that the search for typological clarity within the spectrum of nondemocratic regimes gained new momentum; the aim here was to find out about survival prospects for various types of authoritarian regimes. 7 Geddes’s lean tripartite typology is easily applicable, in particular for macro-quantitative purposes and the creation of larger data sets. Brooker (2009 , ch. 2) suggests essentially the same categories, while Ezrow and Frantz follow Geddes’s typology but add the category of monarchies “to give a fuller picture” (2011, xvi; cf. also Frantz and Ezrow 2011 ). It is unclear, however, why monarchies, if indeed they are not merely representative-democratic ones, would not be captured by the personalist subtype. Also, it is not self-evident that “personal authoritarian regimes” include all sorts of personalist forms of nondemocratic rule. 8

Various data sets on authoritarian regimes have been constructed. The three most prominent are by Geddes et al. ( 2014b ; cf. also 2014a ); Hadenius et al. (2012 ; an update of which is by Wahman et al. 2013 ); and Cheibub et al. (2010) . Although they resemble each other, they differ in their conceptualization of authoritarian regimes as well as in the subtypes they recognize (i.e., in the criteria they identify for definition, as well as in the number of subtypes and the definition itself). “Military,” “royal,” and “civilian” are the autocratic subtypes in Cheibub et al. (2010) , whereas “military,” “monarchical,” “party-based,” and “personal” are those of Geddes et al. (2014a) . Hadenius et al. (2012) use a different theoretical underpinning of subtypes by not following the identity of incumbents but rather types of underlying institutions, yet the subtypes they arrive at (“military,” “monarchy,” “one-party authoritarian,” “multi-party authoritarian,” and “no-party authoritarian,” plus “other”) come very close to those of the other data sets (cf. also Roller 2013 ). Such data sets are valuable because they are a precondition for engaging in diachronic studies and for running time series, as well as for testing hypotheses that view regime subtypes as an explanatory variable. Overall, while it seems that a consensus on authoritarian subtypes is emerging, a more critical question is whether these comply with the meta-methodological rules of class building.

Origins of Authoritarianism, Regime Building, and Elite Constellations

Divergent origins lead to the formation of different types of authoritarian regimes. This is the argument advanced by a range of authors, although they do not agree about the exact patterns that make authoritarian regimes emerge or about the types that result from different modes of state formation. Slater’s (2010) comparative historical analysis of Southeast Asian cases sees various kinds of contentious politics as leading to either “provision pacts” or “protection pacts,” with the latter having greater prospects for durability (Singapore and Malaysia are the cases in which Slater sees such pacts emerging out of post–World War II mass mobilization). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) , by contrast, elaborate what has become widely known as “selectorate theory,” building on earlier works on coalition building in democratic polities, while Brownlee (2002) finds extensive neopatrimonial ties causal for regime survival and restabilization in fifteen cases. Brownlee thus also refers to domestic regime- and state-society-related variables in explaining regime outcomes.

Both Slater and Bueno de Mesquita build on literature that has been adapted from the study of democracy/democratization to the study of authoritarianism/authoritarianization. 9 Alternatively, Solt (2012) offers a “relative power theory” to explain why prolonged and increasing social inequality leads to authoritarianism: Citizens then tend to regard hierarchical relations as natural and thus accept authority more readily. Yet this contradicts other authors who focus on various types of elite bargains or winning coalitions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also look at strategic elite behavior, but in relation to class constellations. For them, dictatorship is a function of the interplay of wealth and inequality, with both very low and very high inequality making the emergence of authoritarianism more likely than medium levels.

Strikingly, a large share of the literature on origins, as well as on the question of durability of authoritarian regimes, focuses on questions of power sharing among elites and/or between an imagined ideal-type “leader” and elites (cf. Boix and Svolik 2013 ; Svolik 2012 ; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 ; and ultimately also Slater 2010 ). 10 In light of the colored revolutions in the former Soviet Union and Balkans, the upheavals of 1989–1990, and the Arab spring, it might not be so clear that threats from within are actually greater for the survival of dictators than those that originate from the masses; this is so also in light of the findings of works like Slater’s (2010) , in which regime breakdown and re-formation starts with mass contention.

Contributions on elite politics that extend beyond the question of state or regime formation have also resulted in important intraregional or general insights (cf., e.g., Perthes 2004 on Arab countries and Bo 2007 on China). Depending on the nature of the regimes, elite conceptualizations other than “ruling” or “winning coalitions,” such as those of concentric circles, seem to be better able to empirically capture “politically relevant elites” ( Perthes 2004 ) and to present a fuller picture of who exactly influences not only decisions but also agendas.

Institutionalist Approaches

Without doubt, the largest share of the new research on authoritarian regimes has focused on the role of formal and often democratic-looking institutions, and this focus has been particularly (and strikingly) popular among US- and US-based scholars. Institutions examined include (competitive and noncompetitive) elections; parliaments; oppositions; and political parties, both single parties as well as parties in multiparty systems (to name just a few of the vast flood of literature, cf., e.g., Lust-Okar 2001 , 2005 , 2006 ; Lust-Okar et al. 2011 ; Gandhi 2008 ; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007 ; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009 ; Magaloni 2006 , 2008 ; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010 ; Shambaugh 2008 ; Donno 2013 ; Brownlee 2007a , 2007b ; and many others).

To this we might add other institutions such as courts or constitutions in authoritarian contexts (e.g., the edited volumes by Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008 and Ginsburg and Simpser 2013 ), about which one of the core research interests is the fine line between the rule of law and “rule by law.” Proof has yet to be furnished, however, that a politically independent judiciary can actually exist within nondemocratic regimes, or in other words, that the rule of law is compatible in principle with authoritarianism.

Although notoriously difficult to study, there is also a recently renewed interest in civil-military relations and the role of armies in autocracies, in particular in situations of coups and during revolutionary uprisings, along with questions of coup proofing. This research has regional origins in studies on South and Southeast Asian countries such as Myanmar, Pakistan, the Fijis, and Thailand on the one hand, and Middle Eastern cases such as Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Tunisia on the other (e.g., Barany 2009 , 2016 ; Croissant 2013 ; Bellin 2004 ; Springborg 2015 ; Albrecht and Ohl 2016 ). While scholarly access to key decision makers almost never exists, heuristic categorization of professional versus nonprofessional armies or deductive principal-agent modeling remains the most common approach to tackling these questions.

Any number of correlations between institutions and autocratic survival, durability, reproduction, plurality, and other variables have been assumed and detected. Oppositional forces, whether “loyal” or “anti-systemic,” have also been examined for their intentional and unintentional contributions to authoritarian survival (cf Albrecht 2006 ). The bottom line in all of them is that institutions that bear the same name as their democratic counterparts decisively fulfill different functions, and produce dissimilar output, than those institutions in democratic contexts. This gives credence to the assumption that dictators actually engage in institution building for a variety of reasons, but all of them aim at enhancing autocratic rule.

What makes those contributions valuable is that they shed light on a long-neglected or misread component of authoritarian regimes. Formal democratic-looking institutions had been neglected because either they were considered mere rubber stamps that were at best created to maintain some semblance of democracy for external (Western) audiences and thus facilitate the acquisition of aid, or this semblance of democratic institutions was taken at face value and not further questioned. Yet even if such institutions as parliaments, political parties, and (unfree) elections were mere window dressing, and when citizens would not believe in them, why would autocrats then invest in having them? Many possible answers have been suggested; scholars assume them to be anything from opinion barometers, to patronage machines, to facilitators of power-sharing arrangements, to instruments that enable regimes to acquire some form of nondemocratic responsiveness (on the latter, cf. Miller 2014 ). 11

What remains conspicuously absent from this voluminous research, however, are informal institutions . They seem to have been relegated to the back burner and largely omitted. Art (2012 , 355) surprisingly considers this not a lack, but “a welcome correction to a literature that has focused overwhelmingly on patronage.” Have informal institutions thus lost their importance? Most probably not, but they are much harder to study.

State-Society Relations beyond State Institutions: Civil Society, the Media, Iconography, and Legitimacy

In the 1990s there was a largely transitology-inspired euphoria about the anticipated role of the “third sector.” Civil society organizations in particular were thought to be a vehicle for democratization, and in fact the prodemocratic functions of voluntary intermediate organizations in established democracies along the lines of Putnam’s neo-Tocquevillean argument (civic traditions and institutions as promoters of social capital and of democratic practices and values such as engagement or toleration; cf. Putnam 1993 ) remain little contested. But the picture became more serious in the 2000s regarding civil society under authoritarian conditions; autocrats responded to the upsurge in civil societies through a strategy of (a) co-opting organizations that emerged outside of governmental control and (b) deliberately creating a mimicry of look-alike institutions through processes of “imitative institution-building” ( Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004 ; see also Heydemann 2007 ). De facto, however, the public sphere was closely surveilled and controlled by regime-organized NGOs (GONGOs or government-organized nongovernmental organizations; cf. Hasmath et al. 2016 for a good conceptualization; see also Naím 2009 and Carapico 2000 ). 12 A third strategy pursued by regimes consists of publicly delegitimizing autonomous third-sector organizations as external agents that interfere with the sovereignty of authoritarian regimes. Also, a survey on Vietnamese NGOs finds that they can help embed the state and ruling party more deeply into local society ( Wischermann et al. 2015 ).

In line with the polyvalent roles civil society organizations play in different types of political regimes, there is still a widespread belief that the new media constitute “liberation technologies” ( Diamond 2010 ) that tend to undermine authoritarian rule (cf. also Lynch 2011 for a more nuanced discussion). Yet Rød and Weidmann (2015 , 339) emphasize the Janus-faced nature of new media, emphasizing that they also “can serve evil purposes” and be a “repression technology.” More specifically, autocrats use the Internet for three distinct purposes: to (a) track dissidents, (b) send signals of surveillance and control that aim at deterrence, and (c) influence public opinion through the spread of propaganda and misinformation. The latter in particular has become part and parcel of authoritarian policies, either directly or through hired regime-friendly bloggers who flood the Web with pro-regime posts and “information,” often also delegitimizing counterarguments (see also Chestnut Greitens 2013 , 263ff.). Kalathil and Boas (2001) demonstrate with the examples of Cuba and China how different types of authoritarian regimes make effective use of the Internet through different mixes of proactive and reactive strategies, respectively. Overall, autocrats seem to be able to gain net benefits from the new technology and effectively manage to enhance control, surveillance, and agnotology (conceptually on the latter, see Proctor and Schiebinger 2008 as well as Ahram and Goode 2016 ).

In this context the commercialization of media service provision does not help. Private suppliers of Internet access are compelled to abide by the rules and requests of local authorities. Likewise, Chinese TV privatization makes content appear more modern, but leaves censorship unchanged while support for governmental institutions is effectively raised ( Stockmann and Gallagher 2011 ). Even when content originates from liberal democracies, its effects are difficult to predict. Kern and Hainmueller (2009 , 378) find that on East Germans in the 1980s, “the net effect of West German television exposure was an increase in regime support.” In sum, therefore, what Rød and Weidmann (2015 , 349) state about the Internet goes for the media as a whole: “If democratic governments know how to take advantage of it, it might be naïve to think that autocratic governments do not.”

What applies to the media also holds true in the broader politics of symbols in virtually every corner of daily life, as Wedeen (1999) demonstrated. Using the Syrian case, she showed how a personality cult that nobody believes in is at the same time obviously phony and effective because it drives citizens to act as if they believed in it, thereby generating obedience and rules of behavior that strengthen the authoritarian regime. An iconography that appears ridiculous at first sight thereby turns out to be an effective tool for control and regime maintenance that goes beyond what we have come to know as preference falsification (on this latter point, with reference to the Chinese case, see Jiang and Yang 2016 ; see Kalinin 2016 , on Russia).

The effects of the media and symbol politics on political support for incumbents point to another dimension of authoritarianism that is important, but almost impossible to pin down and operationalize: legitimacy. There is today an overwhelming consensus in the social sciences to understand the concept along with its Weberian meaning as a reciprocal category. In this understanding, legitimacy is seen as the subjects’ belief in the legitimacy of the ruler(s) ( Legitimitätsglaube ), to be gained through either input procedures (that is: democratic elections) or through output or performance ( Scharpf 1999 ). Strikingly, studying legitimacy in authoritarian contexts seems an almost exclusively European (and German in particular) endeavor (e.g., Holbig 2010 ; Holbig and Gilley 2010 ; Schlumberger 2010 ; Kailitz 2013 ; Grauvogel and von Soest 2013 ; von Soest and Grauvogel 2016 ; Kneuer 2013 ; Pickel 2013 ; etc.), almost entirely neglected in Anglo-American research.

While common wisdom has it that autocracies by definition suffer from an inherent legitimacy gap, recent studies have presented both theoretical ( Schlumberger 2004 ) and empirical ( Gilley 2009 ) counterarguments: Legitimacy originates from various sources and does not per se depend on regime type. Gilley, for example, finds autocratic China among the most “empirically legitimate” countries in his sample of seventy-two cases. 13   Schlumberger (2010) distinguishes analytically between (a) the “who” (the addressees of claims to legitimacy); (b) the success or failure (whether addressees buy these claims); (c) the “what” (the content of legitimation strategies invoked); and (d) the “how” (How are claims to legitimacy delivered to their addressees?). Country-specific and regional studies such as those by Yakoutchyk (2016b ; on Belarus); White (2005 ; on Southeast Asia); and Schlumberger (2010 ; on the Middle East and North Africa) have flourished recently. The database by von Soest and Grauvogel (2016) takes this approach one step further; in their data, they differentiate along the content of legitimation strategies (or the “what”: foundational myth, ideology, personalism, international engagement, procedural mechanisms, and performance) and establish different “legitimation profiles” of political regimes. If the profile is coherent, their argument holds, authoritarian resilience is enhanced. Yet this of course evades the most difficult question of how legitimacy (as opposed to legitimation strategies) could be reliably and validly measured.

The flip side of legitimacy is repression, the other mainstay of authoritarian rule. 14 In comparison to “the asymmetric attention that quasidemocratic institutions have received thus far in the literature” ( Art 2012 , 361; see the subsection “Institutionalist Approaches” above), repression still remains understudied. 15   Landman (2013 , 4) correctly reminds us that we “must not lose sight of the study of repression and coercion.” He suggests that “the varied combinations of principals and agents in the face of diverse threats produce great variation in both the use and severity of repression, and a differentiation of regimes necessary for a comparative politics of authoritarianism” ( Landman 2013 , 24). Existing work on repression mostly centers on questions about why, when, how, and to what avail authoritarians engage in repressive activity. One core demand has been for “disaggregating repression” spatially, temporally, and with respect to its types, as well as for integrating the topic into wider political science research (cf. Davenport 2007 , 18ff.). Part of this is practiced by Josua and Edel (2015) , who model variation in repression as caused by (a) the setup of the authoritarian regime, (b) the state and its capacities, and (c) the nature of the challenge to the regime, while the decision for or against repression hinges upon the availability of alternatives—and alternatives, to them, “can be framed as the availability of legitimation strategies” (291).

This latter point in particular brings in threat perception, which influences the way incumbents perceive the need for repression (against mass protest or other contentious politics). Indirectly, this also brings in society, including the societal targets of repression (How targeted is repression?). Information from the “recipient’s side” (i.e., the victims) is usually limited because repression instills fear. However, sometimes it becomes possible to take on a bottom-up perspective, as is impressively demonstrated by Pearlman (2016) , who in a case study on Syrian refugees in neighboring countries traces shifts in this notion of fear.

Two other important dimensions that demonstrate the need for deeper research are added to the emerging agenda by Landman (2013 , 23ff.). First, he hints at possibilities of an internationalization/transnationalization of repression and second at its privatization. Other authors point to a path dependency in the emergence of repressive patterns that can be traced back to incumbents’ previous interactions with contenders ( Boudreau 2004 ). Art, in his turn, asks about the nature and identity of regime-hired “thugs” (which could be seen in combination with an increasing privatization of repression 16 ) and also about the origins of repressive institutions: “Why do some dictators succeed in building effective institutions while others fail?” (2012, 369ff.)

Ultimately, most of this literature takes repression as a dependent variable to be explained by regime features, state-society constellations, perceptions of the latter, or historical experiences. For obvious reasons, micro-level empirical studies are rare in this field, but they are all the more desirable, with respect to both the institutions and the effects of repression. In particular, further studies that do not take an isolated look at repressive action but view repression as part of the larger picture of how autocrats manage their societies are still much needed.

Political Economy of Authoritarian Regimes

Economic factors are often seen as an independent variable that explains regime outcomes. 17 In this regard, by far the most coherent argument links economic structures to nondemocratic political rule and is made by the rentier state approach (for a recent critical discussion, see Waldner and Smith 2015 ; for a related debate, see also Papyrakis 2016 ). It is quite firmly established that states that to a large extent rely on external revenues derived from rent income (such as the export of oil or natural gas) foster authoritarian rule and hardly democratize ( Beblawi and Luciani 1987 ; Ross 2001 , 2012 ). In a nutshell, this is because external revenues can be distributed domestically both to privilege strategically important elites and to aliment the population at large. In turn, extraction remains marginal, so that the shibboleth of the American War of Independence, “no taxation without representation,” seems effectively reversed: no representation without taxation. This argument has been further validated in quantitative studies by Smith (2004) and Ulfelder (2007) , but has also been criticized (for instance, by Herb 1999 and Alahmad 2007 ). 18 Further development and refinement of the core arguments have been made in various directions ( Peters and Moore 2009 ; Smith 2005 , 2006 ). Looking at revenues must be complemented by a view of disbursement patterns and allocative power per person ( Richter 2012 ), because this is what engenders loyalty. Further confirmation was recently provided by Lucas and Richter (2016) ; richness in resources strengthens authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, however, the likelihood of authoritarian leaders being ousted by competing elites does not seem to be reduced by the availability of external rent income.

Counterintuitively, bust periods do not automatically lead to regime crises ( Smith 2006 ). Rather, as Moore (2015) demonstrated for the 2011 Arab revolts, earlier changes within the general fiscal framework toward indirect rather than direct taxation (itself a consequence of neoliberal adjustment policies) were key in a longer term relative deprivation of Arab societies that ultimately led to protest.

Neoliberal reform and its consequences, in their turn, have empirically led to more social inequality and to a relative deprivation of broad social segments in otherwise different world regions. They therefore constitute in themselves a link to protest and repression (cf. subsection “Repression” above); to regime performance (see the subsection “Performance” below); to questions of legitimacy (subsection “State-Society Relations beyond State Institutions” above); and to the origins of authoritarian regimes (see subsection “Origins of Authoritarianism, Regime Building, and Elite Constellations” above).

Since rentier states allocate resources to society, incentives to comply with regime restrictions are high as long as individual benefits are realized from such distributional politics. Such benefits are usually extended through informal, pyramidal patron-client relations that are also at the heart of a growing political economy literature on cronyism in autocracies. In this context, an amalgamation of regime-business interests can constitute powerful economic underpinnings of authoritarianism. Haddad (2012) , for example, shows in a single-case study on Syria how state agents orchestrated collusion with select business actors in the light of dwindling revenues such as oil or aid. Heydemann (2004) finds similar cross-regional results for the Middle East (cf. also Demmelhuber and Roll 2007 on Egypt) that strikingly correspond with the findings that Ledeneva (1998) reached on “Russia’s economy of favors.” With respect to Asia, Kang (2002) examines state-business relations with a similar focus, whereas Schlumberger’s (2008) “patrimonial capitalism” tries to conceptualize and theorize, but also to make empirically identifiable, cases in which this particular type of politically induced capitalism prevails. 19 Both Haddad (2012) and Schlumberger (2008) conclude that this type of state-business relations has detrimental impacts on development prospects, but the latter sees in this a type of economic order that emerged out of selective neoliberal reform in nondemocratic developing countries more generally.

International Factors

It took democratization studies almost four decades to take into account the fact that actors, processes, and structures outside the borders of individual states impact their political regimes within. In the recent research on authoritarianism, this subfield was included early on, so there is no doubt about the importance of international factors. But the range of possible influences from abroad and the conceptualizations of such influence are very broad indeed. They start with Levitsky’s and Way’s various studies on linkage and leverage 20 ( 2005 , 2006 , 2007 , 2010 ; and many subsequent studies by various authors). They identify important transnational mechanisms that impact regime outcomes. This subfield continues with studies on an often questionable efficacy of democracy promotion policies by Western powers, which furthermore can have unintended opposite effects (e.g., Kienle 2007 ; Dandashly 2014 ). Moreover, Western actors do not usually accord democracy promotion the policy priority in actual commitment that exists in rhetoric (e.g., Youngs 2010 ; Schlumberger 2006 ). Rather, it can unintentionally and mostly unconsciously make the representatives of democracy-promoting agencies part of local power games (see Leininger 2010 on Mali). Foreign aid more generally cannot automatically be assumed to be regime neutral (cf., e.g., Bader and Faust 2014 ). The (erroneous) assumption of the purely positive effects of Western influence that shines through early studies like those by Levitsky and Way has thus given way to a more differentiated picture.

From the viewpoint of authoritarian regimes, diverse options exist to shape relations to donors and influence donor perceptions by emphasizing themes that are foreign policy priorities of those donors (order and stability)—a phenomenon that Jourde (2007) studies by building on Bayart (2000) , with the help of the African cases of Gabun and Mauretania.

At the other end of the spectrum of international factors that affect regime outcomes, some autocracies have started an outright export of autocracy or aim at disrupting democratic regimes in their home environments. Not surprisingly, this “black knight” phenomenon is most prominently observed in the Russian case (see, for instance, Ambrosio 2009 ; Bader et al. 2010 ; Jackson 2010 , Dannreuther 2014 ) and in other post-Soviet countries like Belarus ( Yakoutchyk 2016a ). There is far less agreement about whether China also represents a black knight, and if so, under what conditions ( Bader 2015 ; cf. also Burnell 2010 ; for more skeptical accounts of autocracy promotion in general, see Tansey 2016 and Way 2016 ).

Finally, authoritarian learning, cooperation, and diffusion represent probably the most recent strand in the growing literature on international factors that impact authoritarian regimes. Apart from individual studies, Germany’s GIGA Institute Hamburg embarked on a global project on this topic (cf. Erdmann et al. 2013 ; Bank and Edel 2015 ; Lynch et al. 2016 ; cf. also Heydemann and Leenders 2011 ). The studies emphasize the adaptive capacities of authoritarian regimes in learning from each other’s experience as well as collaborating among themselves in order to preserve and uphold authoritarian rule.

Performance

The debate on whether autocracies or democracies fare better in creating growth and development dates back to the Cold War era but continues unabatedly, without consensus. Why is this question important? “A political order that does not perform well will ultimately be considered illegitimate no matter how democratic the policymaking process,” Risse and Kleine (2007 , 74) argue. Whether and how regime type affects the (economic, social, cultural, etc.) performance of countries is thus not restricted to research on authoritarianism, but has been a field of intense and contradictory arguments (“authoritarian advantage” versus “democratic dividend”). Much of the current literature can still be attributed to this dichotomous view of “who is doing better” (cf., e.g., Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein 2005 ; Faust 2007 ).

Art (2012 , 365), however, rightly demands that “having discovered that ‘institutions matter’ in understanding authoritarian regimes, the next step for scholars is to unpack exactly how they do.” This process has started with respect to the specific performance of some institutions (and sometimes, in a next step, what that means for authoritarian survival, emergence, or durability). 21 Topics include, among others, environmental sustainability ( Wurster 2013 ), social performance ( McGuire 2013 ), property rights ( Knutsen and Fjelde 2013 ), and responses to economic crises (among others, see Tanneberg et al. 2013 ). Most of all, however, they deal with developmental performance. While some precursors do exist in the literature (e.g., King 1981 ), to date the lack of consensus on how to classify authoritarian regimes continues to have a negative impact on this research; taken together, clear directions of results are difficult to find (cf. also Croissant et al. 2014 , 2015 ).

A case in point is the impact of elections on performance. Miller (2015) claims that when the electoral process in autocracies is competitive, this has positive effects on health, education, gender equality, and civil liberties. While the mere existence of legislatures and elections, according to Miller, does not produce heightened levels of human development, the boldly stated finding is: “Multiparty elections […] motivate regimes to promote citizen welfare” (2015, 26). By contrast, McGuire (2013) states that single-party autocracies perform better than multiparty authoritarian regimes, having lower infant mortality rates. Yet again, Little (2016) claims that elections benefit citizens even if they are not competitive—that is, under any conditions. If we trust all three, that leaves us with confusion about contradictory findings. Juxtaposing these results, we would need to state more generally that elections are always good, but single-party rule is also, and add the gradualist assumption that the freer elections are, the better for citizens; from a scholarly viewpoint, this is not exactly satisfying. Schedler (2013 , 380ff.) concurs (“bad elections are better than no elections”), albeit on totally different, noneconomic grounds, whereas the various works by Lust-Okar ( 2006 , 2009 ), Magaloni ( 2006 , 2008 ), and others (see the subsection “Institutionalist Approaches” above) aim at demonstrating how elections foster and facilitate authoritarian regime maintenance. All in all, the research on regimes’ impact on performance cannot yet be considered to have produced unquestioningly consolidated new knowledge. One core question is: Are findings really generalizable on the basis of the quality, amount, and operationalization of the data used? And to add another challenge: because of the absence of any agreed upon typology of nondemocratic regimes, it seems very demanding to establish generalized claims on performance not about authoritarianism in comparison to democracy, but within the universe of authoritarian regimes in intra-class, subtype comparisons.

Links and Distinctions between Regimes and States

A final research arena is just about to open up, but, upon closer inspection, is not entirely new: the relationship between regime and state(-ness). Authors of the constitutive phase had either implicitly or explicitly assumed that “the autonomy and centrality of the state is the most important concept in modern politics” ( Perlmutter 1981 , 2). Against this backdrop, authoritarian regimes were seen as one specific way of organizing the state and its institutions, whereby authoritarian regimes would enhance state autonomy “at the expense of society and its development” ( Perlmutter 1981 , 4). State and authoritarian regime could thus be seen as corresponding, mutually reinforcing entities. Today authors are re-examining the relationship between state and democracy ( Andersen et al. 2014 ) and between state and authoritarian regimes ( Schlumberger 2016b ). As Russia’s autocracy consolidates with the help of huge oil and gas revenues, Perlmutter’s statement seems to hold: authoritarian regimes might be able to enhance stateness. Then again, states are crumbling where authoritarian regimes fall that have largely been congruent to the very states they ran, as evidenced in North Africa and the Persian Gulf (e.g., Libya or Yemen; cf. Schlumberger 2016a ). At any rate, the nexus between the two fundamental concepts is again under scrutiny, even though this research is still at its beginning.

Interestingly, work that focuses on the performance of authoritarian regimes is likely among the first within the vast new research on authoritarianism that takes the regimes’ side not as a dependent but as an independent variable, explaining by their institutional setup how well regimes fare on a number of performance criteria and in different areas. However, this is true only prima facie; if performance impacts regime legitimacy, and we know that legitimacy is heavily affecting the complex of stability and persistence, then the deeper research interest in performance ultimately lies, once again, in the survival, persistence, or breakdown of regimes (cf. Keremoglu-Waibler 2016 ). This is different with the emerging research on the nexus between state and (authoritarian) regime; here the survival and breakdown of political order as such, including the institutions and organizations typically associated with the state rather than with the regime, are taken as dependent variables, while political regimes are seen as a potential explanandum for the strengthening, weakening, or erosion and collapse of statehood.

Conclusions

“The field is in its infancy,” Gehlbach et al. (2016 , 566) correctly write about the study of authoritarianism. Yet this is not the case regarding the size of output, the number of publications, the thematic breadth of the field, and the diversity of methods applied. In these respects, the field has been exploding. But it is less than mature regarding the certainty with which we can trust the many and at times contradictory results that are published. This hints at a number of new challenges that are waiting to be addressed by future research, some of which have become apparent in the preceding discussion of the field.

First, there is a terminological fuzziness that stems from the “foggy zone” ( Schedler 2002 ) between authoritarianism and democracy. The blurred lines between the two, as well as the absence of a clear distinction between them, make the universe of cases unclear. At the heart of this problem lies the question of how to establish classes, and the inventors of “regimes with adjectives” in particular have ignored fundamental rules of categorization such as mutual exclusiveness and joint exhaustiveness. The same goes for sub-typologies of authoritarianism, as discussed above.

Second, while most contributions in the field are concerned with how autocracies emerge, how they survive, or what stabilizes them and makes them resilient, these variables are not all the same thing. Conceptual fuzziness is thus accompanied by a fuzziness in the dependent variable. Further clarification being absent, comparative checking across different studies then becomes difficult. We need to know what the precise explanatory purpose of a new study is and what similar or competing claims have already been advanced by others, on what grounds, data, and independent variables. This requires us to distinguish more sharply factors that lead to the emergence of authoritarianism from those that sustain it.

Third, dozens of arguments and hypotheses are on offer to explain authoritarian resilience, and their authors all too often claim that their argument “provides the best explanation” ( Slater 2010 , 230). But the claim is not enough: What arguments are central, which ones more ephemeral? Many authors borrow from earlier literatures, but few engage with competing claims by contemporaries. While this is not to deny multicausality, a science of politics should be able to adjudicate and both methodologically and intellectually discriminate between competing claims. This has hardly happened in the new literature on authoritarian regimes. Rather, it still seems to be caught in a phase of seeking to produce as much publishable output as quickly as possible, at the expense of creating as much scientifically sustainable knowledge as possible.

Fourth, and related to the third point, mere statistical testing will often not be enough in such a process of adjudicating various hypotheses and arguments. This is because autocracies are not only “information-shy” ( Henry and Springborg 2010 , 55, 110) but deliberately produce false data and misinformation, and thus engage in what is called “agnotology” (cf. Betancourt 2014 ). Regimes’ efforts at creating a post-factual world cannot be overestimated, and we “need to reconsider the implications of opacity for our own research” ( Schedler 2013 , 385). Yet very few publications address this problem with even a single word. No small part of the scholarly community sometimes seems to have replaced confidence in the degree of certainty in our results with confidence in the respectability of some methods as opposed to others. Thus, “one cannot expect to be able to study contemporary authoritarian regimes using the same kinds of methods for researching open regimes” ( Ahram and Goode 2016 , 838; see also Croissant 2014 ). If we still do, and do so unaware of the inherent methodological problems, we might even run into the danger of replicating the ignorance, misinformation, and false data that authoritarian regimes so characteristically produce themselves.

These points are certainly not exhaustive regarding the challenges the broad but adolescent research on authoritarian regimes faces. Overall, we see a very encompassing literature that is in various respects still unsystematic and offers lots of publications, but little consolidated knowledge. Questions of research design, concept specification, and methodological pitfalls abound; it is likely that results published today will face important qualifications or disconfirmation tomorrow as further research unfolds. Furthermore, some of today’s findings, such as the one discussed above (subsection “Performance” : “elections are always good [for development or other things], the freer the better”), might more be reflective, albeit subtly, of an age-old democracy bias that Western political research has suffered from for too long, rather than offering consolidated knowledge.

However, if scholars adhere to the maxims of conceptual clarity, thorough concept specification, critical (self-)reflection and comparative checking, and if we adhere to the principle of producing not just publications, but knowledge, then this field of investigation will doubtlessly mature over the next decade. What is needed most for this to materialize is less a further expansion of the field by new arguments and more a rigorous checking and testing of existing ones.

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Note, however, that here, as in most of the political science literature, “authoritarianism” is at times used interchangeably with “authoritarian regime.” This does not imply that it would not matter whether we view authoritarian regimes as one specific type of political regime , as it is defined here, and not to open the door to an all-encompassing conceptual confusion by promoting the idea that transnational and subnational arrangements or interactions should be called “authoritarian regimes,” as representatives of the subdiscipline of international relations have argued (cf. Glasius 2013 ).

Following Robert Fishman , a political regime can be defined as “the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not” (1990, 428).

For the notion of “essentially contested concepts,” see Gallie (1956) .

Among the most prominent were Derrida (1993 , ch.2) and, from the other side of the political spectrum, the later book by Kagan (2008) .

I do not discuss here the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. On the latter, see Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956) and Arendt (1951) , as well as Sartori (1993) on the question of whether there are any empirical cases of totalitarianism today, and if not, what to do with the analytical category. Also, I am not going deeper into definitional discussions on democracy. For pragmatic reasons, I stick with Dahl’s (1971 , 3) definition of polyarchy, or, alternatively, with the more parsimonious but congruent definition of democracy suggested by Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1988 , xvi).

Schedler’s “electoral authoritarianism,” however, might not fit easily into this category of “authoritarianisms with adjectives,” as he does not conceive of it as a diminished, but rather as a classical, subtype that is distinct in that it has (competitive) elections. A critical view is found in Snyder (2006) .

Of course, the search for subtypes of authoritarian regimes had already begun in the constitutive first phase of research. Proponents include Linz himself (who identified no less than seven subtypes, ranging from “bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes” to “post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes” to “organic statism”; Linz 1975 , 285–350), and Perlmutter with his five types (1981, 89–135). While inductively understandable, those early categories would today hardly stand any test of sound category building. In particular, and this is not specific to Linz, there is a general problem with regime typologies that use the prefix “post-.” Typically, the thing that follows the “post” does not help in defining the regime type, but merely refers to a certain empirical case or context (post-totalitarian, post-Soviet, post-conflict, etc.). If there really were peculiar similarities between, say, all post-Soviet regimes, then one should be able to identify and name them and also to explain in what ways such joint features would define a type of regime (logically, a regime type with these characteristics must then not exist anywhere but in that particular geographic area or situation).

For example, the concept of neopatrimonialism received renewed interest during the new wave of research (cf., among others, Erdmann and Engel 2007 ; Bach and Gazibo 2012 ), as did the notion of sultanism ( Chehabi and Linz 1998 ).

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) clearly build on prominent literature on coalition building, such as Axelrod’s (1970) idea of “minimal connected winning coalitions” and Riker’s Theory of Political Coalitions (1962), while discarding the qualitative difference between democracies and autocracies altogether (whether this makes sense is a different matter; see, e.g., Sartori 1991 on comparing and miscomparing). Slater (2010) draws on Luebbert’s (1991) account of fascism, liberalism, and social democracy, but also, in a kind of reverse argument, on the structuralist tradition of Moore (1966) or Rueschemeyer, Stevens, and Stevens (1992) .

To be fair, Svolik devotes only the second half of his book to this question (the first half is about “authoritarian control”).

Another strand that is institutional in nature but little related to the above is the renewed attention that monarchical rule received in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. All monarchical regimes survived, whereas five presidential republics collapsed, lost the personalist leader, or decayed into civil war ( Derichs and Demmelhuber 2014 ; Lucas 2004 ; 2014 ; Bank et al. 2014 , 2015 ). The reasons were seen either in their specific structure of legitimacy or by the elevated position of the monarch above the polity, where the throne is exempt from political contestation.

To be sure, the establishment of GONGOs is restricted to neither developing countries’ governments nor authoritarian rule; counter examples are the German political foundations and the US National Endowment for Democracy. In autocracies, however, they are for the most part established in order to achieve or maintain control over a sector of societal activity that, a priori and by definition, is understood as free from governmental interference. Typical examples include, among others, the Russian youth organization Nashi; the equally Russian-organized and internationally active World Without Nazism; Myanmar’s Women’s Affairs Federation, which infamously involves the wives of the ruling generals; and the Sudanese Human Rights Organization. They often either acquire monopoly positions within domestic society or are established to effectively weaken autonomous societal organizations from below. Other versions are DONGOs (donor-organized …), TANGOs (technical assistance …), RONGOS (royally organized …) or QUANGOs (quasi-nongovernmental …).

There are nonmarginal questions about Gilley’s operationalization and his proxies, which might explain part of this and other counterintuitive findings in his study.

It is of course possible to think of repression as a phenomenon that is exerted by state institutions and should therefore have been treated above (in the subsection on institutionalist approaches ), but (1) the phenomenon is not tied to particular institutions; (2) it can be exerted (and in many instances is exerted) by a broad range of noninstitutional actors; and (3) authors who study repression do not, in their majority, follow strictly institutionalist approaches. Therefore, it makes sense to separate it analytically for the present purpose.

See, however, the recent overview by Davenport and Inman (2012) .

Admittedly, this is not the way Landman understands “privatization of repression”; however, given the manifold ways in which (both authoritarian and democratic) regimes outsource repression to private agencies or mercenaries, the topic’s relevance is beyond doubt.

The paragraphs in this section are not about economic theories of political behavior (or what could be called “orthodox American political economy”), but about economic factors that trigger political consequences, or vice versa, that is, they are about the interrelationship of economic and political outcomes.

Yet most critics either accept the core claims of rentier state theory or else fail to operationalize it appropriately. For example, rentier state theory views not only oil, but also natural gas and other primary goods exports, as rent generators, in addition to the strategic location of a country, strategic infrastructure (such as the Suez canal for Egypt or oil and gas transit pipelines), aid, or remittances—all of which can lead to significant rent income for the state.

Cf. also the notion of socially, politically, and culturally embedded capitalism as elaborated by Di Maggio and Zukin (1990) .

This literature initially stemmed from democratization research (cf. Levitsky and Way 2005 ), but subsequently entered, as a heuristic device, the research on authoritarianism.

The first concerted effort at inquiring into this apart from individual articles is probably the special issue of Contemporary Politics on the “performance and persistence of autocracies” edited by Croissant and Wurster (2013) .

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A Typology of Political Regimes

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• Annette Förster 2  

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As indicated earlier, Rawls introduces five types of political regime, distinguished according to liberal-democratic ideas (Herrera 2005, 337) of political participation, the recognition of (basic) human rights and non-aggressiveness towards other regimes. The last point is not (genuinely) liberal democratic. The global political landscape is divided into the five categories: (1) liberal peoples, (2) decent peoples, (3) benevolent absolutistic societies, (4) burdened societies and (5) outlaw states, though there is room for other types of regime, two of which are introduced later in this chapter.

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Förster, A. (2014). A Typology of Political Regimes. In: Peace, Justice and International Order. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137452665_4

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Essay on Politics: Topics, Tips, and Examples for Students

Defining What is Politics Essay

The process of decision-making that applies to members of a group or society is called politics. Arguably, political activities are the backbone of human society, and everything in our daily life is a form of it.

Understanding the essence of politics, reflecting on its internal elements, and critically analyzing them make society more politically aware and let them make more educated decisions. Constantly thinking and analyzing politics is critical for societal evolution.

Political thinkers often write academic papers that explore different political concepts, policies, and events. The essay about politics may examine a wide range of topics such as government systems, political ideologies, social justice, public policies, international relations, etc.

After selecting a specific research topic, a writer should conduct extensive research, gather relevant information, and prepare a logical and well-supported argument. The paper should be clear and organized, complying with academic language and standards. A writer should demonstrate a deep understanding of the subject, an ability to evaluate and remain non-biased to different viewpoints, and a capacity to draw conclusions.

Now that we are on the same page about the question 'what is politics essay' and understand its importance, let's take a deeper dive into how to build a compelling political essay, explore the most relevant political argumentative essay topics, and finally, examine the political essay examples written by the best essay writing service team.

Politics Essay Example for Students

If you are still unsure how to structure your essay or how to present your statement, don't worry. Our team of experts has prepared an excellent essay example for you. Feel free to explore and examine it. Use it to guide you through the writing process and help you understand what a successful essay looks like.

How to Write a Political Essay: Tips + Guide

A well-written essay is easy to read and digest. You probably remember reading papers full of big words and complex ideas that no one bothered to explain. We all agree that such essays are easily forgotten and not influential, even though they might contain a very important message.

If you are writing an essay on politics, acknowledge that you are on a critical mission to easily convey complicated concepts. Hence, what you are trying to say should be your main goal. Our guide on how to write a political essay will help you succeed.

Conduct Research for Your Politics Essay

After choosing a topic for the essay, take enough time for preparation. Even if you are familiar with the matter, conducting thorough research is wiser. Political issues are complex and multifaceted; comprehensive research will help you understand the topic better and offer a more nuanced analysis.

Research can help you identify different viewpoints and arguments around the topic, which can be beneficial for building more impartial and persuasive essays on politics. Sometimes in the hit of the moment, opposing sides are not able to see the common ground; your goal is to remain rational, speak to diverse audiences, and help them see the core of the problem and the ways to solve it.

In political papers, accuracy and credibility are vital. Researching the topic deeply will help you avoid factual errors or misrepresentations from any standpoint. It will allow you to gather reliable sources of information and create a trustworthy foundation for the entire paper.

If you want to stand out from the other students, get inspired by the list of hottest essay ideas and check out our political essay examples.

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Brainstorm Political Essay Topics

The next step to writing a compelling politics essay is to polish your thoughts and find the right angle to the chosen topic.

Before you start writing, generate fresh ideas and organize your thoughts. There are different techniques to systematize the mess going on in your head, such as freewriting, mind mapping, or even as simple as listing ideas. This will open the doors to new angles and approaches to the topic.

When writing an essay about politics, ensure the topic is not too general. It's always better to narrow it down. It will simplify your job and help the audience better understand the core of the problem. Brainstorming can help you identify key points and arguments, which you can use to find a specific angle on the topic.

Brainstorming can also help you detect informational gaps that must be covered before the writing process. Ultimately, the brainstorming phase can bring a lot more clarity and structure to your essay.

We know how exhausting it is to come up with comparative politics essay topics. Let our research paper writing service team do all the hard work for you.

Create Your Politics Essay Thesis Statement

Thesis statements, in general, serve as a starting point of the roadmap for the reader. A political essay thesis statement outlines the main ideas and arguments presented in the body paragraphs and creates a general sense of the content of the paper.

Creating a thesis statement for essays about politics in the initial stages of writing can help you stay focused and on track throughout the working process. You can use it as an aim and constantly check your arguments and evidence against it. The question is whether they are relevant and supportive of the statement.

Get creative when creating a statement. This is the first sentence readers will see, and it should be compelling and clear.

The following is a great example of a clear and persuasive thesis statement:

 'The lack of transparency and accountability has made the World Trade Organization one of the most controversial economic entities. Despite the influence, its effectiveness in promoting free trade and economic growth in developing countries has decreased.'

Provide Facts in Your Essay about Politic

It's a no-brainer that everything you will write in your essay should be supported by strong evidence. The credibility of your argument will be questioned every step of the way, especially when you are writing about sensitive subjects such as essays on government influence on economic troubles. 

Provide facts and use them as supporting evidence in your politics essay. They will help you establish credibility and accuracy and take your paper out of the realm of speculation and mere opinions.

Facts will make your essay on political parties more persuasive, unbiased, and targeted to larger audiences. Remember, the goal is to bring the light to the core of the issue and find a solution, not to bring people even farther apart.

Speaking of facts, many students claim that when they say ' write my essay for me ' out loud, our writing team is the fastest to respond and deliver high-quality essays meeting their trickiest requirements.

Structure Your Political Essay

Your main goal is to communicate your ideas to many people. To succeed, you need to write an essay that is easy to read and understand. Creating a structure will help you present your ideas logically and lead the readers in the right direction.

Sometimes when writing about political essay topics, we get carried away. These issues can be very emotional and sensitive, and writers are not protected from becoming victims of their own writings. Having a structure will keep you on track, only focusing on providing supported arguments and relevant information.

Start with introducing the thesis statement and provide background information. Followed by the body paragraphs and discuss all the relevant facts and standpoints. Finish it up with a comprehensive conclusion, and state the main points of your essay once again.

The structure will also save you time. In the beginning, creating an outline for essays on politics will give you a general idea of what should be written, and you can track your progress against it.

Revise and Proofread Your Final Politics Essay

Once every opinion is on the paper and every argument is well-constructed, one final step should be taken. Revision!

We know nothing is better than finishing the homework and quickly submitting it, but we aim for an A+. Our political essay must be reviewed. You need to check if there is any error such as grammatical, spelling, or contextual.

Take some time off, relax, and start proofreading after a few minutes or hours. Having a fresh mind will help you review not only grammar but also the arguments. Check if something is missing from your essays about politics, and if you find gaps, provide additional information.

You had to spend a lot of time on them, don't give up now. Make sure they are in perfect condition.

Effective Political Essay Topics

We would be happy if our guide on how to write political essays helped you, but we are not stopping there. Below you will find a list of advanced and relevant political essay topics. Whether you are interested in global political topics or political science essay topics, we got you covered.

Once you select a topic, don't forget to check out our politics essay example! It will bring even more clarity, and you will be all ready to start writing your own paper.

Political Argumentative Essay Topics

Now that we know how to write a political analysis essay let's explore political argumentative essay topics:

• Should a political party take a stance on food politics and support policies promoting sustainable food systems?
• Should we label Winston Churchill as the most influential political figure of World War II?
• Does the focus on GDP growth in the political economy hinder the human development index?
• Is foreign influence a threat to national security?
• Is foreign aid the best practice for political campaigning?
• Does the electoral college work for an ideal political system?
• Are social movements making a real difference, or are they politically active for temporary change?
• Can global politics effectively address political conflicts in the modern world?
• Are opposing political parties playing positive roles in US international relations?
• To what extent should political influence be allowed in addressing economic concerns?
• Can representative democracy prevent civil wars in ethnically diverse countries?
• Should nuclear weapons be abolished for the sake of global relations?
• Is economic development more important than ethical issues for Caribbean politics?
• What role should neighboring nations play in preventing human rights abuse in totalitarian regimes?
• Should political decisions guide the resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea?

Political Socialization Essay Topics

Knowing how to write a political issue essay is one thing, but have you explored our list of political socialization essay topics?

• To what extent does a political party or an influential political figure shape the beliefs of young people?
• Does political influence shape attitudes toward environmental politics?
• How can individuals use their own learning process to navigate political conflicts in a polarized society?
• How do political strategies shape cultural globalization?
• Is gender bias used as a political instrument in political socialization?
• How can paying attention to rural communities improve political engagement?
• What is the role of Amnesty International in preventing the death penalty?
• What is the role of politically involved citizens in shaping minimum wage policies?
• How does a political party shape attitudes toward global warming?
• How does the federal system influence urban planning and attitudes toward urban development?
• What is the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy, and how does it affect political decision making
• Did other countries' experiences affect policies on restricting immigration in the US?
• How can note-taking skills and practice tests improve political engagement? 
• How do the cultural values of an independent country shape the attitudes toward national security?
• Does public opinion influence international intervention in helping countries reconcile after conflicts?

Political Science Essay Topics

If you are searching for political science essay topics, check our list below and write the most compelling essay about politic:

• Is environmental education a powerful political instrument? 
• Can anarchist societies provide a viable alternative to traditional forms of governance?
• Pros and cons of deterrence theory in contemporary international relations
• Comparing the impact of the French Revolution and World War II on the political landscape of Europe
• The role of the ruling political party in shaping national policies on nuclear weapons
• Exploring the roots of where politics originate
• The impact of civil wars on the processes of democratization of the third-world countries
• The role of international organizations in promoting global health
• Does using the death penalty in the justice system affect international relations?
• Assessing the role of the World Trade Organization in shaping global trade policies
• The political and environmental implications of conventional agriculture
• The impact of the international court on political decision making
• Is philosophical anarchism relevant to contemporary political discourse?
• The emergence of global citizenship and its relationship with social movements
• The impact of other countries on international relations between the US and China

Final Words

See? Writing an essay about politic seems like a super challenging job, but in reality, all it takes is excellent guidance, a well-structured outline, and an eye for credible information.

If you are stressed out from juggling a hundred different course assignments and have no time to focus on your thesis, our dissertation writing services could relieve you! Our team of experts is ready to take over even the trickiest tasks on the tightest schedule. You just have to wish - ' write my essay ' out loud, and we will be on it!

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Annie Lambert

specializes in creating authoritative content on marketing, business, and finance, with a versatile ability to handle any essay type and dissertations. With a Master’s degree in Business Administration and a passion for social issues, her writing not only educates but also inspires action. On EssayPro blog, Annie delivers detailed guides and thought-provoking discussions on pressing economic and social topics. When not writing, she’s a guest speaker at various business seminars.

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Article contents

International political economy: overview and conceptualization.

• Renée Marlin-Bennett Renée Marlin-Bennett International Studies, Johns Hopkins
•  and  David K. Johnson David K. Johnson Political Science, Johns Hopkins University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.239
• Published in print: 01 March 2010
• Published online: 22 December 2017
• This version: 22 January 2021
• Previous version

The concept of international political economy (IPE) encompasses the intersection of politics and economics as goods, services, money, people, and ideas move across borders. The term “international political economy” began to draw the attention of scholars in the mid-1960s amid problems of the world economy and lagging development in the third world. The term “global political economy” (GPE) later came to be used frequently to illustrate that what happens in the world is not only about interactions between states and that the GPE includes many different kinds of actors. The survey aims at a comprehensive picture of the different schools of IPE, both historically and as they have developed in the early 21st century. Authors of antiquity, such as Aristotle and Kautilya, explored the relationship between the political and the economic long before the term “political economy” was coined, presumably by Antoine de Montchrestien in 1613. The mercantilist writings of the 17th and 18th centuries, including those of Colbert, Mun, and Hamilton, argued in favor of the state using its powers to increase its wealth. List, writing in the 19th century, emphasized the tension between national economic self-determination and free markets. The 19th- to 20th-century iteration of the mercantilist view can be found in the form of economic nationalist policies, which link to a realist approach to international relations more generally. Theorists of the Global South have adapted economic nationalist policies to address the problem of development. The liberal tradition of IPE also has historical antecedents, beginning with classical political economy. Examples include the influential works of Locke, Hume, Smith, and Ricardo. After World War II, the economic writings of Keynes, Hayek, and Friedman were influential. Variants of neoliberal IPE can be found from the 1950s with scholarship on integration and from the late 1970s with scholarship on international regimes. Late-20th-century and early-21st-century liberal scholarship has also explored varieties of capitalism and economic crises. An alternative stream of IPE can be traced through Marxian political economy, beginning with the work of Marx and Engels in the 19th century and proliferating globally. This approach provides a critique of capitalism. Other critical approaches that have emerged in the 20th and 21st centuries include feminist global political economy and postcolonial critiques of liberal and Marxian analyses. Trends in scholarship include analyses of China and transition of the neoliberal order, queer theory for global political economy, and studies of growing trends toward precarious forms of labor. A final section discusses research beginning in the 1990s that is relevant to the global political economy of transborder transmission of disease, a topic of special concern in light of the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020.

• international political economy
• global political economy
• mercantilism
• economic nationalism
• classical liberalism
• neoliberal institutionalism
• neoclassical liberalism
• postcoloniality

Updated in this version

Light revision throughout, added discussions of postcoloniality and Covid-19

Introduction

Research in the field of international political economy, as described in this overview, includes work grounded in different schools of thought and drawing upon distinct conceptualizations of important concepts, relationships, and causal understandings. Antoine de Montchrestien ( 1889 ) is reputed to have introduced the term œconomie politique in his treatise of 1613 , by which he referred to the study of how states should manage the economy or make policy. The concept of international political economy has come to encompass a larger range of concerns, including the intersection of politics and economics, as goods, services, money, people, and ideas move across borders. The term “international political economy” (IPE) began to appear in the scholarly literature in the mid-1960s as problems of the world economy and development in the third world gained scholarly attention. The term “global political economy” (GPE) came into sporadic use at about the same time. GPE was (and is) often used more or less synonymously with IPE, though IPE approaches usually emphasize the individual nation-state as the basic unit of analysis, while GPE approaches tend to be more holistic, placing states and other kinds of actors within larger structures or the global system. Gill ( 1990 ) notes that in the 1980s, the terminological difference between IPE and GPE came to mark a difference in methodological orientation, mapping onto more or less “mainstream” and “critical” approaches, respectively. By the end of the 1990s, the GPE came to be used by both mainstream scholars (Gilpin, 2001 , and Cohn, 2016 , are examples) and critical scholars, although critical scholars are more likely to use GPE exclusively. (This article omits a full discussion of the development of IPE in the Global South and its engagement with GPE, a topic covered in Deciancio and Quiliconi, 2020 ). This survey of IPE and GPE scholarship proceeds in a roughly historical plan and consists of eight sections. It begins with some very early works on the intersection of politics and economics, and then it turns to the mercantilist school and its 20th-century successor, economic nationalism. The next section traces the development of the liberal tradition of political economy, including classical political economy, Keynesianism, neoclassical economics, and neoliberalism. This discussion is followed by sections on the Marxian, feminist, and postcolonial global political economy. The penultimate section briefly discusses some trends of scholarship in the 21st century , especially moving into the 2020s. The survey concludes with a discussion of scholarship (published prior to May 2020 ) that is relevant for assessing the global political economy reverberations of the COVID-19 global pandemic.

Politics and Economics: Early Works

The study of the relationship between economic activities and state interests originated long before the term “political economy” was coined. Two examples of very early works include writings by Aristotle ( 384–322 bce ), who criticized Plato’s conception of communal ownership and placed the state in the role of guarantor of private property in The Politics , and Kautilya ( ca . 350–283 bce ), the Indian author of Arthashastra , a book of statecraft, who wrote of the need for the ruler to send spies to the marketplace to ensure fair weights and measures (Kautilya, 1915 ). In the Middle Ages, Islamic social theorist Ibn Khaldun ( 1332–1406 ) wrote about the relationship between governing structures and productivity of people (Ibn Khaldun, 1967 ). Another Muslim scholar of this era, Al-Maqrizi (d. 1442) ( 1994 ), analyzed governmental policies, including monetary policy. Niccolò Machiavelli ( 1469–1527 ), generally seen as a political theorist, was mindful of the relationship between the state and the economy as well, at least in the sense that a primary role of the prince or of a republican government is to protect private property. He called “public security and the protection of the laws [. . .] the sinews of agriculture and of commerce,” and suggested that the protection of property rights was important “so that the one may not abstain from embellishing his possessions for fear of their being taken from him, and [. . .] not hesitate to open a new traffic for fear of taxes” (Machiavelli, 1882 , p. 448; see also Machiavelli, 1979 , ch. XVI, on how princes ought to spend—or not spend—money).

Governments traditionally were held responsible for defending their own citizens’ property, but they had no such obligation toward conquered peoples. The European Age of Exploration led unsurprisingly to the expropriation of resources, since the purpose of those conquests was to bring home wealth in the form of gold, silver, and other precious materials. Enslavement of the indigenous peoples and profiting from their resources was considered consistent with natural law, as Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, drawing on Aristotle, argued in 1550 (Garcia-Pelayo, 1986 ).

Sepúlveda’s opinion was commonly, but not universally, held. The famous opposition to Spain’s inhuman treatment of indigenous people was published by Bartolomé de Las Casas in 1552 . He charged that the “avarice and ambition” that motivated the Spaniards and led them to perpetrate acts of barbarism were, to use a modern term, “illegitimate” (Las Casas, 2007 ). At a time when imperial conquest was considered the natural goal for states, Las Casas sounded a normative message—that the state cannot act with impunity and that the quest for riches does not excuse unjust forms of violence. The Sepúlveda–Las Casas debate prefigured future debates over the norms of international political economic interaction.

From Mercantilism to Economic Nationalism

Adam Smith referred dismissively to the various theories and policies on how states should intervene in markets to increase wealth and power as “mercantilism.” The more neutral-sounding “economic nationalism” became the successor term in more recent times. In both cases, assumptions about the role of the state conform to a general realist model, although a form of economic nationalism has also been espoused by theorists and polities of the Global South with the aim of “delinking” from relations of dependency on the North. This section traces the development of theories of mercantilism and economic nationalism from the 16th century to the 21st .

Mercantilism

The two-volume history of mercantilism by Eli Heckscher ( 1935 ) outlines at least four elements of this school of thought. Following List, and especially Schmoller, mercantilism is identified as the economic element of creating national states from disparate regions. Mercantilism is also characterized as a specific conceptualization of the nature of wealth that stresses the critical nature of inflows. The lack of reciprocal demand, the difficulty of facilitating accumulation in early agrarian societies, and the differential ability of various economic pursuits regarding generating employment opportunities are central to this element. A third characterization of mercantilism is as a body of policy designed to decrease the cost of inputs and facilitate production in the face of competition. Finally, mercantilism is characterized as a belief in the importance of enhancing the power and wealth of a state, so that it is better able to direct resources both at home and abroad. The best-known mercantilist theories focus on maintaining a positive balance of trade and payments by limiting imports or encouraging exports. One variant, bullionism, focuses on the desirability of increasing a country’s supply of gold and silver. (See Viner, 1937 , for a detailed history of English writings on mercantilism and “bullionism” prior to Adam Smith. A more recent and strongly proneoclassical liberal discussion of the relationship of historical theories of mercantilism to monetary policy can be found in Humphrey, 1999 .)

European exploration and conquest of new lands led to intellectual debate, starting in France in the 16th century , over which policies would best achieve these ends. An influx of gold and silver led to instability in the value of money. Commentators began to consider the government’s role in determining the value of money, the terms of trade, and other facets of what scholars since the mid- 20th century would call international political economy. Jean Bodin, for example, wrote in 1568 about how the value of specie would fluctuate with supply and demand and warned that government interference would only worsen the situation. “A ruler,” he wrote, “who changes the price of gold and silver ruins his people, country and himself” (cited in Turchetti, 2018 ). Instead, as Luigi Cossa ( 1880 , p. 117) noted, Bodin argued that the oversupply of money that resulted in price increases “would be turned to better advantage by a fiscal system promoting the growth of national manufactures in opposition to the excessive consumption of foreign goods.” Antoine de Monchrestien drew heavily on the work of Bodin to advocate for government protection of manufactures. (See Ashley, 1891 , and Perry, 1883 , for discussions of Monchrestien’s work.)

An influential supporter of mercantilism was Jean Baptiste Colbert, minister of finance for King Louis XIV of France. He increased taxes, created benefits for production that would substitute for imports, and worked to bring wealth into the country through his policies, which were referred to as Colbertism. In 1664 , he wrote a memorandum to the king in which he argued “that only the abundance of money in a State makes the difference in its greatness and power.” He advocated government intervention in markets to increase domestic manufactures, to encourage imports of raw materials to be used for manufactures, and to support the exportation of manufactured goods. To encourage French traders to sell goods widely, he also advocated rewards for building or buying new ships and for long-distance voyages (Colbert, 1998 ). Thomas Mun, a director of the British East India Company, expressed similar views in a widely read defense of mercantilism. He argued that a country’s wealth is increased if a positive balance of trade is maintained. England should try to produce as much of what it must consume as possible and import as little as possible for its own consumption. People should tame their appetites to avoid wanting foreign garments and foods. However, having English traders purchase valuable wares from distant locales, bring them back to England, and, from England, reexport them would, according to Mun, serve to increase the national treasure. Mercantilism, in other words, would result in a net inflow of gold and silver—commodities not produced in any great quantity from English mines—and this would be the only way for England to increase its wealth (Mun, 1895 ).

The protectionist policies of mercantilism held considerable attractiveness as countries sought to industrialize and develop their economies. Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, provided a Report on Manufactures to Congress in which he outlined steps that the young country should take to secure its economy, especially in opposition to the economic might of other countries. Creating an economy based on manufactures, Hamilton argued, would protect the United States from being dependent on other countries “for military and other essential supplies.” He implicitly countered the argument of the physiocrats, discussed in the section “ Early Liberal Writers ,” who stressed the importance of agriculture over manufactures. Hamilton maintained that the country was best served by encouraging the development of manufacturing. Using machines would allow for the full employment of the population (including women and children) in order to increase the country’s self-sufficiency—and therefore its wealth and security (Hamilton, 1913 , p. 3).

Friedrich List, a German scholar and politician who later became a naturalized American citizen, extended Hamilton’s argument by emphasizing that states should take advantage of their own human resources—that is, the ability of people to produce agricultural and manufactured products through their innovation, hard work, and the natural environment. He argued that “it is of the utmost concern for a nation [. . .] first fully to supply its own wants, its own consumption with the products of its own manufactures,” he wrote. Only then should a country trade with others. List also developed the proposition that young economies could not compete with more established, more technologically advanced ones until the younger country had invested in developing its domestic industry. He emphasized “that a nation is richer and more powerful in proportion as it exports more manufactured products, imports more raw materials, and consumes more tropical commodities.” Government policies should therefore work toward these goals (List, 1909 , pp. 76–77). For a classic but much overlooked contribution to the tensions between protectionism and free trade in theories of IPE, see E. H. Carr ( 2001 , pp. 41–62).

Economic Nationalism

The 20th century marked a shift in theoretical labels. “Mercantilism” was supplanted by “economic nationalism,” a more neutral term and one that is more easily interpreted from a realist perspective. Economic nationalists are realists who expect the contest for wealth to mirror the contest for power in international relations. However, they often articulate a somewhat schizophrenic view: theorists who write about economic nationalism often see it as an unfortunate, economically inefficient, but unavoidable fact of international life. For example, in 1931 , T. E. Gregory criticized economic nationalism, but explained that such policies continued to be implemented because citizens and governments were reacting to six factors. They (a) feared “dependence on foreign markets for the sale of your products”; (b) saw “the danger of intervention in the domestic market by the foreign capitalist”; (c) desired “to reserve for the intelligence of the country itself such positions of honour and prestige as are offered by the existence of growing industries and a growing financial structure”; (d) realized “the undesirability of allowing [. . .] raw materials to be owned by foreigners”; (e) worried about the risk “that in a period of war, if you depend on foreign food supplies, you may find yourself in a very difficult situation, and therefore you ought to grow your own food”; and (f) believed that keeping “agriculture going as a type of economic production” would guarantee a supply of “vigorous manhood”—men who would be strong soldiers in times of war (pp. 292–294). Similarly, Gregory’s contemporary, Charles Schrecker, begins his discussion of “the causes, characteristics and possible consequences” of economic nationalism with the caveat that he “consider[s] this tendency [toward economic nationalism] in its ultimate effects to be regrettable and detrimental to the future economic welfare of humanity” (Schrecker, 1934 , p. 208).

This differentiation between the scholars’ personal beliefs and their analytical stance continues in more recent scholarship. Judith Goldstein ( 1986 ) discusses the principle of “free and fair” trade as a norm of U.S. trade policy, and she finds that while “free trade” is consistent with liberal economic analysis (which, by implication, she endorses), “fair trade” refers to protecting U.S. firms from unfair trade practices of other countries. In other words, U.S. trade policy ultimately pursues mechanisms that support the interests of those groups that capture the state and persuade policymakers of their claims. Eric Helleiner ( 2002 ), through a careful reading of the 19th-century economic nationalists, makes the sophisticated argument that economic nationalism has always been nationalist—that is, realist—first and economic second. In other words, he argues that countries choose economic policies for nationalist purposes. Sometimes these policies will be liberal, when it suits the country to deploy liberal policies; sometimes the policies will be protectionist, when protection is expected to lead to desired ends. In this analysis, liberal policies may be wholly consistent with theoretical explanations of economic nationalism. In a similar vein, Robert Gilpin clarifies the separation of analytical tools and preferred outcomes. He implicitly accepts the normative goals of liberalism while interpreting behavior in terms of “state centric realism,” a theoretical perspective closely connected to economic nationalism. He writes, “Although realists recognize the central role of the state, security, and power in international affairs, they do not necessarily approve of this situation. [. . .] It is possible to analyze international economic affairs from a realist perspective and at the same time to have normative commitment to certain ideals” (Gilpin, 2001 , pp. 15–16). Cohn ( 2016 ) elaborates these difficulties in the treatment of “neomercantilism.”

Economic Nationalism and Development

For many theorists, however, economic nationalism takes on a more positive hue when argued from the position of infant industries and developing country economies that need to develop internally before they can compete in global markets. Thus, tenets of economic nationalism have appealed to many writers in the Global South. Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, could be considered a (somewhat ironic) example. Nyerere’s ujamaa (“familyhood”) policies can be divided into two: a frankly socialist “villagization” policy in which people were moved onto collective farms and a mercantilist self-reliance policy in which Tanzania was supposed to detach itself from dependence on the industrialized world. Ultimately, his policy failed on both counts: the collective farms were unproductive, Tanzania became more dependent on aid from other countries, and the democratic ideals of the movement deteriorated (Prashad, 2008 , pp. 191–203). The idea of self-reliance, however, resonates closely with economic nationalist emphasis on the ability of states to produce for their own basic needs (Amin, 1990 ; Nyerere, 1967 ).

In general, theories advocating import substitution industrialization fall into this category of developing country economic nationalism. Economist Raúl Prebisch, working on behalf of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, formulated the theory of dependent development, which explained how industrialization in the developing world could continue to keep countries dependent on advanced economies in the “core.” These peripheral country economies were too closely tied to production for export. Instead, he argued that developing countries needed to implement import-substituting industrialization (ISI) policies. By delinking from the dependent economic relationships that they have with core countries, developing countries could build their own economies. He advocated the mechanization of agriculture, industrialization, and technological advance (Prebisch, 1986 ). In short, “the fundamental arguments of [Alexander] Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures have a striking similarity with those of Prebisch and his staff” (Grunwald, 1970 , p. 826). (Of course, the results of ISI policies have been highly uneven. See, for example, the analysis of Albert Hirschman, 1968 , and Vijay Prashad, 2014 , on the difficulties of ISI as a development strategy.)

From Classical Liberalism to Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neoclassical Liberalism

In contrast to the emphasis on state power and state interests that characterizes mercantilism and economic nationalism, liberalism emphasizes possessive individualism and the individual as the bearer of rights (Macpherson, 1973 ). The political economic theory that results from the emphasis on the individual is grounded in the idea that markets should be allowed to function as freely as possible and that the purpose of economic activity is not to benefit the government but rather to benefit individuals who, through their efforts, earn income, purchase goods, and constitute the basic unit of economic life.

Early Liberal Writers

Among the most important of these liberal rights from the perspective of political economy is that of property. For John Locke ( 1884 ), the right to property was natural; for David Hume ( 1992 ), the right to property was the result of interactions over time between people. (See also Sugden, 1989 , on Hume’s view of property.) Liberals reject the idea that the purpose of the state is to gather wealth. Instead, the state exists to provide security and to safeguard property.

In the liberal tradition, “political economy” came to be associated expansively with the relationship between governments, markets, welfare, and wealth. Discourse on Political Economy by Jean-Jacques Rousseau ( 1983 ), originally written for Diderot’s Encyclopédie , was an example of this. For Rousseau, political economy referred rather generally to those policies and laws that aim to protect and promote society being governed. What set Rousseau’s view apart from mercantilism was the liberal ethos that pervaded his writing: citizens were individuals who held rights; they had private wills; and collectively the community as a whole had a general will. States were bound by the rule of law and, in adhering to the general will, had the responsibility for protecting citizens’ rights, including property rights, but Rousseau was silent on what later writers would term “laissez-faire” policies, a free market vision of popular (as opposed to tyrannical) political economy. Instead, Rousseau seemed to have a very specific view of important government intervention in the economy: “One of the most important functions of the government” is to prevent extreme differences in wealth, since extremes of opulence and poverty erode the sense of “common cause” among citizens. To prevent such inequality and to provide the other functions of government, the state must tax, but, because the right to one’s own property was fundamental, taxation must be limited and levied fairly and progressively (those living at subsistence levels paying nothing, the rich paying relative to their wealth), in accordance with the general will. Rousseau’s popular political economy was thus liberal in protecting rights yet interventionist with respect to taxation and the uses of taxes.

The physiocrats introduced the idea of laissez-faire , laissez-passer (“let do and let pass,” in other words, the government should not interfere in the market) as a goal for states. They argued that the state should avoid intervention wherever possible, and especially avoid the taxation of agriculture. François Quesnay’s Economical Table presented a view of economics that placed a strong emphasis on the value of agriculture and the “sterility” of manufactures (Quesnay, 1968 ), in contrast to the mercantile emphasis on encouraging manufactures. The physiocrats favored agriculture because, in their calculation, the value of the output—crops—exceeded the value of the inputs used to produce the crops: land, labor, seeds, and the like. Artisans who manufactured things, the physiocrats maintained, only produced goods that equal the value of the inputs because competition would drive prices down to the level that only covered costs. Quesnay and the other physiocrats understood the limited supply of land and the ability of farmers to produce more than was needed for subsistence as evidence of the superior productivity of agriculture (Quesnay, 1968 ; also Bilginsoy, 1994 ). A major policy goal of the physiocrats was to “prevent deviations of the market price of industrial goods from their fundamental price, and to guarantee the maintenance of the proper price in the agricultural sector—the price high enough to cover the unit costs and rent” (Bilginsoy, 1994 , p. 531). The government, in their view, should limit taxes on agricultural products to ways that meet this goal. The French policies then in place of protecting manufacturers from foreign imports and of the government selling the right to tax farming to wealthy citizens thus had a particularly deleterious effect on the economy (Quesnay, n.d. ).

Adam Smith, whose Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations is often seen as the foundational work in the field of political economy, built on the work of the physiocrats, as well as that of Hume. Smith, who first referred to political economy in the eighth paragraph of the introduction to the book, understood the term as concerning causal theories about what governments believe they ought to do—which policies they think they should implement—to increase their wealth. The purpose of political economy, according to Smith ( 1904 ), was

first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign. (Book IV, Introduction)

The first purpose is achieved primarily through free markets, with Smith advocating for reliance upon “invisible hand.” The second is achieved through some government involvement in the economy, including the provision of funds for militias to defend against foreign invaders; setting up a system to pay for the administration of justice (with revenues for this purpose coming, perhaps, from court fees); providing public works such as roads, bridges, and postal services (which, with fees attached, may produce revenue for the government); and education (Viner, 1948 ).

For what later came to be known as international political economy, Adam Smith, like the physiocrats before him, made a major intellectual contribution with his rejection of the common mercantile practices of his age. In contrast to mercantilists like Colbert and Mun, Smith opposed the government’s intervention in markets to maintain a positive balance of trade. Smith ( 1904 ) wrote:

We trust, with perfect security, that the freedom of trade, without any attention of government, will always supply us with the wine which we have occasion for; and we may trust, with equal security, that it will always supply us with all the gold and silver which we can afford to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our commodities or in other uses. (IV.1.11)

Some IPE scholars, however, have highlighted Smith’s “agonism” in relation to the contradictions of the free market system, reading Smith not so much as an unequivocal supporter of the laissez-faire economics, as he is often assumed to be, but rather as a careful observer of the positive and negative aspects of the market economy (Arrighi, 2007 ; Blaney & Inayatullah, 2010 ; Shilliam, 2020 ). This reading both contributes to a reappraisal of the classical tradition and serves as a critique of its contemporary reception in neoclassical economic theory, suggesting a different path for economic studies at large.

Immanuel Kant, in his famous essay on perpetual peace, extended the liberal optimism about the beneficial effects of trade. An international federation of republics would naturally trade with each other, and the positive effects of commerce would stand as a bulwark against hostilities. “The spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later this spirit dominates every people. For among all those powers (or means) that belong to a nation, financial power may be the most reliable in forcing nations to pursue the noble cause of peace (though not from moral motives)” (Kant, 1983 , p. 125). Thus, as scholars such as Jahn ( 2013 ) and Ince ( 2018 ) have demonstrated, classical liberal thought has always contained an essentially international dimension, the study of which is instructive for understanding later forms of liberal IPE.

Comparative Advantage

An important question for international political economy is, Why engage in international trade? In On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation , Englishman David Ricardo ( 1821 ) built upon Smith’s support for international trade. In this work, Ricardo outlined the theory of comparative costs (comparative advantage), a cornerstone of trade theory to the present day. The common view had been that states trade with one another when one has an absolute advantage in the production of something and the trading partner has an absolute advantage in the production of something else. (If England produced cloth more cheaply than Portugal did, and Portugal produced wine more cheaply than England did, then both countries would profit from trade.) Ricardo’s insight was that even if a country produced both wine and cloth more cheaply than another, it still made sense for the countries to specialize in and export that good it had the greatest advantage in producing. This theory depended on another theoretical contribution from Ricardo, the labor theory of value: the value of a product can be represented in the amount of labor (person-hours) needed to produce it (a good summary of the theory can be found in Ruffin, 2002 ).

Comparative advantage continued to be a topic of discussion in international political economy. Swedish economists Eli Hecksher and Bertil Ohlin ( 1991 ) contributed a major extension of Ricardo’s theory by focusing on the role that factor endowments play in determining comparative advantage. Since land, labor, and capital move less easily than goods, a country should specialize in those products that are produced with the factors that are relatively abundant in the country. (Jacob Viner, 1937 , pp. 500–507, provided a summary and critical analysis of this theory, and Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson further developed the theory by examining what happens to prices when two countries move from not trading to trading. The consequence can be higher prices, which can affect income distribution, as discussed in Lindert and Kindleberger, 1982 , pp. 58–60.)

Some scholars have begun to note areas in which the traditional understanding of comparative advantage no longer fits the evidence. For example, Michael Storper ( 1992 ) finds that

the world of production has changed fundamentally since the time of Ricardo. We now live in a world where factors of production for technologically stable products are not endowed, but produced as intermediate inputs. Almost any developed country making the effort can become as efficient as the next country in a technologically stable manufacturing sector. (pp. 63–64)

Storper ( 1992 ) argues that products that depend on technological innovation are traded with respect to “technological advantage” rather than comparative advantage.

Another question about the validity of comparative advantage is raised by strategic trade theory. James Brander and Barbara Spencer ( 1985 , p. 83) showed how protection through subsidies would “change the initial conditions of the game that firms play” and make a firm more profitable. By calibrating the protection properly—not too much, not too little—states, according to strategic trade theory, can lead to an equilibrium that may be jointly suboptimal, but the protecting country still gains because its firm is able to earn more. Although strategic trade theory shares some elements with mercantile support for the protection of infant industry, those arguing for strategic trade theory place themselves within a liberal model and seek rational intervention at the best possible levels (i.e., levels that provide net benefits). Some scholars suggest that strategic trade theory is most useful when considering the challenges faced by industries when there are large economies of scale, high learning curves, and knowledge-intensive advanced manufacturing processes. Paul Krugman and others offer a cautionary note, however. The benefits of strategic trade theory fall mainly to the protected firm or industry, not to the domestic economy. Overall costs are likely to outweigh benefits, especially when protectionism leads to trade war (Krugman, 1994 ).

Two Strands of Liberalism: Keynesianism and Neoclassical Liberalism

As the questions raised by strategic trade theory suggest, liberals wrestle with the appropriate role of the state in the economy. Since the middle of the 20th century , liberalism has been bifurcated into two major strands: Keynesianism and neoclassical liberalism. Keynesian economics, named after John Maynard Keynes, sees direct government intervention in markets as a way to improve welfare and make the economy function better, especially given inescapable market failures and inefficiencies. Neoclassical economics, sometimes understood as libertarianism, draws on the writings of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and others who believed that governments had become too involved in the economy and that freedom suffered as a result. Keynesianism filtered into international political economy, with variants consistent with integration theory, neoliberal institutionalism, and regimes (which are a form of neoliberal institutionalism). Neoclassical liberalism can be seen in the “Washington Consensus,” which has led to deregulation of global and domestic economies, decreases in foreign aid, and further reliance on marketization.

Keynesianism and Neoliberal Institutionalism

John Maynard Keynes ( 1883–1946 ) served on the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 . He resigned from this position in opposition to the draconian terms of peace. The Allies, in ending the war “with France and Italy abusing their momentary victorious power to destroy Germany and Austria-Hungary now prostrate, they invite their own destruction also, being so deeply and inextricably intertwined with their victims by hidden psychic and economic bonds” (Keynes, 1920 , I.4). During World War II, he served on the British delegation in the Bretton Woods negotiations on the postwar monetary order. Central to Keynesian economics is the idea that free markets will not ( contra classical theory) always find an equilibrium at full employment. Instead, crises of underemployment call for public expenditures, for example, in public works (Keynes, 1936 , 1937 ; Galbraith, 1968 .)

Integration Theory

An important inference from Keynesianism is that institutions and governance can be used to create better political, social, and economic outcomes. In contrast to economic nationalism and to neoclassical economics, as James Caporaso ( 1998 , pp. 3–4) noted, integration theorists understood that institutions matter because institutions alter the conditions in which exchanges of various kinds take place by establishing rules. In addition, integration theorists explicitly tied a goal of peaceful relations among nations to integration: liberal markets, with well-functioning institutions, would lead to peaceful outcomes that would be conducive to commercial ties, which would once again feed back and encourage more cooperation. Drawing on both Keynesian liberalism and contributions from sociology to an understanding of cooperative action (Parsons, Shils, & Smelser, 2001 ), integration theory sought a formula for creating the institutions that would promote positive, peaceful outcomes.

Historically, integration theory emerged with discussion by David Mitrany ( 1948 ) of functionalism and world organization. With the cataclysmic effects of both world wars firmly in mind, Mitrany described a world in which functional integration—cooperation and institution building on specific functional tasks and in specific functional areas—would lead to a more peaceful outcome. He wrote:

If one were to visualize a map of the world showing economic and social activities, it would appear as an intricate web of interests and relations crossing and recrossing political divisions comes that would be conducive to commercial, but a map pulsating with the realities of everyday life. They are the natural basis for international organizations: and the task is to bring that map, which is a functioning reality, under joint international government, at least in its essential lines. The political lines will then in time be overlaid and blurred by this web of joint relations and administrations. (Mitrany, 1948 , pp. 358RERL)

Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas both furthered the study of how functional cooperation may lead to political cooperation. Deutsch found “economic ties,” communication across territorial borders and social strata, “mobility of persons,” and a wide range of different kinds of communication and transaction (among other factors) to be necessary conditions for amalgamation of separate states into a “security-community” (Deutsch, 1957 , p. 58). Haas ( 1964 ) further emphasized the connection between liberalism and functional integration theory. “Integration,” he wrote, “is conceptualized as resulting from an institutionalized pattern of interest politics, played out within existing international organizations. [. . .] There is no common good other than that perceived through the interest-tinted lenses worn by the international actors” (p. 35). Having functional interests in common, states would be able to cooperate, especially when international organizations create the conditions that would facilitate cooperation. Unfortunately, this theory failed in that the hopeful expectations about how international organizations would foster integration and peaceful cooperation did not come to fruition (at least not in the near term, after the publication of these works). Philippe Schmitter offered a revision of the theory that was at once more modest in its predictions and less precise in its specifications of complex expected interactions. Schmitter ( 1970 ) thus presents a less deterministic version: under some conditions, integration may result from the complex functional interactions of states.

Interdependence, Regimes, and Neoliberal Institutionalism

Although it soon became apparent that the hopeful expectation about how international organizations would foster integration and peaceful cooperation would not come to fruition, the main liberal tenets of integration theory continued to play a role in IPE theory. Neoliberal institutionalism soon superseded integration theory as the major approach to IPE among those who followed this Keynesian side of liberalism. The “institutionalism” in neoliberal institutionalism may have been drawn from the economics literature, in which institutionalism referred to “an approach which stresses the interactions between social institutions and economic relationships and aspects of behavior, aims to present an orderly arrangement of economic phenomena in which institutions are elevated from the status of the exception and the footnote, and integrated with the main body of economics” (Eveline Burns, in Homan et al., 1931 , p. 135). Both sociology (Parsons, 1935 ) and political science (Apter, 1957 ) adopted the term, to refer to approaches that explore how organized groups are and what they do in society.

Early links between institutionalism and political economy can be found in an International Studies Association conference panel on “Patterns of International Institutionalism” (Rohn, 1968 ). James March and Johan Olsen ( 1984 ) reviewed the revival of institutionalist thought in political science in the 1970s and 1980s and suggested that the new institutionalism is “simply an argument that the organization of political life makes a difference.” From this parsimonious insight, however, institutionalists opened the examination of how cooperative interactions could regularly, even ubiquitously, comprise IPE. These investigations resulted in the development of both interdependence theory and the concept of international regimes.

“Interdependence,” encapsulating various kinds of interactions and mutual dependencies that promoted peaceful interactions, did not rise to the level of significant scholarly appreciation until the 1970s. The idea had been around for a while. In 1958 , John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State of the United States, referred specifically to interdependence when he asserted that providing development aid and encouraging trade would combine with military security cooperation to prevent developing countries from falling into the Soviet orbit. A few years later, Vincent Rock ( 1964 ) suggested, perhaps in a fairly unrealistic vein, that interdependence in scientific, trade, and other kinds of interactions would lead to peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. Edward L. Morse refined the concept of interdependence to argue that the “low policies” that involved economic transactions and welfare interests were becoming more important for international relations than the “high policies” of military strategic concerns. Consequently, “the classical goals of power and security have been expanded to, or superseded by, goals of wealth and welfare. [. . .] [T]he old identification of power and security with territory and population has been changed to an identification of welfare with economic growth” (Morse, 1970 , pp. 379–380). Richard Cooper ( 1972 , p. 159) further developed the idea “to refer to the sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations.” Cooper, however, saw interdependence as a policy conundrum for states, rather than as a means to more peaceful outcomes in international relations. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein ( 1973 , p. 22) emphasized the unpredictability of the situation in the 1970s: “Whether interdependence will emerge as positive or negative will depend largely on old-fashioned cooperation among governments.”

In a 1974 publication, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., focused on interdependence between the United States and Canada. Drawing on Oran Young’s definition of interdependence (Young, 1968 ), Keohane and Nye ( 1974 , p. 606) studied “patterns of interdependence, particularly with regard to symmetry” on policy issues and how patterns of interdependence were “used as sources of bargaining power.” Keohane and Nye ( 1977 ) further developed this concept into “complex interdependence,” in which actors would have varying levels of sensitivity or vulnerability to each other across “multiple channels” (i.e., across different issue areas) in which military issues would not be more important but rather there would be no clear hierarchy among the issues; and in which these ties across these issues would preclude the use of military force.

Attention to interdependence and international institutions highlighted how states and other actors were sensitive and vulnerable to each other. Scholars also questioned whether the interdependence would lead to coordinated action to solve collective international public goods problems. Even if integration, in the functional sense, was not happening completely and directly, could some sort of coordination short of full-fledged integration be going on? International “regimes,” a term borrowed from the legal scholarship by Ernst B. Haas, provided a tentative affirmative answer to this question. In Haas’s description, international regimes were “collective arrangements among nations designed to create or more effectively use scientific and technological capabilities” and that would “minimize the undesired consequences associated with the creation and exploitation of such capabilities” (Haas, 1975b , p. 147; see also Haas, 1975a ). Later debates over the definition of the term included Haas’s restatement: “ Regimes are norms, rules, and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area ” (Haas, 1980 , p. 358 (emphasis in the original); see also Young, 1980 ). Keohane and Nye ( 1977 , p. 19), in their book on interdependence, took up the issue of regimes as well, referring to them as “the sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence.”

The concept of regimes became more formalized in 1982 with the publication of a special issue of the journal International Organization edited by Stephen D. Krasner ( 1982a ), which was republished as an edited book (Krasner, 1983 ). The group of influential scholars writing for this publication agreed upon a uniform definition:

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors that affect relationships of interdependencees” (Haasterdependence would lead to coordinated action to solve collective inte. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. (Krasner, 1982b , p. 186)

Under this umbrella definition, the authors divided themselves into three separate groups: those who understood regimes to be ubiquitous, “Grotians,” since their views were consistent with that of the 17th-century scholar of international law, Hugo Grotius (Young, 1980 ; e.g., Puchala & Hopkins, 1982 ); those who saw in regimes a possibility for states to escape—sometimes—the pessimistic outcomes of a realist world by creating opportunities for rational actors to cooperate (the “modified structuralists,” like Stein, 1982 ); and those, represented in the volume by Susan Strange ( 1982 ), who thought that regimes obscured, rather than elucidated, what was really going on in the world. (None of these authors questioned who “gave” the issue area, or how it was given, a question that was later raised by constructivists such as Onuf, 1989 , and Marlin-Bennett, 1993 .)

Notwithstanding criticisms, the usefulness of the analytical construct of regimes was that it shifted attention to issues, those questions of international political economy around which negotiations were held, agreements struck, deals kept or not kept. The regimes literature spawned a host of studies of different kinds of issues. By looking at the institutions and the normative structures that made cooperation possible, regimes theorists and empirical researchers opened up the opportunity to see how the vast majority of interactions in the world—those that do not involve military hostilities—actually occur and are ordered. Among the many such works are Rittberger ( 1993 ), Martin and Simmons ( 1998 ), Nadelmann ( 1990 ), Nye ( 1987 ), Peterson ( 2005a ), and Cogburn ( 2017 )

The attention to institutions and the role they play under conditions of a relatively liberal international political economy led scholars to start referring to all these approaches to integration and regimes in a globalizing world as “neoliberal institutionalism” (Keohane, 1984 ). Often contrasted with structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism assumes that rational actors can cooperate under conditions of anarchy because institutions provide rules that the actors are willing to accept and because actors are happy with absolute gains, rather than struggling for relative gains (as a state-centric realist or economic nationalist would assume), from any set of proposed arrangements. Many, however, see flaws in the theoretical edifice of neoliberal institutionalism. Robert Powell ( 1991 ), for example, suggests that both structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism are special cases of a single model of states attempting to pursue their interests under conditions of anarchy and constraints imposed by different capabilities among the actors in the system. Others contest neoliberal institutionalism’s empirical validity (Drezner, 2001 , among others) and its conceptualization of anarchy (Grieco, 1988 ). Yet others disagree with the implicit assumption that neoliberal institutionalist cooperation is good , that cooperation necessarily leads to more peaceful, more materially comfortable, and more emancipatory outcomes (Keeley, 1990 ; Kokaz, 2005 ; Marchand, 1994 ). The intellectual history by Cohen ( 2008 ) provides an overview and assessment of the development of regimes theory.

Neoclassical Liberalism

The other major stream of liberalism diverges from the neoliberal institutionalism and the Keynesian emphasis on coordination through regulation of (global) economic interactions. The neoclassical liberals, including economists of the Austrian School and leading U.S. economists such as Milton Friedman, understood government intervention as damaging to markets and consequently to the economic freedoms of society. Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. von Hayek, two leaders of the Austrian School, advocated antisocialist, antigovernment intervention policies (Hayek, 1994 ; von Mises, 1998 ).

Milton Friedman similarly argued in favor of letting markets operate without government intervention. Government policies that seek to manipulate markets for political outcomes are unavoidable errors, in his view. In an article coauthored with Anna J. Schwartz, the economists conclude that

leaving monetary and banking arrangements to the market would have produced a more satisfactory outcome than was actually achieved through governmental involvement. Nevertheless, we also believe that the same [political] forces that prevented that outcome in the past will continue to prevent it in the future. (Friedman & Schwartz, 1986 , p. 311)

For Friedman, the role of government is important but limited. With Rose Friedman, he wrote:

“Government is essential both as a forum for determining the ‘rules of the game’ and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on.” Markets, on the other hand, “reduce greatly the range of issues that must be decided through political means, and thereby [. . .] minimize the extent to which government need participate directly in the game.” (Friedman & Friedman, 1982 , p. 15)

The ascendancy of laissez-faire economics resulted in the dominance of the “Washington Consensus,” which changed the way the international financial institutions (especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and governments made policies on foreign aid from the 1980s through the 1990s. Proponents of the Washington Consensus placed efficiency of the economy as their highest objective. Further, they did so under the assumptions that efficiency was good and that they understood mechanisms of economics sufficiently to identify good, efficient policies (Williamson, 1993 , p. 1330). Though pursuing equity or more fair distribution of resources had often been considered a goal of policy, supporters of the Washington Consensus were not concerned with equity; at best, they saw the possibility that some improvements in equity could come about “as a byproduct of seeking efficiency objectives” (Williamson, 1993 , p. 1329). As Dani Rodrik ( 2006 ) sardonically recounted:

Any well-trained and well-intentioned economist could feel justified in uttering the obvious truths of the profession: get your macro balances in order, take the state out of business, give markets free rein. “Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize” became the mantra of a generation of technocrats who cut their teeth in the developing world and of the political leaders they counseled. (p. 973)

Ultimately, the popularity of the Washington Consensus waned as it failed to produce positive economic growth in developing countries. By 2005 , the World Bank issued a careful analysis of the failures of its own policies that implemented the neoclassical economics of the Washington Consensus (Zagha & Nankani, 2005 ). The failure of the Washington Consensus cast attention back onto other liberal, but not neoclassical, political economy theories, specifically those dealing with how institutions can resolve externalities and other forms of market failure in an otherwise liberal global political economy.

In the wake of the decline of the Washington Consensus and the financial crisis beginning in 2008 , special mention of the scholarship of Susan Strange must be made. Strange, who could be classified, broadly, as a liberal in her understanding of markets and efficiency, strongly criticized the neoclassical position. She understood that markets did not function in the absence of good governance. Indeed, in 1986 and again in 1998 she analyzed a global political economy in which states had ceded control to markets, with the expectation of disastrous results for volatility and the health of the global economy (Strange, 1986 , 1998 ). She saw clearly the danger of fast-moving financial flows in a global political economy in which no government provided the appropriate regulation to ensure fair dealing and protect against the negative externalities that result when rational self-interested agents pursue their self-interest in the absence of such regulation. No one has been overseeing the global financial system, and the result has been, as Strange ( 1986 ) predicted, serious harm.

Strange’s contributions have only been confirmed in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008 , in response to which liberal theorists have been challenged to critically reformulate the ideal and real relations between market forces and state planning. Landmark works in the empirical study of financial crisis and contemporary inequality such as Picketty ( 2014 ) and Tooze ( 2018 ) are essential contributions to the study of the contemporary salience of finance and financial crisis in contemporary global capitalism. Indeed, as John Ikenberry ( 2018 ) observes, the liberal international order faces grave challenges from resurgent economic nationalisms and social conservatisms. In addition to this 21st-century political challenge, the liberal tradition has historically been most broadly and deeply challenged by Marxian theories of global political economy.

Marxian Global Political Economy

The third major school of thought in international political economy has been Marxism, along with several “neo”-variants. Karl Marx, along with Friedrich Engels and (later) Vladimir Lenin, is considered the progenitor of a political economy that emphasizes the role class plays in society. Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the systemic changes within the People’s Republic of China have demonstrated the failures of Marxian-influenced policies, Marxian thought offers a useful critique of the structure of the global political economy by shedding light on capitalism and the production of inequities.

Marx, writing in the mid- 19th century , combined philosophical investigation of political economy with activism. He witnessed a world that was being changed by industrial development, in which the workers were increasingly subject not just to the authority of the state but also to the control of the capitalist. Marx adapted Hegel’s dialectic to the material world, seeing the contradictions within capitalism driving change, which he expected to lead to revolutionary transformation of society. This notion of the dialectic and the teleological view of history—that these contradictions would inexorably lead to a communist society as the predictable end state and (ironically, somewhat self-contradictorily) that this unavoidable revolutionary change should be fomented—has not been borne out and, arguably, has been contradicted. The Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels, 1983 ) remains, though, the clearest explication of Marx’s view.

In terms of the development of political economy, Marx broke with the liberals in his identification of the sphere of production, as opposed to the sphere of exchange, as the focal point of sociopolitical and economic dynamics. Market mechanisms were relatively fixed, but the politics of production—whether it is on land used to grow food or on the shop floor—determined the nature and dynamics of the social order. Though there are several “Marxian” variations of the broad sweep of history, we basically find a succession of stages that are differentiated by the nature of the ownership of the means of production. Early history is characterized as an era of “primitive capitalism” without specialization where all members of the human community were essentially equal in the tasks they pursued and the status they held. A long period characterized by slavery followed, where some people subjugated others to the status of chattel and appropriated their labor power directly. This system is inefficient and comes to be plagued with high costs involved in maintaining order and overseeing production. In Europe, the period of slavery is followed by feudalism, where direct ownership of individuals ends, but peasants are nonetheless tied to the land, which itself can be owned. The peasant thus owes the owner of the land a level of labor dues. The transition to capitalism emerges when the social relations of production (the social overlay of the feudal system in this latest stage) become impediments to further development. Feudalism’s limits lead to changes that find landowners failing to control their charges, and peasants taking up a new position in the economy. They are stripped of their land and put in a position where they must sell their labor power in the market for a wage.

Marx extended this concept of alienated labor in two ways that are important for the study of global political economy. First, he emphasized the alienation of labor as the definitive element in the capitalist system. The division of labor in an industrializing society meant that workers would have no choice but to sell their labor power as a commodity to survive. In doing so, the worker sells his power of production to the capitalist. The alienation of the worker from his own labor gives a special viciousness to the class relations that characterize the capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1983a ). Second, Marx examined how the alienation of labor led to the accumulation of “surplus value,” the profit that accrued to the capitalist when the price of a good exceeded the wages the capitalist paid the laborer for its production. The wage laborer would only earn enough for their subsistence, but the capitalist would be able to take in the surplus, which would be much greater than that needed for the capitalist’s subsistence (Marx, 1983b ).

Vladimir Lenin’s tract, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism—A Popular Outline , brought Marxian thought into the global political economy. Lenin extended Marx’s predictions, showing how capitalism would spread around the world, leading to an ultimate contradiction of inter-imperialist conflict. As capitalism became more advanced, the accumulation of surplus value led to the concentration of ownership through the rise of monopolies. Bank ownership became concentrated and closely interconnected with the interests of monopoly capital. According to Lenin, the results were monopolistic “finance capital.” Further, the connections between capital and banks were “completed” by tight connections between each of these and the state. The consequence, Lenin wrote, was a shift in capitalism. “Under old capitalism, when free competition prevailed, the export of goods was the most typical feature. Under modern capitalism, when monopolies prevail, the export of capital has become the typical feature” (Lenin, 1982 , p. 62). He argued that the “superabundance of capital” in the advanced capitalist countries drove exports, and capitalism spread throughout the world. Furthermore, imperialism was the natural result, as finance capital moved to expropriate the raw materials of the colonies. The result was the immiseration of the masses, both within the advanced capitalist countries and abroad, “for uneven development and wretched conditions of the masses are fundamental and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production” (Lenin, 1982 , pp. 62–63 [emphasis in the original]). The ultimate contradiction between capitalism and monopoly and the push for domination eventually must lead, Lenin stated, to inter-imperialist rivalry and, finally, the decay of monopoly capitalism.

Where Marx saw the spread of the capitalist mode of production to all societies as inevitable, other critical scholars were concerned that capitalism was creating not models of itself but of a new kind of social order. Dependency scholars argued that instead of facilitating the growth of capitalism in the third world, capitalist and imperialist actions were leading to a system where real capitalism could not possibly develop. What we were witnessing, they argued, was “the development of underdevelopment” (Gunder Frank, 1969 ). Dependency scholars argued that capitalist interests often strengthened precapitalist forms of exploitation. Hence, large landowners would solidify their position in a society by reaping the benefits of a captive population of laborers in a system more akin to feudalism than capitalism, but without the internal contradictions that would lead to its transformation. The ability of one society to warp the subsequent developmental path of another, given the incentives that trade relations with capitalists offered, was described by Sweezy ( 1942 ), Baran ( 1957 ; Baran & Sweezy, 1969 ), Gunder Frank ( 1969 ), Cardoso and Faletto ( 1979 ), dos Santos ( 1970 ), and Amin ( 1976 ). Amin, for example, examined how accumulation differs in the core of developed countries and the periphery of developing countries. In the wealthier core, the masses are essentially co-opted through the production and availability of the consumer goods needed to satisfy them. In the periphery, production is focused on luxury goods and exports, thereby further enriching the dominant classes and leaving the needs of the masses unfulfilled and the people marginalized.

Marxist scholars considered this analysis to be flawed by its concern for actions taking place in the sphere of exchange (trade between core and periphery) and not the sphere of production (more class-based analysis). Supporters of the original Marxian formulation like Laclau ( 1971 ) and Warren ( 1973 ) produced critical analyses of dependency arguments. Brenner ( 1977 ) labels dependency and related schools of thought “neo-Smithian” in orientation and therefore fundamentally un-Marxian.

Dependency scholarship was quite popular given its ability to explain both underdevelopment and the failure of class politics to grow along traditionally identified Marxist paths. In the 1970s, Immanuel Wallerstein brought dependency and a desire to reconceptualize the developmental paths of the advanced industrial states in the long-term approach of Fernand Braudel ( 1982–1984 ) together to form world-systems analysis. Wallerstein ( 1974 ) dated the origins of the development of the “capitalist world-economy” to the long 16th century . He was able to add political and cultural conditions to the essentially materialist analyses of longer-term critical history. Wallerstein ( 2004 ) understands a world-economy as

A large geographic zone within which there is a division of labor and hence significant internal exchange of basic or essential goods as well as flows of capital and labor. A defining feature of a world-economy is that it is not bounded by a unitary political structure. Rather, there are many political units inside the world-economy, loosely tied together in our modern world system in an interstate system. And a world-economy contains many cultures and groups—practicing many religions, speaking many languages, differing in their everyday patterns. This does not mean that they do not evolve some cultural patterns, what we shall be calling a geoculture. It does mean that neither political nor cultural homogeneity is to be expected or found in a world-economy. What unified the structure most is the division of labor which is constituted within it. (p. 23)

Wallerstein also came under critical scrutiny for keeping “capitalism” at the core of his analysis. Scholars like Chase-Dunn and Hall ( 1991 , 1997 ) sought to push the elements of world-system analysis to earlier eras in explicitly comparative work. Others, like Gunder Frank and Gills, argued for the abandonment of “capitalism” as the core of global developmental concerns, and argued for the development of a world system history that would cover the last 5,000 years of human history (Gunder Frank, 1998 ; Gunder Frank & Gills, 1993 ). All these works are essentially emancipatory in their intent. They share the view that poverty is a central problem, that global inequalities should be addressed, and that remedies must be adopted.

Italian communist Antonio Gramsci continues to have a major influence on the field of international political economy. Gramsci, who was influenced by Marx, Lenin, and other socialist and communist thinkers, contributed the concept of Gramscian hegemony to the study of IPE. While in liberal and realist IPE, hegemony simply refers to a single state having a preponderance of power, Gramsci looked at the complex interconnection between the material and productive base of the social order (the structure) and philosophy, ideas, culture, and relationships (the superstructure). Hegemony is in place “in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge” (Gramsci, 1988 , p. 292). For Gramsci, a class is hegemonic when it is able to lead through the consent of those it controls, because of this complex set of dominant “ethico-political” ideas, and through force, in terms of ownership and organization of economic activity. Giovanni Arrighi ( 1994 ) summarizes Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as

the capability of a state to lead the system of states itself in a desired direction—that is, to set the rules for the system in ways that buttress rather than undermine the world power of the hegemon. [. . .] (p. 365)

Here we should remember Gramsci’s point that intellectual and moral leadership (Machiavelli’s consent) is as critical to the effective exercise of hegemony internationally as coercion pure and simple is at the national level. Henk Overbeek ( 1994 ), however, emphasizes that hegemony in the global political economy has to do more with dominance of a class—specifically of the capitalist class.

Another important Gramscian term is “historical bloc,” which refers to the dynamic dialectical relationship between the material and productive base and the superstructure of ideas. As Robert W. Cox ( 1999 , p. 5) explains, “Gramsci was less concerned with the historic bloc as a stable entity than he was with historical mutations and transformations, and with the emancipatory potential for human agency in history.” In short, the relationship between civil society and the state within any historical bloc will embody both the existing hegemony and the seeds of counterhegemonies. “Civil society was the ground that sustained the hegemony of the bourgeoisie but also that on which an emancipatory counterhegemony could be constructed” (Cox, 1999 , p. 3).

Like Gramsci, Karl Polanyi ( 2001 ) saw society resisting the negative consequences of capitalist markets. In The Great Transformation , he argued that a “double-movement” resulted from social forces pushing back against the aspects of a market-driven society. Polanyi also saw the relationship between society, markets, and the state as historically situated, with technological and policy innovations leading to changes in society. Polanyi traced the creation of the self-regulating market economy through the commodification of land, labor, and specie, social changes that made the industrial revolution and the rise of “haute finance” possible.

Both Gramsci and Polanyi have influenced a cohort of critical IPE scholars, including Robert Cox ( 1996 ), Stephen Gill ( 2003 ; see also Gill & Mittelman, 1997 ), Craig Murphy ( 2005 ), James Mittelman ( 2004 ), and Mark Rupert ( 2000 ). Gramscian global political economy has been particularly relevant to the study of globalization and the spread of liberal markets around the world. These approaches to global political economy suggest that the existing tension in the world between the antiglobalizers and the proglobalizers has at root a dialectical contestation between hegemonic and counterhegemonic groups. These authors focus on the importance of groups and other nonstate actors, as well as states, since civil society within the global political economy includes a variety of types of actors.

The global financial crisis of 2008 provided the impetus for Marxian-influenced scholarship focusing on globalization. Marxian analyses of global financial crises differ from their liberal counterparts in emphasizing the structural nature of these periodic crises. That is, Marxian theorists tend to locate the tendency for economic crisis in the very nature of the system, as a necessary and (relatively) predictable feature, impossible to explain by reference to the individual decision-making of leaders and firms alone (Harvey, 2010 ; Krippner, 2011 ).The tensions between a liberal and a Marxian analysis of capitalism’s crisis tendencies are displayed in the substantive critique of the liberal approach in Crashed by Adam Tooze ( 2018 ; see Anderson, 2019 ). Some of this research, as discussed in the section “ Postcolonial Approaches ,” emphasizes the consequences of capitalist crises in postcolonial societies (e.g., Krishna, 2009 ).

Feminist Global Political Economy

Despite the differences among them, the three most common approaches to global political economy (liberal/neoliberal, mercantile/economic nationalist, and Marxian) tend to assume that the buying, selling, and production of goods and services are what matter. Important actors in the analysis, be they firms and consumers, states, or classes, are all engaged in buying and selling, producing goods and services for sale, and seeking wealth (Tickner, 1992 ). Feminist approaches to global political economy highlight two important points that are usually overlooked. First, people are gendered, and gender is generally understood hierarchically, with men and activities that are understood as masculine (competing, making money) being valued more highly than women and women’s activities. Second, productive (i.e., market-based) activities are not the only things that happen in society; rather, society needs, but, again, does not value as highly, the activities of the reproductive economy—the unpaid work necessary to create a home life, provide leisure activities, and care for family members. These reproductive activities are almost universally associated with feminine characteristics and are not considered by mainstream global political economy analyses. As V. Peterson ( 2005b ) argues, however, understanding the analytical implications of gendered hierarchies provides a more complete understanding of processes of the global political economy (see also Griffin, 2007 ). The approach by J. K. Gibson-Graham ( 2006 ) to decentering and reconceptualizing the capital-labor relation opens an analytical space for feminist theorizations of GPE along these lines.

The marketization of the global political economy, including the integration of emerging market economies, also has important gender implications. As some scholars note, these changes are not necessarily simply good or bad. On the negative side, the informalization of labor—the changing nature of available jobs from regular, full-time employment to part-time, temporary, or independent contracting arrangements—adds significant uncertainty to households’ economic stability. The effect is more pronounced on women’s work and on the feminized jobs held by men. On the positive side, globalization has also brought increasing equity in educational opportunities and increased access to some jobs (Benería, Floro, Grown, & MacDonald, 2000 ; Peterson, 2005b ). Similarly, Jacqui True, in a case study of the Czech Republic, finds that “the commodification of gender is facilitating the extension of markets,” with the dual effect of “empower[ing] women as much as it subjects them to new forms of discipline and market civilization” (True, 1999 , p. 363).

Consequently, a further contribution of feminist GPE has been to challenge the pervasive association of the study of the global or the totality with a masculine drive to dominance. Instead of combatting the impulse to study the global by turning to a study of microrelations, feminist GPE has developed theories and methods for understanding gender as a mechanism of producing and rationalizing the inequalities within global capitalism (Bhattacharya, 2017 ; Fraser, 2013 ; Tepe-Belfrage, 2016 ). Hozic and True ( 2016 ) bring together a variety of feminist and queer perspectives on global financial crisis, highlighting how these concerns cannot be consigned to the margins of the study of global economic processes.

Postcolonial Approaches

A burgeoning literature in postcolonial political economy has emerged through critical conversation with traditional IPE. This literature mobilizes a critique of Eurocentrism in political economy and foregrounds the structural impact that colonial histories continue to exert on global economic life (Dirlik, 1994 ; Grovogui, 2011 ; Lowe, 2015 ; Shilliam, 2018 ). Another key contribution of postcolonial theory to political economy has been its critique of Eurocentric epistemologies and its attention to the knowledge traditions and economic formations of the non-West (Agathangelou & Ling, 2003 ; Blaney & Inayatullah, 2010 ; Ling, 2000 ; Shilliam, 2012a , 2020 ). Robbie Shilliam ( 2009 , 2012b ), for example, theorizes about Atlantic slavery and its consequences for our understanding of liberal and Marxian IPE.

Debates continue over whether Marxian theory is essential to a postcolonial project of emancipation and self-determination (Rao, 2017 ). On the one hand, the reading of Marx by Dipesh Chakrabarty ( 2008 ) has inspired new possibilities for the critique of the coloniality and the racism of capitalism’s history and present (e.g., Persaud & Sajed, 2018 ; Tilley & Shilliam, 2018 ). On the other hand, Hobson ( 2012 , 2013a , 2013b ) argues that Marx and Lenin’s theoretical edifice is too indebted to a colonial worldview in which the West represents the model of future progress and social development. An influential Marxian critique of postcolonial studies can be found in Chibber ( 2013 ). Notwithstanding these tensions, scholars continue to draw inspiration from both postcolonial theory and Marxian theory to construct critiques of contemporary global capitalism. For example, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu ( 2015 ) have brought the sensibilities of the Marxian tradition together with postcolonial theory to highlight the irreducibly global or intersocietal history of capitalism, and Khalili ( 2020 ) takes stock of the colonial echoes that resonate within global trade flows from the standpoint of the Arabian Peninsula.

Upon entering the third decade of the 21st century , three rapidly evolving areas of scholarship, discussed briefly in this section, are likely to continue to be of interest and grow in importance: China and the transition of the neoliberal world order, queer global political economy, and “precarity” of the global workforce.

Prior to the 1990s, research on China generally focused on processes of development and modernization of a peripheral country. As China made initial changes to its economy and began to participate more in global trade, new questions emerged. Jacobson and Okensenberg ( 1990 ), for example, examined the impact of the participation of China, a developing country with a command economy, in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (it had been a member since 1980 ) and the likely consequences for the global economic order of its signing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. At the end of the 20th century , China’s economy underwent a major transformation, including the growth of its private sector, reliance on exports, and full engagement with international trade and finance. These changes spurred assessment of the IPE implications of China as a rising power. This research is consistent with mainstream IPE schools of thought, framing China’s opening and market reforms in terms of realist/economic nationalist expectations of conflict between China and the liberal capitalist countries (Layne, 2018 ) or liberal expectations that China will end up conforming to Western liberal capitalist norms (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2018 ; Ikenberry, 2009 ).

The new trend in the research moves away from this “binary orthodoxy” (De Graaff, ten Brink, & Parmar, 2020 ). Instead, this trend provides empirical and theoretical analysis of how China reshapes but does not necessarily remake global capitalism—not overturning global capitalism and the neoliberal order but rather exerting influence on and shaping its contours (Hung, 2009 , 2015 ). This stream of research avoids theorizing China as a unitary actor and instead looks closely at the global consequences of how the Chinese economy is organized domestically and in the global context. Hung ( 2008 ) assesses the overaccumulation of capital in China resulting from the state’s decentralization of regulatory authority, local actors’ overinvestment in productive capacity, and widespread underconsumption. China has been able to maintain strong growth and an export-driven trade policy in this unstable circumstance only because of overconsumption and debt in the United States. Other scholars have explored how China’s trade policy is both influenced by and promoted by transnational networks that Chinese elites have entered (de Graaff, 2020 ; Huo & Parmar, 2020 ). Disruption of neoliberal globalization is another important theme. For example, Hopewell ( 2016 ) argues that Chinese inconsistency—sometimes supporting and sometimes contesting neoliberal rules—is the root of its disruptiveness. Ironically, by supporting liberal rules, China shines a light on the “hypocrisy” of illiberal trade policies of the United States and other Western countries. Weinhardt and ten Brink ( 2020 ) suggest that explanation for this inconsistency can be found in domestic differences in the structure and degree of government intervention in sectors. McNally ( 2020 ) identifies the source of instability in the contradictions of Sino-capitalism, described as both neoliberal and neostatist and as organized top-down by the state and bottom-up through networks of entrepreneurs.

The second trend, queer global political economy, can be seen within the broader category of queer international relations (IR) theory (Weber, 2015 ), while overlapping substantially with feminist and other critical approaches. Queer IR theory uncovers and problematizes the political consequences of assumptions, grounded in naturalized cultural practices, of binary constructions of identity—of assuming the world is divided into male and female or similarly into normal and abnormal, heterosexual and homosexual, or other taken-for-granted dichotomies. Applied to the substantive domain of global political economy, this approach focuses attention on “heteromasculine and cissexist assumptions and biases” and “the differential—and productive—impact of processes and policies associated with neoliberal globalization sexualized and gendered subjects, practices, and kinship relations” (see article “Queer International Relations”). Peterson ( 2014 ), for example, explores “global householding,” a term that encompasses the many transborder processes of social reproduction necessary to sustain families and the wider society, especially in the Global North. These processes include “marriage/partnership, earning income, managing daily life, securing childcare, eldercare, healthcare, and education, acquiring domestic ‘help,’ relocating for retirement” (p. 606). Smith ( 2016 ) investigates how neoliberal policy responses to global financial crises disadvantage those whose lives differ from that of the presumed “normal” family, a husband and a wife and their children. “Imaginaries” of the family, she argues, reproduce the neoliberal economic order.

The growing “precarity” of the global workforce, the subject of the third new direction of research discussed here, has emerged as a grave side effect of the processes of globalization, a reality acknowledged by all the different schools of IPE. Guy Standing ( 2016 ) has introduced and popularized the concept of the “precariat,” which he regards as a new stratum of the working class marked by an extreme lack of job security and basic benefits like healthcare and paid time off. This class, according to Standing, represents a growing contingent of the global workforce, a verdict corroborated by many empirical studies, especially from a comparative political economy perspective (Agarwala, 2013 ; Kalleburg, 2018 ; Mosoetsa, Stillerman, & Till, 2016 ). This framing of the issue of precarious labor, however, is not without its critics. With a properly global analytic lens, some argue, precarity does not appear to be a new phenomenon at all but a condition that has characterized the Global South since its inception and which now threatens the North as well (Scully, 2016 ). Moreover, as Ritu Vij ( 2019 , p. 504) has argued, the idea of precarity as it is popularly conceived rests on “the pathologization of vulnerability,” an ideological process which normalizes a liberal individualist political economy and understands nonliberal forms of life as “abject.”

It is also worth mentioning a trend that seems to have petered out. At the time the original 2010 version of this article was drafted, communitarianism seemed to be a promising, emerging stream of normative research that would address problems of global capitalism. Largely associated with the work of Amitai Etzioni ( 1991 , 2004 ), communitarianism can be seen as a countertheory to the idea that liberal markets are natural and that men and women are naturally economically rational, self-interested agents. Etzioni’s communitarianism does not eschew liberal economics wholly, nor does he advocate a loss of individual freedoms; instead, he looks for a via media in which the interests of individuals are balanced by the interest of the communities of which they are a part. The local, national, and global political economies are in essence communities. The connection to community seems to draw on the feminist idea of an ethic of care (Tronto, 1987 ). William Galston ( 2002 ), in a similar vein, argues for a rejection of both socialist and laissez-faire economics in favor of an approach that he calls “mutualism”; the policy implementation would be a “progressive market strategy,” in which policies would promote “moderate self-interest, regard for others, and internalized norms” of responsibility. Communitarian global political economy, however, failed to gain traction, perhaps because other, more normatively progressive critical approaches came to the fore.

GPE Research Relevant to COVID-19

As this article was being prepared for publication ( May 2020 ), it became difficult to ignore the severe implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the global political economy. The robust literature dealing with the global history of pandemics and the dangers that a new pandemic would pose in a world marked by increasingly intensifying processes of economic globalization are highlighted here.

A review of GPE’s engagements with the history of global pandemics reveals a wide variety of analytical lenses, including descriptive accounts of the impact of environment on society and more politically focused accounts of the differential impacts suffered by different peoples. The account by McNeil ( 1998 ) of the history of plagues is notable for its emphasis on intersocietal transmission, highlighting how the world’s peoples have been interconnected long before the emergence of 20th-century globalization. The work of Pirages ( 1995 , 1997 , 2007 ) deserves special mention for its wide historical and geographical scope and its sensitivity to the intersections between international politics, infectious disease transmission, and the coordinated social responses (or lack thereof) that have been implemented historically to combat the worst consequences of infectious disease. Work by Paul Farmer ( 2004 ) seeks to highlight how the social toll of pandemics largely depends on preexisting power relations and inequalities in society, which he theorizes in terms of “structural violence.” Another key scholar of pandemics is Mike Davis ( 2005 ), whose study on the Avian Flu offered a prescient warning of the political–economic threat of a new global pandemic. Davis ( 2020 ) has published an analysis of COVID-19 in a periodical issue focused on the pandemic (NLR Editors, 2020 ).

A special issue of Review of International Political Economy on Political Economies of Global Health, edited by Susan K. Sell and Owain D. Williams ( 2020b ), appeared online just a few months before the first reported cases of COVID-19. The issue focuses on global capitalism’s effects on the health of the world’s people across multiple scales and through multiple processes. Neoliberalism and policies insisting on free markets, Sell and Williams ( 2020a ) argue, have negative effects on global health through “regimes and institutions in areas such as trade and investment policy, austerity programs, pharmaceutical and food governance, and the rules that support globalized production and consumption” (p. 1). Though this observation focuses on health more generally, the global, national, and local responses to pandemics are certainly a part of the larger global health system. Three of the articles are especially relevant to the GPE aspects of pandemics and other instances of the spread of infectious disease. Rebecca J. Hester and Owain D. Williams ( 2020 ) ground their exploration of the political economy of the “somatic-security industrial complex,” upon influenza and its movement around the world. Stefan Elbe and Christopher Long ( 2020 ) explore global assemblages of medical molecules that become valuable for biodefense against disease outbreaks, bioterrorist attacks, and the like. João Nunes ( 2020 ) examines Brazil’s domestic political economy within the neoliberal order, the precarity of health workers’ jobs, and the consequences for Brazil during the Zika virus outbreak.

Much of the salient research on the global politics of infectious diseases prior to COVID-19 has occurred in fields of global health governance (Huang, 2014 ; Youde, 2018 ) and security studies (Davies, 2008 ; Price-Smith, 2009 ), and these studies will likely prove essential for future pandemic-related knowledge production in GPE. New materialist approaches that privilege the impact of nonhuman life processes will likely contribute in important ways to pandemic research (White, 2015 ).

Though COVID-19 was only recognized as a global pandemic in March 2020 , the sheer scope of the crisis resulted in immediate scholarly attention. Notable analyses of the pandemic and its reverberations in the global economy include the world-systems approach of Silver and Payne ( 2020 ) and a short but generative series of contributions to the journal of Foreign Policy (Walt et al., 2020 ). Certainly, many scholars of GPE will be turning to these contributions and constructing their own in responses to the global crisis of COVID-19.

Links to Digital Materials

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political system , the set of formal legal institutions that constitute a “government” or a “ state .” This is the definition adopted by many studies of the legal or constitutional arrangements of advanced political orders. More broadly defined, however, the term comprehends actual as well as prescribed forms of political behaviour, not only the legal organization of the state but also the reality of how the state functions. Still more broadly defined, the political system is seen as a set of “processes of interaction” or as a subsystem of the social system interacting with other nonpolitical subsystems, such as the economic system . This points to the importance of informal sociopolitical processes and emphasizes the study of political development.

Traditional legal or constitutional analysis, using the first definition, has produced a huge body of literature on governmental structures, many of the specialized terms that are a part of the traditional vocabulary of political science , and several instructive classifying schemes. Similarly, empirical analysis of political processes and the effort to identify the underlying realities of governmental forms have yielded a rich store of data and an important body of comparative theory. The third definition has inspired much scholarly work that employs new kinds of data, new terms, and some new concepts and categories of analysis. The discussion that follows draws on all three approaches to the study of political systems.

Regime | Definition, Types & Examples

Adam Bilinski has taught Political Science courses at various colleges since 2008. In 2015 he graduated with a PhD in Political Science from the University of Florida. He has Applying the QM Rubric (APPQMR) certificate on teaching online. His research interest include immigrant integration and democratization.

Kevin has edited encyclopedias, taught history, and has an MA in Islamic law/finance.

Table of Contents

What is a regime, types of regimes, regime examples, lesson summary, what does regime mean.

A regime means a set of rules, whether formal or informal, determining a country's politics (for example, a rule saying that if one wants to rule a democracy, they must win free and fair elections).

What are the different types of regimes?

There are different ways to classify regimes. Depending on how much freedom a regime allows, there are democratic, autocratic, and totalitarian regimes. Depending on whether a regime's head of state is an inherited or an elected position, there are monarchies and republics.

What is the difference between regime and government?

A regime is a set of rules determining politics in a country. These rules are usually quite stable. A government is a group of people ruling a country. Governments change significantly more often than regimes.

In political science , a regime is usually defined as a set of rules and norms determining how politics works in a country. These rules might be formal, like a constitutional provision in France that affirms the president is elected for five years, or informal, like a tradition in the United Kingdom that maintains that the monarch cannot veto bills even though technically she is allowed to do so. The rules defining a regime specify the workings of its political institutions (the government, legislature, courts, etc.). This definition of a regime is neutral, but in everyday language, the term has negative connotations. It is usually used to characterize autocratic or repressive systems (like a Fascist regime). Contrastingly, the phrase "Germany's democratic regime" sounds unusual. A term with a similar meaning to "regime" is "political system."

Regime vs. Government

In contrast to the regime, which is a more general term, "government" refers to a group of people who control a country. Government has a broader and narrower meaning. In the broader meaning, it refers to a country's central political institutions, which are usually divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In the narrower sense, it encompasses only the people holding top executive positions (presidents, prime ministers, ministers/secretaries, monarchs, etc.).

One of the differences between regime and government is that governments, especially in democratic countries, change significantly more often than regimes. For example, a change of government occurred in France in May 2017 when Francois Hollande left the presidency and Emmanuel Macron assumed office. In a similar way, China had a change of government in March 2013 when Hu Jintao left the presidency and Xi Jinping took it over. Yet, France's democratic regime and China's autocratic regime did not change.

A regime change implies not only a change of government but also a change of fundamental rules governing the country. Burma experienced a regime change in February 2021 when the military overthrew its democratically elected government in a coup. Fundamental rules of the regime changed because before the coup, free elections decided who would rule the country. After the coup, the military decided who would rule. Similarly, China experienced a regime change in 1949 when Communists won a civil war over their Nationalist opponents. One should add that under some circumstances, especially in personalist autocratic regimes (in which a single ruler concentrates power and civil institutions are weak), the regime is hardly distinguishable from the government. This is the case, for example, in North Korea.

In the United States, the term "government" is also often used to describe what other varieties of English call "the state," that is, the entirety of public institutions at all administrative levels (which include the military, police, and agencies such as the Social Security Administration and National Park Service).

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• 0:01 Types of Government…
• 0:57 Autocratic
• 2:17 Limited Suffrage
• 3:53 Truly Democratic
• 5:13 Lesson Summary

Just like with people, regimes may be categorized into several overlapping dimensions. In the case of a person, one can describe them, for example, in terms of height and age. So, elderly people might be either tall or short and the same can be said about young people. There are at least four ways to describe a person alongside these two dimensions. Obviously, adding dimensions multiplies the number of possible ways.

In the same way, there are several dimensions in which regimes can be classified. First, in terms of how much freedom a regime allows, one can identify the following types of regimes: Democratic, autocratic, and totalitarian .

In a democratic regime , government institutions originate from free and fair elections while civil liberties (speech, religion, association, press, assembly, and due process rights) and political rights are respected. The key characteristics of politics are the people's ability to peacefully change the government using the electoral process. Some examples of democratic regimes include contemporary France, Germany, the United States, Ghana, Japan, and India.

In an autocratic regime , rulers do not originate from free and fair elections but reach power via other means (election rigging, coup, revolutions, hereditary succession, or appointment by the ruling oligarchy). Various forms of repression (dismissal from work, imprisonment, exile, assassination) are used against political opponents. Civil liberties are restricted to prevent opponents from reaching power. Yet, the government does not force people to participate politically through simulated shows of support, and people not interested in politics are left alone. There are some spheres of social activity that are independent of the government, like churches and professional associations. Some examples of autocratic regimes include contemporary Russia, Singapore, China, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Rwanda.

One can further divide autocratic regimes by asking whether they permit legal political opposition. Some of them, like Russia, allow opposition parties to operate and participate in elections. However, due to election rigging and other forms of manipulation, they cannot win in practice. Such regimes are called competitive authoritarian regimes. Other regimes, like China, do not allow any legal opposition parties and are one-party states . Alternatively, a regime might not allow any political parties whatsoever, like Saudi Arabia, which is an absolute monarchy.

Finally, a totalitarian regime shares most features of autocracies but are even more repressive and controlling. Repression is applied not only against political enemies but also, in order to create fear in the society, entirely innocent people. Even slight political disobedience, like telling a political joke, may be severely punished. A totalitarian regime does not permit any independent social activity by controlling non-government associations and businesses (which are politicized) and even most aspects of private life. The population is forced to participate in shows of (fake) political support like obligatory marches and meetings. A totalitarian regime is guided by a clearly specified ideology (Communism, Fascism, Islamism ) and led by a charismatic leader (Hitler, Stalin, Mao) who enforces a cult of personality .

Another dimension used to classify regimes looks at how their head of state comes to power. In this regard, one can identify monarchies and republics. In a monarchy , the head of state is an unelected monarch (emperor, king, queen, prince, duke, sultan, etc.) who assumes the throne based on inheritance within a ruling dynasty. In a republic , the head of state is usually an elected president. In presidential systems, the elected president is also the head of government, but in parliamentary systems, an indirectly elected prime minister performs this function.

Some monarchies, like Britain and Japan, are democracies. In these cases, the monarch only performs ceremonial and representative functions and the real power belongs to the prime minister, who is appointed by a democratically elected legislature (parliament). Other monarchies, like Saudi Arabia and Eswatini, are autocracies. In such monarchies, the monarch is the head of government and the most powerful official in the country. In the same way, republics might function under democratic (e.g. Italy), autocratic (e.g. China), or totalitarian (e.g. North Korea) regimes.

Types of Politicians

The different types of politicians and how they work depend on the regime type. In a democratic country, to achieve power, one usually first needs to associate oneself with a political party and reach a leading position within it. Subsequently, one needs to win free and fair elections by convincing the people to vote for them. A democrat means someone who believes that democracy is the best way to organize power in one's country. Politicians operating in democratic countries are nearly always democrats although autocratic countries also feature democratic politicians. In that case, they fight for their countries to become democracies and are often repressed for their activities. Some democratic politicians include Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, and President Joe Biden of the United States.

A monarch is a ruler of a monarchy. In a monarchy, rules of succession determine how one achieves the throne. Usually, the oldest child of the previously ruling monarch assumes the throne after the latter's death or abdication. Sometimes, as in Saudi Arabia, only male heirs can inherit the throne, and women are excluded. There are also cases, like in Oman, where the dynasty decides together who will inherit the throne among many eligible members. The goal is to ensure that someone competent will become the next ruler. As mentioned, some monarchs do not have real power and are only ceremonial heads of states (like Emperor Hirohito of Japan and King Harald V of Norway), while others are the most powerful people and rulers of their countries (like King Abdullah II of Jordan and Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman). Absolute monarchs have few constraints on power.

Many autocratic countries are ruled by dictators. A dictator is a ruler that enjoys nearly unlimited power and makes decisions single-handedly. In a dictatorship, there is a limited rule of law because any law can be overridden or sidestepped by the dictator's decision. Many dictators come to power through coups or revolutions, but others win democratic elections and subsequently establish a dictatorship. Some examples of dictators include President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un of North Korea, President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi of Egypt, and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh.

Yet, some autocratic countries, such as Vietnam, are ruled collectively by a wider group (e.g. a party leadership or military council). This wider group appoints the leader and is consulted on all major decisions. In such an oligarchical autocracy, politicians are appointed for a top office only after a long career in a ruling party or the military. Such politicians include President Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Vietnam, President Hu Jintao of China, and President John Magufuli of Tanzania.

About half of the world's regimes are democracies . In the Americas, nearly all countries qualify as democracies except for Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Similarly, nearly all countries in Europe are democratic with the clear exceptions of Russia and Belarus. About half of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are democratic, including Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, and South Africa. Asia and the Middle East do not have many democracies, but one can point to India, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, South Korea, and Indonesia as examples.

Autocracies predominate in the Middle East and Asia. Examples of autocratic countries allowing political opposition are Russia, Venezuela, Algeria, Morocco, and Tanzania. Examples of autocratic countries that do not allow political opposition are Vietnam, China, Cuba, and Myanmar since the 2021 military coup.

There are few totalitarian regimes nowadays. Contemporary North Korea is an example of a totalitarian regime, and some scholars also classify Eritrea as totalitarian. In the past, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2014-17), the Soviet Union (1917-56), Germany (1933-45), and China (1949-78) were clearly totalitarian.

Moving to another regime dimension, in today's world, there are 44 monarchies and 149 republics . All countries listed above serve as examples of either democratic states, autocracies, or republics. Examples of democratic constitutional monarchies, in which the monarch serves only as a ceremonial head of state, include Britain, Norway, Lesotho, and Japan. Examples of monarchies in which the monarch is the head of government and the most powerful figure in the country include Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Eswatini. Most of such monarchies are located in the Middle East.

A regime is a set of rules defining how politics work in a country. There are various ways to classify political regimes. Depending on how much freedom a regime allows, one can identify democratic (e.g. the UK and India), autocratic (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Jordan), and totalitarian (e.g. North Korea) regimes. Autocratic and totalitarian regimes use various organizations to govern the country, which could be a political party (as in China, where the Communist Party is the most powerful) or a military. Depending on how the head of state is selected, one can identify monarchical and republican regimes. In a monarchy , the head of state is a monarch, a position inherited within a ruling dynasty. Saudi Arabia is an example of an autocratic (absolute) monarchy while the UK is an example of a democratic constitutional monarchy, in which freely elected parliament has the ultimate power. In a republic , an elected president is usually the head of state.

Video Transcript

Types of government and regimes.

Since the first groups of nomadic humans formed, some sort of government structure has been in place to provide them with guidance and mediation of disputes. In the centuries and millennia since those first groups, the roles of government have evolved greatly in many respects, not the least of which is how power is passed down between generations and how many people have access to power.

Often, you'll hear political scientists describe a country as either a monarchy , where a single person has control of the state, often passed down through generations, or a republic , where power is, at least in theory, shared amongst a larger group. Those terms are used to describe the government in question. However, the regime , or ruling powers behind a government, can take on a number of different varieties. In this lesson, we'll look at what different regimes look like in republics and monarchies.

When we think of the most basic types of regime, we tend to think first of autocratic governments. Autocratic regimes are ruled by one person or a small group of people, and very little input from outside of that central group is admitted. Think of a child's idea of what it would be like to be king or queen, ordering people to do arbitrary tasks without anyone to challenge their authority, and you've got a handle on what an autocratic regime looks like. Note that these types of government always must have some element of the population that supports them, lest there be riots and revolts. These supporters are rewarded heavily for their loyalty, but such rewards rarely bring any actual measure of input.

Shockingly, autocratic regimes are still in use around the world - most obviously, in places like North Korea and Saudi Arabia, where a single family controls everything with the support of a few other individuals. In fact, they demonstrate that both countries that consider themselves monarchies and republics can be autocratic. Also, note that in each of these cases, it is a single family that runs the government. Again, observers often call the Kim family that rules North Korea the Kim Dynasty, implying that they are really quite close to being a monarch. However, for propaganda reasons, North Korea insists that it is a republic.

Limited Suffrage

North Korea and Saudi Arabia are certainly extreme examples, and that's because many countries stop short of being completely autocratic. Instead, countries that don't allow full democratic institutions allow some sort of limited suffrage , where a selected group of people can have influence over a range of issues. Think about it like a teacher giving a pre-selected helper from the class a choice between cleaning up toys after playtime or helping to feed the classroom pet. The choices are defined and limited, as are the participants.

The classic example of limited suffrage in a republic is China. Here, the Communist Party has incredible power, indeed to the point that no other political group has any real power in the country. Extensive background checks are done on potential party members in order to make sure that only those individuals who share the goals of the party are admitted. However, once you're in, you get a shocking amount of influence. In fact, this has been a big driver in the change from China being a closed country with little external trade to one of the most powerful economies in the world.

Monarchies can also have limited suffrage. Jordan provides a great example of this. The king holds supreme power in the country, with outside influences being heavily policed. However, members of Parliament are allowed to have considerable dissent from the king's position on issues. The Prime Minister serves as an advisor to the king and communicates concerns to the king, thus providing influence on a narrow range of issues from a select group of people.

Truly Democratic

Fully democratic regimes have grown faster than any other type of regime in the last 100 years. Starting with the American and British experiences, these governments allow every citizen to vote on a wide range of issues. As a result, these types of government are among the most popular with people, while the establishment of a firm political ruling family is next to impossible. Still, sometimes a family does gain so much popularity so as to ensure votes for the next generation. The most famous examples of this are the American Kennedys and the Indian Gandhis. To continue our analogy of children, imagine kids at recess determining what to do with their free time. They are completely in charge of the decision and everyone can vote.

Both monarchies and republics can be fully democratic. The United States provides the most obvious example of a fully democratic republic. While American suffrage for all citizens has been hard-won and is even being defined today, there is no doubt that the overwhelming number of Americans regard this principle as central to their culture. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, despite being a monarchy, demonstrates the wide-ranging democratic powers available even under a queen. The government refers to itself as ruling in the name of the queen, and monarchs in the past have affirmed that Parliament, as the representative of the people, has ultimate power in the UK.

In this lesson, we look at the differences in political regimes that have developed over the past centuries, especially focusing on how varying degrees of suffrage are available to both monarchies and republics. We see how autocracies , ruled firmly by one person, are still in place in Saudi Arabia and North Korea. Then we focus on places with limited suffrage , which Communist Party members in China and Parliament members in Jordan enjoy only after extensive vetting. Still, they are only able to comment on a definite range of issues.

Finally, we focus on fully democratic regimes where everyone gets a voice, namely like those found in the United States and the United Kingdom. In particular, we see how the monarch of the United Kingdom has ceded great deals of power to the people via Parliament.

Learning Outcomes

Use all of your knowledge to perform the following actions:

• Compare a monarchy, a republic and a regime
• Give specific national examples of different types of regimes such as autocracies and democratic

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Political regime

What you should know about this indicator.

• The indicator uses the Regimes of the World classification by political scientists Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg and Staffan Lindberg.
• The classification distinguishes between closed autocracies (score 0), electoral autocracies (score 1), electoral democracies (score 2), and liberal democracies (score 3).
• In closed autocracies , citizens do not have the right to either choose the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections.
• In electoral autocracies , citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression, that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair.
• In electoral democracies , citizens have the right to participate in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections.
• In liberal demoracies , citizens have further individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts.

Related research and writing

The ‘Regimes of the World’ data: how do researchers measure democracy?

Democracy data: how sources differ and when to use which one

200 years ago, everyone lacked democratic rights. Now, billions of people have them

Explore charts that include this data, sources and processing, this data is based on the following sources, v-dem – v-dem country-year (full + others).

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project publishes data and research on democracy and human rights.

It acknowledges that democracy can be characterized differently and measures electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian characterizations of democracy.

The project relies on evaluations by around 3,500 country experts and supplementary work by its researchers to assess political institutions and the protection of rights.

The project is managed by the V-Dem Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden.

This snapshot contains all 500 V-Dem indicators and 245 indices + 57 other indicators from other data sources.

How we process data at Our World in Data

All data and visualizations on Our World in Data rely on data sourced from one or several original data providers. Preparing this original data involves several processing steps. Depending on the data, this can include standardizing country names and world region definitions, converting units, calculating derived indicators such as per capita measures, as well as adding or adapting metadata such as the name or the description given to an indicator.

At the link below you can find a detailed description of the structure of our data pipeline, including links to all the code used to prepare data across Our World in Data.

Notes on our processing step for this indicator

We expand the years covered by V-Dem further: To expand the time coverage of today's countries and include more of the period when they were still non-sovereign territories, we identified the historical entity they were a part of and used that regime's data whenever available

For example, V-Dem only provides regime data since Bangladesh's independence in 1971. There is, however, regime data for Pakistan and the colony of India, both of which the current territory of Bangladesh was a part. We, therefore, use the regime data of Pakistan for Bangladesh from 1947 to 1970, and the regime data of India from 1789 to 1946. We did so for all countries with a past or current population of more than one million.

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2015 Theses Doctoral

Essays on the Effects of Political Institutions on Development Policies

Cohen, Jordan Kyle

This dissertation examines the relationship between political institutions and development policies across a wide array of policy arenas. It consists of three essays. In the first essay, I examine how corruption in political institutions affects citizens’ attitudes towards proposed policy reforms that should yield long-run benefits. I argue that where corruption in political institutions reduces citizens’ benefits from existing programs, governmental promises to deliver benefits via reforms are less credible. Thus, citizens will cling to inefficient policies not because they are unable to recognize the benefits of reform but because they do not trust political institutions to implement reforms in ways that will benefit them in practice. I use this logic to explain why citizens frequently resist attempts to reform the economically and environmentally costly practice of setting domestic gasoline prices below market prices. To reveal these patterns, I rely on original survey and administrative data from Indonesia. The second essay maintains the focuses on the quality of political institutions and natural resource governance but from a more macro perspective. In this essay, I argue that political regimes and political time horizons shape financial arrangements between governments and multinational oil companies. This essentially asks the reverse of a central question in comparative politics. Rather than asking how oil income affects political institutions, I ask how political institutions motivate politicians to make policy choices that increase or decrease the government’s access to oil income over time. To do so, I utilize an original dataset on financial arrangements between host countries and multinational oil companies, as reflected in historically confidential oil contracts. The final essay travels to a different substantive area of development policy, yet allows for a critical role for political institutions. This essay argues that the relationship between developing country governments and foreign aid donors should be conditional on the quality of political institutions, with aid donors giving countries with institutions better able to commit to selecting policies that promote development wider latitude to direct foreign aid resources towards local priorities. Instead, I find that political and security alliances shape whether donors give developing country governments more “ownership” over aid flows. Overall, the dissertation deepens understanding of the relationship between the quality of political institutions and policies within developing countries, while offering insights into contemporary policy debates about natural resource governance, environmental politics, and development aid.

• Investments, Foreign--Government policy
• Investments, Developing country
• Sustainable development--Government policy
• Political science
• Natural resources—Management

More About This Work

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Introductory essay

Written by the educators who created Cyber-Influence and Power, a brief look at the key facts, tough questions and big ideas in their field. Begin this TED Study with a fascinating read that gives context and clarity to the material.

Each and every one of us has a vital part to play in building the kind of world in which government and technology serve the world’s people and not the other way around. Rebecca MacKinnon

Over the past 20 years, information and communication technologies (ICTs) have transformed the globe, facilitating the international economic, political, and cultural connections and exchanges that are at the heart of contemporary globalization processes. The term ICT is broad in scope, encompassing both the technological infrastructure and products that facilitate the collection, storage, manipulation, and distribution of information in a variety of formats.

While there are many definitions of globalization, most would agree that the term refers to a variety of complex social processes that facilitate worldwide economic, cultural, and political connections and exchanges. The kinds of global connections ICTs give rise to mark a dramatic departure from the face-to-face, time and place dependent interactions that characterized communication throughout most of human history. ICTs have extended human interaction and increased our interconnectedness, making it possible for geographically dispersed people not only to share information at an ever-faster rate but also to organize and to take action in response to events occurring in places far from where they are physically situated.

While these complex webs of connections can facilitate positive collective action, they can also put us at risk. As TED speaker Ian Goldin observes, the complexity of our global connections creates a built-in fragility: What happens in one part of the world can very quickly affect everyone, everywhere.

The proliferation of ICTs and the new webs of social connections they engender have had profound political implications for governments, citizens, and non-state actors alike. Each of the TEDTalks featured in this course explore some of these implications, highlighting the connections and tensions between technology and politics. Some speakers focus primarily on how anti-authoritarian protesters use technology to convene and organize supporters, while others expose how authoritarian governments use technology to manipulate and control individuals and groups. When viewed together as a unit, the contrasting voices reveal that technology is a contested site through which political power is both exercised and resisted.

Technology as liberator

The liberating potential of technology is a powerful theme taken up by several TED speakers in Cyber-Influence and Power . Journalist and Global Voices co-founder Rebecca MacKinnon, for example, begins her talk by playing the famous Orwell-inspired Apple advertisement from 1984. Apple created the ad to introduce Macintosh computers, but MacKinnon describes Apple's underlying narrative as follows: "technology created by innovative companies will set us all free." While MacKinnon examines this narrative with a critical eye, other TED speakers focus on the ways that ICTs can and do function positively as tools of social change, enabling citizens to challenge oppressive governments.

In a 2011 CNN interview, Egyptian protest leader, Google executive, and TED speaker Wael Ghonim claimed "if you want to free a society, just give them internet access. The young crowds are going to all go out and see and hear the unbiased media, see the truth about other nations and their own nation, and they are going to be able to communicate and collaborate together." (i). In this framework, the opportunities for global information sharing, borderless communication, and collaboration that ICTs make possible encourage the spread of democracy. As Ghonim argues, when citizens go online, they are likely to discover that their particular government's perspective is only one among many. Activists like Ghonim maintain that exposure to this online free exchange of ideas will make people less likely to accept government propaganda and more likely to challenge oppressive regimes.

A case in point is the controversy that erupted around Khaled Said, a young Egyptian man who died after being arrested by Egyptian police. The police claimed that Said suffocated when he attempted to swallow a bag of hashish; witnesses, however, reported that he was beaten to death by the police. Stories about the beating and photos of Said's disfigured body circulated widely in online communities, and Ghonim's Facebook group, titled "We are all Khaled Said," is widely credited with bringing attention to Said's death and fomenting the discontent that ultimately erupted in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, or what Ghonim refers to as "revolution 2.0."

Ghonim's Facebook group also illustrates how ICTs enable citizens to produce and broadcast information themselves. Many people already take for granted the ability to capture images and video via handheld devices and then upload that footage to platforms like YouTube. As TED speaker Clay Shirky points out, our ability to produce and widely distribute information constitutes a revolutionary change in media production and consumption patterns. The production of media has typically been very expensive and thus out of reach for most individuals; the average person was therefore primarily a consumer of media, reading books, listening to the radio, watching TV, going to movies, etc. Very few could independently publish their own books or create and distribute their own radio programs, television shows, or movies. ICTs have disrupted this configuration, putting media production in the hands of individual amateurs on a budget — or what Shirky refers to as members of "the former audience" — alongside the professionals backed by multi-billion dollar corporations. This "democratization of media" allows individuals to create massive amounts of information in a variety of formats and to distribute it almost instantly to a potentially global audience.

Shirky is especially interested in the Internet as "the first medium in history that has native support for groups and conversations at the same time." This shift has important political implications. For example, in 2008 many Obama followers used Obama's own social networking site to express their unhappiness when the presidential candidate changed his position on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The outcry of his supporters did not force Obama to revert to his original position, but it did help him realize that he needed to address his supporters directly, acknowledging their disagreement on the issue and explaining his position. Shirky observes that this scenario was also notable because the Obama organization realized that "their role was to convene their supporters but not to control their supporters." This tension between the use of technology in the service of the democratic impulse to convene citizens vs. the authoritarian impulse to control them runs throughout many of the TEDTalks in Cyber-Influence and Power.

A number of TED speakers explicitly examine the ways that ICTs give individual citizens the ability to document governmental abuses they witness and to upload this information to the Internet for a global audience. Thus, ICTs can empower citizens by giving them tools that can help keep their governments accountable. The former head of Al Jazeera and TED speaker Wadah Khanfar provides some very clear examples of the political power of technology in the hands of citizens. He describes how the revolution in Tunisia was delivered to the world via cell phones, cameras, and social media outlets, with the mainstream media relying on "citizen reporters" for details.

Former British prime minister Gordon Brown's TEDTalk also highlights some of the ways citizens have used ICTs to keep their governments accountable. For example, Brown recounts how citizens in Zimbabwe used the cameras on their phones at polling places in order to discourage the Mugabe regime from engaging in electoral fraud. Similarly, Clay Shirky begins his TEDTalk with a discussion of how cameras on phones were used to combat voter suppression in the 2008 presidential election in the U.S. ICTs allowed citizens to be protectors of the democratic process, casting their individual votes but also, as Shirky observes, helping to "ensure the sanctity of the vote overall."

Technology as oppressor

While smart phones and social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook have arguably facilitated the overthrow of dictatorships in places like Tunisia and Egypt, lending credence to Gordon Brown's vision of technology as an engine of liberalism and pluralism, not everyone shares this view. As TED speaker and former religious extremist Maajid Nawaz points out, there is nothing inherently liberating about ICTs, given that they frequently are deployed to great effect by extremist organizations seeking social changes that are often inconsistent with democracy and human rights. Where once individual extremists might have felt isolated and alone, disconnected from like-minded people and thus unable to act in concert with others to pursue their agendas, ICTs allow them to connect with other extremists and to form communities around their ideas, narratives, and symbols.

Ian Goldin shares this concern, warning listeners about what he calls the "two Achilles heels of globalization": growing inequality and the fragility that is inherent in a complex integrated system. He points out that those who do not experience the benefits of globalization, who feel like they've been left out in one way or another, can potentially become incredibly dangerous. In a world where what happens in one place very quickly affects everyone else — and where technologies are getting ever smaller and more powerful — a single angry individual with access to technological resources has the potential to do more damage than ever before. The question becomes then, how do we manage the systemic risk inherent in today's technology-infused globalized world? According to Goldin, our current governance structures are "fossilized" and ill-equipped to deal with these issues.

Other critics of the notion that ICTs are inherently liberating point out that ICTs have been leveraged effectively by oppressive governments to solidify their own power and to manipulate, spy upon, and censor their citizens. Journalist and TED speaker Evgeny Morozov expresses scepticism about what he calls "iPod liberalism," or the belief that technology will necessarily lead to the fall of dictatorships and the emergence of democratic governments. Morozov uses the term "spinternet" to describe authoritarian governments' use of the Internet to provide their own "spin" on issues and events. Russia, China, and Iran, he argues, have all trained and paid bloggers to promote their ideological agendas in the online environment and/or or to attack people writing posts the government doesn't like in an effort to discredit them as spies or criminals who should not be trusted.

Morozov also points out that social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter are tools not only of revolutionaries but also of authoritarian governments who use them to gather open-source intelligence. "In the past," Morozov maintains, "it would take you weeks, if not months, to identify how Iranian activists connect to each other. Now you know how they connect to each other by looking at their Facebook page. KGB...used to torture in order to get this data." Instead of focusing primarily on bringing Internet access and devices to the people in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, Morozov argues that we need to abandon our cyber-utopian assumptions and do more to actually empower intellectuals, dissidents, NGOs and other members of society, making sure that the "spinternet" does not prevent their voices from being heard.

The ICT Empowered Individual vs. The Nation State

In her TEDTalk "Let's Take Back the Internet," Rebecca MacKinnon argues that "the only legitimate purpose of government is to serve citizens, and…the only legitimate purpose of technology is to improve our lives, not to manipulate or enslave us." It is clearly not a given, however, that governments, organizations, and individuals will use technology benevolently. Part of the responsibility of citizenship in the globalized information age then is to work to ensure that both governments and technologies "serve the world's peoples." However, there is considerable disagreement about what that might look like.

WikiLeaks spokesperson and TED speaker Julian Assange, for example, argues that government secrecy is inconsistent with democratic values and is ultimately about deceiving and manipulating rather than serving the world's people. Others maintain that governments need to be able to keep secrets about some topics in order to protect their citizens or to act effectively in response to crises, oppressive regimes, terrorist organizations, etc. While some view Assange's use of technology as a way to hold governments accountable and to increase transparency, others see this use of technology as a criminal act with the potential to both undermine stable democracies and put innocent lives in danger.

ICTs and global citizenship

While there are no easy answers to the global political questions raised by the proliferation of ICTs, there are relatively new approaches to the questions that look promising, including the emergence of individuals who see themselves as global citizens — people who participate in a global civil society that transcends national boundaries. Technology facilitates global citizens' ability to learn about global issues, to connect with others who care about similar issues, and to organize and act meaningfully in response. However, global citizens are also aware that technology in and of itself is no panacea, and that it can be used to manipulate and oppress.

Global citizens fight against oppressive uses of technology, often with technology. Technology helps them not only to participate in global conversations that affect us all but also to amplify the voices of those who have been marginalized or altogether missing from such conversations. Moreover, global citizens are those who are willing to grapple with large and complex issues that are truly global in scope and who attempt to chart a course forward that benefits all people, regardless of their locations around the globe.

Gordon Brown implicitly alludes to the importance of global citizenship when he states that we need a global ethic of fairness and responsibility to inform global problem-solving. Human rights, disease, development, security, terrorism, climate change, and poverty are among the issues that cannot be addressed successfully by any one nation alone. Individual actors (nation states, NGOs, etc.) can help, but a collective of actors, both state and non-state, is required. Brown suggests that we must combine the power of a global ethic with the power to communicate and organize globally in order for us to address effectively the world's most pressing issues.

Individuals and groups today are able to exert influence that is disproportionate to their numbers and the size of their arsenals through their use of "soft power" techniques, as TED speakers Joseph Nye and Shashi Tharoor observe. This is consistent with Maajid Nawaz's discussion of the power of symbols and narratives. Small groups can develop powerful narratives that help shape the views and actions of people around the world. While governments are far more accustomed to exerting power through military force, they might achieve their interests more effectively by implementing soft power strategies designed to convince others that they want the same things. According to Nye, replacing a "zero-sum" approach (you must lose in order for me to win) with a "positive-sum" one (we can both win) creates opportunities for collaboration, which is necessary if we are to begin to deal with problems that are global in scope.

Let's get started

Collectively, the TEDTalks in this course explore how ICTs are used by and against governments, citizens, activists, revolutionaries, extremists, and other political actors in efforts both to preserve and disrupt the status quo. They highlight the ways that ICTs have opened up new forms of communication and activism as well as how the much-hailed revolutionary power of ICTs can and has been co-opted by oppressive regimes to reassert their control.

By listening to the contrasting voices of this diverse group of TED speakers, which includes activists, journalists, professors, politicians, and a former member of an extremist organization, we can begin to develop a more nuanced understanding of the ways that technology can be used both to facilitate and contest a wide variety of political movements. Global citizens who champion democracy would do well to explore these intersections among politics and technology, as understanding these connections is a necessary first step toward MacKinnon's laudable goal of building a world in which "government and technology serve the world's people and not the other way around."

Let's begin our exploration of the intersections among politics and technology in today's globalized world with a TEDTalk from Ian Goldin, the first Director of the 21st Century School, Oxford University's think tank/research center. Goldin's talk will set the stage for us, exploring the integrated, complex, and technology rich global landscape upon which the political struggles for power examined by other TED speakers play out.

Navigating our global future

i. "Welcome to Revolution 2.0, Ghonim Says," CNN, February 9, 2011. http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/world/2011/02/09/wael.ghonim.interview.cnn .

Relevant talks

Gordon Brown

Wiring a web for global good.

Clay Shirky

How social media can make history.

Wael Ghonim

Inside the egyptian revolution.

Wadah Khanfar

A historic moment in the arab world.

Evgeny Morozov

How the net aids dictatorships.

Maajid Nawaz

A global culture to fight extremism.

Rebecca MacKinnon

Let's take back the internet.

Julian Assange

Why the world needs wikileaks.

Global power shifts

Shashi Tharoor

Why nations should pursue soft power.

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Aristotle’s Political Theory

Aristotle (b. 384–d. 322 BCE), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and scientist. Along with his teacher Plato, Aristotle is generally regarded as one of the most influential ancient thinkers in a number of philosophical fields, including political theory. Aristotle was born in Stagira in northern Greece, and his father was a court physician to the king of Macedon. As a young man he studied in Plato’s Academy in Athens. After Plato’s death he left Athens to conduct philosophical and biological research in Asia Minor and Lesbos, and he was then invited by King Philip II of Macedon to tutor his young son, Alexander the Great. Soon after Alexander succeeded his father, consolidated the conquest of the Greek city-states, and launched the invasion of the Persian Empire. Aristotle returned as a resident alien to Athens, and was a close friend of Antipater, the Macedonian viceroy. At this time (335–323 BCE) he wrote, or at least worked on, some of his major treatises, including the Politics . When Alexander died suddenly, Aristotle had to flee from Athens because of his Macedonian connections, and he died soon after. Aristotle’s life seems to have influenced his political thought in various ways: his interest in biology seems to be reflected in the naturalism of his politics; his interest in comparative politics and his qualified sympathies for democracy as well as monarchy may have been encouraged by his travels and experience of diverse political systems; he reacts critically to his teacher Plato, while borrowing extensively, from Plato’s Republic , Statesman , and Laws ; and his own Politics is intended to guide rulers and statesmen, reflecting the high political circles in which he moved.

Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Political Naturalism

4. Study of Specific Constitutions

5. aristotle and modern politics, glossary of aristotelian terms, a. greek text of aristotle’s politics, b. english translations of aristotle’s politics, c. anthologies, d. single-authored commentaries and overviews, e. studies of particular topics, other internet resources, related entries, 1. political science in general.

The modern word ‘political’ derives from the Greek politikos , ‘of, or pertaining to, the polis’. (The Greek term polis will be translated here as ‘city-state’. It is also commonly translated as ‘city’ or simply anglicized as ‘polis’. City-states like Athens and Sparta were relatively small and cohesive units, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns were intertwined. The extent of their similarity to modern nation-states is controversial.) Aristotle’s word for ‘politics’ is politikê , which is short for politikê epistêmê or ‘political science’. It belongs to one of the three main branches of science, which Aristotle distinguishes by their ends or objects. Contemplative science (including physics and metaphysics) is concerned with truth or knowledge for its own sake; practical science with good action; and productive science with making useful or beautiful objects ( Top . VI.6.145a14–16, Met . VI.1.1025b24, XI.7.1064a16–19, EN VI.2.1139a26–8). Politics is a practical science, since it is concerned with the noble action or happiness of the citizens (although it resembles a productive science in that it seeks to create, preserve, and reform political systems). Aristotle thus understands politics as a normative or prescriptive discipline rather than as a purely empirical or descriptive inquiry.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes his subject matter as ‘political science’, which he characterizes as the most authoritative science. It prescribes which sciences are to be studied in the city-state, and the others — such as military science, household management, and rhetoric — fall under its authority. Since it governs the other practical sciences, their ends serve as means to its end, which is nothing less than the human good. “Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state” ( EN I.2.1094b7–10). The two ethical works (the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics ) explain the principles that form the foundations for the Politics : that happiness is the highest human good, that happiness is the activity of moral virtue defined in terms of the mean, and that justice or the common advantage is the political good. Aristotle’s political science thus encompasses the two fields which modern philosophers distinguish as ethics and political philosophy. (See the entry on Aristotle’s ethics .) Political philosophy in the narrow sense is roughly speaking the subject of his treatise called the Politics . For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

2. Aristotle’s View of Politics

Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman ( politikos ), in much the way that medical science concerns the work of the physician (see Politics IV.1). It is, in fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert, will also wield in pursuing their tasks. The most important task for the politician is, in the role of lawgiver ( nomothetês ), to frame the appropriate constitution for the city-state. This involves enduring laws, customs, and institutions (including a system of moral education) for the citizens. Once the constitution is in place, the politician needs to take the appropriate measures to maintain it, to introduce reforms when he finds them necessary, and to prevent developments which might subvert the political system. This is the province of legislative science, which Aristotle regards as more important than politics as exercised in everyday political activity such as the passing of decrees (see EN VI.8).

Aristotle frequently compares the politician to a craftsman. The analogy is imprecise because politics, in the strict sense of legislative science, is a form of practical knowledge, while a craft like architecture or medicine is a form of productive knowledge. However, the comparison is valid to the extent that the politician produces, operates, maintains a legal system according to universal principles ( EN VI.8 and X.9). In order to appreciate this analogy it is helpful to observe that Aristotle explains the production of an artifact such as a drinking cup in terms of four causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes ( Phys . II.3 and Met . A.2). For example, clay (material cause) is molded into a roughly cylindrical shape closed at one end (formal cause) by a potter (efficient or moving cause) so that it can contain a beverage (final cause). (For discussion of the four causes see the entry on Aristotle’s physics .)

One can also explain the existence of the city-state in terms of the four causes. It is a kind of community ( koinônia ), that is, a collection of parts having some functions and interests in common ( Pol . II.1.1261a18, III.1.1275b20). Hence, it is made up of parts, which Aristotle describes in various ways in different contexts: as households, or economic classes (e.g., the rich and the poor), or demes (i.e., local political units). But, ultimately, the city-state is composed of individual citizens (see III.1.1274a38–41), who, along with natural resources, are the “material” or “equipment” out of which the city-state is fashioned (see VII.14.1325b38–41).

The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution ( politeia ). Aristotle defines the constitution as “a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state” (III.1.1274b32–41). He also speaks of the constitution of a community as “the form of the compound” and argues that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same constitution (III.3.1276b1–11). The constitution is not a written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. Hence, the constitution is also “the way of life” of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40–b1, VII.8.1328b1–2). Here the citizens are that minority of the resident population who possess full political rights (III.1.1275b17–20).

The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause, namely, its ruler. On Aristotle’s view, a community of any sort can possess order only if it has a ruling element or authority. This ruling principle is defined by the constitution, which sets criteria for political offices, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). However, on a deeper level, there must be an efficient cause to explain why a city-state acquires its constitution in the first place. Aristotle states that “the person who first established [the city-state] is the cause of very great benefits” (I.2.1253a30–1). This person was evidently the lawgiver ( nomothetês ), someone like Solon of Athens or Lycurgus of Sparta, who founded the constitution. Aristotle compares the lawgiver, or the politician more generally, to a craftsman ( dêmiourgos ) like a weaver or shipbuilder, who fashions material into a finished product (II.12.1273b32–3, VII.4.1325b40–1365a5).

The notion of final cause dominates Aristotle’s Politics from the opening lines:

Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community. [I.1.1252a1–7]

Soon after, he states that the city-state comes into being for the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life (2.1252b29–30). The theme that the good life or happiness is the proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the Politics (III.6.1278b17–24, 9.1280b39; VII.2.1325a7–10).

To sum up, the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form) compound of a particular population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given territory (material cause) and a constitution (formal cause). The constitution itself is fashioned by the lawgiver and is governed by politicians, who are like craftsmen (efficient cause), and the constitution defines the aim of the city-state (final cause, IV.1.1289a17–18). Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis has important practical implications for him: just as a craftsman should not try to impose a form on materials for which it is unsuited (e.g. to build a house out of sand), the legislator should not lay down or change laws which are contrary to the nature of the citizens. Aristotle accordingly rejects utopian schemes such as the proposal in Plato’s Republic that children and property should belong to all the citizens in common. For this runs afoul of the fact that “people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give attention” ( Pol. II.3.1261b33–5). Aristotle is also wary of casual political innovation, because it can have the deleterious side-effect of undermining the citizens’ habit of obeying the law (II.8.1269a13–24). For a further discussion of the theoretical foundations of Aristotle’s politics, see the following supplementary document:

It is in these terms, then, that Aristotle understands the fundamental normative problem of politics: What constitutional form should the lawgiver establish and preserve in what material for the sake of what end?

3. General Theory of Constitutions and Citizenship

Aristotle states, “The politician and lawgiver is wholly occupied with the city-state, and the constitution is a certain way of organizing those who inhabit the city-state” (III.1.1274b36–8). His general theory of constitutions is set forth in Politics III. He begins with a definition of the citizen ( politês ), since the city-state is by nature a collective entity, a multitude of citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants, such as resident aliens and slaves; and even children and seniors are not unqualified citizens (nor are most ordinary workers). After further analysis he defines the citizen as a person who has the right ( exousia ) to participate in deliberative or judicial office (1275b18–21). In Athens, for example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council, and other bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed from a modern representative democracy in that the citizens were more directly involved in governing. Although full citizenship tended to be restricted in the Greek city-states (with women, slaves, foreigners, and some others excluded), the citizens were more deeply enfranchised than in modern representative democracies because they were more directly involved in governing. This is reflected in Aristotle’s definition of the citizen (without qualification). Further, he defines the city-state (in the unqualified sense) as a multitude of such citizens which is adequate for a self-sufficient life (1275b20–21).

Aristotle defines the constitution ( politeia ) as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). The constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born). Before attempting to distinguish and evaluate various constitutions Aristotle considers two questions. First, why does a city-state come into being? He recalls the thesis, defended in Politics I.2, that human beings are by nature political animals, who naturally want to live together. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle then adds, “The common advantage also brings them together insofar as they each attain the noble life. This is above all the end for all both in common and separately” (III.6.1278b19–24). Second, what are the different forms of rule by which one individual or group can rule over another? Aristotle distinguishes several types of rule, based on the nature of the soul of the ruler and of the subject. He first considers despotic rule, which is exemplified in the master-slave relationship. Aristotle thinks that this form of rule is justified in the case of natural slaves who (he asserts without evidence) lack a deliberative faculty and thus need a natural master to direct them (I.13.1260a12; slavery is defended at length in Politics I.4–8). Although a natural slave allegedly benefits from having a master, despotic rule is still primarily for the sake of the master and only incidentally for the slave (III.6.1278b32–7). (Aristotle provides no argument for this: if some persons are congenitally incapable of governing themselves, why should they not be ruled primarily for their own sakes?) He next considers paternal and marital rule, which he also views as defensible: “the male is by nature more capable of leadership than the female, unless he is constituted in some way contrary to nature, and the elder and perfect [is by nature more capable of leadership] than the younger and imperfect” (I.12.1259a39–b4).

Aristotle is persuasive when he argues that children need adult supervision because their rationality is “imperfect” ( ateles ) or immature. But he is unconvincing to modern readers when he alleges (without substantiation) that, although women have a deliberative faculty, it is “without authority” ( akuron ), so that females require male supervision (I.13.1260a13–14). (Aristotle’s arguments about slaves and women appear so weak that some commentators take them to be ironic. However, what is obvious to a modern reader need not have been so to an ancient Greek, so that it is not necessary to suppose Aristotle’s discussion is disingenuous.) It is noteworthy, however, that paternal and marital rule are properly practiced for the sake of the ruled (for the sake of the child and of the wife respectively), just as arts like medicine or gymnastics are practiced for the sake of the patient (III.6.1278b37–1279a1). In this respect they resemble political rule, which is the form of rule appropriate when the ruler and the subject have equal and similar rational capacities. This is exemplified by naturally equal citizens who take turns at ruling for one another’s advantage (1279a8–13). This sets the stage for the fundamental claim of Aristotle’s constitutional theory: “constitutions which aim at the common advantage are correct and just without qualification, whereas those which aim only at the advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community of free persons” (1279a17–21).

The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combined with the observation that the government may consist of one person, a few, or a multitude. Hence, there are six possible constitutional forms ( Politics III.7):

This six-fold classification (which is doubtless adapted from Plato’s Statesman 302c–d) sets the stage for Aristotle’s inquiry into the best constitution, although it is modified in various ways throughout the Politics . For example, he observes that the dominant class in oligarchy (literally rule of the oligoi , i.e., few) is typically the wealthy, whereas in democracy (literally rule of the dêmos , i.e., people) it is the poor, so that these economic classes should be included in the definition of these forms (see Politics III.8, IV.4, and VI.2 for alternative accounts). Also, polity is later characterized as a kind of “mixed” constitution typified by rule of the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class between the rich and poor ( Politics IV.11).

Aristotle’s constitutional theory is based on his theory of justice, which is expounded in Nicomachean Ethics book V. Aristotle distinguishes two different but related senses of “justice” — universal and particular — both of which play an important role in his constitutional theory. Firstly, in the universal sense “justice” means “lawfulness” and is concerned with the common advantage and happiness of the political community ( NE V.1.1129b11–19, cf. Pol. III.12.1282b16–17). The conception of universal justice undergirds the distinction between correct (just) and deviant (unjust) constitutions. But what exactly the “common advantage” ( koinê sumpheron ) entails is a matter of scholarly controversy. Some passages imply that justice involves the advantage of all the citizens; for example, every citizen of the best constitution has a just claim to private property and to an education ( Pol. VII.9.1329a23–4, 13.1332a32–8). But Aristotle also allows that it might be “in a way” just to ostracize powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crimes (III.13.1284b15–20). Whether Aristotle understands the common advantage as safeguarding the interests of each and every citizen has a bearing on whether and to what extent he anticipates what moderns would understand as a theory of individual rights. (See Fred Miller and Richard Kraut for differing interpretations.)

Secondly, in the particular sense “justice” means “equality” or “fairness”, and this includes distributive justice, according to which different individuals have just claims to shares of some common asset such as property. Aristotle analyzes arguments for and against the different constitutions as different applications of the principle of distributive justice (III.9.1280a7–22). Everyone agrees, he says, that justice involves treating equal persons equally, and treating unequal persons unequally, but they do not agree on the standard by which individuals are deemed to be equally (or unequally) meritorious or deserving. He assumes his own analysis of distributive justice set forth in Nicomachean Ethics V.3: Justice requires that benefits be distributed to individuals in proportion to their merit or desert. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth should also have superior political rights, whereas the democrats hold that those who are equal in free birth should also have equal political rights. Both of these conceptions of political justice are mistaken in Aristotle’s view, because they assume a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-state. The city-state is neither a business enterprise to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs suppose) nor an association to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats maintain). Instead, Aristotle argues, “the good life is the end of the city-state,” that is, a life consisting of noble actions (1280b39–1281a4). Hence, the correct conception of justice is aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full contribution to the political community, that is, to those with virtue as well as property and freedom (1281a4–8). This is what Aristotle understands by an “aristocratic” constitution: literally, the rule of the aristoi , i.e., best persons. Aristotle explores the implications of this argument in the remainder of Politics III, considering the rival claims of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous individual. Here absolute kingship is a limiting case of aristocracy. Again, in books VII-VIII, Aristotle describes the ideal constitution in which the citizens are fully virtuous.

Although justice is in Aristotle’s view the foremost political virtue ( Pol . III.9.1283a38–40), the other great social virtue, friendship, should not be overlooked, because the two virtues work hand in hand to secure every sort of association ( EN VIII.9.1159b26–7). Justice enables the citizens of a city-state to share peacefully in the benefits and burdens of cooperation, while friendship holds them together and prevents them from breaking up into warring factions (cf. Pol . II.4.1262b7–9). Friends are expected to treat each other justly, but friendship goes beyond justice because it is a complex mutual bond in which individuals choose the good for others and trust that others are choosing the good for them (cf. EE VII.2.1236a14–15, b2–3; EN VIII.2.1155b34–3.1156a10). Because choosing the good for one another is essential to friendship and there are three different ways in which something can be called ‘good’ for a human being—virtuous (i.e., good without qualification), useful, or pleasant—there are three types of friendship: hedonistic, utilitarian, and virtuous. Political (or civic) friendship is a species of utilitarian friendship, and it is the most important form of utilitarian friendship because the polis is the greatest community. Opposed to political friendship is enmity, which leads to faction or civil war ( stasis ) or even to political revolution and the breakup of the polis, as discussed in Book V of the Politics. Aristotle offers general accounts of political or civic friendship as part of his general theory of friendship in EE VII.10 and EN VIII.9–12.

The purpose of political science is to guide “the good lawgiver and the true politician” (IV.1.1288b27). Like any complete science or craft, it must study a range of issues concerning its subject matter. For example, gymnastics (physical education) studies what sort of training is best or adapted to the body that is naturally the best, what sort of training is best for most bodies, and what capacity is appropriate for someone who does not want the condition or knowledge appropriate for athletic contests. Political science studies a comparable range of constitutions (1288b21–35): first, the constitution which is best without qualification, i.e., “most according to our prayers with no external impediment”; second, the constitution that is best under the circumstances “for it is probably impossible for many persons to attain the best constitution”; third, the constitution which serves the aim a given population happens to have, i.e., the one that is best “based on a hypothesis”: “for [the political scientist] ought to be able to study a given constitution, both how it might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what manner it might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for example, if a particular city happens neither to be governed by the best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary things, nor to be the [best] possible under existing circumstances, but to be a baser sort.” Hence, Aristotelian political science is not confined to the ideal system, but also investigates the second-best constitution or even inferior political systems, because this may be the closest approximation to full political justice which the lawgiver can attain under the circumstances.

Regarding the constitution that is ideal or “according to prayer,” Aristotle criticizes the views of his predecessors in the Politics and then offers a rather sketchy blueprint of his own in Politics VII–VIII. Although his own political views were influenced by his teacher Plato, Aristotle is highly critical of the ideal constitution set forth in Plato’s Republic on the grounds that it overvalues political unity, it embraces a system of communism that is impractical and inimical to human nature, and it neglects the happiness of the individual citizens ( Politics II.1–5). In contrast, in Aristotle’s “best constitution,” each and every citizen will possess moral virtue and the equipment to carry it out in practice, and thereby attain a life of excellence and complete happiness (see VII.13.1332a32–8). All of the citizens will hold political office and possess private property because “one should call the city-state happy not by looking at a part of it but at all the citizens.” (VII.9.1329a22–3). Moreover, there will be a common system of education for all the citizens, because they share the same end ( Pol . VIII.1).

If (as is the case with most existing city-states) the population lacks the capacities and resources for complete happiness, however, the lawgiver must be content with fashioning a suitable constitution ( Politics IV.11). The second-best system typically takes the form of a polity (in which citizens possess an inferior, more common grade of virtue) or mixed constitution (combining features of democracy, oligarchy, and, where possible, aristocracy, so that no group of citizens is in a position to abuse its rights). Aristotle argues that for city-states that fall short of the ideal, the best constitution is one controlled by a numerous middle class which stands between the rich and the poor. For those who possess the goods of fortune in moderation find it “easiest to obey the rule of reason” ( Politics IV.11.1295b4–6). They are accordingly less apt than the rich or poor to act unjustly toward their fellow citizens. A constitution based on the middle class is the mean between the extremes of oligarchy (rule by the rich) and democracy (rule by the poor). “That the middle [constitution] is best is evident, for it is the freest from faction: where the middle class is numerous, there least occur factions and divisions among citizens” (IV.11.1296a7–9). The middle constitution is therefore both more stable and more just than oligarchy and democracy.

Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant constitution (albeit the best of a bad lot), he argues that a case might be made for popular rule in Politics III.11, a discussion which has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. The central claim is that the many may turn out to be better than the virtuous few when they come together, even though the many may be inferior when considered individually. For if each individual has a portion of virtue and practical wisdom, they may pool these moral assets and turn out to be better rulers than even a very wise individual. This argument seems to anticipate treatments of “the wisdom of the multitude” such as Condorcet’s “jury theorem.” In recent years, this particular chapter has been widely discussed in connection with topics such as democratic deliberation and public reason.

In addition, the political scientist must attend to existing constitutions even when they are bad. Aristotle notes that “to reform a constitution is no less a task [of politics] than it is to establish one from the beginning,” and in this way “the politician should also help existing constitutions” (IV.1.1289a1–7). The political scientist should also be cognizant of forces of political change which can undermine an existing regime. Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for excessive utopianism and neglect of the practical duties of a political theorist. However, he is no Machiavellian. The best constitution still serves as a regulative ideal by which to evaluate existing systems.

These topics occupy the remainder of the Politics . Books IV–VI are concerned with the existing constitutions: that is, the three deviant constitutions, as well as polity or the “mixed” constitution, which are the best attainable under most circumstances (IV.2.1289a26–38). The mixed constitution has been of special interest to scholars because it looks like a forerunner of modern republican regimes. The whole of book V investigates the causes and prevention of revolution or political change ( metabolê ) and civil war or faction ( stasis ). Books VII–VIII are devoted to the ideal constitution. As might be expected, Aristotle’s attempt to carry out this program involves many difficulties, and scholars disagree about how the two series of books (IV–VI and VII–VIII) are related to each other: for example, which were written first, which were intended to be read first, and whether they are ultimately consistent with each other. Most importantly, when Aristotle offers practical political prescriptions in Books IV–VI, is he guided by the best constitution as a regulative ideal, or is he simply abandoning political idealism and practicing a form of Realpolitik?For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle has continued to influence thinkers up to the present throughout the political spectrum, including conservatives (such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin), communitarians (such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel), liberals (such as William Galston and Martha C. Nussbaum), libertarians (such as Tibor R. Machan, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl), and democratic theorists (such as Jill Frank and Gerald M. Mara).

It is not surprising that such diverse political persuasions can lay claim to Aristotle as a source. For his method often leads to divergent interpretations. When he deals with a difficult problem, he is inclined to consider opposing arguments in a careful and nuanced manner, and he is often willing to concede that there is truth on each side. For example, though he is critical of democracy, in one passage he allows that the case for rule by the many based on the superior wisdom of the multitude “perhaps also involves some truth” ( Pol. III.11.1281a39–42). Again, he sometimes applies his own principles in a questionable manner, for example, when he reasons that because associations should be governed in a rational manner, the household should be run by the husband rather than by the wife, whose rational capacity “lacks authority” (I.13.1260a13). Modern commentators sympathetic with Aristotle’s general approach often contend that in this case he applies his own principles incorrectly–leaving open the question of how they should be applied. Further, the way he applies his principles may have seemed reasonable in his socio-political context–for example, that the citizen of a polity (normally the best attainable constitution) must be a hoplite soldier (cf. III.7,1297b4)–but it may be debatable how these might apply within a modern democratic nation-state.

The problem of extrapolating to modern political affairs can be illustrated more fully in connection with Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8. He first lays out the argument for making the laws changeable. It has been beneficial in the case of medicine, for example, for it to progress from traditional ways to improved forms of treatment. An existing law may be a vestige of a primitive barbaric practice. For instance, Aristotle mentions a law in Cyme that allows an accuser to produce a number of his own relatives as witnesses to prove that a defendant is guilty of murder. “So,” Aristotle concludes, “it is evident from the foregoing that some laws should sometimes be changed. But to those who look at the matter from a different angle, caution would seem to be required” (1269a12–14). Since the law gets its force from the citizens’ habit of obedience, great care should be exercised in making any change in it. It may sometimes be better to leave defective laws in place rather than encouraging lawlessness by changing the laws too frequently. Moreover, there are the problems of how the laws are to be changed and who is to change them. Although Aristotle offers valuable insights, he breaks off the discussion of this topic and never takes it up elsewhere. We might sum up his view as follows: When it comes to changing the laws, observe the mean: don’t be too bound by traditional laws, but on the other hand don’t be overeager in altering them. It is obvious that this precept, reasonable as it is, leaves considerable room for disagreement among contemporary “neo-Aristotelian” theorists. For example, should the laws be changed to allow self-described transsexual persons to use sexually segregated restrooms? Conservatives and liberals might agree with Aristotle’s general stricture regarding legal change but differ widely on how to apply it in a particular case.

Most scholars of Aristotle advisedly make no attempt to show that he is aligned with any contemporary ideology. Rather, insofar as they find him relevant to our times, it is because he offers a remarkable synthesis of idealism and pragmatism unfolding in deep and thought-provoking discussions of perennial concerns of political philosophy: the role of human nature in politics, the relation of the individual to the state, the place of morality in politics, the theory of political justice, the rule of law, the analysis and evaluation of constitutions, the relevance of ideals to practical politics, the causes and cures of political change and revolution, and the importance of a morally educated citizenry.

• action: praxis
• citizen: politês
• city-state: polis (also ‘city’ or ‘state’)
• community: koinônia
• constitution: politeia (also ‘regime’)
• faction: stasis (also ‘civil war’)
• free: eleutheros
• friendship: philia
• good: agathos
• happiness: eudaimonia
• happy: eudaimôn
• justice: dikaiosunê
• lawgiver: nomothetês
• master: despotês
• nature: phusis
• noble: kalon (also ‘beautiful’ or ‘fine’)
• people ( dêmos )
• political: politikos (of, or pertaining to, the polis )
• political science: politikê epistêmê
• politician: politikos (also ‘statesman’)
• practical: praktikos
• practical wisdom: phronêsis
• revolution: metabolê (also ‘change’)
• right: exousia (also ‘liberty’)
• ruler: archôn
• self-sufficient: autarkês
• sovereign: kurios
• virtue: aretê (also ‘excellence’)
• without qualification: haplôs (also ‘absolute’)
• without authority: akuron

Note on Citations . Passages in Aristotle are cited as follows: title of treatise (italics), book (Roman numeral), chapter (Arabic numeral), line reference. Line references are keyed to the 1831 edition of Immanuel Bekker which had two columns (“a” and “b”) on each page. Politics is abbreviated as Pol. and Nicomachean Ethics as NE . In this article, “ Pol . I.2.1252b27”, for example, refers to Politics book I, chapter 2, page 1252, column b, line 27. Most translations include the Bekker page number with column letter in the margin followed by every fifth line number.

Passages in Plato are cited in a similar fashion, except the line references are to the Stephanus edition of 1578 in which pages were divided into five parts (“a” through “e”).

Caveat on Bibliography. Although fairly extensive, this bibliography represents only a fraction of the secondary literature in English. However, the items cited here contain many references to other valuable scholarly work in other languages as well as in English.

• Dreizehnter, Alois, Aristoteles’ Politik , Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970 [generally the most reliable critical edition].
• Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Politica , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.
• Barker, Ernest, revised by Richard Stalley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Jowett, Benjamin, revised in The Complete Works of Aristotle (The Revised Oxford Translation), Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. II, pp. 1986–2129.
• Lord, Carnes, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, revised edition.
• Rackham, H., Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1932.
• Reeve, C. D. C., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2017 (new translation).
• Simpson, Peter L. P., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
• Sinclair, T. A., revised by Trevor J. Saunders, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.

The Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford University Press) includes translation and commentary of the Politics in four volumes:

• Trevor J. Saunders, Politics I–II (1995).
• Richard Robinson with a supplementary essay by David Keyt, Politics III–IV (1995).
• David Keyt, Politics V–VI (1999).
• Richard Kraut, Politics VII–VIII (1997).
• Also of interest is the Constitution of Athens , an account of the history and workings of the Athenian democracy. Although it was formerly ascribed to Aristotle, it is now thought by most scholars to have been written by one of his pupils, perhaps at his direction toward the end of Aristotle’s life. A reliable translation with introduction and notes is by P. J. Rhodes, Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution . Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.
• Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977.
• Boudouris, K. J. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, 2 volumes, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Höffe, Otfried (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
• Keyt, David, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
• Kraut, Richard, and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
• Lockwood, Thornton, and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
• Lord, Carnes, and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Patzig, Günther (ed.), Aristoteles’ Politik: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
• Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics , translated by Richard J. Regan, Indianapolis Publishing Co.: Hackett, 2007.
• Barker, Ernest, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle , London: Methuen, 1906; reprinted, New York: Russell & Russell, 1959.
• Bodéüs, Richard, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics , Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.
• Brill, Sara, Aristotle on the Concept of the Shared Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
• Hansen, Mogens Herman, Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics , Copenhagen: Tusculaneum Press, 2013.
• Keyt, David, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017.
• Kontos, Pavlos, Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason: Spectators, Legislators, Hopes, and Evils , Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Mulgan, Richard G., Aristotle’s Political Theory , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle , 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887–1902; reprinted Salem, NH: Ayer, 1985.
• Nichols, Mary, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.
• Pangle, Lorraine Smith, Reason and Character: The Moral Foundations of Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, Endangered Excellent: On the Political Philosophy of Aristotle , translated by Anthony Preus, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2020.
• Riesbeck, David J., Aristotle on Political Community , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
• Roberts, Jean, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics , London and New York: Routledge, 2009.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, Aristoteles: Politik , 4 vols. Berlin and Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1999–2005.
• Simpson, Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
• Strauss, Leo, “On Aristotle’s Politics,” in The City and Man , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 13–49.
• Susemihl, Franz, and R. D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle , London: Macmillan, 1894. [Includes books I–III and VII–VIII renumbered as IV–V.]
• Trott, Adriel M., Aristotle on the Nature of Community , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
• Veogelin, Eric, Order and History (Vol. III: Plato and Aristotle ), Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
• Yack, Bernard, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

1. Biographical and Textual Studies

• Barker, Ernest, “The Life of Aristotle and the Composition and Structure of the Politics ,” Classical Review , 45 (1931), 162–72.
• Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.
• Kelsen, Hans, “Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 170–94.
• Lord, Carnes, “The Character and Composition of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), 459–78.

2. Methodology and Foundations of Aristotle’s Political Theory

• Adkins, A. W. H., “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 75–93.
• Cherry, Kevin M., Plato, Aristotle and the Purpose of Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
• Depew, David J., “The Ethics of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 399–418.
• Frank Jill, “On Logos and Politics in Aristotle,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 9–26.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Political Character of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 14–37.
• Gerson, Lloyd, “On the Scientific Character of Aristotle’s Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 35–50.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Moral Science and Political Theory in Aristotle,” History of Political Thought , 6 (1985), pp. 150–68.
• Kahn, Charles H., “The Normative Structure of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 369–84.
• Kamtekar, Rachana, “The Relationship between Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Discourses ( NE X 9),” in Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 370–82.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 165–95.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “ Politics II: Political Critique, Political Theorizing, Political Innovation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 64–83.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “The Unity of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in David Konstan and David Sider (eds.), Philoderma: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in Honor of Phillip Mitsis (Siracusa: Parnassos Press, 2022), pp. 215–43.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Political Sociology: Class, Status, and Order in the Politics ,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “On the ‘Platonic’ Part of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in William Wians (ed.) Aristotle’s Philosophical Development , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, pp. 347–59.
• –––, “Is Politics a Natural Science?” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 27–45.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 558–85.
• Peonids, F., “The Relation between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics Revisited,” History of Political Thought 22 (2001): 1–12.
• Rowe, Christopher J., “Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 57–74.
• Salkever, Stephen G., “Aristotle’s Social Science,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), pp. 479–508; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 27–64.
• –––, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Santas, Gerasimos X.,“The Relation between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 160–76.
• Smith, Nicholas D. and Robert Mayhew, “Aristotle on What the Political Scientist Needs to Know,” in K. I. Boudouris (ed.) Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1995, vol. I, pp. 189–98.
• Vander Waerdt, Paul A., “The Political Intention of Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985), 77–89.
• –––, “The Plan and Intention of Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Writings,” Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991), 231–53.

3. Political Naturalism

• Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 163–85.
• Annas, Julia, “Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 731–54.
• Berryman, Sylvia, Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2919, esp. Ch. 3 “Naturalism in Aristotle’s Politics. ”
• Chan, Joseph, “Does Aristotle’s Political Theory Rest on a Blunder?” History of Political Thought , 13 (1992), 189–202.
• Chappell, Timothy, “‘Naturalism’ in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 382–98.
• Cherry, K. and E. A. Goerner, “Does Aristotle’s Polis Exist ‘By Nature’?” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 563–85.
• Cooper, John M., “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 220–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 65–89.
• DePew, David J., “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium ,” Phronesis , 40 (1995), 156–76.
• –––, “Political Animals and the Genealogy of the Polis : Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Statesman ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 238–57.
• Everson, Stephen, “Aristotle on the Foundations of the State,” Political Studies , 36 (1988), 89–101.
• Karbowski, Joseph, “Political Animals and Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 221–37.
• Keyt, David, “The Meaning of BIOS in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” Ancient Philosophy , 9 (1989), 15–21; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 101–9.
• –––, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 118–41; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 111–38.
• Kullmann, Wolfgang, “Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 94–117.
• Lloyd, Geoffrey, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability, Skills and Intelligence of Animals,” in Verity Harte and Melissa Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 277–94.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle: Naturalism,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 321–43.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal,” Hermes , 102 (1974), 438–45.
• Reeve, C. D. C., “The Naturalness of the Polis in Aristotle,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 512–25.
• Roberts, Jean, “Political Animals in the Nicomachean Ethics ,” Phronesis , 34 (1989), 185–202.

4. Household: Women, Children, and Slaves

• Booth, William James, “Politics and the Household: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics Book One,” History of Political Thought , 2 (1981), 203–26.
• Brunt, P. A., “Aristotle and Slavery,” in Studies in Greek History and Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 434–88.
• Chambliss, J. J., “Aristotle’s Conception of Children and the Poliscraft,” Educational Studies , 13 (1982), 33–43.
• Cole, Eve Browning, “Women, Slaves, and ‘Love of Toil’ in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 127–44.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, “The Virtues of Women and Slaves,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 25 (2003), 213–31.
• –––, “Political Rule Over Women in Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 46–63.
• Fortenbaugh, W. W., “Aristotle on Slaves and Women,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 135–9.
• Frank, Jill, “Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature,” American Political Science Review , 98 (2004), 91–104.
• Freeland, Cynthia, Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
• Garnsey, Peter, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• Lindsay, Thomas K., “Was Aristotle Racist, Sexist, and Anti-Democratic?: A Review Essay,” Review of Politics 56 (1994), 127–51.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Justice in Aristotle’s Household and City,” Polis , 20 (2003), 1–21.
• –––, “Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 45 (2007), 207–21.
• Mayhew, Robert, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
• Modrak, Deborah, “Aristotle: Women, Deliberation, and Nature,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 207–21.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Political Role of Women,” History of Political Thought , 15 (1994), 179–202.
• Nagle, D. Brendan, The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “Natural Slavery,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 92–116.
• Saxenhouse, Arlene W., “Family, Polity, and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates’ Community of Wives,” Polity , 15 (1982), 202–19.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 1–27; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 91–119.
• Senack, Christine M., “Aristotle on the Woman’s Soul,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 223–36.
• Simpson, Peter, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Socrates’ Communism of Wives and Children,” Apeiron , 24 (1991), 99–114.
• Smith, Nicholas D., “Plato and Aristotle on the Nature of Women,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 21 (1983), 467–78.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Natural Slavery,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 142–55.
• Spelman, E. V., “Aristotle and the Politicization of the Soul,” in Sandra Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds) Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983, pp. 17–30.
• –––, “Who’s Who in the Polis,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 99–125.
• Stauffer, Dana J., “Aristotle’s Account of the Subjection of Women,” Journal of Politics , 70 (2008), 929–41.

5. Political Economy

• Ambler, Wayne H., “Aristotle on Acquisition,” Canadian Journal of Political Science , 17 (1984), 487–502.
• Crespo, Ricardo F., A Re-assessment of Aristotle ’ s Economic Thought . London: Routledge, 2014.
• Dobbs, Darrell, “Aristotle’s Anticommunism,” American Journal of Political Science , 29 (1985), 29–46.
• Finley, M. I., “Aristotle and Economic Analysis,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 140–58.
• Gallagher, Robert L., Aristotle’s Critique of Political Economy with a Contemporary Application. London: Routledge, 2018.
• Hadreas, Peter, “Aristotle on the Vices and Virtue of Wealth,” Journal of Business Ethics, 39 (2002), 361–76.
• Hartman, Edwin M., “Virtue, Profit, and the Separation Thesis: An Aristotelian View,” Journal of Business Ethics ,99 (2011), 5–17.
• –––, Virtue in Business: Conversations with Aristotle . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Inamura, Kazutaka, “The Role of Reciprocity in Aristotle’s Theory of Political Economy,” History of Political Thought , 32 (2011), 565–87.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Aristotle’s Defense of Private Property,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.). A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 200–25.
• Judson, Lindsay, “Aristotle on Fair Exchange,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 15 (1997), 147–75.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and the Joy of Working,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 223–39.
• Mathie, William,“Property in the Political Science of Aristotle,” in Anthony Parel & Thomas Flanagan(eds.), Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present . Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979, pp. 12–35.
• Mayhew, Robert, “Aristotle on Property,” The Review of Metaphysics , 46 (1993), 802–31.
• McNeill, D., “Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and Reciprocity,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 4 (1990), 55–68.
• Mei, Todd S., “The Preeminence of Use: Reevaluating the Relation between Use and Exchange in Aristotle’s Economic Thought,” American Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009), 523–48.
• Meikle, Scott, “Aristotle on Money” Phronesis 39 (1994), 26–44.
• –––, Aristotle’s Economic Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Miller, Fred D. Jr., “Property Rights in Aristotle,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 121–44.
• –––, “Was Aristotle the First Economist?” Apeiron , 31 (1998), 387–98.
• –––, “Aristotle and Business: Friend or Foe?” in Eugene Heath and Byron Kaldis (eds.), Wealth, Commerce and Philosophy: Foundational Thinkers and Business Ethics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017, pp. 31–52.
• Morris, Tom, If Aristotle Ran General Motors: The New Soul of Business , New York: Henry Holt, 1997.
• Nielsen, Karen Margrethe, “Economy and Private Property,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 67–91.
• Solomon, Robert C., “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 2 (1992), 317–39.
• –––, “Aristotle, Ethics, and Business Organizations,” Organization Studies, 25 (2004), 1021–43.

6. Political Justice and Injustice

• Brunschwig, Jacques, “The Aristotelian Theory of Equity,” in Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–55.
• Marguerite Deslauriers, “Political Unity and Inequality,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 117–43.
• Georgiadis, Constantine, “Equitable and Equity in Aristotle,” in Spiro Panagiotou (ed.), Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle , Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987, pp. 159–72.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 238–78.
• –––, “The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 220–40. Reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 197–221.
• –––, “Nature and Justice,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 1–19.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Polity, Political Justice, and Political Mixing,” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 207–22.
• Morrison, Donald, “The Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 176–98.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 153–87.
• Roberts, Jean, “Justice and the Polis,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 344–65.
• Rosler, Andrés, “Civic Virtue: Citizenship, Ostracism, and War,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 144–75.
• Saxonhouse, Arlene W., “Aristotle on the Corruption of Regimes: Resentment and Justice,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 184–203.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, “Little to Do With Justice: Aristotle on Distributing Political Power,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 163–83.
• Young, Charles M., “Aristotle on Justice,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy , 27 (1988), 233–49.
• Zingano, Marco, “Natural, Ethical, and Political Justice,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 199–222.

7. Political Friendship and Enmity

• Hatzistavrou, Antony, “Faction,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Irrera, Elena, “Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship,” History of Political Thought , 26 (2005), 565–85.
• Jang, Misung, “Aristotle’s Political Friendship as Solidarity,” in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, & Nuno M.S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018. pp. 417–33.
• Kalimtzis, Kostas, Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
• Kreft, Nora, “Aristotle on Friendship and Being Human,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 182–99.
• Kronman, Anthony, “Aristotle’s Idea of Political Fraternity,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979),114–138.
• Leontsini, Eleni, “The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice, and Concord,” Res Publica , 19 (2013), 21–35.
• Ludwig, Paul W., Rediscovering Political Friendship: Aristotle’s Theory and Modern Identity, Community, and Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on Deviant Constitutions,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. II, pp. 105–15.
• Mulgan, Richard, “The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory,” in Preston King, and Heather Devere (eds.), The Challenge to Friendship in M odernity , London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 15–32.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity,” in Saving the City , London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 82–99.
• Schwarzenbach, Sibyl, “On Civic Friendship,” Ethics , 107 (1996), 97–128.
• Skultety, Steven C.,. “Defining Aristotle’s Conception of Stasis in the Politics ,” Phronesis 54 (2009), 346–70.
• –––, Conflict in Aristotle ’ s Political Philosophy , Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2019.
• Sosa, Javier Echeñique & Jose Antonio Errázuriz Besa, “Aristotle on Personal Enmity,” Ancient Philosophy , 62 (2022), 215–31.
• Ward, Ann, “Friendship and politics in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ,” European Journal of Political Theory , 10 (2011), 443–62.
• Weed, Ronald, Aristotle on Stasis: A Psychology of Political Conflict , Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2007.
• Yack, Bernard, “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 92–112.
• –––, “Natural Right and Aristotle’s Understanding of Justice,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 216–37.

8. Citizenship, Civic Obligation, and Political Rights

• Allan, D. J., “Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics ,” Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique IX, La ‘Politique’ d’Aristote , Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1964, pp. 53–95.
• Barnes, Jonathan, “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 249–63; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 185–201.
• Collins, Susan D., Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Frede, Dorothea, “Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 167–84.
• Horn, Christoph, “Law, Governance, and Political Obligation,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 223–46.
• Irwin, Terence H., “The Good of Political Activity,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 73–98.
• Kraut, Richard, “Are There Natural Rights in Aristotle?” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 755–74.
• Lane, Melissa, “Claims to Rule: The Case of the Mutlitude,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 247–74.
• Long, Roderick T., “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 775–802; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 384–410.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 873–907.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Political Rights,” in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 309–50.
• Morrison, Donald, “Aristotle’s Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly , 16 (1999), 143–65.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 195–215.
• Roberts, Jean, “Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 555–65.
• Samaras, Thanassis, “Aristotle and the Question of Citizenship,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 123–41.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Sharing in the Constitution,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 831–58; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 353–80.
• Zuckert, Catherine H., “Aristotle on the Limits and Satisfactions of Political Life,” Interpretation , 11 (1983), 185–206.

9. Constitutional Theory

• Balot, Ryan, “The ‘Mixed Regime’ In Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 103–22.
• Bates, Clifford A., Aristotle’s “Best Regime”: Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law , Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
• Bobonich, Christopher, “Aristotle, Decision Making, and the Many,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 142–62.
• Cherry, Kevin M., “The Problem of Polity: Political Participation in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Journal of Politics , 71 (2009), 406–21.
• Coby, Patrick, “Aristotle’s Three Cities and the Problem of Faction,” Journal of Politics , 50 (1988), 896–919.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Aristotle on Improving Imperfect Cities,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 204–23.
• Dietz, Mary G., “Between Polis and Empire: Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review 106 (2012), 275–93.
• Garsten, Bryan, “Deliberating and Acting Together,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 324–49.
• Huxley, G., “On Aristotle’s Best State,” in Paul Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix , London: Duckworth, 1985, pp. 139–49.
• Johnson, Curtis N., Aristotle’s Theory of the State , New York: Macmillan, 1990.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and Anarchism,” Reason Papers , 18 (1993), 133–52; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety. Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 203–22.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Critique of False Utopias,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 59–73.
• Lintott, Andrew, “Aristotle and Democracy,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series), 42 (1992), 114–28.
• Mayhew, Robert, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
• –––, “Rulers and Ruled,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 526–39.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on the Ideal Constitution,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 540–54.
• –––, “The Rule of Reason,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 38–66.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 307–22.
• –––, “Constitutions and the Purpose of the State,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 93–106.
• Mulhern, J. J., “ Politeia in Greek Literature, Inscriptions, and in Aristotle’s Politics : Reflections on Translation and Interpretation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 84–102.
• Murray, O., “Polis and Politeia in Aristotle,” in Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-State , Copenhagen: Muksgaard, 1993, pp. 197–210.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Natural Democracy,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 223–43.
• –––, “Democracy’s Wisdom: An Aristotelian Middle Way for Collective Judgment,” American Political Science Review , 107 (2013), 104–22.
• –––, “Nature, History, and Aristotle’s Best Possible Regime,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 224–43.
• Polansky, Ronald, “Aristotle on Political Change,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 322–45.
• Rosler, Andres, Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
• Rowe, C. J., “Reality and Utopia,” Elenchos , 10 (1989), 317–36.
• –––, “Aristotelian Constitutions,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 366–89.
• Strauss, Barry, “On Aristotle’s Critique of Athenian Democracy,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 212–33.
• Vander Waert, Paul A., “Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Phronesis , 30 (1985), 249–73.
• Waldron, Jeremy, “The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 145–65.
• Wilson, James L., “Deliberation, Democracy, and the Rule of Reason in Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review , 105 (2011), 259–74.

10. Education

• Burnyeat, Myles F., “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 69–92.
• Curren, Randall R., Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
• Depew, David J., “Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal State,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 346–80.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Education, Leisure, and Politics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Deficiency of Human Nature: The Task of a ‘Philosophy of Human Nature’,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 258–74.
• Jimenez, Marta, Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle on Method and Moral Education,” in Jyl Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 171–90.
• –––, “Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection, and Perception,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 529–57.
• Lord, Carnes, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
• Lynch, John Patrick, Aristotle’s School , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
• Muzio, G. D., “Aristotle on Improving One’s Character,” Phronesis , 45 (2000), 205–19.
• Reeve, C. D. C,  “Aristotelian Education,” in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Philosophers on Education , London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 51–65.
• Stalley, Richard, “Education and the State,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 566–76.
• Brooks, Richard O. and James B. Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
• Burns, Tony, “Aristotle and Natural Law,” History of Political Thought , 19 (1998), 142–66.
• Duke, George, Aristotle and Law: The Politics of Nomos , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gordley, James R., “Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in Salvador Rus Rufino (ed.), Aristoteles: El Pensamiento Politico y Juridico . León & Seville: University of León & University of Seville, 1999, pp. 71–97.
• Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.
• Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth & Nuno M..S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics , Dordrecht: Springer, 2018.
• Miller, Eugene, “Prudence and the Rule of Law,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979), 181–206.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” in Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi (eds.), A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics [vol. 6 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence , ed. Enrico Pattaro]. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, pp.79–110.
• Schroeder, Donald N., “Aristotle on Law,” Polis , 4 (1981), 17–31; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 37–51.
• Wormuth, F. D., “Aristotle on Law,” in M. R. Korvitz and A. E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in Political Theory Presented to G. H. Sabine,  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948, pp. 45–61.
• Zanetti, Gianfrancesco, “Problematic Aspects of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” Archiv f ü r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie , 81 (1995), 49–64.

12. Aristotle and Contemporary Politics

• Biondi, Carrie-Ann, “Aristotle on the Mixed Constitution and Its Relevance for American Political Thought,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 176–98.
• Frank, Jill, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
• Galston, William A., Justice and the Human Good , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
• Garver, Eugene, Aristotle’s Politics: Living Well and Living Together , Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011.
• Goodman, Lenn E. and Robert Talise (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics Today , Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle and Rawls on the Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 350–74.
• Lord, Carnes, “Aristotle and the Idea of Liberal Education,” in Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (eds.), Demokrateia: A Conversation of Democracy, Ancient and Modern , Princeton: Princeton University Press Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 271–88.
• Machan, Tibor R., “Aristotle and the Moral Status of Business,”  Journal of Value Inquiry , 38 (2004), 217–33.
• Mara, Gerald M., “The Culture of Democracy: Aristotle’s Athênaiôn Politeia as Political Theory,” in Aristide Tessitore (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002, 307–41.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Was Aristotle an ‘Aristotelian Social Democrat’?” Ethics , 111 (2000), 79–101.
• Murphy, James Bernard, The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson (eds.) Liberalism and the Good , London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 203–52.
• –––, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review , 66 (1997), 273–300; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 413–40.
• –––, “Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Anthony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan,” Ethics , 111 (2000), 102–40.
• Pack, Spencer J., “Aristotle’s Difficult Relationship with Modern Economic Theory,” Foundations of Science , 13 (2008), 256–80.
• Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order , La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991.
• –––, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.
• Schollmeier, Paul, Rewriting Contemporary Political Philosophy with Plato and Aristotle: An Essay on Eudaimonic Politics,  London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.
• Salkever, Stephen S., Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Tessitore, Aristide (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
• Wallach, John C., “Contemporary Aristotelianism,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41.

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The Question of Political Regime

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Aaron Bushnell’s Act of Political Despair

By Masha Gessen

On Sunday afternoon, Aaron Bushnell, wearing a mustard-colored sweater under his combat fatigues, walked up to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. As he approached the building, he filmed himself saying, “I am an active-duty member of the United States Air Force, and I will no longer be complicit in genocide. I’m about to engage in an extreme act of protest, but, compared to what people have been experiencing in Palestine at the hands of their colonizers, it’s not extreme at all. This is what our ruling class has decided will be normal.” He set his phone down, propping it up to continue filming, poured a flammable liquid from a water bottle over his head, then put on his camouflage hat and used a lighter to set himself on fire. He died in the hospital from his injuries later that day. He was twenty-five years old.

If you are having thoughts of suicide, call or text 988 or chat at 988Lifeline.org .

Self-immolation is not a new form of political protest, but it is by no means a common one. Dozens of Buddhist monks have committed self-immolation, to protest the suppression of Buddhist leaders in Vietnam in the middle of the last century and, more recently, to draw attention to Chinese rule over Tibet, and the exile of the Dalai Lama . In the nineteen-sixties, dozens of people in the United States and Asia died after setting themselves on fire to protest the war in Vietnam. Then the practice spread to the Soviet bloc. It began when hope died. In 1968, students in Warsaw and Prague protested, much like students elsewhere in the West that year. In Czechoslovakia, the leadership of the Communist Party instituted liberal reforms, relaxing censorship and promising to build a “socialism with a human face.” It was known as the Prague Spring. But, in August, Warsaw Pact troops, commanded by Moscow, entered Czechoslovakia. The country’s leadership was placed under arrest and airlifted to Moscow. The Prague Spring was crushed . In September, Ryszard Siwiec, a fifty-nine-year-old Polish war veteran, set himself on fire during a harvest festival, insuring that his protest against his country’s complicity in the invasion was witnessed by thousands of people. A more widely remembered act of self-immolation was committed several months later by a twenty-year-old Czech student named Jan Palach, who ran down a street in Prague after setting himself on fire.

Under conditions of democracy, people act politically because they think that their actions can lead to change. They cannot effect change alone, and change is never immediate, but their experience tells them that change is possible and that it is brought about by the actions of citizens. When people do not believe that change is possible, most do not act. Authoritarian regimes rely on a passive citizenry. Totalitarian regimes mobilize their subjects to imitate political action, but in a way that never brings about change. The vast majority comply. But a small minority can’t stand it. Dissidents are people who would rather pay the psychic cost of becoming outcasts because what Václav Havel called “living within the lie” is even worse. Within this minority, there seems to be an even smaller group of people who find their individual helplessness so unbearable that they are willing to do something as desperate as self-immolate. Jan Palach’s protest suicide was followed by several more in Czechoslovakia, then in Lithuania and Ukraine. In the past few years, self-immolation has reëmerged as a form of protest in Putin’s Russia.

What does it mean for an American to self-immolate? Since the Vietnam War, Americans have died by this form of suicide to draw attention to climate change, as the lawyer and conservationist David Buckel did, in Brooklyn in 2018, and the climate activist Wynn Bruce did, on Earth Day, 2022, on the steps of the Supreme Court . Like all of us, these men lived in a world that knows about the catastrophic threat of climate change, pays lip service to the need to protect the human population of the planet, yet fails to act. “Many who drive their own lives to help others often realize that they do not change what causes the need for their help,” Buckel wrote in an e-mail that he sent to several media outlets before setting himself on fire in Prospect Park. Buckel had been a lifelong activist, a lawyer who had helped to advance L.G.B.T. rights. But, on the issue of climate, despite being surrounded with like-minded people and being able to act with them, he felt helpless.

We know very little about Aaron Bushnell. His Facebook page shows that he had been following the war in Gaza and admired Rashida Tlaib, a Democratic congresswoman from Michigan, who is Palestinian American. We know that Bushnell belonged to a generation of Americans—adults under the age of thirty—who express more sympathy with Palestinians than with Israelis in the current conflict. Perhaps, like Buckel, he was surrounded by people who thought as he did yet was constantly reminded of his helplessness. He probably watched as, in November, twenty-two Democrats joined House Republicans in censuring Tlaib for alleged antisemitic remarks, though Tlaib herself, who has family in the occupied West Bank, had taken pains to stress that her issues are with Israel’s government, not its people. He had been watching a Presidential race between two elderly men who seem to differ little on what for Bushnell was the most pressing issue in the world today: the slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza. What did it matter that Bushnell had the right to vote if he had no real choice? That he was a member of the military surely made matters worse. His final message on Facebook read, “Many of us like to ask ourselves, ‘What would I do if I was alive during slavery? Or the Jim Crow South? Or apartheid? What would I do if my country was committing genocide?’ The answer is, you’re doing it. Right now.” (The message, which contained a link to the page on Twitch where Bushnell was planning to live-stream his final act of protest, is no longer visible.)

Bushnell wrote a will in which he left his savings to the Palestine Children’s Relief Fund. Perhaps he had watched the hearing of a case in federal court in California, brought by Defense for Children International-Palestine in an attempt to stop the Biden Administration from continuing to aid the Israeli attacks on Gaza . Perhaps he saw the U.S. government argue that there is no legal pathway for citizens to stop the government from providing military aid, even if it can be shown that the aid is used to genocidal ends. A few days later, the judge in the case, Jeffrey White, said that the legal system could indeed do nothing. “This Court implores Defendants to examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza,” he wrote in his decision. Even the federal judge felt helpless.

Maybe Bushnell watched or read about the proceedings of South Africa’s case against Israel in the International Court of Justice. Perhaps he listened to the litany of atrocities that grew familiar as fast as it became outdated: the exact thousands of women and children killed, the precise majority of Gazans who are experiencing extreme hunger. That court ordered Israel to take immediate measures to protect Palestinian civilians. Israel has ignored the ruling, and the United States has vetoed resolutions calling for a ceasefire and argued, in another I.C.J. case, that the court should not order Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. This was a government that Bushnell had sworn to protect with his life, subverting mechanisms created to enforce international law, including law—such as the Genocide Convention—that the United States had played a key role in drafting.

We know that Bushnell planned his self-immolation carefully. He made final arrangements. He contacted the media. On the day of the action, he carried himself with purpose. His movements appeared rehearsed. Perhaps he dreamed that his protest would awaken a country that had descended into a moral stupor. Like Jan Palach, who ran down a street, and Ryszard Siwiec, who set himself aflame at a dance, Bushnell wanted us to see him burn.

In 2013, the Dalai Lama, long under pressure to call for an end to the practice of self-immolation, called it a form of nonviolence. Nonviolence should not be confused with passivity: as a form of protest, nonviolence is a practice that exposes violence. The philosopher Judith Butler has argued that nonviolence cannot be undertaken by a person acting alone. That would be true for nonviolence as a political act—an act aimed at effecting change, an act founded in hope. Self-immolation is a nonviolent act of despair. ♦

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By Bernard Avishai

By Susan B. Glasser

By Rania Abouzeid

What’s the Israel-Palestine conflict about? A simple guide

It’s killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions. And its future lies in its past. We break it down.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced many millions of people and has its roots in a colonial act carried out more than a century ago.

With Israel declaring war on the Gaza Strip after an unprecedented attack by the armed Palestinian group Hamas on Saturday, the world’s eyes are again sharply focused on what might come next.

Keep reading

From hubris to humiliation: the 10 hours that shocked israel from hubris to humiliation: the 10 hours ..., fears of a ground invasion of gaza grow as israel vows ‘mighty vengeance’ fears of a ground invasion of gaza grow ..., ‘my voice is our lifeline’: gaza journalist and family amid israel bombing ‘my voice is our lifeline’: gaza ....

Hamas fighters have killed more than 800 Israelis in assaults on multiple towns in southern Israel. In response, Israel has launched a bombing campaign in the Gaza Strip, killing more than 500 Palestinians. It has mobilised troops along the Gaza border, apparently in preparation for a ground attack. And on Monday, it announced a “total blockade” of the Gaza Strip, stopping the supply of food, fuel and other essential commodities to the already besieged enclave in an act that under international law amounts to a war crime.

But what unfolds in the coming days and weeks has its seed in history.

For decades, Western media outlets, academics, military experts and world leaders have described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as intractable, complicated and deadlocked.

Here’s a simple guide to break down one of the world’s longest-running conflicts:

What was the Balfour Declaration?

• More than 100 years ago, on November 2, 1917, Britain’s then-foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, wrote a letter addressed to Lionel Walter Rothschild, a figurehead of the British Jewish community.
• The letter was short – just 67 words – but its contents had a seismic effect on Palestine that is still felt to this day.
• It committed the British government to “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and to facilitating “the achievement of this object”. The letter is known as the Balfour Declaration .
• In essence, a European power promised the Zionist movement a country where Palestinian Arab natives made up more than 90 percent of the population.
• A British Mandate was created in 1923 and lasted until 1948. During that period, the British facilitated mass Jewish immigration – many of the new residents were fleeing Nazism in Europe – and they also faced protests and strikes. Palestinians were alarmed by their country’s changing demographics and British confiscation of their lands to be handed over to Jewish settlers.

What happened during the 1930s?

• Escalating tensions eventually led to the Arab Revolt, which lasted from 1936 to 1939.
• In April 1936, the newly formed Arab National Committee called on Palestinians to launch a general strike, withhold tax payments and boycott Jewish products to protest British colonialism and growing Jewish immigration.
• The six-month strike was brutally repressed by the British, who launched a mass arrest campaign and carried out punitive home demolitions , a practice that Israel continues to implement against Palestinians today.
• The second phase of the revolt began in late 1937 and was led by the Palestinian peasant   resistance movement, which targeted British forces and colonialism.
• By the second half of 1939, Britain had massed 30,000 troops in Palestine. Villages were bombed by air, curfews imposed, homes demolished, and administrative detentions and summary killings were widespread.
• In tandem, the British collaborated with the Jewish settler community and formed armed groups and a British-led “counterinsurgency force” of Jewish fighters named the Special Night Squads.
• Within the Yishuv, the pre-state settler community, arms were secretly imported and weapons factories established to expand the Haganah, the Jewish paramilitary that later became the core of the Israeli army.
• In those three years of revolt, 5,000 Palestinians were killed, 15,000 to 20,000 were wounded and 5,600 were imprisoned.

What was the UN partition plan?

• By 1947, the Jewish population had ballooned to 33 percent of Palestine, but they owned only 6 percent of the land.
• The United Nations adopted Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.
• The Palestinians rejected the plan because it allotted about 55 percent of Palestine to the Jewish state, including most of the fertile coastal region.
• At the time, the Palestinians owned 94 percent of historic Palestine and comprised 67 percent of its population.

The 1948 Nakba, or the ethnic cleansing of Palestine

• Even before the British Mandate expired on May 14, 1948, Zionist paramilitaries were already embarking on a military operation to destroy Palestinian towns and villages to expand the borders of the Zionist state that was to be born.
• In April 1948, more than 100 Palestinian men, women and children were killed in the village of Deir Yassin on the outskirts of Jerusalem.
• That set the tone for the rest of the operation, and from 1947 to 1949, more than 500 Palestinian villages, towns and cities were destroyed in what Palestinians refer to as the Nakba , or “catastrophe” in Arabic.
• An estimated 15,000 Palestinians were killed, including in dozens of massacres.
• The Zionist movement captured 78 percent of historic Palestine. The remaining 22 percent was divided into what are now the occupied West Bank and the besieged Gaza Strip.
• An estimated 750,000 Palestinians were forced out of their homes.
• Today their descendants live as six million refugees in 58 squalid camps throughout Palestine and in the neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.
• On May 15, 1948, Israel announced its establishment.
• The following day, the first Arab-Israeli war began and fighting ended in January 1949 after an armistice between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria.
• In December 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194, which calls for the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

The years after the Nakba

• At least 150,000 Palestinians remained in the newly created state of Israel and lived under a tightly controlled military occupation for almost 20 years before they were eventually granted Israeli citizenship.
• Egypt took over the Gaza Strip, and in 1950, Jordan began its administrative rule over the West Bank.
• In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was formed, and a year later, the Fatah political party was established.

The Naksa, or the Six-Day War and the settlements

• On June 5, 1967, Israel occupied the rest of historic Palestine, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula during the Six-Day War against a coalition of Arab armies.
• For some Palestinians, this led to a second forced displacement, or Naksa, which means “setback” in Arabic.
• In December 1967, the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was formed. Over the next decade, a series of attacks and plane hijackings by leftist groups drew the world’s attention to the plight of the Palestinians.
• Settlement construction began in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. A two-tier system was created with Jewish settlers afforded all the rights and privileges of being Israeli citizens whereas Palestinians had to live under a military occupation that discriminated against them and barred any form of political or civic expression.

The first Intifada 1987-1993

• The first Palestinian Intifada erupted in the Gaza Strip in December 1987 after four Palestinians were killed when an Israeli truck collided with two vans carrying Palestinian workers.
• Protests spread rapidly to the West Bank with young Palestinians throwing stones at Israeli army tanks and soldiers.
• It also led to the establishment of the Hamas movement, an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood that engaged in armed resistance against the Israeli occupation.
• The Israeli army’s heavy-handed response was encapsulated by the “Break their Bones” policy advocated by then-Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It included summary killings, closures of universities, deportations of activists and destruction of homes.
• The Intifada was primarily carried out by young people and was directed by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, a coalition of Palestinian political factions committed to ending the Israeli occupation and establishing Palestinian independence.
• In 1988, the Arab League recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.
• The Intifada was characterised by popular mobilisations, mass protests, civil disobedience, well-organised strikes and communal cooperatives.
• According to the Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem, 1,070 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces during the Intifada, including 237 children. More than 175,000 Palestinians were arrested.
• The Intifada also prompted the international community to search for a solution to the conflict.

The Oslo years and the Palestinian Authority

• The Intifada ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), an interim government that was granted limited self-rule in pockets of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
• The PLO recognised Israel on the basis of a two-state solution and effectively signed agreements that gave Israel control of 60 percent of the West Bank, and much of the territory’s land and water resources.
• The PA was supposed to make way for the first elected Palestinian government running an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with its capital in East Jerusalem, but that has never happened.
• Critics of the PA view it as a corrupt subcontractor to the Israeli occupation that collaborates closely with the Israeli military in clamping down on dissent and political activism against Israel.
• In 1995, Israel built an electronic fence and concrete wall around the Gaza Strip, snapping interactions between the split Palestinian territories.

The second Intifada

• The second Intifada began on September 28, 2000, when Likud opposition leader Ariel Sharon made a provocative visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound with thousands of security forces deployed in and around the Old City of Jerusalem.
• Clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli forces killed five Palestinians and injured 200 over two days.
• The incident sparked a widespread armed uprising. During the Intifada, Israel caused unprecedented damage to the Palestinian economy and infrastructure.
• Israel reoccupied areas governed by the Palestinian Authority and began construction of a separation wall that along with rampant settlement construction, destroyed Palestinian livelihoods and communities.
• Settlements are illegal under international law, but over the years, hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers have moved to colonies built on stolen Palestinian land. The space for Palestinians is shrinking as settler-only roads and infrastructure slice up the occupied West Bank, forcing Palestinian cities and towns into bantustans, the isolated enclaves for Black South Africans that the country’s former apartheid regime created.
• At the time the Oslo Accords were signed, just over 110,000 Jewish settlers lived in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Today, the figure is more than 700,000 living on more than 100,000 hectares (390sq miles) of land expropriated from the Palestinians.

The Palestinian division and the Gaza blockade

• PLO leader Yasser Arafat died in 2004, and a year later, the second Intifada ended, Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip were dismantled, and Israeli soldiers and 9,000 settlers left the enclave.
• A year later, Palestinians voted in a general election for the first time.
• Hamas won a majority. However, a Fatah-Hamas civil war broke out, lasting for months, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Palestinians.
• Hamas expelled Fatah from the Gaza Strip, and Fatah – the main party of the Palestinian Authority – resumed control of parts of the West Bank.
• In June 2007, Israel imposed a land, air and naval blockade on the Gaza Strip, accusing Hamas of “terrorism”.

The wars on the Gaza Strip

• Israel has launched four protracted military assaults on Gaza: in 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2021. Thousands of Palestinians have been killed, including many children , and tens of thousands of homes, schools and office buildings have been destroyed.
• Rebuilding has been next to impossible because the siege prevents construction materials, such as steel and cement, from reaching Gaza.
• The 2008 assault involved the use of internationally banned weaponry, such as phosphorus gas.
• In 2014, over a span of 50 days, Israel killed more than 2,100 Palestinians, including 1,462 civilians and close to 500 children.
• During the  assault , called Operation Protective Edge by the Israelis, about 11,000 Palestinians were wounded, 20,000 homes were destroyed and half a million people displaced .

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Guest Essay

Harvard Should Say Less. Maybe All Schools Should.

By Noah Feldman and Alison Simmons

Dr. Feldman is a law professor and Dr. Simmons is a professor of philosophy, both at Harvard.

Last fall, Harvard University’s leadership found itself at the center of a highly public, highly charged fight about taking an official institutional position in connection with the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the war in Gaza.

First, critics denounced the school for being too slow to issue a statement on the matter. Then, after a statement was released by Harvard’s president, Claudine Gay, and 17 other senior Harvard officials, some critics attacked it for being insufficiently forceful in condemning the Hamas attack, while others criticized it for being insufficiently forceful in condemning Israel’s retaliation.

One of the many sources of confusion at the time was that Harvard, like many other universities, did not have a formal policy on when and whether to issue official statements. In the absence of a policy, Harvard not only had to figure out what to say or not say; it also had to deal with the perception that not issuing a statement, or not issuing one fast enough, would in effect be a statement, too.

Fortunately, Harvard now does have official guidance for a policy on university statements, in the form of a report issued on Tuesday by a faculty working group on which we served together as chairs, and endorsed by the president, provost and deans. The report recommends a policy based on both principle and pragmatism, one that we hope can enable Harvard — and any other school that might consider adopting a similar policy — to flourish in our highly polarized political era.

In brief, the report says that university leaders can and should speak out publicly to promote and protect the core function of the university, which is to create an environment suitable for pursuing truth through research, scholarship and teaching. If, for example, Donald Trump presses forward with his announced plan to take “billions and billions of dollars” from large university endowments to create an “American Academy” — a free, online school that would provide an “alternative” to current institutions — Harvard’s leadership can and should express its objections to this terrible idea.

It makes sense for university leaders to speak out on matters concerning the core function of the institution: That is their area of expertise as presidents, provosts and deans. But they should not, the report says, take official stands on other matters. They should not, for instance, issue statements of solidarity with Ukraine after Russia’s invasion, no matter how morally attractive or even correct that sentiment might be.

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We're witnessing the rise of a new digital censorship regime in which political interests collude with Big Tech. We don't just need transparency but investigations to counter abuses of power. (Photo illustration: Hinterhaus Productions/Getty Images)

A House panel held a hearing last month examining how the Biden White House colluded with Big Tech platforms to censor speech about COVID-19 and the 2020 presidential election.

Exposing these past abuses was a good start for the House Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government . But now, the same forces are reforming to impose a new digital censorship regime ahead of this fall’s elections.

Indeed, American tech, government, and nonprofit elites are bent on repeating the sins of 2020.

Congress and the states stand in the way. To ensure the integrity of the upcoming election, they need to refocus efforts on disrupting the new censorship apparatus.

The first step should be addressing the private organizations calling on Big Tech platforms to remove or throttle content that they label as election misinformation or disinformation.

In an open letter, over 200 such groups demand that Facebook, X, Instagram, and other major platforms reinstate “election-integrity policies, inclusive of moderating content around the Big Lie” and changing algorithms to “promote factual election content.”

Doing so won’t be easy. These groups have the backing of powerful political interests.

According to a recent report from the Media Research Center, at least 45 of the groups collected $80.8 million between 2016 and 2022 from liberal financier and  philanthropist George Soros.

And they’re not the only ones pressuring Big Tech to censor.

Initiatives such as the State Department-backed Global Disinformation Index and news-rating company NewsGuard partner with Big Tech to deprive so-called fake news sites of ad dollars and user engagement. But their ratings are deeply biased.

Analysis from the Media Research Center found that NewsGuard rates liberal media outlets 27 points higher on average for trustworthiness than conservative outlets. The Global Disinformation Index is similarly biased. It maintains a “ Dynamic Exclusion List ” of websites that it subjectively determines are “high risk” purveyors of “disinformation,” including at least 10 conservative-leaning media outlets.

In 2022, the Xandr ad platform, owned by Microsoft, partnered with the Global Disinformation Index to defund so-called disinformation groups. Following public scrutiny, Microsoft temporarily suspended its subscription to the Global Disinformation Index.

Even still, Microsoft integrated the NewsGuard rating system into “numerous products,” including the company’s Edge browser, news aggregators, Bing search, and various AI-powered assistants.

In November, Microsoft announced that it would partner with NewsGuard and other groups to “provide information on authoritative sources” and ensure that “queries about election administration will surface reputable sites.”

This push is paralleled by efforts on the state and federal level to shape public discourse in collusion with dominant tech firms.

The FBI, for example, recently confirmed that it has resumed talks with social media platforms over so-called disinformation. According to reporting by The Federalist, both the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, known as the “nerve center” for government censorship operations, refused to say whether they intend to pressure tech platforms to “remove posts containing so-called ‘disinformation.’”

Meanwhile, the California Secretary of State’s Office colluded with Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter (now X) to censor posts deemed election “misinformation” in 2020. And California now requires social media platforms to submit reports to the attorney general’s office detailing efforts to combat so-called hate speech.

At the same time, Washington and Oregon hired the censorship surveillance group Logically to help monitor so-called election misinformation. And Arizona’s secretary of state created a dedicated position to identify and report “especially egregious posts” to Big Tech platforms.

To counteract these efforts, Congress and state lawmakers should insist on transparency , which is key to addressing concerns about collusion.

For example, Congress should investigate new government efforts to collude with Big Tech—particularly in the states and at both the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The relevant authorities should also probe ongoing relationships between Big Tech firms and outside researchers to examine whether they are running afoul of state or federal law.

Big Tech platforms may be in violation of election laws if they enforce content moderation policies in ways that favor certain political candidates. That includes censoring posts on behalf of partisan groups.

Without shining the light of day on Big Tech’s notoriously opaque practices around political speech, there is no way to know for sure.

Congress’ investigations into past collusion between government and Big Tech are admirable. But the same collusion is happening before our eyes.

Policymakers must take action, and fast, if they want to prevent a replay of 2020.

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