essay about peace not war

Essay on Peace

500 words essay peace.

Peace is the path we take for bringing growth and prosperity to society. If we do not have peace and harmony, achieving political strength, economic stability and cultural growth will be impossible. Moreover, before we transmit the notion of peace to others, it is vital for us to possess peace within. It is not a certain individual’s responsibility to maintain peace but everyone’s duty. Thus, an essay on peace will throw some light on the same topic.

Importance of Peace

History has been proof of the thousands of war which have taken place in all periods at different levels between nations. Thus, we learned that peace played an important role in ending these wars or even preventing some of them.

In fact, if you take a look at all religious scriptures and ceremonies, you will realize that all of them teach peace. They mostly advocate eliminating war and maintaining harmony. In other words, all of them hold out a sacred commitment to peace.

It is after the thousands of destructive wars that humans realized the importance of peace. Earth needs peace in order to survive. This applies to every angle including wars, pollution , natural disasters and more.

When peace and harmony are maintained, things will continue to run smoothly without any delay. Moreover, it can be a saviour for many who do not wish to engage in any disrupting activities or more.

In other words, while war destroys and disrupts, peace builds and strengthens as well as restores. Moreover, peace is personal which helps us achieve security and tranquillity and avoid anxiety and chaos to make our lives better.

How to Maintain Peace

There are many ways in which we can maintain peace at different levels. To begin with humankind, it is essential to maintain equality, security and justice to maintain the political order of any nation.

Further, we must promote the advancement of technology and science which will ultimately benefit all of humankind and maintain the welfare of people. In addition, introducing a global economic system will help eliminate divergence, mistrust and regional imbalance.

It is also essential to encourage ethics that promote ecological prosperity and incorporate solutions to resolve the environmental crisis. This will in turn share success and fulfil the responsibility of individuals to end historical prejudices.

Similarly, we must also adopt a mental and spiritual ideology that embodies a helpful attitude to spread harmony. We must also recognize diversity and integration for expressing emotion to enhance our friendship with everyone from different cultures.

Finally, it must be everyone’s noble mission to promote peace by expressing its contribution to the long-lasting well-being factor of everyone’s lives. Thus, we must all try our level best to maintain peace and harmony.

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Conclusion of the Essay on Peace

To sum it up, peace is essential to control the evils which damage our society. It is obvious that we will keep facing crises on many levels but we can manage them better with the help of peace. Moreover, peace is vital for humankind to survive and strive for a better future.

FAQ of Essay on Peace

Question 1: What is the importance of peace?

Answer 1: Peace is the way that helps us prevent inequity and violence. It is no less than a golden ticket to enter a new and bright future for mankind. Moreover, everyone plays an essential role in this so that everybody can get a more equal and peaceful world.

Question 2: What exactly is peace?

Answer 2: Peace is a concept of societal friendship and harmony in which there is no hostility and violence. In social terms, we use it commonly to refer to a lack of conflict, such as war. Thus, it is freedom from fear of violence between individuals or groups.

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December 2, 2021

Peace Is More Than War’s Absence, and New Research Explains How to Build It

A new project measures ways to promote positive social relations among groups

By Peter T. Coleman , Allegra Chen-Carrel & Vincent Hans Michael Stueber

PeopleImages/Getty Images

Today, the misery of war is all too striking in places such as Syria, Yemen, Tigray, Myanmar and Ukraine. It can come as a surprise to learn that there are scores of sustainably peaceful societies around the world, ranging from indigenous people in the Xingu River Basin in Brazil to countries in the European Union. Learning from these societies, and identifying key drivers of harmony, is a vital process that can help promote world peace.

Unfortunately, our current ability to find these peaceful mechanisms is woefully inadequate. The Global Peace Index (GPI) and its complement the Positive Peace Index (PPI) rank 163 nations annually and are currently the leading measures of peacefulness. The GPI, launched in 2007 by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), was designed to measure negative peace , or the absence of violence, destructive conflict, and war. But peace is more than not fighting. The PPI, launched in 2009, was supposed to recognize this and track positive peace , or the promotion of peacefulness through positive interactions like civility, cooperation and care.

Yet the PPI still has many serious drawbacks. To begin with, it continues to emphasize negative peace, despite its name. The components of the PPI were selected and are weighted based on existing national indicators that showed the “strongest correlation with the GPI,” suggesting they are in effect mostly an extension of the GPI. For example, the PPI currently includes measures of factors such as group grievances, dissemination of false information, hostility to foreigners, and bribes.

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The index also lacks an empirical understanding of positive peace. The PPI report claims that it focuses on “positive aspects that create the conditions for a society to flourish.” However, there is little indication of how these aspects were derived (other than their relationships with the GPI). For example, access to the internet is currently a heavily weighted indicator in the PPI. But peace existed long before the internet, so is the number of people who can go online really a valid measure of harmony?

The PPI has a strong probusiness bias, too. Its 2021 report posits that positive peace “is a cross-cutting facilitator of progress, making it easier for businesses to sell.” A prior analysis of the PPI found that almost half the indicators were directly related to the idea of a “Peace Industry,” with less of a focus on factors found to be central to positive peace such as gender inclusiveness, equity and harmony between identity groups.

A big problem is that the index is limited to a top-down, national-level approach. The PPI’s reliance on national-level metrics masks critical differences in community-level peacefulness within nations, and these provide a much more nuanced picture of societal peace . Aggregating peace data at the national level, such as focusing on overall levels of inequality rather than on disparities along specific group divides, can hide negative repercussions of the status quo for minority communities.

To fix these deficiencies, we and our colleagues have been developing an alternative approach under the umbrella of the Sustaining Peace Project . Our effort has various components , and these can provide a way to solve the problems in the current indices. Here are some of the elements:

Evidence-based factors that measure positive and negative peace. The peace project began with a comprehensive review of the empirical studies on peaceful societies, which resulted in identifying 72 variables associated with sustaining peace. Next, we conducted an analysis of ethnographic and case study data comparing “peace systems,” or clusters of societies that maintain peace with one another, with nonpeace systems. This allowed us to identify and measure a set of eight core drivers of peace. These include the prevalence of an overarching social identity among neighboring groups and societies; their interconnections such as through trade or intermarriage; the degree to which they are interdependent upon one another in terms of ecological, economic or security concerns; the extent to which their norms and core values support peace or war; the role that rituals, symbols and ceremonies play in either uniting or dividing societies; the degree to which superordinate institutions exist that span neighboring communities; whether intergroup mechanisms for conflict management and resolution exist; and the presence of political leadership for peace versus war.

A core theory of sustaining peace . We have also worked with a broad group of peace, conflict and sustainability scholars to conceptualize how these many variables operate as a complex system by mapping their relationships in a causal loop diagram and then mathematically modeling their core dynamics This has allowed us to gain a comprehensive understanding of how different constellations of factors can combine to affect the probabilities of sustaining peace.

Bottom-up and top-down assessments . Currently, the Sustaining Peace Project is applying techniques such as natural language processing and machine learning to study markers of peace and conflict speech in the news media. Our preliminary research suggests that linguistic features may be able to distinguish between more and less peaceful societies. These methods offer the potential for new metrics that can be used for more granular analyses than national surveys.

We have also been working with local researchers from peaceful societies to conduct interviews and focus groups to better understand the in situ dynamics they believe contribute to sustaining peace in their communities. For example in Mauritius , a highly multiethnic society that is today one of the most peaceful nations in Africa, we learned of the particular importance of factors like formally addressing legacies of slavery and indentured servitude, taboos against proselytizing outsiders about one’s religion, and conscious efforts by journalists to avoid divisive and inflammatory language in their reporting.

Today, global indices drive funding and program decisions that impact countless lives, making it critical to accurately measure what contributes to socially just, safe and thriving societies. These indices are widely reported in news outlets around the globe, and heads of state often reference them for their own purposes. For example, in 2017 , Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, though he and his country were mired in corruption allegations, referenced his country’s positive increase on the GPI by stating, “Receiving such high praise from an institute that once named this country the most violent in the world is extremely significant.” Although a 2019 report on funding for peace-related projects shows an encouraging shift towards supporting positive peace and building resilient societies, many of these projects are really more about preventing harm, such as grants for bolstering national security and enhancing the rule of law.

The Sustaining Peace Project, in contrast, includes metrics for both positive and negative peace, is enhanced by local community expertise, and is conceptually coherent and based on empirical findings. It encourages policy makers and researchers to refocus attention and resources on initiatives that actually promote harmony, social health and positive reciprocity between groups. It moves away from indices that rank entire countries and instead focuses on identifying factors that, through their interaction, bolster or reduce the likelihood of sustaining peace. It is a holistic perspective.  

Tracking peacefulness across the globe is a highly challenging endeavor. But there is great potential in cooperation between peaceful communities, researchers and policy makers to produce better methods and metrics. Measuring peace is simply too important to get only half-right. 

Essay on War and Peace

Students are often asked to write an essay on War and Peace in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on War and Peace

Understanding war and peace.

War and peace are two sides of the same coin, representing conflict and harmony respectively. War often arises from disagreements, leading to violence and destruction. On the other hand, peace symbolizes tranquility, unity, and cooperation.

The Impact of War

The importance of peace.

Peace is essential for the well-being of individuals and societies. It fosters growth, prosperity, and happiness. Peace encourages dialogue, understanding, and mutual respect, helping to resolve conflicts peacefully.

250 Words Essay on War and Peace

Introduction.

War and peace, two contrasting states, have shaped human civilization, politics, and cultural identity. The dichotomy between these two conditions is not merely a matter of physical conflict or tranquility but extends to philosophical, psychological, and ethical dimensions.

War: A Double-Edged Sword

The necessity of peace.

Peace, on the other hand, is a state of harmony and cooperation, conducive to prosperity, growth, and human development. It fosters an environment where creativity, innovation, and collaboration can thrive. Peace is not merely the absence of war but also the presence of justice and equality, which are fundamental for sustainable development.

Striking a Balance

The challenge lies in striking a balance between the pursuit of peace and the inevitability of war. This balance is not about accepting war as a necessary evil, but about understanding its causes and working towards preventing them. Peacebuilding efforts should focus on addressing root causes of conflict, like inequality and injustice, and promoting dialogue, understanding, and cooperation.

In conclusion, the complex relationship between war and peace is a reflection of the human condition. Striving for peace while understanding the realities of war is a delicate but necessary balance we must achieve. It is through this equilibrium that we can hope to progress as a society, ensuring a better future for generations to come.

500 Words Essay on War and Peace

War and peace are two polar opposites, yet they are inextricably linked in the complex tapestry of human history. They represent the dual nature of humanity: our capacity for both destruction and harmony. This essay explores the intricate relationship between war and peace, the impacts they have on societies, and the philosophical perspectives that underpin both.

The Dualism of War and Peace

War and peace are not merely states of conflict and tranquility, but rather manifestations of human nature and societal structures. War, in its essence, is a reflection of our primal instincts for survival, dominance, and territoriality. It exposes the darker side of humanity, where violence and power struggles prevail. Conversely, peace symbolizes our capacity for cooperation, empathy, and mutual understanding. It showcases the brighter side of humanity, where dialogue and diplomacy reign.

Impacts of War and Peace

On the other hand, peace allows societies to flourish. It fosters economic growth, social development, and cultural exchange. Yet, peace is not merely the absence of war. It requires active effort to maintain social justice, equality, and mutual respect among diverse groups.

Philosophical Perspectives

War and peace have been subjects of philosophical debate for centuries. Realists argue that war is an inevitable part of human nature and international relations, while idealists contend that peace can be achieved through international cooperation and diplomacy.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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War and Peace in Modern World Essay

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Introduction

In our world of ever-increasing number of innovations and informational technologies there is hardly a problem which cannot be solved. The scientists are working out the medicines which can cure even AIDs and cancer, regardless the fact that the diseases which were considered fatal a couple of decades ago can be easily cured now. The world has developed a global network for communication and each day offers new inventions in which our ancestors would never believe in if in their times they heard that something like this would ever be possible to invent. Nevertheless, there remains one big problem the modern society seems to be unable to deal with. Every day we continue to listen to news reports about numerous cases of violence, crimes, natural disasters and wars, which in some parts of the world have lasted over the years and seem to never stop. At this, the reasons of the wars are in fact insignificant and seem to be not serious enough for starting something as terrible as a war. No matter how strange and unfair it may seem, but innocent people give their lives for a miserable strip of land which two governments of the belligerent countries are unable to share or because of the desire of one country to prove that it is more powerful than any other. And here the question arises: When will people all over the world stop wars and finally understand that wars and international conflicts are just a mere waste of money and, what is the most important, of human lives? Is that strip of land worth those losses and sufferings of innocent people involved in wars because of misunderstandings and inability to settle the governmental matters peacefully? Living in peace and prosperity is possible but a lot has to be done in order to achieve peaceful coexistence of different countries and their people in this small world which cannot function properly because of something people missed when forming their society.

First of all, people should admit that it is because of each of them that this world cannot become perfect and agree to introduce some changes into their lives. Everything depends on people and their desire to live peacefully: “Attempting to achieve world peace would mean that the people in this world would have to be willing to make some minor changes in the way we govern ourselves on this earth. Common sense should tell us that the best way to put an end to wars or military conflicts is to create a fully civilized world.” (Jim Des Rocher, 7). It should be admitted that a lot here depends on the government of each country because it is namely governments together with the world leaders who are responsible for wars and international conflict. Constant fighting for power and deciding who is the strongest and who should rule this world leads to what we have now and what will be very difficult to change. It should be realized that not only people of each country should become civilized but the governments as well because welfare of the whole world rather than of separate countries is at stake and with each day the risk of the world to get consumed with uncontrolled violence is increasing. Creating a civilized society will help in achieving world peace and proving to each other that living peacefully in prosperity is not only possible to achieve but is easy to maintain once the desired is already attained: “Civilized countries settle their disputes peacefully. Once you have established a civilized world the chances for military conflicts goes away.” (Jim Des Rocher, 33).

Second, to mention but not less important on the way of achieving world peace is bringing up of such qualities as compassion, justice and mutual forgiveness each of which is necessary for proper functioning of a society. It is striking how brutal and hard-hearted the people of our generation became. Everybody is obsessed with money and is ready to hurt and kill the others in order to gain more money, get promoted or achieve something in this life. Most of people do not care about the others and stopped helping each other though mutual readiness has always been the basis of a successful and prospering society. If mutual assistance becomes a part of each person’s life it will be a grain of mustard seed on the way of achieving world peace. It is also necessary for justice to rule the world for everybody to get proper punishment and for all people to live in fair conditions: “Peace seems to conflict with justice; the one deletes the past, the other acts on it” (Martin Ramirez, 65). Justice should be an integral part of each society for its members to feel secured and to know that their misdeeds will be punished. And as for mutual forgiveness, this noble quality will help make the world understanding and sensible. Learning to forgive should be a part of each person’s life as only being able to forgive the others one can earn a chance to be forgiven: “To seek peace through forgiveness is a life’s program, and it is a worthwhile risk even to the extent of heroism. But one cannot forget that forgiveness also has its own demands: truth (recognition of the crime) and justice (reparation), together with the guarantee that it will not be repeated.” (Martin Ramirez, 65).

And the final important factor directly influencing the world peace is religion. There exist three main religions in this world and supporters of each of them believe that only their religion is the only true one whereas the rest do not have any right for existence. Religion matters have always caused conflicts and to fight this problem is senseless that’s why one has just to face the reality. Modern society does not make tries to introduce a single religion or to abolish religion as such because the history proved that it will get back to the society as it is an essential part of it. Religion gives people hope for the best and turning to God for help they believe sincerely that everything possible will be done in order to make their lives better. World peace depends on the peace of society thus on the peace of each person. If chaos rules the world not a single person will find peace in him and vice versa. The task of people is to support faith in each other and never to let troubles weaken their faith because if the religion won’t be practiced world peace will be out of the question. Religion makes people intelligent and understanding, well-disposed, noble and generous. Without religion they will become aggressive, arrogant, self-centered and this will cause conflicts all around the world. This is why religion should be freely and widely practised in order to make all people believe that if they treat each other well, if they support each other and do not forget about morality they make a contribution into a difficult but rewarding process of achieving world peace and prosperity.

To sum it up, the modern world full of violence and brutality, ruled by those who being in constant pursuit of power use innocent people to prove that their country is the strongest badly needs some improvements because now it is in danger of collapse and each day is being destroyed by people who live in it. To achieve world peace and prosperity seems impossible but just as a lot of other great deeds what it requires is time, efforts and strong desire to change the life of every person for better. It is possible to make this world better even if not perfect and keys to this are the building of a civilized society where both people and government will be civilized, the desire of each person to eradicate his/her shortcomings by trying to develop such qualities as compassion, justice and mutual forgiveness. On top of this all stands the religion which irrespective of its kind keeps people united and gives them hope for the best. Provided that all these points are taken into consideration and put into life the necessary result will be achieved and our world spoiled by money and power will turn into what every person dreams about – a world with no sufferings and grief where people care about each other and are not afraid for their future.

Jim Des Rocher. (2004). How to Achieve World Peace: The Second Greatest Book Ever Written. Trafford Publishing.

J. Martin Ramirez. (2007). Peace Through Dialogue. International Journal on World Peace, 24 (1), 65.

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Home > Books > New Perspectives on Global Peace [Working Title]

Peace beyond the Absence of War: Three Trends in the Study of Positive Peace

Submitted: 05 February 2024 Reviewed: 12 February 2024 Published: 28 March 2024

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.1004656

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Recent years have seen a surge in renewed academic interest in positive concepts of peace. This chapter takes stock of these developments, arguing that three trends can be observed. First, in a quest to make positive peace measurable, additional indicators of peace are added to the absence of war, mostly relying on existing databases. Second, in an attempt to capture the varieties of peace that resonate with inhabitants of postwar countries, authors rely on interviews with various groups to construct locally grounded notions of peace. Third, the ontological status of peace is reconceptualized. Rather than being a (utopian?) state of affairs, peace is said to be a process, an emergent phenomenon, or a quality of relationships between actors. The uptake of these three trends is that we are left with a variety of peace paradigms for local and international peacebuilders to work on. Consequently, special attention should be paid to concepts of peace that resonate with rising powers in peacebuilding and with populations in conflict-affected areas. The chapter concludes that the field of peace studies is maturing into a separate discipline, following a different logic than that of conflict studies, holistic rather than reductionist, bottom-up rather than top-down and focusing on long-term change rather than quick problem-solving.

• peacebuilding
• positive peace
• concepts of peace
• measuring peace
• peace continuum
• relational peace
• quality peace
• peace and conflict studies

Author Information

Gijsbert m. van iterson scholten *.

• University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

*Address all correspondence to: [email protected]

1. Introduction

In 2016, the International Study Association devoted its annual conference to the topic of “exploring peace,” a call by its president to “look beyond conventional ideas of ‘negative peace,’ typically thought of as the absence of war, and examine the manifestation of ‘positive peace’ in the cases and situations that we study” [ 1 ]. A few years before, the president of the Peace Science Society (International) likewise called on the members of his society to “bring peace back in” to their studies of armed conflict and peacebuilding [ 2 ]. Both calls seem to have originated in a certain unease with the fact that most academics that study peace are actually studying armed conflict [ 3 ,  4 ]. Some exceptions withstanding, the general consensus among peace researchers seemed, and perhaps still seems, to be a paraphrase of the old Latin adage: if you want to understand peace, study war.

This chapter is about those exceptions. It argues that they are growing in both numbers and depth and that the calls to “bring peace back in” should be seen as part of a renewed interest in the study of peace as a positive phenomenon. That is, as something that extends beyond the absence of war and should be studied as a phenomenon “in and of its own” ([ 5 ], p. 177). This renewed interest comes at a time when armed conflict is once again on the rise [ 6 ], seemingly thwarting earlier optimism about a decline in violence [ 7 , 8 ].

It also comes at a time when other authors are arguing that international peacebuilding is experiencing a severe crisis [ 9 , 10 ]. For the study of (post-conflict) peacebuilding, conceptualizing peace in terms other than an absence of armed conflict seems to be especially appropriate, as the very notion of building peace would seem to presuppose that peace is a positive phenomenon. Building an “absence” of anything seems a priori absurd. Having a more fine-grained concept of peace might lead to a more realistic assessment of what international peacebuilding can and has achieved and thus a better assessment of whether peacebuilding is “in crisis” or merely building a different kind of peace, or different peaces (in the plural, see [ 11 ]) than its critics are looking for.

Various authors, in contexts other than peacebuilding operations, have pointed out the need for a concept of peace that can make a distinction between North Korea and Sweden [ 12 ], for instance, or between various situations described as “no war, no peace” [ 13 ]. Whether the trend of focusing primarily on the study of armed conflict to understand peace has been broken is not yet certain, but the past decade has been rather productive in producing studies that explore peace as a positive phenomenon. This chapter seeks to take stock of this renewed interest in positive peace, exploring three tracks researchers have taken to further our understanding of peace. Adopting a peacebuilding perspective, the chapter presents arguments for fruitful ways in which to combine and/or elaborate on these three tracks. The three paths taken can roughly be characterized as (1) a quantitative track expanding the concept of peace by combining the absence of armed conflict with other databases and indices, for instance, on democracy or various human rights; (2) a local turn asking mostly representatives of marginalized groups in (post-) conflict areas what peace means to them; and (3) a more philosophical approach seeking to understand the ontological nature of peace as something other than a condition at a certain point in space and time. Before going into the details of these three developments, it is important to first briefly revisit the concept of positive peace and the changes it has undergone since its first inception in the 1950s/1960s.

2. Positive peace: a short history

The notion of positive peace is often traced back to two of the founding fathers of peace studies: Quincy Wright and Johan Galtung. Wright was the first to coin the term “positive peace” [ 14 ] to describe a situation of integration and cooperation between states in international relations. This idea of cooperation and integration as the antithesis of war was taken up by Johan Galtung in his first exploration of positive and negative peace [ 15 ]. He later changed his mind though and famously equated positive peace with the absence of structural—rather than direct or physical—violence, or “structural limitations on the fulfillment of human potential,” sometimes also formulated as the presence of social justice [ 16 , 17 ].

Over time, other peace researchers have proposed different conceptualizations of positive peace (for an excellent overview, see [ 12 ], p. 40-47). Some of these went back to the original meaning attached to the concept by Wright, stressing “harmonious relationships” as a core attribute of peace (see, e.g., [ 18 , 19 ]). Others have tried to describe a situation of positive peace as the presence of a common legal order or international rule of law [ 20 , 21 ] or tried to conceptualize peace as a continuum of ever-increasing levels of peacefulness in various domains of human interaction [ 19 , 22 , 23 , 24 ].

However, among scholars of peace, it is primarily Galtung’s name that has stuck to the concept of positive peace. His focus on peace as the absence of different kinds of violence has probably helped to keep the discussion of peace closely linked to conflict and violence, rather than studying peace as a phenomenon in and of itself ([ 12 ], p. 27). Concerns that more elaborative definitions of peace would be too vague or expansive to be of any practical use in studying the real-world occurrence of peace have reinforced the tendency of peace scholars to focus on conflict and war [ 12 , 25 , 26 ].

In the late 2000s, the need to evaluate the success of United Nations peacebuilding operations, especially the more multidimensional peace operations that did much more than observe cease-fires, led to a renewed interest in definitions of peace beyond the absence of war [ 27 ]. It is to these efforts to reconceptualize peace that we now turn, starting with the idea that positive peace equals negative peace plus some additional criteria.

3. The first trend: more data

The first trend that can be observed in more recent efforts to reconceptualize peace as a positive phenomenon is to add additional criteria for a situation to count as one of positive rather than negative peace. Scholars in this first track are mostly concerned with finding operational definitions of peace that allow for systematic analysis and comparison across cases [ 12 ]. One of the reasons negative peace is so attractive as a concept is that it is easy to observe. Various institutes host online databases, like the Correlates of War project (COW, https://correlatesofwar.org/ ), the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/ ), or the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, https://acleddata.com/ ). All of these keep track of the number of armed conflicts in the world, using precise and widely accepted measures of armed conflict, based on casualty statistics. If the level of violence drops below the specified threshold for armed conflict, (negative) peace prevails.

However, for many comparisons, merely relying on casualty statistics is too crude a measure to capture the diversity of peace in post-settlement societies [ 28 ] or the differences between the peacefulness of Sweden and North Korea [ 12 , 29 ]. For larger-N comparisons, we need some concept of peace, for which indicators exist, that can be measured with the same level of accuracy as the absence of armed conflict. Therefore, authors have searched for other datasets that can capture these additional aspects of peace.

Early attempts in this direction simply added a measure of democracy to distinguish more “participatory” peace from negative peace (e.g., [ 17 , 30 , 31 , 32 ]). Although this does make it possible to distinguish peace in Sweden from that in North Korea, the stream of critiques on what is called “liberal peace” by its critics (for example [ 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 ], see also [ 11 ] chapter 2) shows serious challenges with this simple equation of positive peace with some semblance of democracy. In a nutshell, critics argue that state capacity might be more important than democracy for prolonged peace [ 33 ], that the notion of democracy (or at least the models implemented in postwar peacebuilding) forces Western concepts and institutions onto non-Western states [ 36 ,  37 ,  39 ], and that democracy-promotion makes liberal peacebuilding focus too much on national-level politics at the expense of local factors relevant for peace [ 37 ,  38 , 40 ].

A more ambitious attempt was made by Madhav Joshi and Peter Wallensteen in a 2016 edited volume [ 41 ]. They try to conceptualize the quality of peace in societies emerging from civil war along five dimensions: post-accord security, governance, economic reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation and civil society. They stress that every situation is different and not every dimension is equally important in every situation or at each moment in time. Although they present the diversity of the findings in different case study chapters as a strength of their new concept of peace, they also acknowledge that more data, more theory development, and more rigorous methods are needed to make the concept as clear as the classic notion of negative peace.

Davenport, Melander, and Regan build on the idea of quality peace, as well as Wright’s insistence that peace is best thought of as a continuum, to argue for various interpretations of a “peace continuum” [ 12 ]. Their three proposals for a positive concept of peace are all grounded in a solid theoretical approach to peace and measurable by way of indicators that should be able to distinguish different levels of quality peace. They take great care to avoid both the Scylla of an overly narrow definition like the one by Doyle and Sambanis [ 30 ] and the Charybdis of overly broad concepts of peace that are impossible to measure, like the ones by De Rivera [ 18 ] and Anderson [ 19 ]. As an illustration of this rather sophisticated attempt to broaden our understanding of peace, while keeping it measurable, their three proposals will be briefly introduced.

Regan offers the narrowest conceptualization, proposing that we see peace as a situation in which “no actor or group of actors has a unilateral incentive to attempt change by force of arms” ([ 42 ], p. 86). This may seem overly biased in favor of stability and keeping the status quo, as well as difficult to measure, but he valiantly tries to overcome these doubts and propose proxy indicators for risk assessment (bond prices and black-market currency exchange rates) that might capture the extent to which actors have such incentives.

His two colleagues propose more expansive definitions of peace, one cleverly constructed as a mirroring of Carl Clausewitz’ famous definition of war as the continuation of policy by other means [ 43 ], the other as a continuum ranging from opposition to mutuality along different dimensions of interaction and levels of analysis [ 44 ]. Both approaches produce indicators that can be measured using existing databases on, for example, the occurrence of torture, democracy, and women’s rights [ 43 ], or citizenship rights and degrees of segregation [ 44 ].

A slightly different, but even more ambitious approach, to come up with indicators for positive peace is the Institute for Economics and Peace’s Positive Peace Index [ 45 , 46 ]. Based on a big data analysis of factors that create and sustain peaceful societies, it identifies no less than eight “pillars of peace” that create and sustain peaceful societies: a well-functioning government, low levels of corruption, acceptance of the rights of others, good relations with neighbors, free flow of information, a sound business environment, the equitable distribution of resources, and high levels of human capital. Each pillar has various indicators to measure a country’s progress on it. If this seems to leave open the question of what constitutes a peaceful society, the same institute also publishes the Global Peace Index measuring peacefulness in terms of a country’s level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic or international conflict, and the degree of militarization [ 47 ].

For all their sophistication, these attempts at operationalizing a measurable concept of peace are not without problems. For one thing, the focus on measurability and country rankings sits somewhat uncomfortably with the idea that peace in different societies is qualitatively different. How can these qualitative differences be accounted for in some quantitative comparison like the Positive Peace Index? Can we really say that a country with high levels of economic growth but low levels of human rights observance (let us say China) is less peaceful than a country that is economically less developed but fares better on the human rights spectrum (like Guyana or, potentially, Bhutan)? Is the United States, with its large levels of gun violence but also a sound business environment and premium internet access, really more peaceful than Costa Rica or Mauritius, two countries in the positive peace index that do not even have a standing army? 1

However, the move to expand the concept of peace beyond the absence of war by integrating various other concerns into it is definitely an interesting one. While the authors working in this track should be applauded for their efforts at methodological rigor, operationalization, and data collection, the track is not without risk. Three main risks are conceptual overstretch, conceptual confusion, and blind spots because of the need for indicators and data.

The first risk is conceptual overstretch. By adding democracy, observance of various human rights, or the IEP’s eight pillars of peace, the risk is that peace becomes a synonym for “all things desirable,” making it impossible theoretically to even describe the relationship between positive peace and things like economic development, human happiness or well-being, and various forms of government. This seems to be a risk most people working with this notion of positive peace are aware of though and seek to limit by proposing only a few indicators and insisting that peace remains a separate concept ([ 12 ], p. 29).

The second risk is that indicators drive the underlying concept of peace away from something that can be meaningfully labeled “positive peace” and to the direction of human rights observance, economic development, or economic risk management. For instance, Regan’s concept of peace as a situation in which “no actor or group of actors has a unilateral incentive to attempt change by force of arms’ ([ 42 ], p. 186) can still be seen as a positive concept of peace, but his indicators (bond prices and black-market currency exchange rates) push peace into the economic domain, where many actors actually working for peace would not think it belongs (see [ 11 , 48 ]). Of course, it can be argued that the proposed indicators should explicitly be seen as proxy indicators, but that begs the question of whether these proxies correctly mirror the level of positive peace in a society or are merely selected because of the availability of databases.

Third, by basing their concept of peace on indicators for which data is available, authors in this line of research run the risk of molding peace according to Western practices, as the Global West has the most extensive and highest quality data available. Western countries score consistently higher on all pillars of the positive peace index, but maybe because the index is based on statistics that come mostly from Western countries. It is this third pitfall that the second trend in positive peace research seeks to counteract by calling attention to the concepts of peace that people in the Global South espouse.

4. The second trend: more voices

The second shift in conceptualizing peace can be observed in authors partaking in a “local,” or anthropological, turn, who have started to ask people in conflict-affected areas what peace means to them, in order to come up with more locally legitimate notions of peace. The local turn is a hotly debated topic among peacebuilding scholars [ 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 ]. Those debates will not be summarized here; rather the focus is on the key development relevant for exploring peace: the trend to ask people in conflict-affected areas what peace means to them in their everyday lives. In the past 10 years, studies have been published on the meanings that indigenous peoples [ 53 , 54 ], young people [ 55 ], women [ 56 , 57 ], or more generally people in local communities in conflict-affected areas [ 48 , 58 , 59 ] or traditional peaceful societies [ 60 ] attach to peace.

One of the most ambitious projects in this regard has been the effort to “reclaim” everyday peace by developing a set of Everyday Peace Indicators that can serve as a yardstick for measuring peacebuilding success [ 48 , 61 , 62 ]. These indicators were established in a two-step bottom-up process using focus groups from particular conflict-affected communities in Colombia and Uganda. First, people were asked what peace means to them and how they know whether there is more peace or less peace in their community. The list of possible indicators derived from these interviews was then narrowed down to ten indicators for everyday peace that a focus group from the community had to agree on. These indicators were subsequently used in longitudinal surveys to establish whether peace was increasing or decreasing over time in this particular community ([ 48 ], pp. 68–76).

Although presented as a tool to improve the measurement of peacebuilding success in external evaluations, the Everyday Peace Indicators project also has consequences for how peace is conceptualized. One of the more interesting findings in this respect is that the indicators, and thus the meaning attached to peace, not only are different for different communities but also change over time [ 48 , see also 63 ]. This presents problems not only for peacebuilders who might have to adapt their programs to fit these shifts in objectives but even more so for researchers who want to study the development of peace over time and/or in different parts of the world, like the academics in the first track identified above.

One other striking aspect of these studies is that often the (explicit) objective of them is to “give a voice to people who have not been heard before” [ 64 ]: the victims of armed conflict, in particular marginalized groups like youth or women. Lee [ 58 ] is an exception in that he also included former Khmer Rouge combatants in his study of everyday peace in Cambodia, but often the focus seems to be on making additional voices heard, rather than on finding consensus between different groups or actors. While this is certainly laudable, and a much-needed correction on overly Western-centric conceptualizations of peace, it would be interesting to apply the same methodology to Western peacebuilders. Doing so could establish a dialog between local and external peacebuilders that would allow both sides to see some new perspectives, rather than maintaining the divide between warzones and what Severine Autesserre has called “peaceland” [ 65 ] or the fiction of a unified liberal peace consensus [ 34 , 66 ]. The works of Van Iterson Scholten [ 11 ] who interviewed professional peace workers rather than victims of conflict and Caplan [ 26 ] who studied the meanings that different international organizations attach to peace are promising points of entry for such a dialog.

5. The third trend: A different ontology

The third way authors have tried to find new meanings for positive peace is by moving away from the idea that peace is a certain condition, or situation, in a particular country at a certain moment in time. While this idea of peace as a state of affairs is highly attractive, if we want to measure it, it just might not reflect the ontological status of the phenomenon in reality. Or, to put it in slightly less controversial terms, changing the ontology of our concepts of peace provides new insights into how it can be achieved. There are three main routes for this ontological reorientation: defining peace as a process, as an emergent phenomenon, and as a relationship.

The first, peace as a process, is the oldest of the three (for an early formulation, see [ 67 ]). Authors studying nonviolence [ 68 , 69 , 70 ] or conflict transformation [ 71 , 72 ] stress that conflicts do not necessarily need to be resolved for peace to occur, but rather that peace is about the way in which conflicts are handled. The quote that “there is no way to peace, peace is the way,” ascribed (apocryphally) to both Gandhi and the Buddha, nicely sums up this approach.

More recent contributions to this line of thinking have stressed the need for an “agonistic” understanding of peace [ 73 , 74 , 75 , 76 , 77 ]. Building on the work of Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe, these authors argue that peace consists of the transformation of antagonistic (openly hostile) conflicts into agonistic ones, in which the opponent is thought of as an “adversary” rather than an enemy. In order to achieve this, structures should be put in place that channel conflicts between adversaries along nonviolent paths. Especially the work of Lisa Strömbom and colleagues should be mentioned here, who valiantly try to operationalize this idea into an analytical framework [ 75 , 76 , 77 ].

In the 2015 review of its peacebuilding architecture, the United Nations has also taken up the idea that peace is more a continuous process than a goal to be achieved [ 78 ]. This insight has led to a new literature on “sustaining peace” (see, e.g., [ 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 ]). At the core of the sustaining peace agenda are two ideas. Peacebuilding should be focused more on prevention of violent conflict than on handling the aftermath of violent conflict, and it requires a more holistic approach than the UN has taken to date ([ 82 ], pp. 15–16). Peace is something that requires upkeep, or “perpetual peacebuilding” [ 83 ], also in countries not immediately affected by war. Although this is still often framed in terms of preventing armed conflict, one interesting consequence of reconceptualizing peace as a process is that it allows us to see that also in countries where war seems “unthinkable” ([ 84 ], p. 13), sustaining peace still requires governments to invest in peace as a positive project. In this respect, it is like the Sustainable Development Goals, which also require action by all governments, not only by governments in the Global South.

One other aspect of peace that is stressed by authors writing about sustaining peace is the idea that peace is not so much the result of deliberate policies or actions, but “emerges” out of a complex web of social interaction among a host of different actors [ 79 ]. This idea of peace as an “emergent phenomenon” is the second interesting reconceptualization now taking place [ 79 , 85 , 86 , 87 ]. Drawing on complexity theory, authors working with this concept of peace suggest that peace is best thought of as a stable equilibrium in a complex system. Complex systems are defined by three characteristics: holism, nonlinearity, and self-organization ([ 79 ], p. 168). Holism means that the properties of individual elements of a social system (individuals or groups) are co-determined by the properties of the system as a whole. To put it (perhaps too) bluntly: people in a democracy behave differently from those in an autocracy. Hence, analysis should not start from (rational) individuals or social groups but should take into account the feedback loops between the individual and the system level.

One of the consequences of these feedback loops is that causality takes a nonlinear form, meaning that the output of a system can be disproportional to its input. A small peacebuilding initiative may have large consequences but may equally have effect only in the longer term, or have one effect at one point in time but another effect at another point in time. This nonlinearity makes it difficult to predict the outcomes of any specific peacebuilding intervention.

Finally, complex systems are self-organizing, meaning that the feedback loops tend to push the system toward a state of equilibrium, even in the absence of specific planning or (foreign) intervention. Thinking about peace as an emergent property of complex systems makes concepts like the local [ 49 , 50 , 51 ], friction [ 87 ], resilience [ 88 ], and hybridity [ 89 ] even more relevant. As de Coning notes, if the system is self-organizing, intervention can also be seen as an interruption preventing such organization ([ 79 ], pp. 174–175).

The complexity approach to peace has two main drawbacks. The first is that it becomes extremely difficult to identify the factors that lead to successful peacebuilding. If peace is some emergent phenomenon arising more or less spontaneously out of complex interactions between a myriad of actors and factors (both local and international, if those categories still make sense in a complex system), it becomes hard, if not a priori impossible, to pinpoint which of these exactly lead to success. The most one can do is either analyze which characteristics of a system correlate to a situation of peace (as the Positive Peace Index purports to do) or reconstruct the factors that led to success after the fact. But since no two complex situations are alike, it becomes virtually impossible to draw lessons from past peacebuilding experiences. Or, to make the point even more pressing, if peace is something that emerges autonomously from complex interactions, efforts to actively “build” it may always go amiss. This might seem like a philosophical underpinning of the argument that peacebuilding is in crisis [ 9 , 10 ] or that war should be given a chance [ 90 ].

The second problem with this approach is that for all its stress on complexity and emerging properties, it is not very clear what exactly constitutes this “emerging” peace, other than a situation in which no regular fighting occurs: negative peace. By limiting peace to a stable state of the system, even if this comes in the form of a dictatorship, we once again lose sight of a positive definition of peace that is more than the (self-organized) absence of war.

Here is where another set of scholars, some of whom are also interested in complexity, come in [ 44 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 ]. Rather than focusing on characteristics of the system in which actors operate, they investigate the relationships between actors and conceptualize peace as a quality of these relationships. The more relationships between two actors are characterized by symbiosis [ 92 ] or by cooperation, non-domination, and trust [ 93 ], the more peaceful this relationship is.

There are five advantages to defining peace in relational, rather than conditional, terms. First, it relates peace much closer to power, which is also a relational concept. Second, it draws attention to the crucial role played by reconciliation and trust-building in establishing sustainable peace. Third, it reminds us that war and peace are ontologically different and hence can coexist at the same time and place. Even in a situation of war, people can still experience peaceful relations with others, a point developed in the literature on everyday peace as well [e.g., 95 ]. Fourth, it matches the way people in conflict-affected areas themselves define peace. In the Everyday Peace Indicators project alluded to above, relational indicators were the second most common kind mentioned, after security-related ones ([ 62 ], p. 7). Fifth, defining peace in relational terms makes it easier to study its occurrence across different levels of analysis. Individuals can have (everyday) peaceful relations with other individuals, even if the relations between their respective ethnic groups are more hostile. States have relations with other states, as well as with the people living in their state, and predatory elites can do a lot of damage to the relationship people experience with their own state. Finally, international interventions build new relationships between those intervening and those intervened upon. Relational peace offers a framework that can accommodate all of these.

Despite its potential, the reconceptualization of peace into a quality of relationships is not without problems. The first of these is epistemological. How do we know whether a relationship between two actors is peaceful or not, other than by looking at the behavior that characterizes their interactions? If the two are fighting, their relationship is obviously not peaceful, but if not, how can we tell just how peaceful their relationship is? Or whether there is a relationship at all, and the two are not just ignoring each other? Söderström and colleagues [ 93 ] propose two other components of relational peace, subjective attitudes toward the other and the idea actors have of the relationship, and provide some categories that can be used to classify these but do not really discuss the validity or operationalization of these categories. More work needs to be done here.

Second, if relations extend beyond individuals to inter-group relations, what are the boundaries of these groups? Individual people often have different overlapping identities, but if peace is conceived as a collective phenomenon depending on the quality of relationships between groups, how can the boundaries between these groups be drawn? If the groups are ethnic (a relatively easy and often occurring case), what to do with people who are of mixed ethnic origin? Or with people who do not identify (primarily) with their ethnic group or who reject the concept of different ethnic groups altogether? Any distinction between social groups runs a risk of essentializing those groups, but without some sort of differentiation between groups, it becomes extremely difficult to say anything at all about the relationships between them. And given the interconnectedness of groups at the local, national, regional, and international levels, it becomes very challenging to compare cases.

6. Toward a mature field of peace studies

So far, this chapter has sketched three different tracks that research into positive peace has taken over the past 10, maybe 15 years. By analytically separating these tracks and showing the advantages and disadvantages of each, this chapter strives to have contributed to the building of better notions of peace along each of them. But if some of the brush between the paths has been cleared and people along the tracks can once again clearly see each other, the question remains what the way forward should look like. Three suggestions are provided.

The first is to really start treating peace as a word with a plural [ 96 ]. Researchers should take seriously the idea that peace is not just an essentially contested concept, but that it might be more fruitful to make some distinctions between different kinds of peace. Doing so would allow researchers to identify both what kind of peace is most urgently needed in a specific (post-) conflict area (or frozen conflict, or pre-conflict situation) and what kind of peace different kinds of peacebuilders (both local and international) can actually bring. Elsewhere, I have proposed both a five-fold distinction of different visions of peace, based on what professional peace workers say they are working on ([ 11 ], chapter 3), and a more coarse-grained distinction between (political) Security Council peace and (cultural, societal, or even individual) UNESCO peace ([ 11 ], pp. 212–214). Other authors have proposed different distinctions with different numbers of “peaces” [ 24 , 97 , 98 ]. The point is not so much to settle on a specific number, or to draw rigid boundaries between them, but rather to acknowledge that different peacebuilders build different peaces . Peace education is not going to lead to the signing of a peace agreement in the foreseeable future, but neither is peace agreement implementation (no matter how “comprehensive” the accord) going to lead to a genuinely felt desire for reconciliation and a culture of peace among the wider population. What academics should do is find out how these different peaces are connected to one another, either strengthening each other or working at cross-purposes. The Varieties of Peace research program at the University of Umeå is one interesting development in this regard, as it actively seeks to further a research agenda taking into account situational, relational, and ideational conceptualizations of peace [ 98 ].

Second, academics should look beyond the Global West for existing ideas about peace. If we think of peace as a relational phenomenon, rather than a state of affairs, non-Western philosophies may offer interesting insights. Especially Eastern philosophy also focuses more on relationships rather than on entities and may bring useful insights for how to further peace [ 99 ]. Along the same lines, the interesting work of Call and de Coning on rising powers and peacebuilding [ 100 ] should be elaborated with an exploration of the philosophical backgrounds these rising powers bring to their peacebuilding efforts. Likewise, the exploration of everyday peace can be deepened by considering the many different ways that local traditions in conflict-affected areas conceptualize peace. Some work in this field has already been done [ 53 , 101 , 102 , 103 ], but more effort is required to connect it to the literature on peacebuilding and make it operational.

Although the diversity of peace probably warrants scrutiny of the ideas of peace prevalent in many different societies, two areas would seem to be particularly urgent. On the one hand, it would be interesting to look at future “providers” of peace in the world. This makes Chinese visions of peace and related concepts a very interesting area to study. By all accounts, China is going to be a, if not the, major power in the 21st century, so studying its ideas about peace and peacebuilding might help us understand the way UN peacebuilding is going to evolve [ 100 , 104 , 105 ].

On the other hand, and following the cue of the local turn, African ideas about peace also ought to receive much more attention. Most armed conflicts still take place in Africa, and whereas we should not fall in the trap of treating all these conflicts (or indeed all of Africa, probably the most diverse continent on earth) as somehow similar, much can be learned from studying African ideas of peace [ 101 , 102 , 106 ].

The third way forward is to stop thinking of peace as something closely related to either violence or conflict. Violence is merely a symptom of conflict run amok, as the conflict transformation literature has been arguing for a long time, and conflict can also be productive. However, the main lesson we can draw from this review of positive peace is that conflict and peace might have two different “logics”. Hence, efforts to mirror Clausewitz’ analysis of war [ 43 ] or Galtung’s conflict triangle [ 28 ] are not necessarily the best way forward for the study of positive peace. Just like the study of conflict has provided us with models for conflict analysis, conflict transformation tools, and many other insights into the working of conflicts, the study of peace, as a phenomenon in and of itself, should provide us with models for peace analysis and valuable insights for peacebuilding. To demonstrate, I will end this chapter with three differences between an approach focused on (analyzing or ending) conflict and an approach focused on (analyzing or building) peace. Three things seem to be especially worth noticing about these different approaches.

First, both the practice and analysis of conflict is geared toward finding differences between actors. A conflict approach has a binary logic, separating one side from the other and trying to get a clear view of where both sides differ. Conflict analysis is quite clear on this: the aim is to identify actors, their allies, the incompatibilities between their positions, and their underlying goals and positions [ 107 ].

Peacebuilders, on the other hand, seek to identify not just what different actors have in common but more broadly to overcome a focus on incompatibilities and oppositions. Peacebuilding is often presented as a holistic enterprise that seeks to take all elements of a situation into account. If peace is an emergent phenomenon arising from a complex set of interactions in nonlinear ways, then analysts of peacebuilding ought to have attention for all the little details that make up a conflict situation and should always be on the lookout for other factors that further complicate the picture. In that sense, academics studying peace have more in common with historians than with social scientists.

Second, scholars of conflict and conflict resolution practitioners often take a top-down approach, by focusing on the incompatibilities and demands of political leaders, as well as high-level negotiations, the signing of peace agreements and political interventions like democracy promotion, rule of law, and state building. This is a point well noted by many critics of international peacebuilding (e.g., [ 37 , 40 , 61 ]), but my argument would be that this top-down approach is an inherent part of any strategy that focuses on violent conflict as the main obstacle to peace. After all, the easiest way to resolve, transform, or mitigate violent conflict is via the leadership that drives the conflict.

In contrast, peacebuilders take a bottom-up approach, focusing on civil society, infrastructures for peace, and what ordinary people can do to promote peace. Rather than trying to find solutions for a particular incompatibility, peacebuilding tries to inculcate the population against conflict entrepreneurs and delegitimizes the use of violence to achieve any objective. This is a long-term strategy that requires a different mindset than international actors operating in conflict zones often have [ 65 ].

Third, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, because of its focus on bringing out incompatibilities, the logic of conflict is better suited to address issues of injustice and demands for (radical) change. If a group feels they are subject to historical injustices, naturally they want to get attention for their cause, rally supporters (both within their own country and internationally), and show that they are being treated differently from other groups in society. This fits very well with a (nonviolent) conflict approach.

In contrast, peacebuilding is more geared toward stability and slow change in the status quo. Being holistic and bottom-up, there is no principled objection to including ever more perspectives and voices, but there is also plenty of attention for other groups and how demands for radical change might impact them. This is probably a drawback of this approach for practitioners who want to see (or need to show) quick results. It is, however, entirely in line with what peace practitioners have been saying for decades: peace is a slow and never-ending process.

Acknowledgments

This chapter was originally written as an introduction to the course The other side of conflict: peace beyond the absence of war , which I teach at the University of Amsterdam. I want to thank all students who have participated in this course over the years for their enthusiasm and thoughtful reflection on previous drafts.

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• Like 19 other countries in the world, though most of them are too small to have been included in the positive peace index.

© The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

The views expressed on this site are the author's. The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics does not advocate particular positions but seeks to encourage dialogue on the ethical dimensions of current issues. The Center welcomes comments and alternative points of view .

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Essay on War and Peace

No doubt war is an evil, the greatest catastrophe that befalls human beings. It brings death and destruction, disease and starvation, poverty, and ruin in its wake.

One has only to look back to the havoc that was wrought in various countries not many years ago, in order to estimate the destructive effects of war. A particularly disturbing side of modern wars is that they tend to become global so that they may engulf the entire world.

But there are people who consider war as something grand and heroic and regard it as something that brings out the best in men, but this does not alter the fact that war is a terrible, dreadful calamity.

This is especially so now that a war will now be fought with atom bombs. Some people say war is necessary. A glance at the past history will tell that war has been a recurrent phenomenon in the history of nation.

We have had advocates of non violence and the theory of the brotherhood of man. We have had the Buddha, Christ and Mahatma Gandhi. But in spite of that, weapons have always been used, military force has always been employed, clashes of arms have always occurred; war has always been waged.

War has indeed been such a marked feature of every age and period that it has come to be regarded As part of the normal life of nations. Machiavelli, the author of the known book, The Prince, defined peace as an interval between two wars Molise, the famous German field marshal declared war to be part of God’s world order.

Poets and prophets have dreamt of a millennium, a utopia in which war will not exist and eternal peace will reign on earth. But these dreams have not been fulfilled. After the Great War of 1914-18, it was thought that there would be no war for a long time to come and an institution called the League of Nations was founded as a safeguard against the outbreak of war.

The occurrence of another war (1939-45), however, conclusively proved that to think of an unbroken peace is to be unrealistic And that no institution or assembly can ever ensure the permanence of peace.

Large numbers of Wars, the most recent ones being the one in Vietnam, the other between India and Pakistan, or indo-china War, Iran-Iraq war or Arab Israel war, have been fought despite the UN. The fact of the matter is that fighting in a natural instinct in man.

When individuals cannot live always in peace, it is, indeed, too much to expect so many nations to live in a state of Eternal peace. Besides, there will always be wide differences of opinion between various nation, different angles of looking at matters that have international importance, radical difference in policy and ideology and these cannot be settled by mere discussions.

For example, Germany wished to avenge the humiliating terms imposed upon her at the conclusion of the war of 1914-18 and desired to smash the British Empire and establish an empire of her own. Past wounds, in fact, were not healed up and goaded it to take revenge.

He wants something thrilling and full of excitement and he fights in order to get an outlet for his accumulated energy. It must be admitted, too, that war Has its good side. It spurs men to heroism and self-sacrifice. It is an incentive to scientific research and development. War is obviously an escape from the lethargy of peace.

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Peace is Not Simply the Absence of War

Kanter, Steven L. MD

In this issue of the journal you will find five essays, each of which offers a response to my 2009 Question of the Year, How should academic medicine contribute to peace-building efforts around the world? 1 My goal in having a Question of the Year each January is to foster deeper, more comprehensive thinking about issues important to medical schools and teaching hospitals, to open new avenues of exploration, and to engage readers with the journal in a new way. And when you read the essays submitted in response to this year's question, I believe you will agree that this goal is being achieved.

The five selected essays demonstrate how medical schools and teaching hospitals can provide education, research, and service activities to people and institutions in war-ravaged countries, implement scientific and medical exchange programs, and partner with academic health centers in other countries. These essays call on medical schools and teaching hospitals to adhere to peace-building values, to lobby their own governments, to promote a rights-based approach to health around the world, and to use the strength and influence of associations, organizations, and consortia to pursue a peace-advocacy agenda.

These action-oriented responses recognize that there exists a body of knowledge and a literature on peace studies, that there are important ongoing initiatives at academic health centers, and that there is much more to be done.

As I reflected on the 2009 Question of the Year and the submitted responses, the following foundational themes emerged again and again.

First, medical schools and teaching hospitals have important and substantive roles to play in the peace process.

Second, these roles must be grounded in an understanding of existing knowledge and literature, rational thought, and sound arguments.

Third, if medical schools and teaching hospitals are to be effective in their roles in the peace process, they must move beyond the notion that world peace simply is a good idea and begin to develop explicit, targeted strategies to assist with specific, defined phases of the peace process. For example, consider the following four phases of the peace process (1): preventive diplomacy (i.e., preventing violence through the use of diplomatic approaches to disputes), (2) peacemaking (i.e., stopping a conflict), (3) peacekeeping (i.e., preserving peace once it is attained), and (4) peace-building (i.e., preventing the recurrence of violence once peace is attained). While a medical school or a teaching hospital may not have the resources and skills necessary for peacemaking (which often requires military engagement), academic health centers certainly have the intellectual capital and inventiveness to contribute to peace-building initiatives (and that is one reason why I focused the Question of the Year specifically on that phase). One could also build a strong argument for a substantive role of academic health centers in preventive diplomacy.

Fourth, doing nothing is not an option. Each individual who works at an academic health center can and should contribute in some way. Not every individual must be a leader in this area or a vocal activist, or give speeches, write essays, and attend rallies. But if each individual, at the very least, develops a basic understanding of peace studies, learns more about what other medical schools and teaching hospitals are doing, and incorporates that knowledge into his or her everyday thinking, teaching, and practice, then we will have made good progress. Integrating these ideas into the culture of the academic health center will lead to new and better questions, which will lead to new and better studies and initiatives.

Finally, perhaps the most important notion–although not stated explicitly–underlying the responses to my 2009 Question of the Year is that peace is not simply the absence of war. Peace is a state of active engagement and healthy interdependency among different groups of people. Those who work at medical schools and teaching hospitals are in a position to catalyze this engagement, while the institutions themselves can and should be part of interdependent relationships that, collectively and over time, have the potential to prevent the recurrence of violence.

I thank the members of the journal's editorial board and professional editorial staff for participating in judging the submitted responses and for sharing insightful comments and perspectives.

Steven L. Kanter, MD

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Essay on Peace and War

Introduction to Peace and War

“Peace: The Path to Prosperity, War: The Road to Ruin.”

In the complex tapestry of human history, few themes resonate as profoundly as the dichotomy between peace and war. These two forces, often depicted as opposed, are intrinsic to the human experience, shaping societies, cultures, and civilizations throughout the ages. While peace embodies harmony, stability, and cooperation among individuals and nations, war symbolizes conflict, turmoil, and the breakdown of social order. Understanding the dynamics between peace and war is paramount, as it illuminates the complexities of human interaction and the perennial struggle for equilibrium on a global scale.

At its core, peace entails societies experiencing tranquility and harmony, characterized by the absence of conflict within and among them. It encompasses a spectrum of meanings, ranging from inner serenity to societal cohesion and international diplomacy. Conversely, war epitomizes the ultimate manifestation of conflict, characterized by violence, aggression, and the pursuit of dominance or territorial expansion. The interplay between these two forces is not merely theoretical but has profound real-world implications, shaping the course of history and the destiny of nations.

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Historical Perspectives of Peace and War

1. Marked Peaceful Periods

Historically, notable periods have seen societies experiencing relative peace and stability, minimizing conflicts, and flourishing in harmony. These epochs test humanity’s capacity for cooperation and progress amidst historical upheavals. Some of the marked peaceful periods include:

• Pax Romana (Roman Peace) : A period of relative peace and stability that lasted around 200 years (27 BCE – 180 CE) within the Roman Empire, characterized by minimal military campaigns and internal strife. It facilitated economic prosperity, cultural exchange, and the spread of Roman civilization across vast territories.
• Pax Mongolica (Mongol Peace) : During the 13th and 14th centuries, large areas of Eurasia saw a degree of economic unification and relative peace under the rule of the Mongol Empire. The Mongol Empire’s expansive trade networks and diplomatic efforts fostered stability and cultural exchange across diverse societies.
• European Enlightenment : The 17th and 18th centuries witnessed the emergence of the European Enlightenment, a philosophical and intellectual movement that emphasized reason, human rights , and the pursuit of knowledge. Despite political tensions and occasional conflicts, this era saw significant advancements in science, philosophy, and governance, contributing to intellectual and cultural harmony.

2. Major Wars in History

World War I (1914-1918)

• Causes: The conflict began due to imperial competition, tensions between European nations, and the assassination of Austria-Hungary’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
• Consequences: The Treaty of Versailles, which laid the groundwork for World War II , resulted in millions of casualties, political upheavals, and the redrawing of national boundaries.

World War II (1939-1945)

• Causes: Expansionist policies of Nazi Germany, militaristic ambitions of Japan, and unresolved issues from World War I .
• Consequences: Unprecedented devastation, including genocide such as the Holocaust, marked the emergence of the United Nations and the onset of the Cold War era.

Cold War (1947-1991)

• Causes: Ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, nuclear arms race, and geopolitical competition for global influence.
• Consequences: The dynamics of international politics during the Cold War era were affected by proxy conflicts like the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, the weapons race, the space race, and the segmentation of the globe into spheres of influence.

Importance of Peace

• Human Flourishing: Peace provides the conditions for individuals to thrive, pursue their aspirations, and contribute meaningfully to their communities. It constructs an atmosphere where people can focus on personal and collective development, fostering creativity, innovation, and overall well-being.
• Social Cohesion: Social cohesion and unity are more likely in peaceful societies. People are more inclined to work together for common goals, fostering a sense of community and shared responsibility . It, in turn, contributes to creating resilient and supportive social structures.
• Economic Prosperity: Peace is a catalyst for economic growth and prosperity. Stable environments attract investments, encourage entrepreneurship, and facilitate trade. Nations at peace can allocate resources to development rather than defense, leading to sustainable economic progress.
• Health and Safety: Peace directly correlates with improved public health and safety. During peace, efficient operation of healthcare systems allows for the directed allocation of resources towards disease prevention and healthcare infrastructure. Additionally, reduced conflict-related hazards contribute to overall safety.
• Educational Opportunities: Peaceful environments foster conducive conditions for education. Schools and educational institutions can operate without the disruptions caused by conflicts. This enables the population to access quality education, empowering someone with the knowledge and skills necessary for personal and societal advancement.
• Environmental Conservation: Peace plays a crucial role in environmental conservation. During conflict, parties often ravage ecosystems and exploit resources for strategic advantage. In peaceful conditions, societies are more likely to prioritize sustainable practices and environmental stewardship.
• International Cooperation: Peace is essential for fostering diplomatic relations and international cooperation on the global stage. Nations can work together to address common challenges, such as climate change , poverty, and pandemics, leading to collective solutions that benefit the entire global community.

Impact of War

The impact of war is profound and far-reaching, leaving enduring scars on individuals, societies, and the world. War inflicts a multitude of consequences, both immediate and long-term, across various aspects of human existence. Understanding the multifaceted impact of war is crucial for appreciating the urgent need for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Some of the key dimensions of the impact of war include:

• Human Casualties and Suffering: War results in the loss of countless lives, causing immeasurable pain and suffering for individuals and their families. The direct impact includes fatalities, injuries, displacement, and the psychological trauma endured by those directly involved or affected by the conflict.
• Destruction of Infrastructure: Armed conflicts often lead to the destruction of infrastructure, including homes, hospitals, schools, and vital public facilities. The devastation disrupts daily life and hinders post-war reconstruction efforts, prolonging the recovery process for affected communities.
• Economic Consequences: War has severe economic ramifications, causing disruptions to trade, production, and investment. The allocation of resources to military efforts drains financial reserves that could otherwise be used for development, leading to long-term economic setbacks for nations involved in conflicts.
• Social Disintegration: War can result in the breakdown of social structures and community ties. Displacement, loss of cultural heritage, and the erosion of social trust contribute to a sense of dislocation and disarray within affected societies.
• Environmental Degradation: Conflict often brings about environmental degradation , as resources are exploited for strategic advantage, leading to deforestation, pollution, and habitat destruction. The long-term environmental impact can exacerbate ecological challenges and hinder sustainable development.
• Political Instability: War frequently begets political instability, fostering conditions conducive to authoritarianism, corruption, and power struggles. The aftermath of conflict may see the emergence of fragile governments, contributing to ongoing tensions and regional instability.
• Generational Trauma: Subsequent generations inherit war trauma. Trauma leaves a legacy that impacts the mental health and general well-being of succeeding generations. These consequences include psychological scars, cultural upheavals, and generational knowledge loss.
• Humanitarian Crises: War often leads to humanitarian crises, with widespread displacement, food insecurity, and inadequate access to healthcare. The challenges humanitarian organizations encounter in delivering relief worsen the suffering of marginalized communities.
• Global Repercussions: The impact of war extends beyond national borders, influencing geopolitics, international relations, and global security. Wars can create refugee crises, trigger regional instability, and contribute to the proliferation of weapons, affecting the broader international community.

The Dynamics Between Peace and War

• Geopolitical Forces: Nations often navigate a delicate balance between cooperation and competition. Geopolitical considerations, such as territorial disputes, resource competition, and power dynamics, can foster collaboration or escalate tensions, influencing the trajectory toward peace or conflict.
• Diplomacy and Negotiation: The diplomatic efforts of nations play a vital function in shaping the dynamics between peace and war. Successful negotiations and diplomatic initiatives can lead to peaceful resolutions, while breakdowns in communication or failed diplomacy may escalate tensions and trigger conflicts.
• Arms Race and Military Buildup: The accumulation of military capabilities and the pursuit of technological advancements in weaponry can create a precarious environment. An arms race may heighten the likelihood of conflict as nations seek to assert their military prowess or deter potential adversaries.
• Economic Factors: The dynamics of peace and war closely link economic stability and prosperity. Nations experiencing economic hardships may be more prone to internal strife or external aggression. Conversely, peaceful cooperation can contribute to economic development and shared prosperity.
• Cultural and Ideological Differences: Cultural and ideological disparities can be sources of cooperation and conflict. Understanding and respecting diversity can foster peace, while intolerance and cultural misunderstandings may contribute to tensions and confrontations.
• Global Governance and Institutions: The effectiveness of international organizations and governance structures, such as the United Nations, is pivotal in maintaining global peace. These institutions serve as platforms for diplomatic dialogue, conflict resolution, and establishing norms that guide state behavior.
• Civil Society and Grassroots Movements: The engagement of civil society, grassroots movements, and non-governmental organizations can influence the dynamics between peace and war. Advocacy for human rights, social justice , and diplomacy at the grassroots level can contribute to peacebuilding efforts.
• Technological Advancements: Technological progress introduces new dynamics into the peace-war continuum. Advancements in communication, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence can either facilitate peaceful purposes or present new challenges and risks that could escalate into conflict.
• Environmental Pressures: Environmental issues, such as resource scarcity, climate change, and competition for natural resources , can influence the dynamics between peace and war. Preventing conflicts caused by environmental stressors relies on individuals and communities actively cooperating to address these challenges.
• Historical Context and Memory: Historical events and collective memory can shape perceptions and attitudes toward peace and war. Learning from past conflicts and understanding historical grievances can contribute to conflict prevention, while unresolved historical issues may perpetuate tensions.

Factors Affecting War

1. Political Factors

• Geopolitical Competition: Rivalry between nations for strategic influence, resources, and territory can escalate tensions and lead to armed conflict.
• Government Instability: Weak or unstable governments may resort to militarization or aggression to maintain power or divert attention from internal issues.
• Ideological Conflicts: Clashes of ideology, such as communism versus capitalism or religious fundamentalism, can fuel conflicts driven by ideological differences.

2. Economic Factors

• Resource Scarcity: Competition over scarce resources, such as oil, water , or arable land, can trigger conflicts, especially in regions prone to environmental degradation or climate change.
• Economic Inequality: Disparities in wealth distribution and access to economic opportunities can exacerbate social tensions and lead to unrest and conflict.
• War Profiteering: Actors may perpetuate or escalate conflicts for financial gain by engaging in economic interests such as arms sales and exploiting conflict resources like minerals and drugs.

3. Social Factors

• Ethnic and Religious Divisions: Deep-seated ethnic or religious tensions can erupt into violence, often exacerbated by historical grievances or competition for resources and power.
• Social Injustice: Discrimination, marginalization, and unequal treatment of certain social groups can lead to resentment and social unrest, contributing to the likelihood of conflict.
• Demographic Pressures: Rapid population growth, urbanization , and youth bulges can strain resources and exacerbate socioeconomic inequalities, increasing the risk of conflict.

4. Military Factors

• Arms Proliferation: The widespread availability and proliferation of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, increase the likelihood of armed conflict and escalate existing conflicts.
• Military Buildup: The buildup of military capabilities and the pursuit of military superiority can create a security dilemma, leading to arms races and heightened tensions between nations.
• Proxy Warfare: External powers may support or sponsor proxy groups or insurgencies to advance their geopolitical interests, leading to localized or regional conflicts.

5. Environmental Factors

• Climate Change: Environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and climate-induced disasters can exacerbate tensions and trigger conflicts over land, water, and natural resources.
• Natural Disasters: The devastation caused by natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, or famines, can destabilize regions and create conditions conducive to conflict, especially in vulnerable or fragile states.

6. Ideological and Cultural Factors

• Nationalism and Patriotism: Political leaders can manipulate ideological narratives based on nationalism or patriotism to justify aggression or military intervention, thereby fostering a culture of militarism.
• Ideological Extremism: Radical ideologies, including religious extremism, nationalism, or separatism, can fuel conflicts by promoting intolerance, exclusion, and violence.

7. Historical Context and Legacy

• Historical Grievances: Lingering historical grievances, unresolved conflicts, and unresolved territorial disputes can serve as sources of tension and contribute to the outbreak of war.
• Legacy of Colonialism: The legacy of colonialism, including arbitrary borders, ethnic divisions, and economic exploitation, can contribute to instability and conflict in post-colonial societies.

8. Technological Factors

• Military Technology: Advancements in military technology, including drones, cyber weapons, and precision-guided munitions, can change the dynamics of warfare and influence the decision-making of actors involved in conflicts.
• Information Warfare: Using propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation in information warfare can shape public perceptions, manipulate public opinion, and influence the outcome of conflicts.

9. International Relations

• Alliances and Treaties: International alliances, security treaties, and defense pacts can draw nations into conflicts or serve as deterrents against aggression.
• Foreign Interventions: Foreign interventions, including military interventions, covert operations, or diplomatic meddling, can exacerbate existing conflicts or trigger new ones.

10. Psychological Factors

• Perceived Threats: Perceptions of threat, insecurity, or vulnerability can fuel fear, mistrust, and aggression, contributing to the escalation of conflicts.
• Psychological Warfare: Psychological warfare tactics, including propaganda, fear-mongering, and manipulation of public opinion, can shape perceptions and attitudes, influencing the behavior of conflict actors.

Peacebuilding Efforts

Peacebuilding efforts encompass a range of initiatives to address the root causes of conflict, promote reconciliation, and foster sustainable peace within and among societies. Governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations often lead these efforts, each playing a distinct role in advancing the peacebuilding agenda. Here’s a closer look at the initiatives undertaken by these entities:

Initiatives by Governments and NGOs:

• Conflict Resolution and Mediation: Governments and NGOs actively engage in conflict resolution and mediation processes to facilitate dialogue and negotiation between conflicting parties. They serve as mediators, facilitators, or impartial observers, bridging differences and building stakeholder trust.
• Peacekeeping Operations: Governments contribute troops and resources to international peacekeeping missions authorized by the United Nations or regional organizations. These missions aim to stabilize conflict-affected areas, protect civilians, and create conditions conducive to peacebuilding and reconstruction.
• Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Programs: Governments and NGOs implement reconciliation, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction programs. These initiatives may include trauma healing, community dialogue forums, capacity-building for local institutions, and socioeconomic development projects to manage the underlying drivers of conflict.
• Humanitarian Assistance and Development Aid: Governments and NGOs provide humanitarian assistance and development aid to conflict-affected regions, addressing immediate needs such as food, shelter, healthcare, and education. These efforts help alleviate suffering, build resilience, and create long-term stability and peace opportunities.
• Promotion of Human Rights and Rule of Law: Governments and NGOs advocate for human rights, justice, and the rule of law as essential pillars of sustainable peace. They support efforts to strengthen legal institutions, promote accountability for human rights violations, and empower marginalized groups, including women and youth.

Role of International Organizations

• United Nations (UN): The UN plays a central role in international peacebuilding efforts through its various organs, including the Security Council, General Assembly, and specialized agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF. The UN facilitates worldwide conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding activities.
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): NATO contributes to peacebuilding through its military and civilian operations, crisis management, and partnership programs. NATO-led missions focus on stabilizing conflict-affected regions, strengthening security sector reform, and promoting good governance in partnership with other international actors.
• Peacebuilding Commissions and Special Envoys: The UN Peacebuilding Commission and special envoys appointed by the Secretary-General are critical in coordinating international efforts and mobilizing support for peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict countries. They provide strategic guidance, resources, and advocacy to facilitate sustainable peace processes.
• Peacekeeping Operations: UN peacekeeping operations, authorized by the Security Council, deploy military, police, and civilian personnel to conflict-affected regions to help maintain peace, protect civilians, and support the implementation of peace agreements. These missions work closely with governments, local communities, and other stakeholders to build trust and support long-term peacebuilding efforts.

The Role of Individuals in Promoting Peace

1. Interpersonal Relationships

• Conflict Resolution Skills: Individuals can cultivate and employ practical conflict resolution skills in their relationships. By practicing active listening, empathy, and open communication, individuals can contribute to resolving disputes peacefully.
• Promoting Tolerance and Understanding: Embracing diversity and fostering a spirit of tolerance in personal interactions helps break down stereotypes and prejudices. Individuals can actively seek to understand different perspectives, fostering an environment of mutual respect.

2. Community Engagement

• Community Building: Individuals can engage in community-building activities that promote social cohesion and solidarity. Participating in local initiatives, events, and neighborhood projects helps build a sense of shared responsibility and belonging.
• Supporting Local Peacebuilding Initiatives: Individuals can actively support and participate in local peacebuilding initiatives led by community organizations, NGOs, or grassroots movements. These efforts may include dialogue sessions, conflict resolution workshops, and community development projects.

3. Education and Advocacy

• Promoting Peace Education: Individuals can advocate for and engage in peace education initiatives, both formal and informal. Promoting awareness of conflict resolution, human rights, and social justice helps instill values that contribute to a culture of peace.
• Advocacy for Peaceful Solutions: Individuals can use their voices to advocate for peaceful solutions to local, national, and international conflicts. It may involve supporting campaigns, participating in advocacy groups, and influencing public opinion.

3. Nonviolent Activism

• Civil Disobedience: Engaging in nonviolent civil disobedience and activism can be a powerful tool for individuals promoting peace and justice. Peaceful protests, demonstrations, and advocacy campaigns draw attention to social issues and encourage positive change.
• Supporting Human Rights: Individuals can actively support and champion human rights causes. Advocating for protecting basic rights, including freedom of expression, equality, and justice, builds a foundation for lasting peace.

4. Conflict Prevention and Mediation

• Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Individuals can contribute to conflict prevention by identifying and addressing potential sources of tension within their communities. Early intervention and dialogue can prevent conflicts from escalating.
• Mediation Skills: Acquiring mediation skills allows individuals to play a direct role in resolving disputes. Training in mediation techniques equips individuals to facilitate constructive dialogues and help parties find mutually acceptable solutions.

5. Promoting Gender Equality and Social Justice

• Empowering Women and Minorities: Recognizing and advocating for the rights and empowerment of women and marginalized groups contributes to creating a more inclusive and just society. Gender equality and social justice are integral to building sustainable peace.
• Addressing Structural Injustices: Individuals can work towards addressing systemic issues contributing to inequality and injustice. Advocating for fair policies, challenging discriminatory practices, and supporting social reforms contribute to a more equitable and peaceful society.

The essay has explored the intricate dynamics between peace and war, highlighting the historical perspectives, the importance of peace, the impact of war, peacebuilding efforts, and factors influencing conflict. Understanding these complexities fosters global cooperation, conflict resolution, and lasting peace.

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Essay on peace: need and importance of peace.

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Essay on Peace: Need and Importance of Peace!

The issue of war and peace has always been a focal issue in all periods of history and at all levels relations among nations. The concern of the humankind for peace can be assessed by taking into account the fact that all religions, all religious scriptures and several religious ceremonies are committed to the cause of peace and all these advocate an elimination of war. The Shanti Path recited by the Hindus, the sermons of Pope and the commands of all the holy scriptures of the Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and all other communities hold out a sacred commitment to peace.

Yet the international community fully realized the supreme importance of the virtue of peace against the evil of war only after having suffered the most unfortunate and highly destructive two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century. The blood soaked shreds of humanity that lay scattered in several hundred battle grounds, particularly on the soils of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cried for peace, peace and peace on the earth.

The UN Charter and International Peace and Security:

The human consciousness then rallied in the Charter of the United Nations to affirm. “We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to humankind…. and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security….. have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.”

Since 1945, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, several international associations and institutions, international peace movements, global and national level human rights movements and in fact all members of the international community have been consistently and strongly advocating the need for the preservation and promotion of peace against war.

In contemporary times, the most urgent and important international objective has been to preserve protect and defend peace against terrorism and terrorist organizations like A1 Qacda, Talibans, and other enemies of peace.

How International Community has been trying to secure peace:

Through international peace keeping under the aegis of the United Nations through the development and use of international law; creation of more international and regional institutions committed to promote peace, promotion of friendly cooperation for development among the member countries; popularization of peaceful means of conflict-resolution, institutionalization of relations among nations; integration of international community through strengthening of human consciousness in favour of peace against war; and by enhancing the ability for crisis-management, the humankind has been trying to secure peace against war.

Currently, through:

(i) Globalization i.e. by encouraging the free flow of people goods, information services and knowledge;

(ii) Establishment of non-official people to people socio-economic-cultural relations;

(iii) Organisation of international peace movements against nuclear weapons, armament race, militarisation, and environmental pollution;

(iv) Launching of special drives for elimination of such evils as apartheid, poverty, illiteracy; ill-health, hunger, disease, inequalities, tyranny and terrorism; and

(v) organised attempts at environment protection and protection of Human Rights of all, the international community has been making meaningful attempts to limit the chances of war.

What is Peace?

One elementary way of defining peace has been to say that peace is absence of war. This is, however, a very narrow view of peace. No doubt absence of war is the first condition of peace, yet peace is not merely an absence of war. It is in reality a condition characterised by peaceful, cooperative and harmonious conduct of international relations with a view to secure all-round sustainable development of the people of the world.

Nevertheless, since absence of war is the first condition of peace, one of the major concerns of all scholars and statesmen has been to formulate and follow the principles and devices needed for securing this primary objective. The cold war that kept the world preoccupied during 1945-90, indirectly secured this objective in a negative way by developing a balance of terror in international relations.

While it was successful in preventing a global war, it failed to prevent local wars and in fact gave rise to several tensions, stresses, strains and crises in international relations. The international community had to work very hard for keeping the conflicts and wars limited. It, however, successfully exhibited a welcome and positive ability in the sphere of crisis-management.

In fact, till today there have been present several hindrances in way of securing a stable, healthy and enduring peace. Fortunately, the final end of cold war came in the last decade of the 20th century and the world found herself living is an environment characterised by a new faith and commitment to peace, peaceful co-existence, peaceful conflict-resolution, liberalisation, cooperation for development and attempts at sustainable development.

The people began focusing their attention on the need for the protection of human rights of all, protection of environment and securing of a real and meaningful international integration. However several negative factors, ethnic conflict, ethnic violence, ethnic wars, terrorism in its several dimensions, neo-colonialism, hegemony n-hegemony and the like kept on acting as big hindrances.

The need to secure peace by controlling these evils continues to be a primary aim of international community. Crises have been repeatedly coming and these are bound to keep coming. This makes it very urgent for the humankind to prepare and act for managing crises through collective efforts and by the use of several devices.

Related Articles:

• Does Peace Require Non-Violence?
• 8 Devices used for the Preservation of Peace

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• How to End a War

How to End a War

Essays on justice, peace, and repair.

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• Edited by Graham Parsons , United States Military Academy , Mark Wilson , Villanova University, Pennsylvania
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Book description

How and when should we end a war? What place should the pathways to a war's end have in war planning and decision-making? This volume treats the topic of ending war as part and parcel of how wars begin and how they are fought – a unique, complex problem, worthy of its own conversation. New essays by leading thinkers and practitioners in the fields of philosophical ethics, international relations, and military law reflect on the problem and show that it is imperative that we address not only the resolution of war, but how and if a war as waged can accommodate a future peace. The essays collectively solidify the topic and underline its centrality to the future of military ethics, strategy, and war.

‘How to End a War is a strong anthology by a major group of scholars which makes important contributions to the crucial issues in the area that has come to be called jus post bellum.'

Steven P. Lee - Hobart and William Smith Colleges

‘A marvellous set of essays that together provide a stimulating overview of cutting-edge issues in contemporary ethics of war.’

Source: Journal of Peace Research

‘How to End a War is worthwhile reading for its new perspectives on jus ex bello and jus post bellum, the integral view on just war theory (where the different branches are intimately connected), and for highlighting the links between the theory and related issues that are equally important for the justice of ending wars. In this way, the volume also draws much needed attention to the experiences of the combatants that we send to war.’

Source: Ethics and International Affairs

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How to End a War pp i-ii

• Get access Check if you have access via personal or institutional login Log in Register

How to End a War - Title page pp iii-iii

• Essays on Justice, Peace, and Repair

Copyright page pp iv-iv

Contents pp v-vi, contributors pp vii-viii, acknowledgments pp ix-x, introduction pp 1-9.

• The Ethics of War after the Longest War
• By Graham Parsons , Mark A. Wilson

Chapter 1 - The Lament of the Demobilized pp 10-30

• By Cheyney Ryan

Chapter 2 - Moral Injury and Moral Failure pp 31-58

• By Lisa Tessman

Chapter 3 - Stoic Grit, Moral Injury, and Resilience pp 59-76

• By Nancy Sherman

Chapter 4 - Political Humiliation and the Sense of Replacement pp 77-91

• By Nir Eisikovits

Chapter 5 - Minimum Moral Thresholds at War’s End pp 92-110

• By Colleen Murphy

Chapter 6 - Ending Endless Wars pp 111-131

• By Alex J. Bellamy

Chapter 7 - Forever Wars pp 132-149

• Time and Value in War
• By David Rodin

Chapter 8 - Two Conceptions of the Proportionality Budget for Jus Ex Bello pp 150-169

• By Darrel Moellendorf

Chapter 9 - Toward a Post Bellum Lieber Code pp 170-193

• By Dan Maurer

Chapter 10 - Reconciliation Is Justice – and a Strategy for Military Victory pp 194-214

• By Daniel Philpott

Bibliography pp 215-232

Index pp 233-234, altmetric attention score, full text views.

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United States Institute of Peace

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If You Want Peace, Prepare for War, and Diplomacy

A combination of deterrence and diplomacy is key to avoiding war and pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula.

By: Robert Einhorn

Publication Type: Analysis

This essay is part of a series, Pursuing Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea , that explores how the United States and South Korea can peacefully coexist with a nuclear North Korea. 

At this Kim Dae-jung Peace Forum, it’s useful to recall seemingly paradoxical advice offered by a fourth-century Roman general: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you want peace, prepare for war.”

This Roman-era aphorism has come to mean that if you face an aggressive adversary, build your military strength so that the adversary knows that, if it launches an attack, it will receive a punishing response — and will therefore be discouraged from pursuing such an attack. The idea of achieving peace by preparing for war has been a critical foundation of security strategies for many centuries. Today we call it “deterrence.”

Of course, not all countries prepare for war in order to have peace. Some have prepared for war as a prelude to waging war. Hitler built the Nazi war machine to conquer Europe and beyond. But for countries genuinely seeking peace and facing significant security threats from well-armed adversaries, building countervailing military strength has usually been the chosen strategy. They feared that failure to build and maintain adequate deterrent capabilities would signal weakness and might only invite aggression.

The Limits of Deterrence

Deterrence — or peace through strength, as it is sometimes called — has stood the test of time because it is widely believed to have worked. Deterrence of the Soviet Union by the United States and its NATO allies during the Cold War is credited with avoiding a major East-West conflict.

But a strategy of deterrence is not without risks. Strengthening defenses to deter an adversary may be interpreted by that adversary as an indication of aggressive intent and a serious threat to its own security. It may respond by further building up its own capabilities. The result may be an expensive and destabilizing arms race — one that reinforces mutual antagonisms, perpetuates a state of confrontation and makes resolution of the underlying conflict even more difficult.

In addition, as both sides build up their military capabilities, they may declare policies, test weapon systems or engage in exercises or deployments that the other side views as preparations for the use of force, even preemptive use of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, the risk of armed conflict breaking out as a result of accidents, misperceptions or miscalculations would grow.

Moreover, even if a mutual military buildup does not result in large-scale armed hostilities, it would not necessarily prevent lower-level provocations. Indeed, an aggressor’s belief that it could deter large-scale retaliation could increase its confidence that it could engage in lower-level provocations with impunity.

To avoid war and ultimately achieve peace, deterrence should be accompanied by diplomacy.

During the Cold War, while amassing huge nuclear arsenals to deter each other, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in diplomacy to moderate and stabilize their competition, limit and reduce their nuclear forces, adopt transparency and confidence-building measures to avoid dangerous miscalculations, and in general prevent their competition from getting out of control.

Yes, if you want peace, prepare for war. But also pursue diplomacy.

So, how do these considerations apply to matters of war and peace on the contemporary Korean Peninsula?

North Korea’s Growing Capabilities

Seventy years after the Korean Armistice Agreement, hope for genuine peace on the peninsula continues to fade. In recent years, the security environment has dramatically deteriorated. The primary cause of increased tension and instability has been North Korea’s relentless efforts to expand and diversify its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Under Kim Jong Un, this rapidly growing nuclear arsenal has been accompanied by inflammatory rhetoric toward Seoul and Washington, including the North’s often-declared willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively .

What is Kim’s motivation for his aggressive nuclear posture? Is it essentially defensive — to ensure the survival of his regime from foreign interference or attack? Or is it essentially offensive — to intimidate and coerce South Korea and reunify the peninsula under Pyongyang’s control? Of course, we don’t know. We can only speculate.

North Korea’s initial motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons may well have been defensive — to deter what it perceived as foreign, mainly U.S., efforts to undermine or eliminate its regime. But whatever its initial motivation, Kim may now feel emboldened by his increased capabilities to pursue more offensive objectives.

Many observers doubt that Kim sees reunification of the peninsula by force as a realistic possibility. But he may now feel he can dominate inter-Korean relations, drive wedges in the U.S.-South Korean alliance and engage in increasingly aggressive provocations. And he may become dangerously overconfident in his ability to control the risks of escalation.

South Korea and the United States have become increasingly alarmed by the growing threat from North Korea. South Korean concerns have been magnified by uncertainty about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees.

U.S.-South Korea Response: Prioritizing Deterrence

The main allied response to the North Korean threat has been to boost their collective deterrent capabilities.

At the highest political levels, the administrations of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden have worked together closely to demonstrate strong alliance solidarity and resolve. Seoul has augmented its own conventional capabilities, including its  three-axis strategy . South Korea and the United States have taken significant steps to reinforce the credibility of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent and to give South Korea a more prominent role in the planning and execution of that deterrent — most notably in the  Washington Declaration adopted during Yoon’s state visit to Washington in April. And together with Japan, the allies have boosted trilateral defense cooperation in unprecedented ways, as agreed at the Camp David summit in August 2023.

While prioritizing deterrence, the allies have also sought diplomatic engagement — reaching out repeatedly to Pyongyang to begin talks . But all those initiatives were rebuffed by the North.

In the absence of diplomacy, the situation is becoming more dangerous. North Korea continues to advance its threatening capabilities. The allies continue to strengthen their deterrent — with large-scale, live-fire joint defense drills and high-profile visits of U.S. strategic assets, including a port visit by a U.S. ballistic missile submarine. Pyongyang, in turn, condemns those allied efforts, which it claims are preparations for attacking the North. It says those efforts justify the further acceleration of its own programs and even its preemptive nuclear doctrine.

Risk Reduction: The Most Immediate Objective

What can be done to break this downward spiral? It may be time for a renewed push for diplomacy. But to get talks underway, a somewhat different approach may be required.

I believe the major reason Kim has so far rejected engagement has been his desire to avoid talks that might interfere with the completion of his ambitious five-year plan to develop and test key nuclear and missile capabilities.

But another reason may be what Washington and Seoul declare must be the focus of any negotiation — namely, the North’s complete denuclearization. Kim has made it clear that he has no intention of eliminating what he regards as essential to the survival of his regime. He says repeatedly that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is irreversible and nonnegotiable .

If Pyongyang eventually gets rid of its nuclear weapons, it will be the result of either a fundamental transformation of the current regime’s policies and values or its collapse.

Neither outcome can be dismissed altogether, especially the regime’s eventual collapse. But we can’t count on either one, at least not in the near term. Realistically, we will have to live with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

The United States and its allies can’t accept the North as a legitimate nuclear-armed country. It acquired nuclear weapons illegally and deceitfully. Accepting its nuclear capability would set a dangerous precedent that is damaging to the global nonproliferation regime.

The United States and its allies should continue to adhere to the ultimate goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But for now, they should focus on the most immediate threat — the risk of intentional or inadvertent armed conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.

The United States and South Korea should therefore approach North Korea and propose setting aside denuclearization for the time being and focusing instead on a risk reduction agenda — primarily confidence-building, transparency and communications measures that can enhance predictability and reduce the risks of armed conflict resulting from accident, misperception or miscalculation. Negotiations could take place bilaterally, trilaterally or in a multilateral regional format, perhaps involving the countries that participated in the Six-Party Talks.

Participants might be required to reaffirm the goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — a goal Kim supported in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement  — although participants would presumably continue to differ on the conditions that would make the attainment of that goal possible.

The risk-reduction measures that might be considered in such talks could include:

• prenotification of flight tests of several categories of missiles
• prenotification of land, sea and air military exercises meeting certain agreed-upon criteria
• avoidance of military activities in specified geographic areas (for example, no-fly zones or maritime buffer zones)
• the establishment of routine and crisis communications channels
• the resurrection of several confidence-building steps contained in the moribund North-South Comprehensive Military Agreement
• the adoption of so-called rules of the road to prevent provocative cyber activities
• the toning down of inflammatory rhetoric (including threats to use nuclear weapons preemptively or to launch decapitation strikes against an adversary’s leadership)
• the creation of what might be called “risk-reduction dialogues” where civilian and military officials would meet regularly to raise concerns about another country’s military activities and seek measures to address those concerns

Such risk reduction measures would not bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. Neither would they ensure progress toward denuclearization or remove the need for current U.S. and South Korean efforts to strengthen deterrence and maintain allied military readiness.

Moreover, North Korea’s willingness to engage on risk-reduction measures is far from certain. It may believe that maintaining risks at a high level serves its interests by discouraging the United States and its allies from conducting military activities that could increase the likelihood of conflict. Or it may decide to engage but condition its support for risk-reduction measures on unacceptable concessions from the allies.

Still, in light of the huge stakes, it is worth a try. Risk-reduction measures along these lines — together with a determined allied effort to reinforce deterrence — could help arrest or even reverse the current downward spiral on the peninsula. They could reduce each side’s incentives for pursuing an open-ended arms competition. Perhaps most importantly, they could help alleviate one of the most acute threats on the peninsula today — the risk of inadvertent armed conflict that could escalate to nuclear war.

And if faithfully implemented, such measures could reduce tensions, build habits of constructive engagement, pave the way for practical steps to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat and at least keep alive the hope, however remote today, of a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula living in peace.

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” There’s much truth in that age-old advice. Deterrence may well be a necessary condition for achieving peace — or at least avoiding war.

But it’s only a partial truth. Deterrence may be necessary, but it’s not sufficient. It must be accompanied by diplomacy. And there’s an increasingly urgent need for diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula — diplomacy with realistically achievable and critically important goals.

This is a lightly edited version of Robert Einhorn’s remarks to the 2023 Kim Dae-jung Peace Forum on October 6, 2023, in Mokpo, South Korea.

Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow at the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology of the Brookings Institution.

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News reports over the past few years featuring Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, or his daughter, Kim Ju Ae, have led to speculation about a future North Korea ruled by a woman. This is an intriguing development worth monitoring, given the North Korean regime’s history of patrilineal succession. However, ordinary North Korean women may have a greater role to play in the future of the country.

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By: Dan Leaf

The greatest challenge to peaceful coexistence between North Korea and the United States is the technical state of war between the two countries. The United States and the Soviet Union may have been at ideological loggerheads, used proxies in regional conflicts and come close to direct superpower blows — but they were not in a state of war. Resolution of the Korean War should be set as a stated U.S. policy objective. This is a necessary Step Zero on the road to peaceful coexistence with North Korea today and could reduce the risk of deliberate or accidental conflict, nuclear or otherwise.

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America’s Military Is Not Prepared for War — or Peace

By Roger Wicker

Mr. Wicker, a Republican, is the ranking member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee.

“To be prepared for war,” George Washington said, “is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” President Ronald Reagan agreed with his forebear’s words, and peace through strength became a theme of his administration. In the past four decades, the American arsenal helped secure that peace, but political neglect has led to its atrophy as other nations’ war machines have kicked into high gear. Most Americans do not realize the specter of great power conflict has risen again.

It is far past time to rebuild America’s military. We can avoid war by preparing for it.

When America’s senior military leaders testify before my colleagues and me on the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee behind closed doors, they have said that we face some of the most dangerous global threat environments since World War II. Then, they darken that already unsettling picture by explaining that our armed forces are at risk of being underequipped and outgunned. We struggle to build and maintain ships, our fighter jet fleet is dangerously small, and our military infrastructure is outdated. Meanwhile, America’s adversaries are growing their militaries and getting more aggressive.

In China, the country’s leader, Xi Jinping, has orchestrated a historic military modernization intended to exploit the U.S. military’s weaknesses. He has overtaken the U.S. Navy in fleet size, built one of the world’s largest missile stockpiles and made big advances in space. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has thrown Europe into war and mobilized his society for long-term conflict. Iran and its proxy groups have escalated their shadow war against Israel and increased attacks on U.S. ships and soldiers. And North Korea has disregarded efforts toward arms control negotiations and moved toward wartime readiness.

Worse yet, these governments are materially helping one another, cooperating in new ways to prevent an American-led 21st century. Iran has provided Russia with battlefield drones, and China is sending technical and logistical help to aid Mr. Putin’s war. They are also helping one another prepare for future fights by increasing weapons transfers and to evade sanctions. Their unprecedented coordination makes new global conflict increasingly possible.

That theoretical future could come faster than most Americans think. We may find ourselves in a state of extreme vulnerability in a matter of a few years, according to a growing consensus of experts. Our military readiness could be at its lowest point in decades just as China’s military in particular hits its stride. The U.S. Indo-Pacific commander released what I believe to be the largest list of unfunded items ever for services and combatant commands for next year’s budget, amounting to $11 billion. It requested funding for a raft of infrastructure, missile defense and targeting programs that would prove vital in a Pacific fight. China, on the other hand, has no such problems, as it accumulates the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal with a mix of other lethal cruise and attack missiles.

Our military leaders are being forced to make impossible choices. The Navy is struggling to adequately fund new ships, routine maintenance and munition procurement; it is unable to effectively address all three. We recently signed a deal to sell submarines to Australia, but we’ve failed to sufficiently fund our own submarine industrial base, leaving an aging fleet unprepared to respond to threats. Two of the three most important nuclear modernization programs are underfunded and are at risk of delays. The military faces a backlog of at least $180 billion for basic maintenance, from barracks to training ranges. This projects weakness to our adversaries as we send service members abroad with diminished ability to respond to crises.

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Introduction, the perennial problem of speaking about peace, the obligation to write about war, traditions of international thinking, funder information.

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What Do We Learn about War and Peace from Women International Thinkers?

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Glenda Sluga, What Do We Learn about War and Peace from Women International Thinkers?, Global Studies Quarterly , Volume 3, Issue 1, January 2023, ksad018, https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad018

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The aim of this essay is to ask what can we learn about war and peace from women international thinkers? As I will show, new and old historical evidence of women thinkers points us in directions that suggest, first, the privations women regularly faced in order to make their arguments against the background of actual war, addressing both the more conventional “women's” topic of peace and the often masculinized controversies of the nature of violence. This same history sounds out the range and changing (gendered) registers of international thought, including the diminished tones of peace as a defining objective. Then there are the diverse locations of specifically women's international thought, from manifestos to pamphlets and newspaper articles to published tomes. These lead us to the intersecting political and intellectual networks of activism and influence that colored the intertextual referentiality that thinking generated. Finally, I will argue that the evidence at hand, and the related examples it connects to, underscores the broad transnational European settings of the texts that specifically address war and peace. It even suggests, as I suggest, that the borders of that transnationalism extended not only across the Atlantic, but also through the entangled continental political histories of Western Europe and Russia. In the twenty-first century, these contours of the history of women's international thought remain relevant, not least because they pose the question for us, what difference have women thinkers made?

Cet article traite de la question suivante: que peut-on apprendre sur la guerre et la paix grâce aux penseuses internationales ? Je montrerai que les nouvelles données issues des penseuses, mais aussi les plus anciennes et historiques, révèlent d'abord les privations auxquelles ont été régulièrement confrontées les femmes quand il s'agissait de présenter leurs idées en temps de guerre. Elles rejoignent le sujet « féminin » plus habituel de paix et les polémiques souvent masculinisées autour de la nature de la violence. Cette même histoire nous donne une idée de l'ampleur et de l’évolution des registres (genrés) de la pensée internationale, notamment la perte de vitesse de la présentation de la paix comme objectif ultime. Ensuite, la pensée internationale spécifiquement féminine s'exprime sur différents supports, des manifestes aux volumes publiés en passant par les pamphlets et articles de journal. Nous constatons ainsi l'intersection des réseaux politiques et intellectuels de militantisme et d'influence qui ont faussé l'intertextualité et la référentialité générées par cette pensée. Enfin, je soutiendrai que les données à disposition, et les exemples connexes, soulignent le large cadre européen transnational des textes qui traitent précisément de la guerre et de la paix. Elles indiquent aussi, comme je le montrerai, que les frontières de ce transnationalisme non seulement s’étendaient par-delà l'Atlantique, mais traversaient aussi l'enchevêtrement des théories politiques continentales de l'Europe occidentale et de la Russie. Au 21e siècle, ces contours de l'histoire de la pensée internationale des femmes conservent toute leur pertinence, notamment parce qu'ils s'interrogent sur l'importance du rôle des penseuses.

El objetivo de este artículo es hacernos la siguiente pregunta, ¿qué podemos aprender de las mujeres pensadoras internacionales acerca de la guerra y de la paz? Como demostraremos, tanto la nueva como la antigua evidencia histórica de las mujeres pensadoras nos indican direcciones que sugieren, en primer lugar, las privaciones a las que las mujeres se enfrentaron regularmente para poder presentar sus alegatos contra el contexto de la guerra real, abordando, o bien el tema más convencional de la paz «de las mujeres», o bien las controversias, a menudo masculinizadas, de la naturaleza de la violencia. Esta misma historia tantea tanto el rango como los registros cambiantes (de género) del pensamiento internacional, incluyendo los reducidos matices de la paz como objetivo definitorio. También podemos encontrar los diversos lugares del pensamiento internacional específicamente femenino, desde manifiestos a panfletos y desde artículos periodísticos hasta tomos publicados. Estos nos dirigen a las redes políticas e intelectuales entrecruzadas de activismo e influencia y que dieron color a la referencialidad intertextual que generaba el pensamiento. Por último, argumentaremos que la evidencia disponible, así como los ejemplos relacionados con los que se conecta esta evidencia, recalcan la amplia configuración europea transnacional de los textos que abordan específicamente la guerra y la paz. Esto incluso nos indica, tal como sugerimos, que las fronteras de ese transnacionalismo se extendieron no solo a través del Atlántico, sino a través de las enredadas historias políticas continentales de Europa Occidental y de Rusia. En el siglo XXI, estos perfiles de la historia del pensamiento internacional de las mujeres siguen siendo relevantes, entre otras razones porque nos plantean la siguiente pregunta, ¿cuál es el diferencial que han aportado las mujeres pensadoras?

Through the twentieth century, women have been “at the forefront of geopolitical thinking”; they have written “powerful analyses of war, the organized, reciprocal killing and maiming of people and destruction of things.” And yet, women have been “completely absent from the academic canon of international thought” ( Owens et al. 2022 , 2; Owens and Rietzler 2021 ). 1 This is the paradoxical intellectual setting of Patricia Owens, Katharina Rietzler, Kimberley Hutchings, and Sarah C. Dunstan's Women's International Thought: Towards a New Canon , an anthology that assembles texts by women on the canonical themes of international politics since 1899: imperialism, anticolonialism, world economy, diplomacy, and foreign policy. Many of the women whose voices come through might be well known to feminist historians, even if they have not been read conventionally through the lens of “international thought”—as intellectual historians acknowledge, the field of international thought is (surprisingly) relatively new ( Armitage 2015 , 116–30; Sluga 2015 , 103–15; Huber, Pietsch, and Rietzler 2021 , 121–45). Even as Women's International Thought revolves around (mostly) Western European and trans-Atlantic examples, its enterprise is indicative of the historical breadth and diversity of the fabric of women's international thinking, textured by the warp and weft of its multivocality and inevitably dissonant tendencies. My aim in this essay is to make use of the anthology and these representative strengths to pose a specific historical question: what do we learn about war and peace from women international thinkers ?

In broaching this question by drawing on this anthology, I have preferred to frame women's international texts as manifestations of thinking , a potentially more generous concept than thought in its canonical accommodations. By emphasizing thinking , my intention is not unlike that of the anthology's editors, namely to draw attention to the same “multiple power relations” that have determined the canon of international thought so far and to expand, and possibly even challenge that canon, by incorporating an even wider spectrum of views on war and peace. In practical terms, the preference for thinking over thought allows me to capitalize on the anthology's own approach to its textual landscape, to incorporate a range of genres: manifestos, pamphlets, and newspaper articles as well as published tomes. I also take the opportunity to historically connect complementary thinkers from inside and outside the anthology, not only Bertha von Suttner, F.M. Stawell, Merze Tate, and Hannah Arendt, for example, but also European and Russian thinkers who, in this same period, were connected across the continent through their methods, and across the boundaries of nonfiction and fiction through their concerns. Among those concerns are the tensions between idealism and realism, the diminishing status of peace as a defining political objective, and the distinctive gendering of war. Then there is the history of the challenges women regularly faced in order to make their arguments, often against the backdrop of actual wars. Here, these themes are organized under the headings: “The perennial problem of speaking about peace”; “The obligation to write about war”; “The politics of war”; and “Traditions of international thought.” In positing the prospect of “traditions,” I also take up the question interrogated by Women's International Thought: Whether, given “the multiple intersecting relations of power that shape intellectual production,” there can be “such thing as a women's tradition [my emphasis] of international thought”? The evidence of the anthology itself, I propose, shows that, through the twentieth century, women international thinkers have regularly confronted the significance of their difference, even as they have attempted to reorient their gendered positionality. In particular, tinctured with the darkest events of the past hundred years, the examples collected here suggest that some women themselves fostered a sense of intellectual tradition around the longevity (and persistence) of their gender-inflected political aims. In this essay, their stories and their insights are connected by my overarching claim: in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the long history of women's international thinking speaks to the difference that women's international thinking continues to make ( Sluga 2014 , 65–72).

To the extent that it has existed as a field, “international thought” has often evoked the history of pacifism, and pacifism has been associated with femininity, and even, occasionally, feminism ( Owens and Rietzler 2021 , 17; Sluga 2021 , 226). Historically, women have been well aware of the impact of these associations on any attempt to speak to peace as a legitimate international imperative. At the turn of the twentieth century, Bertha von Suttner—a baroness who founded the Austrian peace movement and eventually impressed the dynamite king Alfred Nobel to fund a peace prize—struggled against the stigma of being both a woman and a pacifist.

Since then, she has remained perhaps the best known of the women associated with turn-of-the-twentieth-century international thinking about war. She has hardly lacked biographers, and she was herself an early publicist of her ideas ( Moyn 2021 , 32). 2 Her autobiography—published in German in 1889 as Die Waffen nieder! , in English in 1892 as Lay down your arms! , and, later, in many other languages—reached at least a million readers in her own lifetime. In 1905, Suttner (like many of the women under discussion in this intellectual history) was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, in part for her role at the 1899 Hague peace congress famously organized by the Russian Tsar Nicholas II to somehow manage the escalating militarization of Europe's imperial powers. This was the tense setting in which Suttner took up as one of her main themes the realism of pacifists.

Suttner's address to the 1899 congress—now reproduced in the Women's International Thought anthology—directly attacks what she saw as a prevailing and disabling misconception: that “members of peace societies imagine under the name of universal peace a condition of general harmony, a world without fighting or divisions, with undisputed frontiers settled for all time, and inhabited by angelic beings, overflowing with gentleness and love.” She attributes this misrepresentation to the enemies of the peace movement, who accuse it of “absurdities … which it has never asserted.” In contrast, Suttner describes pacifism's realism: “[t]he friends of peace do not desire to found their kingdom on impossibilities, nor on conditions that might perhaps prevail thousands of years hence, but on the living present and living humanity” ( von Suttner 1899 , 50–69). The peace movement she leads does not demand the “avoidance of disputes,” as she clarifies, “for that is impossible” ( von Suttner 1899 , 56). Rather, she stresses, it is realistic; what pacifists want is for disputes between states to be settled “by arbitration instead of by force” ( von Suttner 1899 , 56).

In the early twentieth century, despite such protestations of realism, the authority of the peace movement's faith in arbitration remained vulnerable to the derision of its “enemies” and to the impact of the unprecedented scale of the arms race that provoked the 1899 congress in the first place. After war broke out in late 1914, the American economist and pacifist Emily Greene Balch acknowledged an inevitability to the “widespread feeling” “that this is not the moment to talk of a European peace” (Balch would eventually win the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1946). In October 1915, she equally insisted that “the psychological moment” for talking about peace was near. It could even be coaxed forth by beginning preparations for peace, through discussion of the terms and principles of a future peace:

In each country there are those that want to continue the fight until military supremacy is achieved, in each there are powerful forces that seek a settlement of the opposite type, one which instead of containing within itself the threats to international stability that are involved in annexation, humiliation of the enemy, and competition between armaments, shall secure national independence all round, protect the rights of minorities and foster international co-operation. ( Balch 1915 , 24)

Earlier that year, as battles raged through the nerve centers of Europe's security alliances, Balch was among the women—three British, some American, and one thousand mostly Dutch delegates—who gathered from April 28 to May 1 in The Hague, not uncoincidentally the site of the 1899 congress. Their aim was precisely to pursue the discussions required for a just and early peace. The Women's International Thought anthology includes texts from many of the women involved in The Hague congress, although not the famous manifesto on which the women agreed ( National Peace Federation 1915 ; Costin 1982 , 301–15; Vellacott 1993 , 23–56).

Hardly a conventional intellectual text, the intellectual authority of the 1915 Hague manifesto rests on its capture of the thinking of well-known American and British feminists such as Balch, Jane Addams, and Helena Swanwick, as well as the Hungarian Rosika Schwimmer ( National Peace Federation 1915 ). On the one hand, the manifesto plainly states the principles that Balch predicted would dominate peacemaking: national independence, minority rights, and international cooperation. Indeed, their international thinking possibly influenced, and certainly anticipated, the eventual terms of peacemaking in 1919, from the creation of international institutions, and the principle of nationality, to the democratic control of foreign policy. On the other hand, as importantly, the manifesto espouses topics that were not acceptable in the delineation of a new international politics: the importance of education and women's suffrage as means by which peace might be permanently maintained. Indeed, the Council of Ten who eventually decided the terms of the postwar peace explicitly and unanimously refused to accommodate the status of women in the peace settlement on the grounds that authority over that question defined national sovereignty and thus could not be put on an international agenda ( Sluga 2005a , 166–83; 2005b , 300–19; 2006 ). For our purposes, the manifesto and the history surrounding it is a vital example of how women's rights and women's political roles were consistently the point of distinction between women's international thinking and international thought more narrowly defined.

Over the course of the twentieth century, the women's Hague congress and its decisions were co-opted into general historical inventories of pacifism and internationalism, particularly as part of the story of the creation of the enduring organization “Women's International League for Peace and Freedom” (WILPF), although its specific peacemaking agenda was as often neglected. Less attention has been paid too to the ways in which these women were targeted by governments for their convictions. We know that some European governments attempted to deter attendance on the grounds that so-called peace propaganda might have undermined strategic wartime patriotic programs. In this same context, social historians have shown the extent of censoring of peace publications as well as unprecedented levels of harassment through raids and surveillance that took place in England. The German government, which overall tried to avoid arrest and prosecution, resorted instead to blocking the circulation of peace activists’ publications and views ( Ewing and Gearty 2001 ). In the United States, there is the example of Balch's activism leading to the loss of her academic position at Wellesley. In Russia, in 1915, Anna Shabanova was forced by police order to dismantle the Petrograd (Saint Petersburg) women's peace society she had established on the Austrian model of Bertha von Suttner ( Cohen 2012 , 184).

The connections between the Russian and other European experiences, events, and ideas ran deep. Before the Hague meeting, in March 1915, Shabanova and other socialist women organized their own anti-war meeting in the (wartime) neutral Swiss capital of Berne. Clara Zetkin, the German Secretary of the International Bureau of Socialist Women and one of the key organizers of this Berne congress, faced the opprobrium of her male peers in the German Socialist Party (SPD), which forbade its members’ attendance. The French women's delegation too suffered the criticism of the (male-dominated) French socialist party. When, regardless, the Berne peace congress went ahead, its participants—twenty-two women from Russia, France, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Sweden—agreed a manifesto that was the work mainly of Zetkin, drawn up in their company. The Berne women shared with the Hague attendees a certain obstinacy and pariah status—and the Hague and Berne women even supported each other's efforts to some extent. However, there were also important differences. The Hague manifesto was intrinsically a liberal document asserting the importance of peace, the intrinsically pacifist nature of women's influence, and the pacific influence of free seas, commerce, and trade routes. The Berne manifesto, in contrast, was oriented toward a socialist rather than liberal critique. It targeted not just arms, but also capitalism, making space for violence in the interests of politics: “Down with capitalism, which sacrifices untold millions to the wealth and power of the propertied! Down with the war! Forward to socialism!,” it proclaimed ( Manifesto of the International Conference of Socialist Women at Berne 1915 ).

The themes of the Berne congress are represented by the Russian socialist Alexandra Kollontai, who contributed her thinking to the congress from a distance. Kollontai had a history of participating in anti-war protests in Sweden, Switzerland, and Belgium; she had been arrested for organizing an anti-war demonstration in Belgium the previous year and was absent from Berne because she could not get permission from the French government to cross its territory. In the circumstances, she wrote her breathless pamphlet, Who Needs the War ?. Echoing the message of the Berne gathering, Kollontai describes the war as “a madness, an abomination, a crime,” and, more specifically, as benefitting only capitalism and a capitalist class ( Kollontai 1916 ; Kollontai [1926] 1994 , 123). On these same grounds, she argues in favor of a different imperative: a workers’ revolution. As we will see, political ideology was a critical theoretical dividing point for some women international thinkers on the question of when war might be justified.

Just as the First World War drew women to reflect on war and peace in a range of political contexts, so too did the end of the war, and the novel postwar international institutional setting ( Stöckmann 2018 , 215–35). The unprecedented intergovernmental body, the League of Nations, was the product of wartime activism. New research by Helen McCarthy, for example, has shown the extent of popular support among women as well as men during the war for a League of Nations that might be equipped to ensure peace in the future ( McCarthy 2011 ). Among those supporters was the Cambridge-based classicist Florence Melian Stawell, whose activism took the form of writing pamphlets and addressing the compatibility of national patriotism and internationalism ( Sluga 2021 , 223–43). After the war, Stawell contributed to the English “Home Library” series a long history of the internationalist basis of peace thinking. Her book, The Growth of International Thought (1927), was meant to educate a broader public in the enduring and universal internationalist values of the newly established League of Nations, as an instrument of world peace ( Stawell 1929 , 7, 18–26). From the viewpoint of intellectual history, The Growth of International Thought is the product of Stawell's classicist expertise, which she shared with so many of the male scholars who led the wartime English League of Nations movement ( Sylvest 2004 , 409–32; Sluga 2006 , chapter 2; Stapleton 2007 , 261–91; McCarthy 2011 ). Like other classicists, she turned to Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian wars, “in which oligarchs fought against democrats, where there was ‘every form of murder and every extreme of cruelty’,” as “one of the strongest indictments against war ever written.” The Peloponnesian wars taught that the causes of belligerence are “the lust for power and gain.” War not only has its origins in the motivations of men, it changes them; once war begins “men are tempted by dire necessity,” and many “grow like the lives they lead” ( Owens and Rietzler 2021 , 41).

Stawell's interest in classical texts also underlines what women's international thinking often added to discussions of war and peace, namely an explicit engagement with the difference women made, such as their gendered investment in peace. Sometimes, the rationale for this difference was biological motherhood. Some of the authors of the 1915 Hague manifesto argued that since women's maternal roles instinctively inclined them to peace, granting women rights would inevitably encourage peace. Mostly, however, arguments for making women's rights a basis for peace were proposed on the grounds of social not biological reasoning: the social forms of masculinity that supported gender inequality also contributed to war. On this same view, conventional forms of femininity were more likely to be associated with pacifist ambitions. Emily Greene Balch understood that women could have the same emotions as men, and be likewise “inflamed by nationalism, intoxicated by the glories of war, embittered by old rancors” ( Balch 1922 , 334–36). However, she ventured that psychologically, women “have a less powerful instinctive pugnacity than men,” and she underlined the sociological fact that women had “in the mass… taken little part in the political life of their peoples.” In war, women “always stood to lose even more than men, as Europe knew” ( Balch 2022 , 493). Stawell turned as well to Euripides’ Trojan Women and Aristophanes’ Lysistrata for lessons about the different roles men and women could take in international thinking ( Owens et al. 2022 , 21; Sluga 2021 , 28; Stawell, 2022, 42). 3 In both plays, women reject men's violence. Most famously, Lysistrata , the eponymous figure (“whose name means ‘the Peacemaker’”) determines to band women from all sides together “in a vow that they will have nothing to do with men until the senseless war between them is ended” (cited in Owens et al. 2022 , 42).

Through the twentieth century, in the face of prevalent episodes of imperial and nation-state-based violence, women have felt an obligation to think and write about the fundamental causes of war. Emily Greene Balch explained that “the great war” revealed human nature to be “a thin crust barely concealing a substratum of explosive passions and interests which may break out in a disastrous eruption at any time.” This same truth made it all the more imperative to ask what could be done “to prevent the calamity?” Virginia Woolf, among the most famous of English writers, arrived at this sense of obligation too, but only belatedly, more than a decade after the First World War or Great War as it was known.

Initially, in the face of the overwhelming tragedy of the First World War, its decimation of a generation of men, Woolf felt that the war could not be spoken about; its suffering was so great that it could not be given words and had to be passed over in silence. In A Room of One's Own (1929), she reflected that feelings that were possible before the First World War—including “the abandonment and rapture” excited by love poetry—“could not be written about after it” ( Caine 2015 , 20; Winter 2019 , 223–35; Beganovic 2020 ). By the 1930s, however, as Woolf contemplated the second year of the conflict of the Spanish Civil War, the ominous onward march of colonial wars and militarism, and accruing refugee crisis, all compounding the threat of another cataclysmic war in Europe, she saw it as her duty to write about war, and to ask how war might be prevented. Her answers took up the themes of A Room of One's Own —the social and political constrictions of gender roles and relations, women's inequality in the professions and in education, the (incomplete promise of) the postwar expansion of the franchise, and the broader social and psychological damage inflicted on individuals by “patriarchy”—and brought them to bear on her understanding of war ( Beganovic 2020 ).

In Three Guineas (1938), published on the eve of the Second World War, Virginia Woolf set out to understand the ways in which middle-class women's exclusion from the corridors of power and influence was tied to predominant forms of masculinity, and masculinity to the causes of war. Observing the powerlessness of middle-class women such as herself, she noted that women could not be members of the stock exchange so they could not use the pressure of force nor the pressure of money to prevent or stop wars. Women could not be diplomats so they could not negotiate treaties to end wars. In England, women could participate in civil service and legal institutions, but they had precarious positions and little authority ( Woolf 1966 , 45). Women could write to the press to voice their views; however, the decision what to print or not was in hands of men. In sum, Woolf declaimed, identifying with her middle-class female subject, “we have no weapon with which to enforce our will”: “all the weapons with which an educated man can enforce his opinion are either beyond our grasp or so nearly beyond it that even if we used them we could scarcely inflict one scratch … educated women [are] even weaker than working class women who can use their labour in the munitions factories to protest” ( Woolf 1966 , 12). Woolf connected the precarity of the public situation of women such as herself to their private circumstances, to “the fear which forbids freedom in the private house. That fear, small, insignificant and private as it is, is connected with the other fear, the public fear, which is neither small nor insignificant, the fear which has led you to ask us to help you to prevent war” ( Woolf 1966 , 129–30). This connection between the private and the public becomes her method of dissecting the origins and prevention of war and illustrating its tragedy.

While Stawell returned to classical texts to understand how men's psychological and material motivations could lead to war, and how war changed men, Woolf dwelt on the contemporary situation, drawing on the evidence of everyday life. In particular, she discusses the photographs sent by the Spanish Government to media outlets “with patient pertinacity about twice a week” as witness to the civil war there, and intended to arouse sympathy: “They are not pleasant photographs to look upon. They are photographs of dead bodies for the most part” ( Woolf 1966 , 10).

This morning's collection contains the photograph of what might be a man's body, or a woman's; it is so mutilated that it might, on the other hand, be the body of a pig. But those certainly are dead children, and that undoubtedly is the section of a house. A bomb has torn upon the side; there is still a birdcage hanging in what was presumably the sitting room, but the rest of the house looks like nothing so much as a bunch of spillikins suspended in mid-air. ( Woolf 1966 , 10–11)

The gaze in Woolf's text belongs to women, in this case. She suggests that women's specific social and historical situatedness connects them: “A common interest unites us; it is one world, one life. How essential it is that we should realize that unity the dead bodies, the ruined houses prove. For such will be our ruin if you, in the immensity of your public abstractions forget the private figure, or if we in the intensity of our private emotions forget the public world. Both houses will be ruined, the public and the private, the material and the spiritual for they are inseparably connected.”

Woolf also uses photographs to dissect the social origins of the gendered dimensions of war as a profession, war sold as a source of happiness and excitement for men, and war as an outlet for manly qualities. In particular, she analyses circulating representations of the masculinity embodied by the orchestrators of the violence erupting across Europe, their portraiture declaiming “[t]he quintessence of virility, the perfect type of which all the others are imperfect adumbrations”:

He is a man certainly, His eyes are glazed; his eyes glare. His body, which is braced in an unnatural position, is tightly cased in a uniform. Upon the breast of that uniform are sewn several medals and other mystic symbols. His hand is upon a sword. He is called in German and Italian Fuhrer or Duce ; in our own language Tyrant or Dictator. And behind him lie ruined houses and dead bodies – men, women and children.

Woolf was not focused on this image, she explained, “in order to excite once more the sterile emotion of hate”. Instead, she wanted to use the photo “to release other emotions such as the human figure, even thus crudely, in a coloured photograph arouses in us who are human beings.” She was interested in the “connection” it suggested, between the public and private worlds: “the tyrannies and servilities of the one, are the tyrannies and servilities of the other.” ( Woolf 1966 , 142).

In using the medium of the photograph to gender and to connect the private figure and the public world, Woolf anticipates later treatments of atrocity photography and humanitarianism, and discussions of the representations of fascism, whether by Susan Sontag or feminist international relations scholars. She shares an interest in patriarchy as an elemental cause of war, and, like other women international thinkers before her, renders women's socially and historically determined difference, “their membership of the ‘society of outsiders,’” “in the historical, social circumstances” they face, “their only weapon in the prevention of war.” For Woolf in particular, women's “outsider” position becomes their means of challenging “whether the new militarization of the society was really inevitable and necessary” ( Woolf 1966 , 115). “Different as we are,” Woolf contends, “as facts have proved, both in sex and education … it is from that difference, as we have already said, that our help can come, if help we can, to protect liberty, to prevent war” ( Owens et al. 2022 , 499).

Significantly, Woolf does not claim that any dimensions of masculinity or women's difference are natural, even if they are normative. They are, instead, she argues, symptomatic of “patriarchy.” They are the product of patriarchal institutions and practices. This same explanation means, she argues, that patriarchal gender norms can be tackled through education: “What kind of society, what kind of human being … should [education] seek to produce?”; What is “the kind of society the kind of people that will help to prevent war”? ( Woolf 1966 , 3). In reply, she posits that instead of the arts of dominating other people, the arts of ruling, of killing, and of acquiring land and capital, education should focus on “medicine, mathematics, music, painting and literature,” and “the arts of human intercourse” ( Woolf 1966 , 34). 4

The gender emphasis of Woolf's argument for how to prevent war, and the writer's obligation to take up that topic, has resonated in the themes of women international thinkers, before and after. Her educational thematic has woven its way in and out of twentieth-century rationales for inventing international institutions, not least the League of Nations Intellectual Cooperation initiative, and the United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization. It also underlines the extent to which women's international thinking—with its interest in the intersecting spheres of the private and public, the emotional, intimate relationship between masculinity in the private sphere and militarism in the public sphere, moving across textual/visual sources, and across the boundaries of fiction and nonfiction—has evaded the generic limitations of the existing canon of international thought. Here I want to take up the potential for this same international thinking to link Virginia Woolf to the Nobel literary prizewinner Svetlana Alexievich, writing at the other end of the twentieth century, in the midst of the authoritarian violence of the Russian and Belorussian states in the post–Cold War ( Beganovic 2020 , 28, 33). 5

Born in 1948 in West Ukraine to a Belorussian father and Ukrainian mother, Svetlana Alexievich has been a prominent anti-war voice since the end of the Cold War, convinced that writing about war is an obligation ( Alexievich and Gimson 2018 , 71–72). 6 She is a fiction writer whose novels have been characterized as “attempts to explore human nature through the accounts of war witnesses and to explain more complex social structures in order to understand the causes of wars and prevent them”; “Alexievich says that she wants to show how disgusting wars are, so that even thinking about war would be impossible, even for generals, and so, she does not write a history of war, but the history of feelings or emotional knowledge about wars” ( Novikau 2017 , 320).

In Boys in Zinc (1989), Alexievich’s witness account of the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989), she poses the question, “How can we recover a normal vision of life?”: “After the great wars of the twentieth century and the mass deaths, writing about the modern (small) wars, like the war in Afghanistan, requires different ethical and metaphysical stances” ( Alexievich 2017 , 18–19). Against the background of ongoing Russian imperial wars, her interest lies in reclaiming the specificity of the single human being ( Moorehead 2019 ); “The only human being for someone. Not as the state regards him, but who he is for his mother, for his wife, for his child” ( Alexievich 2017 , 19). Like Stawell and others before her, Alexievich understood that war changed people; she also believed that analyzing postwar time is often more important than analyzing the war itself: “People do not change during war. People change after the war when they look at reality through the lens of their war experience” ( Novikau 2017 , 322).

As we have seen, in these repertoires the diagnosis of war, as often fundamentally associated with masculinity, has made the discussion of war a difficult, if not illegitimate, intellectual terrain for women, while also providing the provocation for women's contributions as different. Is Alexievich an international thinker? She is certainly connected to a tradition of women's international thinking, of women writing about war and peace across its disciplinary confines. Alexievich, like Woolf, works with a “biographical historical method” that aims to dismantle the structures that provoke “the strong emotions which push people, particularly men, to fight” ( Beganovic 2020 ). As writers, Alexievich and Woolf are exemplary of a particular strand of international thinking—characterized by the interplay of fiction, biography, and historical narrative—that can be traced through the twentieth century. As we have seen, in the early twentieth century, the challenge of writing about peace manifested in the ways in which women thought about war, and the way they experienced the costs of that writing, whether social opprobrium, threats, physical attacks, and criminal penalties. While the sociohistorical connections between a middle-class English writer of the interwar years and a female Soviet/post-Soviet intellectual are thinner than those that might connect Alexievich to Anna Shabanova and Alexandra Kollontai, for example, even Woolf bore the brunt of visceral attacks for her “peace propaganda” ( Lee 1997 , 698). In the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Alexievich—like Russian and European women before her engaging the imperative of writing about peace and war— has been accused of “defamation” and “desecration of the soldiers’ honor” ( Sud nad tsinkovimi malchikami 1994 , 130). She has endured vicious political persecution at the hand of Belorussian courts. These have charged her with distorting and falsifying the testimony of Afghan veterans and of offending mothers with portraits of their boys “as soulless killer-robots, pillagers, drug addicts and rapists” ( Sud nad tsinkovimi malchikami 1994 , 130). Facing threats to her personal safety, Alexievich has continued her criticism of Belorussia in the current Ukraine war through her fiction and nonfictional writing, pursued as a kind of obligation ( Belarusian Nobel Laureate Alexievich 2022 ). Just why states object to women's international thinking is clarified by the thinkers themselves, who have detailed the entangled private and public, state and individual interests at stake.

The Politics of War

If we follow the tracks laid by the anthology Women and International Thought , the Second World War leads to other unexpected albeit prominent women thinkers, working across literary and political genres. Some of these women were more enmeshed in the disciplinary landscape of international politics, and yet their status as thinkers was equally neglected. Merze Tate's (1942 ) The Disarmament Illusion —originally a Harvard doctoral thesis—was written as “a transnational intellectual history of debates about war as a mechanism for dispute resolution, about the conflict between state sovereignty and the need for international cooperation, and about the perpetuation of historical power imbalances” ( Savage 2021 , 271). Writing in the context of the Second World War, from the double marginality of her gender and race difference, as an African-American woman, Tate thought about disarmament in the context of the long history of the imperial wars of the previous century: “conflicts fought in the Far East and South Africa”; whether Russia in Manchuria, or “a combined European and American army” avenging “the outrage of the Boxers by sacking Peking”; or England fighting in the Transval, “5000 miles from her base of supplies”; and even the United States, “conquering and holding under military rule conquered possessions an even greater distance from home waters” ( Tate 1942 , 294).

Traversing “economic imperialism” and the state-building military precepts of the late-nineteenth century, Tate does not presume that the prospect of disarmament is an illusion. Rather, she argues that disarmament policies have been ineffective ( Tate 1942 , xi). Disarmament is an issue that stands “for a general simultaneous reduction or non-augmentation of armies and navies or military budgets” ( Tate 1942 , ix). It is not “a matter of mathematics nor of morals but of politics” ( Tate 1942 , 346). By politics, she means the ideological investments of states “seek[ing] to give effect to their national policies through armaments as well as through monetary and immigration policies, tariffs and embargoes”: “armament competition is inextricably interwoven with political tension, and international agreement on armaments is possible only when the national policies of states are not in conflict”; in this same context, an international disarmament process standardizes “the relative diplomatic power of the countries involved and prevents the use of armament competition to upset the political equilibrium” ( Tate 1942 , 27, 246).

The historian Barbara Savage tells us that given the failure of disarmament and the cascade of early twentieth-century wars, Tate had much less confidence than her male mentors, or her female predecessors, that “an educated public might bring pressure to bear on these issues, or that more open diplomacy might yield different results.” In canvassing explanations that acknowledged economic or gender determinism, Tate “resisted the idea that women were early or especially effective advocates of disarmament” and she was skeptical of any “materialistic anti-war impulse.” “Peace would only come from ‘a juster conception of international relations’ and some ‘rational international political system’” ( Savage 2021 , 273). Nevertheless, we also find that when Tate studied past peace congresses, churches, international jurists, interparliamentary groups, and “public opinion,” she reasserted a realist pacifist tradition stretching back to the 1899 Hague peace congress and to Bertha von Suttner.

As we have already seen, the question of realism is a persistent thematic in women's international thinking, defining the reach and limits of reflection on the prevention of wars and the maintenance of peace. When we move (as the anthology does) to Hannah Arendt, among the best-known most often cited women thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century, we return to the predominant concern with the relationship of war to peace, how war changes men and women, and how this fact impacts politics. Writing in the full knowledge of the consequences of the Second World War, and the Holocaust, Arendt's “The Question of War” (1958–1959) takes a lesson from the classical past. Because “military action invalidated the basic equality of citizens … war belongs, as the Greeks saw it, in a non-political sphere” ( Owens 2022 , 114):

What was uniquely wrong about wars of annihilation … was not just the numbers of the dead or the destruction of entire cities, but the destruction of an ‘historical and political reality … that cannot be rebuilt because it is itself not a product … [the] action and speech created by human relationships’ ” (Owens 2002, 83).

Given this understanding of how war undermines politics, as Owens explains, there is only one situation in which Arendt “would have supported the principle of military action,” namely “for the immediate and short-term goal of stopping genocide since it ‘destroys the very possibility of a political world’” ( Owens 2007 , 115). We learn from Arendt that violence is “only rational to achieve immediate and short-term ends, such as ending ethnic cleansing or genocide, not abstract goals of any kind.” Indeed, “all other war should be ruled out if in practice it resulted in a challenge to any ‘actually existing solidarity of mankind’” (Owens 2009, 147). 7

In this same vein, Arendt anticipates that “a future war will not be about a gain or loss of power, about borders, export markets, or Lebensraum, that is, about things that can also be achieved by means of political discussion and without the use of force” ( Owens 2021 , 110). War cannot be understood as “the ultima ratio of negotiations, whereby the goals of war were determined at the point where negotiations broke off”; rather, it is “a continuation of politics by other means,” “the means of cunning and deception” ( Owens 2007 , 91–110; Arendt 2009 , 165).’

Arendt's prognosis resonates with the thinking of women in the past, such as F.M. Stawell, who argues that war not only has its origins in the motivations of men, it changes them; once war begins, “men are tempted by dire necessity,” and many “grow like the lives they lead” ( Committee on the Bureau of International Research in Harvard University and Radcliffe College [n.d. c. 1923] , 41). 8 It also resonates with our present, in which the idea of “new wars”—Mary Kaldor's term—and “forever war” suggests that violence has become its own raison d'etre ( Kaldor 2005 , 491–98). Like women international thinkers before her, Kaldor represents in this “tradition” a woman whose scholarly or theoretical work overlaps with their activist engagement with war and peace. For these same reasons—her gendered relationship to a tradition built on women's difference, and her activism—her thinking can be central to international thought, while she herself has been forced to constantly negotiate a place in a male-dominated canon and discipline.

As women have addressed the realities of war, at times their international thinking has insisted on the links between peace and women's rights as a dimension of the realism of peace itself. It has also referenced an accruing realist/pacifist tradition. In the mid-twentieth century, Merze Tate insisted that her book Disarmament Illusion was “not peace propaganda,” and distinguished her proposals and ideas “for a general, simultaneous reduction or non-augmentation of armies and navies or military budgets” from “the complete abolition of armaments as implied in [Bertha von Suttner's] phrase ‘lay down your arms’” ( Tate 1942 , ix; Savage 2021 , 271). 9 Of course, this was not how Suttner argued the realism of the pacifist cause. Suttner saw herself navigating “that narrow path between fruitless utopianism on the one side and reckless realism on the other, leading to a higher form of international relations” ( Stöcker 2022 , 405). But even as Tate's relatively critical invocation of Suttner's motif anticipated criticisms of the impossibility of disarmament, it inadvertently echoed Suttner's insistence that realism grew out of the ideal; ideals once considered utopian had in fact become real. Suttner noted at the turn of the twentieth century that there was nothing more utopian than the prospect of an “international parliament” and plans for an “International Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration.” “One forgets to contemplate,” she observed in regard to the 1899 Hague peace congress, “the overwhelming fact that such a Conference has been called together by an autocrat in our ultra-military times, and in which every State takes part. Apart from all that will be achieved by speeches, propositions and resolutions ( Suttner 2022 , 375).” She insisted that “the significance and the effect of the event itself must be of the greatest influence, and the first official Peace Conference appears like a miracle in the history of the world.” The conference, in her view, cut through the distinction between ideal and real, because it had created a reality. Half a century later, Merze Tate too presented “the fact of the [1899] Conference itself” (“this wildest dream of the Utopians”) as evidence that governments had taken up debates that are otherwise the concern of philosophers, jurists, and even utopians ( Suttner 2022 , 377).

We can pick up these same threads in 1985, as the Swedish international thinker Alva Myrdal gives her 1985 Nobel Peace Prize lecture. In the fractious landscape of the Cold War's hot conflicts and a nuclear arms race, Myrdal explicitly orients her intellectual journey to disarmament thinking by referencing Suttner's (1899) motif—not uncoincidentally, since Suttner had all but invented the prize ( Sluga 2014 ). Myrdal comments that despite Hiroshima, in the first decade of the post–Second World War, she herself did not really pay much attention to “the problem of ‘atomic weapons’ as they were known.” She was more concerned with reconstruction and “the great historic drama of decolonization”; “I was not from the outset alert to the great risks of an incipient militarization of the word; I was not ready to cry out: Down with weapons”. “My opposition,” she declares, “was directed more against the repression of human rights and the cruelties of war, particularly the bombing of civilians; I personally experienced some of it in London. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear weapons shocked me as it did the rest of the world, but I shared the hope of many that the end of the war also meant the end of nuclear weapons” ( Myrdal 1977 , xxi.).

Which tradition of women's international thinking should we remember? The imperative to write about war, the consequences of writing about peace? The relationship between the private and the public? The role of education and other social institutions? The determinism of patriarchy and/or gender? To be sure, discerning a tradition of women's international thinking offers no simple answers to the question “how to prevent war,” or the challenge of peace, or the difference women's international thinking has made. Instead, that thinking has navigated usefully the difficult path between ideal and real choices by capitalizing on the sociohistorical bases of difference and the possibilities for change. Woolf acknowledges that it is hard to maintain “the recurring dream that has haunted the human mind since the beginning of time, the dream of peace, the dream of freedom” when one has “the sound of the guns in your ears.” In these same circumstances, she ventures that even when the imperative is “how to prevent war,” rather than to consider the nature of peace, women's difference can be put to use:

since we are different, our help must be different … The answer to your question must be that we can best help you to prevent war not by repeating your words and following your methods but by finding new words and creating new methods. We can best help you to prevent war not by joining your society but by remaining outside your society but in cooperation with its aim. That aim is the same for us both. It is to assert “the rights of all-all men and women – to the respect in their persons of the great principles of Justice and Equality and Liberty.” ( Woolf 1966 , 673)

In this tradition of women's international thinking, the tension between realism and idealism has also been converted into a tension between the past—which has to be broken with—and a reimagined future initiated in the present. Here is Arendt on this same theme: “The lifespan of man running towards death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an every-present reminder that men, though they may day, are not born in order to die but in order to begin” ( Arendt [1958] 2019 , 246; Cooper 1991 ; Beckman and D'Amico 1994 ; Sluga 2005b , 2017 , 2021 ).

Whether we consider the status of the international order, our era of artificial intelligence, the changing nature of wars, or the changing position of women themselves, women's difference still matters to international thinking. On the one hand, in many European and trans-Atlantic countries, women now have profiles in the public sphere to the extent that searching for the particularism of gender in analyses of war and peace and women's international thinking seems irrelevant. On the other hand, the gendered nature of women's difference remains relevant, whether in commentary that remarks on the presence of women or, indeed, on the difference that feminist foreign policy itself could make to the prevention of war. In the early twenty-first century, women lead countries and regions, and intergovernmental institutions. They can use the pressure of force and the pressure of money; they can even negotiate treaties. Women, the German press suggests, have been prominent in the commentary field on the war in Ukraine. The Moscow Times talks of the “feminine” face of Russian war protests. Female prime ministers of Finland, Sweden, and Estonia have overseen decisions about membership of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 2022, the European Union (EU) stateswomen Ursula Van der Leyen and Roberta Metsola were prominent early visitors of the embattled president in Kyiv and supporters of the war against Russia as a just war. Even where women do not lead, “feminist foreign policy” ostensibly guides the thinking and strategy of some of the countries looking on, not least the EU itself. In a prime example of the confluence of these shifts, the green German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock has had to reconcile a new era of German militarization and her commitment to “feminist foreign policy” ( Speech by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock 2022 ).

We also know, thanks to the anthology, that women's international thinking does not always diverge from the existing canon of international thought dominated by men. Certainly, the Vietnam war and its purpose found its supporters among women international thinkers such as Roberta Wohlstetter, whose 1960 Bancroft winning book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision argued that “US national security required an assiduously aggressive posture, a willingness to fight and win a nuclear war” ( Speech by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock 2022 ). In 2022, this is a position that echoes through Anne Applebaum's insistence that democracies should not only have weapons, but also wield them or risk the annihilation of democracy ( Applebaum 2022 ). However, it is also true that individual women have regularly taken up the problems of war and peace by thinking against the grain of ideological gender constraints. If we want to understand the lack of enthusiasm of African and Asian states for the United States and Europe's rallying call against the Russian invasion in Ukraine, we need only look at Women's International Thought’ s examples of writing about the dangers of imperial exceptionalism, not least Mary McCarthy's Cold War “The other war,” which lambasted the moral standing of Washington, DC (the “Athens” of the twentieth century) and its war of “pacification” in Vietnam ( Bessner 2022 ; McCarthy 2022 , 121–26).

Women have always drawn on uncommon examples, arrived at uncommon conclusions, and forged alternative intellectual traditions in the process, even when they themselves did not remember them accurately. The difference that women thinking about war and peace have made should inspire us to further collections and considerations, picking up the remnants we still have, diverse in their historical contexts and languages, incorporating voices imagined as subaltern, or outside Europe, and back in time, picking up echoes we may have forgotten along the way. These remind us too of the importance of international thinking itself. This is the difference that the history of women as international thinkers makes.

I want to thank the editors of that volume, and Ekaterina Abramova for their advice and help with this essay. This essay was originally presented as a keynote at the Women's International Thought conference, LSE, May 2022.

In his recent critique of “forever wars,” and the maintenance of the oxymoronic legal concept “humane war,” Sam Moyn singles out the importance in the history of peace thinking of Suttner's Lay Down Your Arms , or Down with Weapons? Die Waffen nieder!

As the anthology editors note, even Stawell's middle name recognized the conquered inhabitants of Melos, her feminist reading of the “Greeks” prefigures more recent calls for “a Melian security studies.” “Introduction”, Owens et al. 2022 , 28.

I have drawn here from a broader selection of Three Guineas than that included in the anthology Women's International Thought .

This connection is inspired by the work of Velid Beganovic, a Bosnian scholar of Woolf who links her method to that of Alexievich.

All Russian texts here are translated by Ekaterina Abramova.

On these same grounds, in the postwar Arendt supports an international criminal court “to try and punish those responsible.”

“So it goes on till there is nothing but suspicion everywhere. There was no treaty binding enough to reconcile opponents: everyone knew that nothing was secure and therefore he thought only of his own safety; he could not afford to trust another.”

The quote continues “but in the wider significance given to it in popular language as meaning ‘limitation and reduction of armaments.’”

Research for this article has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement no 885285).

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Introduction: from peace to war?

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• https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2024.2358641
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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had major effects on geopolitical security imaginings in the Nordic region. While Iceland, Norway and Denmark were founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), within the space of just a few months Sweden and Finland – countries who were ‘neutral’ during the Cold War and thereafter ‘non-aligned’ - turned their longstanding national defence policies on their head as they jointly applied for NATO-membership. Both Sweden and Finland have a long history of peace mediation and have been some of the loudest voices for disarmament and demilitarisation globally, often justified precisely because of their proclaimed status of ‘neutrality’ or ‘non-alignment’ (no matter how dubious). More recently, both countries have promoted ‘gender equality’ as central to their foreign affairs. Nevertheless, even though they had started to scale up their defence capabilities, both military and civilian, well before 2022 due to an increased threat perception from Russia, it is obvious that they are now preparing for war at an increasing pace.

This collaboration is a result of a series of workshops organised by the ‘Feminisms and Wars Community’, a recently launched initiative with the aim of bringing together feminist scholars investigating war and militarisation from feminist perspectives. During the first workshop in Stockholm in June 2023, an international group of feminist scholars and activists gathered to discuss and reflect upon how war is a feminist issue. Several working groups were established, one of which, ours, was tentatively labelled ‘Militarisation of the Nordics’. Our discussions in the working group exposed our different departure points in approaching the topic of militarisation, ranging from experiences of living in highly militarised Israel to the so-called ‘Nordic zone of peace’. Sweden and Finland’s hasty decision to join NATO in 2022, as a direct result of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, meant that for Swedish and Finnish scholars in particular, including myself, the workshop provided an outlet to share frustrations, fears, and confusion regarding the speedy and blatant militarisation of our home countries.

Militarism is commonly understood as the belief or desire of a government or a people that a state should maintain a strong military capability and use it aggressively to defend or promote national interests. Militarisation is the process making something military in character or style; in other words, militarisation leads to militarism. While militarisation is often used as a ‘measure’ of states’ actual preparation for war and/or defence capabilities, a feminist understanding of militarisation also pays attention to the social process of how a society becomes militarised (see Åhäll Citation 2019 ). In this collection of interventions, we address and explore militarisation as a societal process in different ways, as war preparedness, as militarisation of the mind, as marginalising dissent, and as neo-colonialism. Above all, the intervention speaks to how the normalisation of war in the everyday materialises, including how it feels.

For me, a Swedish feminist security studies scholar who previously has analysed the processes of militarisation ‘elsewhere’, the lack of a democratic process and public debate around a prospective Swedish NATO membership, but perhaps even more so around the bilateral ‘Defence Cooperation Agreement’ (DCA) signed between Sweden and the US in December 2023, sparked my feminist curiosity. The urgency and speed with which the national security discourse is currently changing from ‘working for peace’ to ‘preparing for war’ is overwhelming. Before I introduce the other pieces in this intervention, I will elaborate on this discursive shift illustrating the current and rapid militarisation of Swedish society.

Curiously, despite Sweden having de facto given up its neutral stance already in 1995 when joining the European Union, a discourse of ‘neutrality’ has lingered in the national psyche. Sweden’s self-image involves working for peace (including supporting military ‘peace’ operations sanctioned by the UN) rather than participating in war . That Sweden has established ever-closer linkages with NATO in recent decades, providing military support to various NATO missions, participating in NATO military exercises, and being part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, has done little to unsettle this image. While Berg and Fredriksson’s piece in this issue explains in more detail how the Swedish decision to join NATO was taken without too much political nor public debate, notably, a majority of the women’s branch of the Social Democrats (‘S-kvinnor’) in parliament voted to remain non-aligned and thus did not support their party’s shift in policy. The leader of ‘S-kvinnor’, Annika Strandhäll, argued that Sweden should remain non-aligned to continue ‘working for peace and demilitarization’. The swift political decision from ‘alliance-free’ to military aligned therefore threatens Sweden’s self-image as a country at peace, working to promote peace elsewhere (no matter how problematic that self-image may be).

Sweden’s self-image also includes being good at gender equality. True, Sweden scores low in the UN’s Gender Inequality Index and is thereby ranked as one of the most ‘gender equal’ countries in the world. In 2014, Sweden also became the first country with a ‘feminist’ foreign policy. Footnote 1 After a review about a prospective NATO membership, the then Social-Democratic/Green Party government declared that a NATO membership would have ‘no consequences’ for gender equality or the environment (Swedish Government Citation 2023 , 48). However, while yet to be ratified, the CDA between Sweden and the US signed in preparation for a Swedish NATO membership, is extensive. In contrast to Norway’s DCA, which only gives the US access to three bases, the Swedish DCA gives the US access to 17 military bases for the storing of military vehicles, ammunition, and weapons systems. Interestingly, both the Norwegian and the Danish DCA also include a clause about the prohibition of nuclear weapons on their sovereign territory, but the current Swedish coalition government (Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Liberals) saw no need for such a clause. Crucially, according to the agreement, US military and civilian personnel, as well as their family members, and even suppliers and contractors to US armed forces, will be under US jurisdiction. In principle, this means that if, for example, someone was raped in Sweden by anyone in these categories, the perpetrator could not be tried in the Swedish court system.

Moreover, because of the war in Ukraine and the prospect of NATO membership, which significantly expands the market for weapons and munitions sales, the Swedish arms industry is blossoming. Compared to its size, Sweden was already one of the biggest arms producing countries in the world. However, since 2020, Saab Dynamics have quadrupled the production of air defence weapons and munition (Dagbladet Citation 2024 ). This also manifests as a militarisation of the everyday: Apparently, in the Swedish town of Karlskoga, there is now a lack of hairdressers and care-workers as arms producing companies Saab Dynamics and BAE Systems Bofors are recruiting en masse to meet the demands of growing weapons and munition orders (Dagens Nyheter 10/09/ Citation 2023, Citation 2023 ).

War preparedness also involves preparing the Swedish population for the event of war. During the 2024 annual ‘People and Defense’ [Folk och Försvar] conference – where politicians, members of the Royal Family, arms industry companies, lobby groups and other actors gather in the popular Swedish ski-resort of Sälen – the Swedish Minister for Civilian Defence, Carl-Oscar Bohlin of the Swedish conservative political party [Moderaterna] stated: ‘There may be war in Sweden’. The Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, Michael Bydén, reiterated the message and confirmed that ‘all Swedes have to prepare for war’. He also emphasised that the on-going change in the national defence policy is not just something relevant for the Swedish Armed Forces, but for society at large.

While war preparedness (or the lack of it in Swedish society) and the ‘success stories’ of increased production in the Swedish arms industry is given a lot of media (and social media) attention, other political decisions relating to the current militarisation of Sweden seemingly get less attention. The day before the national bank holiday of Midsummer’s Eve, in June 2023, the current right-wing government surprisingly decided that all funding aimed at international development research from the Swedish Research Council [Vetenskapsrådet] was to be cut. None of the applications already submitted earlier in the year would be considered for funding. The government’s decision was taken without dialogue with academic institutions and was criticised for limiting academic freedom. More than 600 academics signed a petition, but to no avail. Funding for development research and development aid has apparently been redirected ‘to support the war in Ukraine’. Two other political decisions that were barely covered in the news: In November 2023, a brief news notice in Dagens Nyheter , a major national newspaper, shared the information that Sweden would not attend the annual meeting for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) because ‘the [UN] convention is not compatible with a Swedish membership in NATO’ (Dagens Nyheter 26/11/ Citation 2023, Citation 2023 ). In December 2023, another brief notice declared that the government had cut all funding to Swedish NGOs working for peace and disarmament. In 2023, this funding covered 20 million SEK, just under two million euros, shared by 18 different organisations (Dagens Nyheter 23/12/ Citation 2023, Citation 2023 ). A hundred-year tradition of ‘working for peace’ was abruptly ended. In contrast, NGOs deemed useful for the civilian defence got an increase of 55 million SEK (4,9 million euros) for 2024 alone (Dagbladet Citation 2024 ).

The long-term social, political, cultural, and environmental effects of this fundamental shift in national defence policy from alliance free to military-aligned are unknown, and yet these huge political decisions were made out to be ‘common sensical’, like there were no alternatives. The signing of the DCA, curiously on the day before Christmas Eve (Swedes celebrate Christmas on Christmas Eve), barely made the news. The rapid pace at which Swedish security imaginings are changing from ‘working for peace’ to ‘preparing for war’ is overwhelming, and the effects we are already seeing are alarming.

This intervention continues with more reflections on how the normalisation of war in the Nordic region materialises, including how it feels. In the first intervention, a collective of Finnish feminist scholars describe how they – living in a country sharing a very long border with Russia, and with a cultural memory of war with Russia/Soviet Union – were emotionally affected by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As a spontaneous form of coping mechanism, they started writing letters to each other, sharing their (embodied) concerns, fears, and frustrations. In their reflection over what this letter exchange entailed, provided, and meant, they demonstrate how it created a comforting space of anti-militarist praxis in a context of increasing and deepening militarisation of Finnish society, and even of their own minds. Attempts at resisting the militarisation of the mind became a key priority. The letter exchange also included a questioning of whose knowledge counts about war, as a particular type of ‘war expert’ dominated the news reporting about the war. As Elin Berg and Emma Fredriksson’s intervention from a Swedish context demonstrates in greater detail, the same thing happened in Sweden. In their intervention, they explore the public debate, or rather, lack of public debate, on the historical decision to swiftly move from non-alignment to seeking membership in NATO. They pay critical attention to how the logic of urgency and ‘common-sense’ in the so-called debate functioned to silence, dismiss, and ridicule critical voices and alternative understandings of security.

In her contribution, Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir explores the curious case of knitting to support Ukraine’s war effort. She explains how Iceland, the only NATO member without its own armed forces, at a political and societal level became engaged in the war effort in an unprecedented way. As she claims, the support for the Ukraine’s defence in the form of knitting jumpers and socks was inherently gendered: support for the war effort mobilised the feminine practice of knitting through a feminine logic of care. Her point is that this practice of ‘sending warmth’ from Iceland to Ukraine could be read as a case of mundane militarisation, as the common-sense with which participation engulfed the nation also normalised war. A feminised logic of care was militarised.

While recent events have shattered the myth of the ‘Nordic zone of peace’, as a militarised response to insecurity becomes the only legitimate response, it is important to remember that militarism was already the basis on which so-called ‘Nordic zone of peace’ is built. ‘Peace’ has relied on militarisation. For example, having a strong domestic arms industry in Sweden was motivated and justified precisely because of the defence policy of ‘neutrality’ and then ‘non-alignment’. As Laura Junka-Aikio’s intervention demonstrates, ‘Peace’ also involves militarisation of land. While this is not a new process, Junka-Aikio applies a decolonial approach to demonstrate how a discourse of ‘terra nullius’ [empty land] is used to justify the rapidly increasing militarisation of land-use in northern Finland. Finally, to conclude this intervention, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv urges us not to lose sight of the civilian domain in conversations about militarism and militarisation. In our increasingly polarised societies, she argues that feminist insights are crucial now, more than ever, to highlight and remind the public what democratic values are, and what they mean: the cornerstones that ensure a robust society. Thus, we need to work to reduce threat perceptions by reducing polarisation. Civil preparedness is not just about civilians’ war preparedness that, for example, the Supreme Commander for the Swedish Armed Forces is currently calling for, but ultimately depends on ‘what we everyday people do’ with our commonplace security perceptions, to not exclude and shut down each other’s efforts in resisting the polarisation in (and militarisation of) our societies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors, linda åhäll.

Linda Åhäll is Senior Lecturer in Peace and Development research in the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg.

1. The eight-year era of ‘feminist’ foreign policy was officially ended after the 2022 election when a right-wing government came into power in September.

• Åhäll, L. 2019. “Feeling Everyday IR: Embodied, Affective, Militarising Movement as Choreography of War.” Cooperation and Conflict 54 ( 2 ): 149–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718807501.   Web of Science ® Google Scholar
• Dagbladet, S. 2024. “Försvarsorganisationer får mer pengar.” February 8. Accessed February 20, 2024. https://www.svd.se/a/69LAQW/forsvarsorganisationer-far-mer-pengar .   Google Scholar
• Dagens Nyheter 10/09/2023. “Stödet till Ukraina förändrar den gamla vapenstaden.” September 10.   Google Scholar
• Dagens Nyheter 23/12/2023. “Fredsorganisationer mister stöd.” December 23.   Google Scholar
• Dagens Nyheter 26/11/2023. “Sverige deltar inte i möte om nedrustning.” November 26.   Google Scholar
• Swedish Government. 2023. “Regeringens proposition 2022/23:74: Sveriges medlemskap i Nato.” March 7. Accessed January 30, 2024. https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/d997a692b4c24d539444084a212b861f/sveriges-medlemskap-i-nato-prop.-20222374 .   Google Scholar

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China says it will not join Swiss peace conference on Ukraine

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CHINA'S 12-POINT PLAN

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Reporting by Laurie Chen and Liz Lee; Additional reporting by Joe Cash in Beijing and Dave Graham in Zurich; Editing by Jacqueline Wong, Stephen Coates, Nick Macfie and Leslie Adler

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Laurie Chen is a China Correspondent at Reuters' Beijing bureau, covering politics and general news. Before joining Reuters, she reported on China for six years at Agence France-Presse and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. She speaks fluent Mandarin.

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China denies fuelling Russia-Ukraine war tensions, says it supports peace

Comments come after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia and China of attempting to undermine Swiss peace summit.

China has said it believes “all efforts” should be recognised in supporting peace measures around the Russia-Ukraine war, rejecting accusations from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that it was trying with Russia to undermine this month’s planned peace summit in Switzerland.

China has never “fanned fire or fuelled the flames”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning said on Monday after she was asked about the peace summit that is scheduled to take place on June 15-16.

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Mao said China’s position on the peace conference was “open and transparent”.

“We believe that we can get the understanding and support of all parties,” she added.

More than 80 delegations have confirmed they will attend the summit in Burgenstock that Switzerland hopes will lay the groundwork for a peace process more than four years after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine .

Speaking in Singapore on Sunday, Zelenskyy said China and Russia were putting pressure on other countries and their leaders not to attend the upcoming talks. He did not say which ones.

“Russia, using Chinese influence in the region, using Chinese diplomats also, does everything to disrupt the peace summit,” he said at a news conference at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a closely-watched security forum.

China maintains it is neutral in the war, although it has deepened ties with Moscow since the invasion. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing last month where he enjoyed a ceremonial welcome and sipped tea with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Its trade with Russia has grown, easing the economic impact of Western-led sanctions. US, Ukrainian and other intelligence agencies say there is evidence that Chinese parts are winding up in Russian weaponry, even if China is not directly arming its neighbour.

The Swiss had been hoping China would attend the peace conference, but Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made clear last week that Beijing would not participate.

Beijing has been calling for a peace conference with “equal participation” of all sides, including Russia, which has not been invited.

Ukraine’s peace plan calls for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, the restoration of its 1991 post-Soviet borders and bringing Russia to account for its actions.

China has also released a peace plan that Putin last month said showed Beijing understood the conflict’s “ root causes ” and “global geopolitical meaning”. The 12-point plan got a lukewarm reception when it was first released a year after the Russian invasion, with analysts noting a lack of concrete proposals.

“There is still a clear gap between the arrangements for the meeting and the demands of the Chinese side, as well as the general expectations of the international community,” Mao said. “This makes it difficult for China to participate in the meeting.”