research paper of moral development

ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Individual differences in moral development: does intelligence really affect children’s moral reasoning and moral emotions.

• Department of Education and Human Development, German Institute for International Educational Research, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

This study investigates the relationship between intelligence and individual differences in children’s moral development across a range of different moral transgressions. Taking up prior research that showed morality and intelligence to be related in adolescents and adults, the current study wants to test if these findings can be extended to younger children. The study was designed to address some of the shortcomings in prior research by examining young children aged between 6 years; 4 months and 8 years; 10 months, using a broad concept of moral development including emotional aspects and applying an approach that is closely connected to children’s daily lives. Participants ( N = 129) completed a standardized intelligence test and were presented four moral transgression stories to assess moral development. Results demonstrated that findings from prior research with adolescents or adults cannot simply be extended to younger participants. No significant correlations of moral development and intelligence were found for any of the presented stories. This provides first evidence that – at least in middle childhood – moral developmental status seems to be independent from children’s general intelligence assessed by figural inductive reasoning tests.

Introduction

This study examines the relationship between intelligence and individual differences in children’s moral development. As common in the field of moral development research, we use the term ‘moral development’ not only to describe the course of moral development but also for the characterization of an empirically ascertainable moral developmental status. Researchers from different fields have documented numerous facets of the development of children’s morality, by describing moral judgments (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969 ), moral reasoning (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1983 ), moral emotions ( Eisenberg, 2000 ), or moral motivation (e.g., Nunner-Winkler, 2007 ). Although in general, there are clear patterns of moral development, children vary in the speed and levels of achieved moral development ( Nunner-Winkler, 1998 ). It remains to be clarified which factors explain these individual differences in children’s moral development. Following Kohlberg’s (1969) idea of a stage model which assumes that moral stages are structured in the same developmental sequence as intelligence operations, it is self-evident to consider intelligence as a factor to adequately explain differences in moral development.

Kohlberg (1969 , 1975 ) as well as researchers from the neo-kohlbergian approach (e.g., Rest et al., 1999 ) have theoretically elaborated and empirically examined the idea that cognitive and moral development are interrelated and go hand in hand. Moral development requires a variety of abilities which are related to cognitive processes and their efficiency: complex situations need to be interpreted, relevant information must be selected and processed, information needs to be integrated, perspectives need to be coordinated, consequences of actions need to be anticipated, inferences need to be made, social norms (e.g., equity, fairness, etc.) need to be restructured and applied ( Rest, 1986 ; Dentici and Pagnin, 1992 ; Derryberry et al., 2005 ). Therefore, it seems plausible that moral judgments or decisions require reasoning abilities and problem solving skills ( Derryberry et al., 2005 ). In other words, a well-developed morality requires a complex organism with the potential for abstract reasoning. And according to Silverman (1994 , p. 112) ‘high intelligence is synonymous with abstract reasoning ability and complexity of thought,’ thus intelligence can be assumed to affect moral development. Further, most of these necessary cognitive processes are connected to information processing. Thus, information processing capacities are crucial and since higher intelligence is associated with more efficient information processing ( Kail and Salthouse, 1994 ), more intelligent people should be better able to integrate and coordinate information efficiently and make more sophisticated moral judgments and justifications.

Empirical evidence for this was provided by research on the gifted in which giftedness was found to be related to advanced moral reasoning skills. For example, Derryberry et al. (2005) found that gifted adolescents were advanced in their moral judgments in comparison to a group of non-gifted children and in both groups, intelligence was a significant predictor for the moral scores. Likewise, Howard-Hamilton and Franks (1995) could show that the gifted high school students in their study were advanced in their moral development showing mean moral scores which are near the level of college students. Lee and Olszewski-Kubilius (2006) also showed that gifted students are more morally sensitive and advanced in moral reasoning than students from unselected samples. A range of older studies similarly indicated a higher level of moral development for gifted students (e.g., Thorndike, 1940 ; Karnes and Brown, 1981 ; Tan-Willman and Gutteridge, 1981 ; Janos and Robinson, 1985 ; Howard-Hamilton, 1994 ; Silverman, 1994 ).

However, four major issues need to be addressed concerning prior research in this field. Firstly, most of the studies examined adolescents or even young adults. Only few studies have dealt with younger children. Yet, there is some evidence that also in younger age groups gifted children are advanced in moral reasoning compared to their non-gifted peers. For instance, already Terman in his ‘Genetic Studies of Genius’ found gifted children to show an advanced moral development making moral decisions on moral levels which are usually found in late adolescence (as cited in Janos and Robinson, 1985 ). Likewise, Kohlberg (1964) and Gross (1993) found that highly gifted children had very advanced abilities in conceptualizing moral issues and provided moral reasoning on levels which are usually prevalent only in very few adults. Finally, Chovan and Freeman (1993) could show that the gifted children in their study achieved higher levels of moral reasoning than their peers of average ability. Regardless, more research with younger children is needed to examine the role of intelligence in periods which are crucial for moral development.

Further, one difficulty is that in most of these earlier studies, groups of gifted children were determined by their participation in certain programs for the gifted, e.g., summer camps. Participation in such programs is usually based on teacher nominations which have been shown to be problematic ( Rost and Hanses, 1997 ; Baudson, 2010 ). In many studies, giftedness is not precisely defined and intelligence is in many cases not even measured at all ( Rost and Czeschlik, 1994 ). Further research is needed which systematically measures intelligence as well as moral development, and is not merely based on samples of pre-selected students.

Moreover, most of the pertinent research has been done in the (neo)-kohlbergian tradition using either the Moral Judgment Interview ( Colby and Kohlberg, 1987 ) or the Defining Issues Test (DIT, Rest, 1979 ; Rest et al., 1999 ). The Moral Judgment Interview consists of a series of moral dilemmas with open ended questions designed to “elicit a subject’s own construction of moral reasoning, moral frame of reference or assumptions about right and wrong and the way these beliefs and assumptions are used to make and justify moral decisions” ( Colby and Kohlberg, 1987 , p. 61). Its coding procedure results in a specification of the stage structure and definition of the developmental sequences of the specific moral concepts within each stage. The DIT, in contrast, is a multiple-choice instrument to measure moral judgment development with the help of different moral dilemmas asking participants to rate and rank a set of items in terms of their moral importance. The idea underlying the DIT is that reading the moral dilemmas and the issue statements activates moral schemas (limited by the extent that a person has already developed them). Both instruments have in common that in the dilemmas, different moral principles conflict each other. This is interesting in terms of moral reasoning from a rather philosophical point of view, but it is less relevant in terms of children’s observable moral development. These dilemmas do not reflect the type of moral conflicts which children usually have to deal with. In children’s daily lives, moral dilemmas rather consist of conflicts between moral obligations on the one hand and personal desires or needs on the other hand ( Hoffman, 1991 ; Keller, 2001 ). Thus, when measuring children’s moral reasoning competencies, it is necessary to use realistic problems which are close to the world of children’s experiences ( Keller, 2001 ).

Hence, there is a lack of research that investigates the relationship between moral development and intelligence using an instrument that captures the kind of moral conflicts which are common in children’s experiences of the world. It should be tested whether findings from prior research can be generalized to assessments of morality which are less abstract and closer to everyday life.

Finally, another important issue is that morality or moral development is not limited to moral cognitions, i.e., moral judgments and moral reasoning. Moral cognition is only one dimension of morality. Most developmental researchers would agree that moral development includes both – cognitive and emotional aspects ( Malti et al., 2009b ; Gibbs, 2013 ). Nevertheless, moral cognition (i.e., moral judgments and moral reasoning) and moral emotions are closely connected and in continuous interaction as the emergence of moral emotions is dependent on moral cognitions ( Dentici and Pagnin, 1992 ; Malti and Latzko, 2010 ). Even though the two aspects are somehow interdependent, there seems to be some disparity in the course of development. Young children already show an elaborate moral knowledge and are also able to reason in morally adequate ways about moral transgressions (e.g., Turiel, 1983 ), yet they do not understand the significance of moral transgressions for their self-evaluative and empathic emotions before the age of 7 or 8 years and thus typically attribute positive emotions to hypothetical wrongdoers in moral transgressions scenarios ( Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988 ; Malti and Krettenauer, 2013 ). From a viewpoint of functional theories of emotions, this means that morality (i.e., moral knowledge and understanding) has not yet gained motivational force ( Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988 ). Children need to develop moral motivation first, which can be understood as the willingness to follow moral rules which a person understands to be valid, even if this entails personal costs or conflicts with one’s own interests ( Nunner-Winkler, 2007 , 2009 ). Accordingly, moral development can be understood as a two-step process: first, children develop moral knowledge which enables moral judgments and moral reasoning, and only in a second step, do they develop moral motivation based on moral emotions ( Nunner-Winkler, 2007 ). So, these two aspects represent two dimensions of morality that are both important for moral behavior and are closely connected. Moral cognitions evoke knowledge structures enabling the emergence of moral emotions ( Dentici and Pagnin, 1992 ). Moral emotions, in turn, engage motivational forces which are important for the development of moral behavior ( Dentici and Pagnin, 1992 ; Hoffman, 2000 ; Malti and Latzko, 2010 ).

Hence, the measurement of morality or moral development should not be restricted to moral judgments and reasoning. Both, moral judgments and moral emotions (and the respective reasoning) should be considered to ensure that a complete picture of children’s moral development is obtained. And in terms of relations to intelligence, not only moral judgments and moral reasoning should be related to cognitive abilities. We assume that intelligence is related to moral emotions as well as to moral judgments and moral reasoning. Moral emotions are complex emotions and they differ from basic emotions insofar as they have a strong cognitive component and emotion attribution in morally relevant situations necessarily involves a substantial degree of cognitive processing ( Malti et al., 2009b ; Malti and Krettenauer, 2013 ). However, research on relations of intelligence and morality is mostly limited to measures of moral judgment or moral reasoning and there is a lack of research that investigates the role of intelligence in moral emotions. Thus, research is needed that systematically examines the relation between cognitive factors, i.e., intelligence, and different facets of moral development such as moral reasoning, moral emotion attribution and moral motivation.

The current study examines the relation between children’s moral development and intelligence across a range of different moral transgressions. The study was designed to test the hypothesis that intelligence contributes to individual differences in children’s moral development by addressing some shortcomings of prior studies.

While most prior studies have dealt with adolescents or young adults, to evaluate the role of intelligence in moral development, it is necessary to focus on individuals who are in a developmental period of large changes in the relevant behavior. In our study, we interviewed children aged between 6 and 9 as during this developmental period, children show an awareness of a range of moral principles, and research demonstrates that developmental changes in children’s understanding of moral principles occur during this period ( Eisenberg et al., 1983 ; Smetana, 2006 ).

Furthermore, other measurement approaches of morality are needed which not only include moral reasoning about abstract dilemmas as in the (neo-)kohlbergian tradition. There is a lack of studies that administer moral variables in a less abstract way, i.e., closer to children’s actual moral behavior in everyday life. The current study aims at closing the gap by measuring children’s morality using an approach which better mirrors the type of moral challenges children face in their daily lives. By using moral transgression stories, the current study applies an instrument that is capable of capturing different facets of moral development such as moral judgments and moral reasoning as well as moral emotions and moral motivation. Furthermore, four different stories were used to measure children’s morality across a range of different moral transgressions scenarios.

With respect to the selection of participants, most prior research relied on pre-selected samples from programs for gifted students without testing intelligence, while the current study draws on a sample for which intelligence was measured by an established cognitive ability test. More specific, a non-verbal intelligence test was used in order to measure inductive reasoning competencies independently from verbal abilities.

In summary, the current study wants to examine the impact of intelligence in the sense of inductive reasoning on children’s moral developmental status. In line with prior research, we assume that moral development is affected by intelligence. More specifically, we expect intelligence-related differences in reasoning about moral judgments. Furthermore, we expect a positive correlation between intelligence and moral motivation as well as between intelligence and negatively valenced moral emotions (NVMEs) which are both also indicators of moral development.

Materials and Methods

Participants.

The sample size was determined based on the following considerations: statistical power of ≥0.90 and small to medium effect sizes of the expected correlations. A power analysis showed that considering a small to medium effect of d ≥ 0.30, at least 112 participants were necessary to achieve a power of ≥0.90 (G ∗ Power; Faul et al., 2007 ). So, we aimed at this figure as a minimum sample size. Participants were recruited from regular primary schools ( n = 62) as well as from enrichment programs for gifted children ( n = 67). Children had been assigned to gifted programs by teacher nomination. The aim of our recruiting approach was not to get two subsamples, we rather pursued a dual recruiting strategy in order to achieve an oversampling of highly intelligent children. Since most studies in this field examined participants from gifted programs, we were striving for an oversampling of gifted children. This procedure successfully resulted in two groups that only differ in their intelligence (see chap. Intelligence), but not in age or gender. However, although means of intelligence scores differ significantly between the two groups, there is a considerable overlap in the distribution of intelligence scores of both groups. A total of 129 children ( M = 7 years; 7 months, SD = 7.5, range = 6 years; 4 months to 8 years; 10 months) from southwestern Germany participated in the study. The sample included more boys ( n = 77) than girls ( n = 52). Informed parental consent was obtained for all participants. The study with its procedural details was approved by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Baden-Württemberg.

Procedure and Assessments

All children were interviewed individually by trained research assistants either in a separate room in their school or at their homes. Interview sessions lasted approximately 30–45 min. All interviews were audiotaped and later transcribed. Before the interview started, children were told that they were supposed to answer questions about picture stories. After a short warm-up task to familiarize children with the interview situation and the Likert-type smiley scale, all participants were presented four picture stories in randomized order. For all tasks, the names used in the stories matched the gender of the participant. After the interview, children were praised and rewarded with a little gift or candy. The intelligence test was conducted either in class as a group test or individually at the child’s home. The order of the two tasks (intelligence test and moral interview) was varied randomly.

Intelligence

Intelligence was assessed with subscales 3–5 of the CFT 1 by Weiß and Osterland (1997) . The CFT1 is a partial adaption of the “Culture Fair Intelligence Tests – Scale 1” by Cattell (1950) . It captures general intelligence with a main focus on general fluid ability defined by Cattell (1971) , namely the ability to analyze cognitive problems in novel situations such as understanding rules or identifying patterns or relationships. Using only figural material, the test is non-verbal and it does not require any previous knowledge. Subtest 3 (classifications) focuses on identifying relations in figural problems with varying levels of difficulty. Subtest 4 (similarities) assesses the ability to compare and relate figural material. And subtest 5 (matrices) measures the ability to comprehend rules and relations in figural cognitive tasks. All three subtests have in common that they focus on relational thinking and the comprehension of rules and regularities which can be understood as a central part of general intelligence ( Weiß and Osterland, 1997 ). IQ scores in the sample ranged from 82 to 145 ( M = 117.6, SD = 11.4) with M = 122.3 ( SD = 9.7) for the children from programs for the gifted, and M = 112.4 ( SD = 11.0) for the children from regular primary schools.

It should be mentioned that the norms of the intelligence test that we used are from data mainly surveyed in the 1990s and thus slightly overestimate children’s IQ. We used that test, though, because it is an established instrument and has a good short version for research. This helped us keep the test sessions short which is important for this age group. Besides, for the purpose of our study, overage norms are not a problem because we did not want to make individual diagnostics. We need intelligence scores to relate them with moral development and we are interested in the covariation of the IQ scores with the indices of moral development, not in “absolute” intelligence scores. Further, despite the old norms, there were no ceiling effects in the IQ data and no significant deviation from normal distribution.

Moral Development

In order to assess children’s moral developmental status, four picture stories describing moral transgressions were used. More precisely, the stories were about not sharing with a needy child, stealing another child’s candy, hiding someone’s property, and picking on someone. This type of moral transgression stories has been frequently used and has been shown to be valid ( Eisenberg, 1982 ; Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988 ; Keller et al., 2003 ). Participants completed four measures for each story: (1) dichotomous act evaluation (“Is what the child did okay or not okay?”), (2) moral reasoning (responses to “Why?”), (3) Likert-type emotion attribution to self as victimizer (“What about you? If you had done that, how would you feel?” Likert-type: 1 = very bad to 4 = very good), and (4) justification for emotion attribution (responses to “Why?”). These four types of measures were used in all stories.

Coding and reliability

Participants’ justifications of act evaluations and attributed emotions were coded with four categories developed from the interviews themselves conforming with categories established in the literature (e.g., Malti et al., 2009a ), including: (1) Moral reasons refer to moral norms or obligations (e.g., “it is not fair to get all the reward”) as well as to empathy or other’s welfare (e.g., “it’s wrong to do that because that would hurt him”). (2) Sanction-oriented reasons refer to an authority or sanctions by that authority (e.g., “you shouldn’t do that because if the teacher sees it, you will get into trouble”). (3) Hedonistic reasons refer to the satisfaction of personal needs and interests (e.g., “it’s ok to take it because I love candy”). (4) Undifferentiated reasons are unelaborated or uncodable (e.g., “Because he did it.” and “It’s not ok because it’s not ok.”).

All justifications were coded by the first author and approximately 25% of the interviews were coded by a second researcher for inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s k = 0.89). Justifications were coded as 1 = full use of the category; 0.5 = partial use with one other category; 0.33 = partial use with two other categories; 0 = no use of the category. This procedure was applied for proportional weighting of the use of multiple categories (thus proportions reflect the total sample). Analyses were conducted on proportional usage.

Moral development indices

In order to operationalize children’s moral development, two indices used in prior research were calculated: ‘Strength of Moral Motivation’ (e.g., Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler, 1992 ; Malti et al., 2009b ) and ‘NVMEs’ ( Ongley and Malti, 2014 ). As the attributed emotions and the corresponding justifications are not independent ( Nunner-Winkler, 2007 ), both indices combine attributed emotions with the corresponding reasoning. The attributed emotion in itself does not reliably tell us anything about the underlying motive and thus does not suffice to evaluate children’s moral developmental status. A combination of both – emotion and justification – helps us understand children’s (moral) motivation. In a first step, both types of indices were calculated separately for each story and in a second step, the scores were aggregated over all four stories resulting in two different sum scores of emotion attribution to self as victimizer and moral reasoning in the context of self-attributed emotions.

Strength of moral motivation . First, strength of moral motivation was calculated for each story separately. The scoring procedure follows the theoretical conceptualization of moral motivation as presented in the introduction. A score of 0 indicates attribution of a positive emotion justified by sanction-oriented, hedonistic or undifferentiated reasons. A score of 1 indicates attribution of a negative emotion justified by any reason that is not considered moral (hedonistic, sanction-oriented, undifferentiated). And a score of 2 indicates attribution of a negative emotion justified by moral reasons. Following Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) , a justification was considered moral as soon as a moral argument was mentioned. The mean scores for moral motivation range from 1.25 to 1.59 in the four stories [picking on someone: M = 1.25 ( SD = 0.76); stealing: M = 1.59 ( SD = 0.71); hiding someone’s property: M = 1.24 ( SD = 0.84); not sharing: M = 1.40 ( SD = 0.77)].

In a second step, the four moral motivation scores were aggregated over all stories (Cronbach’s α = 0.71). Only participants who got a moral motivation score for all four stories were included in the sum score ( N = 125). Thus, the score had a range from 0 to 8 and a higher score indicates stronger moral motivation. The mean of moral motivation sum score was 5.54 ( SD = 2.25, range: 0–8).

Negatively valenced moral emotions (NVME). The concept of NVMEs or ‘guilt’ (e.g., Ongley and Malti, 2014 ; Colasante et al., 2016 ) also combines emotion attribution with the corresponding justifications differentiating between moral reasons versus all other types of reasons. A score of 0 = ‘no NVME’ indicates attribution of a positive emotion or a negative emotion justified by reasons which are not considered moral (hedonistic, sanction-oriented, undifferentiated). A score of 1 = ‘slight NVME’ indicates attribution of a slightly negative emotion (“rather bad”) with moral justifications and a score of 2 = ‘strong NMVE’ indicates a strong negative emotion (“very bad”) with moral justifications. This procedure allows for some gradation among the guilty or ’NVME’ responses acknowledging that children experience varying levels of NVMEs ( Kochanska et al., 2002 ; Colasante et al., 2016 ). Again, justifications were considered moral as soon as any moral argument was mentioned. The mean scores for NVME range from 0.71 to 1.16 in the four stories [picking on someone: M = 0.71 ( SD = 0.86); stealing: M = 1.16 ( SD = 0.85); hiding someone’s property: M = 0.85 ( SD = 0.91); not sharing: M = 0.87 ( SD = 0.84)].

Analogous to the procedure concerning the moral motivation score, the four separate NVME scores were aggregated over all stories (Cronbach’s α = 0.64). Again, only participants who got a score for all four stories were included in the sum score ( N = 125). A higher score indicates stronger NVMEs. The mean of NVME sum score was 3.66 ( SD = 2.4, range: 0–8).

Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to test hypotheses related to differences in children’s reasoning about act evaluations by intelligence. Multiple regression analyses and rank correlations were used to test hypotheses related to the relationship between intelligence and moral developmental status.

Act Evaluation

The act evaluation question was a control question in order to test if all children know the underlying moral rule and to exclude the possibility that the differences in emotion attribution are due to lack of moral knowledge. All participants ( N = 129) evaluated all stories as wrong when completing the dichotomous act evaluation question. Therefore, all reasoning about act evaluation reference justifications why the act was wrong. See Table 1 for an overview of children’s reasoning why the act is wrong.

TABLE 1. Proportions (standard deviations) of justifications for act evaluations and emotion attribution.

Act Evaluation Reasoning and Intelligence

In a first step, correlation analyses were conducted in order to test whether there is a relation between intelligence and the use of moral reasoning. Analyses revealed no significant correlation coefficients between moral reasoning and intelligence in any of the stories (picking on someone: r = -0.12, p = 0.191; stealing: r = 0.10, p = 0.246; hiding someone’s property: r = 0.01, p = 0.918; not sharing: r = 0.02, p = 0.838).

In a second step, we followed the convention established by Turiel (2008) to use ANOVA-based procedures for reasoning analyses because they have been shown to be more appropriate for analyzing this type of data. In order to test the hypothesis that participants’ justifications for their act evaluation differ depending on their intelligence, a separate 2 (Gender: Male, Female) × 3 (Age: 6 year olds, 7 year olds, 8 year olds) × 3 (Justification: Moral, Sanction-oriented, Hedonistic) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and intelligence as a covariate was conducted for each story. The repeated measures factor represents children’s reasoning about act evaluation. Means are proportions of use of the respective category. There was a significant main effect of justification in two of the stories [picking on someone: F (2,244) = 3.53, p = 0.031, η p 2 = 0.03; hiding someone’s property: F (2,244) = 4.30, p = 0.015, η p 2 = 0.03]. This revealed that participants for both stories used more moral justifications than any other reasons ( ps < 0.001). Furthermore, for the not sharing story, there was a significant three-way interaction of justification, gender and age F (4,244) = 4.17, p = 0.003, η p 2 = 0.06. In the group of 6 and 7 year olds, boys and girls displayed significant differences in the use of moral justifications ( ps < 0.05). In the youngest age group, boys ( M = 0.93, SD = 0.26) mentioned more moral reasons than girls ( M = 0.69, SD = 0.46). The reverse finding emerged for the 7 year olds: girls ( M = 0.95, SD = 0.22) mentioned more moral reasons than boys ( M = 0.70, SD = 0.45). For the oldest age group, the 8 year olds, there were no differences between girls and boys.

However, for the current research question, the crucial results are those including intelligence as a covariate. More specifically, we expected intelligence-related differences in moral reasoning. Analyses revealed no significant main effects of intelligence in any of the stories [picking on someone: F (1,122) = 0.45, p = 0.505, η p 2 = 0.00; stealing: F (1,122) = 1.33, p = 0.251, η p 2 = 0.01; hiding someone’s property: F (1,122) = 0.02, p = 0.889, η p 2 = 0.00; not sharing: F (1,122) = 2.94, p = 0.089, η p 2 = 0.02]. Further, there was no significant interaction between intelligence and justifications. In other words, there were no intelligence-related differences in children’s reasoning about act evaluation.

Emotion Attribution

Percentages of the attributed emotions for all stories can be found in Table 2 . Analyses revealed no significant correlation coefficients between attributed emotions and intelligence in any of the stories (picking on someone: r = 0.16, p = 0.065; stealing: r = 0.09, p = 0.330; hiding someone’s property: r = 0.12, p = 0.174; not sharing: r = 0.16, p = 0.752). Table 1 provides an overview of children’s justifications for their emotion attributions.

TABLE 2. Percentage of attributed emotions.

Moral Development Indices and Intelligence

The attributed emotion in itself does not suffice to evaluate children’s moral developmental status because it does not reliably tell us anything about the underlying motive. Thus, in the following analyses moral development indices are used which combine both – emotion attribution and justification.

In order to further test the impact of intelligence on children’s moral development, multiple regression analyses on moral motivation and on NVMEs were conducted for all stories separately, including intelligence, age and gender as predictors. Further, to test the hypothesis that participants’ moral development is positively related to their intelligence, rank correlations between moral motivation and intelligence as well as between NVMEs and intelligence were calculated.

Multiple regression analyses showed that intelligence was not a significant predictor for moral motivation or NVMEs in any of the stories (see Table 3 for t -values of regression coefficients). Analyses with the aggregated scores did not show intelligence to be a significant predictor, either [moral motivation: t (121) = 0.58, p = 0.563; NVME: t (121) = -0.41, p = 0.683]. In the story picking on someone age contributed significantly to moral motivation [ t (125) = -2.17, p = 0.032]. In the story hiding someone’s property gender revealed as a significant predictor of moral motivation [ t (124) = -2.33, p = 0.032]. For the aggregated score moral motivation score, age and gender significantly contributed to the variance [age: t (121) = -2.33, p = 0.021; gender: t (121) = -2.51, p = 0.013]. Since the results on age and gender are not relevant for the current research question, they are not further considered.

TABLE 3. t -values of regression coefficients with p -values in parentheses.

Correlation analyses revealed no significant correlation coefficients between moral development and intelligence in any of the stories. We found no significant correlations with intelligence for either moral motivation or for NVMEs, see Table 4 . Correlation analyses with the aggregated scores did not reveal any significant results, either (moral motivation: r = 0.04, p = 0.632; NVME: r = -0.03, p = 0.713).

TABLE 4. Correlations of moral scores and intelligence.

The purpose of the current study was to investigate whether intelligence affects moral development as assessed across a range of different moral transgressions. Thereby, the study was designed to address some of the shortcomings of prior research by examining younger children and applying an approach that is more closely connected to children’s daily lives. By including moral emotions, a broader conceptualization of moral development was chosen than in prior research in the field which has often been restricted to moral judgments or moral reasoning about those judgments. Furthermore, we did not rely on a pre-selected group of gifted children, but directly measured children’s intelligence. Altogether, 129 children aged between 6 years; 4 months and 8 years; 10 months were interviewed using four different moral transgression stories.

Given our results, findings from prior research with adolescents or adults cannot simply be extended to younger participants. We found no significant correlations between moral development and intelligence in any of the stories. Neither for moral cognitions, nor for moral emotions, did we find any evidence for intelligence-related differences. More specifically, there were no significant correlations between moral motivation and intelligence and no correlations between NVMEs and intelligence, either. Neither did we find any intelligence-related differences in moral reasoning about act evaluations. Therefore, our findings indicate that for children aged between 6 years; 4 months and 8 years; 10 months, inductive reasoning competencies, i.e., intelligence, cannot explain differences in moral development.

At a first glance, this seems to contradict prior findings which demonstrated strong connections between intelligence and morality. How did prior research differ from ours, and why do we expect our study to be more apt than prior ones?

Firstly, as we have illustrated in the introduction, research that examined the association of morality and intelligence, typically used a different approach to measure morality. Our concern is that traditional measures like the DIT or the Moral Judgment Interview are quite disconnected to everyday life and the results of these instruments rather represent an ability to evaluate different moral principles in a prescriptive way, i.e., what should be done in the respective situation ( Elm and Weber, 1994 ). Thus, it is questionable if they really measure a person’s morality, i.e., a person’s level of moral development, in the sense of what a person would really decide to do in morally relevant situations. It could be assumed that this ability – which can rather be considered as philosophizing about moral problems – is stronger connected to intellectual abilities than the attribution of emotions or the reasoning about act evaluations in the type of moral transgression stories we used in the current study. Especially, as the dilemmas used in the DIT or in the Moral Judgment Interview are very complex and abstract, and remote from the kind of moral problems faced by people in their everyday lives. Correspondingly, Malti et al. (2013) concluded based on their findings that it is reasonable to assume a connection between intelligence and moral reasoning but not between intelligence and moral emotions.

Some authors go even further and claim that the DIT is not conceptually distinct from measures of verbal ability, meaning that DIT scores are reducible to intellectual ability ( Sanders et al., 1995 ). In other words, it is even questionable if prior results really show a connection between morality and intelligence or if they can be considered an artifact that is produced because the instrument is confounded with intelligence.

Furthermore, many prior studies relied on pre-selected groups of gifted children (e.g., from summer camps or other enrichment programs). It is often unclear which criteria the classification of giftedness is based on in these programs. Usually, children are nominated by teachers, and teacher judgments are biased by the children’s families’ socio economic background and personality traits like conscientiousness or effort, etc. ( Baudson, 2010 ). Thus, it is unclear whether the findings are really due to intelligence or whether they might be caused by other factors which are typical for some gifted children. In the current study, we did not rely on such a pre-selection. We recruited children from regular elementary schools as well as from a program for gifted children, but we directly measured intelligence in all children who participated and found no relationship between intelligence and our measures of morality. This aligns with research from the field of prosocial development which is closely related to moral development. For example Paulus et al. (2015) assessed intelligence and working memory and did not find any significant correlations between general cognitive abilities and sharing behavior, either.

However, some points remain to be mentioned and discussed. First of all, we interviewed children at elementary school age. Needless to say, we cannot rule out the possibility that intelligence does matter in even younger children. It is conceivable that in younger age groups, intelligence leads to differences in moral development and in our sample the influence of intelligence just does not come into effect due to a threshold effect, meaning that above a certain degree of intelligence there might be no relation to moral development. In terms of information processing, this could mean that a certain degree of intelligence is necessary to adequately process the extent of information that is at play in morally relevant situations. Accordingly, it is plausible to assume that for the normal range of intelligence as well as for the higher range, there is no relation between intelligence and moral development. Thus, to address this question, future studies should include even younger children and children with lower intelligence scores.

Secondly, further research needs to replicate the current findings with other samples and multiple measures. For example, it is conceivable that moral reasoning ability is more related to verbal intelligence than to general intelligence measured with a non-verbal instrument. However, the aim of the current study was to examine the relationship between moral development and inductive reasoning independently of verbal abilities.

Further, it was surprising that we did not find any age-related differences for the emotion attribution questions and for the moral motivation sum score, and only a small but significant correlation with the NVME sum score. So, one might think that the children were too old and did not differ in their answers at all. However, there were no ceiling effects in any of the moral variables and the answers showed a lot of variation, albeit without relation to the children’s age. One possible explanation for the lack of age-related findings might be that in the current study, children’s age range is limited to 2.5 years in contrast to other studies including wider ranges.

Moreover, some researchers might question the procedure of considering a justification to be moral as soon as one moral argument is mentioned. Some authors argue that it is better to use the first, spontaneous, answer ( Ongley and Malti, 2014 ). Accordingly, a justification is only considered moral if the first answer is a moral one. But we assume that the spontaneous answer is not necessarily the most important argument for the child, because the order of reasons that children provide can also be influenced by other things, e.g., situational aspects ( Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988 ). Thus, we argue that when a child is able to express a moral argument, this argument does have certain significance for the child and therefore can be understood in the sense of moral motivation.

All in all, the findings of the current study provide some first evidence that moral development – measured in a way that is closely connected to everyday life and across a range of different moral transgression scenarios – is not affected by children’s general intelligence in the sense of inductive reasoning measured with figural material. Of course, it cannot be denied, that children need a certain amount of cognitive abilities in morally relevant situations to coordinate perspectives, select and process relevant information, anticipate consequences, and interpret the whole situation ( Dentici and Pagnin, 1992 ; Derryberry et al., 2005 ). But given our findings, it can be assumed that young children already have a sufficient minimum level of cognitive abilities to successfully manage morally relevant situations. Thus, individual differences in children’s moral development need to be explained by other factors than intelligence. Nonetheless, the current findings still need to be replicated in further studies.

Author Contributions

Both authors contributed substantially to the conception and design of the study as well as to the planning of the analyses and interpretation of data. HB drafted the manuscript, and it was critically revised by MH. Both authors approve the final version to be published, and agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and resolved.

This research was funded by Hector Foundation II and German Institute for International Educational Research.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Melanie Killen, Kelly Lynn Mulvey, Shelby Cooley, Laura Elenbaas, and Aline Hitti for their feedback on this project as well as Björn Rump and Wolfgang Woerner for the data preparation. We thank the undergraduate research assistants Carolin Niederle, Clara Heißler, Laura Hoeborn, Julia Öhrle, Theresa Strobel, and Gesine Röwer for their assistance with this project. We are grateful to the children, parents, and institutions who supported this study.

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Keywords : intelligence, cognitive development, moral development, moral reasoning, moral emotions

Citation: Beißert HM and Hasselhorn M (2016) Individual Differences in Moral Development: Does Intelligence Really Affect Children’s Moral Reasoning and Moral Emotions? Front. Psychol. 7:1961. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01961

Received: 04 August 2016; Accepted: 30 November 2016; Published: 20 December 2016.

Reviewed by:

Copyright © 2016 Beißert and Hasselhorn. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Hanna M. Beißert, [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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Moral Development: A Critical Review of Research on Kohlbergian Stage Theory.

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Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Verywell / Bailey Mariner

• Applications
• Other Theories

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Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a theory that focuses on how children develop morality and moral reasoning. Kohlberg's theory suggests that moral development occurs in a series of six stages and that moral logic is primarily focused on seeking and maintaining justice.

Here we discuss how Kohlberg developed his theory of moral development and the six stages he identified as part of this process. We also share some critiques of Kohlberg's theory, many of which suggest that it may be biased based on the limited demographics of the subjects studied.

Test Your Knowledge

At the end of this article, take a fast and free pop quiz to see how much you've learned about Kohlberg's theory.

What Is Moral Development?

Moral development is the process by which people develop the distinction between right and wrong (morality) and engage in reasoning between the two (moral reasoning).

How do people develop morality? This question has fascinated parents, religious leaders, and philosophers for ages, but moral development has also become a hot-button issue in psychology and education. Do parental or societal influences play a greater role in moral development? Do all kids develop morality in similar ways?

American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg developed one of the best-known theories exploring some of these basic questions. His work modified and expanded upon Jean Piaget's previous work but was more centered on explaining how children develop moral reasoning.

Kohlberg extended Piaget's theory, proposing that moral development is a continual process that occurs throughout the lifespan. Kohlberg's theory outlines six stages of moral development within three different levels.

In recent years, Kohlberg's theory has been criticized as being Western-centric with a bias toward men (he primarily used male research subjects) and for having a narrow worldview based on upper-middle-class value systems and perspectives.

How Kohlberg Developed His Theory

Kohlberg based his theory on a series of moral dilemmas presented to his study subjects. Participants were also interviewed to determine the reasoning behind their judgments in each scenario.

One example was "Heinz Steals the Drug." In this scenario, a woman has cancer and her doctors believe only one drug might save her. This drug had been discovered by a local pharmacist and he was able to make it for $200 per dose and sell it for $2,000 per dose. The woman's husband, Heinz, could only raise $1,000 to buy the drug.

He tried to negotiate with the pharmacist for a lower price or to be extended credit to pay for it over time. But the pharmacist refused to sell it for any less or to accept partial payments. Rebuffed, Heinz instead broke into the pharmacy and stole the drug to save his wife. Kohlberg asked, "Should the husband have done that?"

Kohlberg was not interested so much in the answer to whether Heinz was wrong or right but in the reasoning for each participant's decision. He then classified their reasoning into the stages of his theory of moral development.

Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg's theory is broken down into three primary levels. At each level of moral development, there are two stages. Similar to how Piaget believed that not all people reach the highest levels of cognitive development, Kohlberg believed not everyone progresses to the highest stages of moral development.

Level 1. Preconventional Morality

Preconventional morality is the earliest period of moral development. It lasts until around the age of 9. At this age, children's decisions are primarily shaped by the expectations of adults and the consequences of breaking the rules. There are two stages within this level:

• Stage 1 (Obedience and Punishment) : The earliest stages of moral development, obedience and punishment are especially common in young children, but adults are also capable of expressing this type of reasoning. According to Kohlberg, people at this stage see rules as fixed and absolute. Obeying the rules is important because it is a way to avoid punishment.
• Stage 2 (Individualism and Exchange) : At the individualism and exchange stage of moral development, children account for individual points of view and judge actions based on how they serve individual needs. In the Heinz dilemma, children argued that the best course of action was the choice that best served Heinz’s needs. Reciprocity is possible at this point in moral development, but only if it serves one's own interests.

Level 2. Conventional Morality

The next period of moral development is marked by the acceptance of social rules regarding what is good and moral. During this time, adolescents and adults internalize the moral standards they have learned from their role models and from society.

This period also focuses on the acceptance of authority and conforming to the norms of the group. There are two stages at this level of morality:

• Stage 3 (Developing Good Interpersonal Relationships) : Often referred to as the "good boy-good girl" orientation, this stage of the interpersonal relationship of moral development is focused on living up to social expectations and roles . There is an emphasis on conformity , being "nice," and consideration of how choices influence relationships.
• Stage 4 (Maintaining Social Order) : This stage is focused on ensuring that social order is maintained. At this stage of moral development, people begin to consider society as a whole when making judgments. The focus is on maintaining law and order by following the rules, doing one’s duty, and respecting authority.

Level 3. Postconventional Morality

At this level of moral development, people develop an understanding of abstract principles of morality. The two stages at this level are:

• Stage 5 (Social Contract and Individual Rights ): The ideas of a social contract and individual rights cause people in the next stage to begin to account for the differing values, opinions, and beliefs of other people. Rules of law are important for maintaining a society, but members of the society should agree upon these standards.
• Stage 6 (Universal Principles) : Kohlberg’s final level of moral reasoning is based on universal ethical principles and abstract reasoning. At this stage, people follow these internalized principles of justice, even if they conflict with laws and rules.

Kohlberg believed that only a relatively small percentage of people ever reach the post-conventional stages (around 10 to 15%). One analysis found that while stages one to four could be seen as universal in populations throughout the world, the fifth and sixth stages were extremely rare in all populations.

Applications for Kohlberg's Theory

Understanding Kohlberg's theory of moral development is important in that it can help parents guide their children as they develop their moral character. Parents with younger children might work on rule obeyance, for instance, whereas they might teach older children about social expectations.

Teachers and other educators can also apply Kohlberg's theory in the classroom, providing additional moral guidance. A kindergarten teacher could help enhance moral development by setting clear rules for the classroom, and the consequences for violating them. This helps kids at stage one of moral development.

A teacher in high school might focus more on the development that occurs in stage three (developing good interpersonal relationships) and stage four (maintaining social order). This could be accomplished by having the students take part in setting the rules to be followed in the classroom, giving them a better idea of the reasoning behind these rules.

Criticisms for Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg's theory played an important role in the development of moral psychology. While the theory has been highly influential, aspects of the theory have been critiqued for a number of reasons:

• Moral reasoning does not equal moral behavior : Kohlberg's theory is concerned with moral thinking, but there is a big difference between knowing what we ought to do versus our actual actions. Moral reasoning, therefore, may not lead to moral behavior.
• Overemphasizes justice : Critics have pointed out that Kohlberg's theory of moral development overemphasizes the concept of justice when making moral choices. Factors such as compassion, caring, and other interpersonal feelings may play an important part in moral reasoning.
• Cultural bias : Individualist cultures emphasize personal rights, while collectivist cultures stress the importance of society and community. Eastern, collectivist cultures may have different moral outlooks that Kohlberg's theory does not take into account.
• Age bias : Most of his subjects were children under the age of 16 who obviously had no experience with marriage. The Heinz dilemma may have been too abstract for these children to understand, and a scenario more applicable to their everyday concerns might have led to different results.
• Gender bias : Kohlberg's critics, including Carol Gilligan, have suggested that Kohlberg's theory was gender-biased since all of the subjects in his sample were male. Kohlberg believed that women tended to remain at the third level of moral development because they place a stronger emphasis on things such as social relationships and the welfare of others.

Gilligan instead suggested that Kohlberg's theory overemphasizes concepts such as justice and does not adequately address moral reasoning founded on the principles and ethics of caring and concern for others.

Other Theories of Moral Development

Kohlberg isn't the only psychologist to theorize how we develop morally. There are several other theories of moral development.

Piaget's Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg's theory is an expansion of Piaget's theory of moral development. Piaget described a three-stage process of moral development:

• Stage 1 : The child is more concerned with developing and mastering their motor and social skills, with no general concern about morality.
• Stage 2 : The child develops unconditional respect both for authority figures and the rules in existence.
• Stage 3 : The child starts to see rules as being arbitrary, also considering an actor's intentions when judging whether an act or behavior is moral or immoral.

Kohlberg expanded on this theory to include more stages in the process. Additionally, Kohlberg believed that the final stage is rarely achieved by individuals whereas Piaget's stages of moral development are common to all.

Moral Foundations Theory

Proposed by Jonathan Haidt, Craig Joseph, and Jesse Graham, the moral foundations theory is based on three morality principles:

• Intuition develops before strategic reasoning . Put another way, our reaction comes first, which is then followed by rationalization.
• Morality involves more than harm and fairness . Contained within this second principle are a variety of considerations related to morality. It includes: care vs. harm, liberty vs. oppression, fairness vs. cheating, loyalty vs. betrayal , authority vs. subversion, and sanctity vs. degradation.
• Morality can both bind groups and blind individuals . When people are part of a group, they will tend to adopt that group's same value systems. They may also sacrifice their own morals for the group's benefit.

While Kohlberg's theory is primarily focused on help vs. harm, moral foundations theory encompasses several more dimensions of morality. However, this theory also fails to explain the "rules" people use when determining what is best for society.

Normative Theories of Moral Behavior

Several other theories exist that attempt to explain the development of morality , specifically in relation to social justice. Some fall into the category of transcendental institutionalist, which involves trying to create "perfect justice." Others are realization-focused, concentrating more on removing injustices.

One theory falling into the second category is social choice theory. Social choice theory is a collection of models that seek to explain how individuals can use their input (their preferences) to impact society as a whole. An example of this is voting, which allows the majority to decide what is "right" and "wrong."

See how much you've learned (or maybe already knew!) about Kohlberg's theory of moral development with this quick, free pop quiz.

While Kohlberg's theory of moral development has been criticized, the theory played an important role in the emergence of the field of moral psychology. Researchers continue to explore how moral reasoning develops and changes through life as well as the universality of these stages. Understanding these stages offers helpful insights into the ways that both children and adults make moral choices and how moral thinking may influence decisions and behaviors.

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By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Moral Development in Business Ethics: An Examination and Critique

• Review Paper
• Open access
• Published: 18 November 2019
• Volume 170 , pages 429–448, ( 2021 )

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• Kristen Bell DeTienne 1 ,
• Carol Frogley Ellertson 2 ,
• Marc-Charles Ingerson 3 &
• William R. Dudley 1  

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The field of behavioral ethics has seen considerable growth over the last few decades. One of the most significant concerns facing this interdisciplinary field of research is the moral judgment-action gap. The moral judgment-action gap is the inconsistency people display when they know what is right but do what they know is wrong. Much of the research in the field of behavioral ethics is based on (or in response to) early work in moral psychology and American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s foundational cognitive model of moral development. However, Kohlberg’s model of moral development lacks a compelling explanation for the judgment-action gap. Yet, it continues to influence theory, research, teaching, and practice in business ethics today. As such, this paper presents a critical review and analysis of the pertinent literature. This paper also reviews modern theories of ethical decision making in business ethics. Gaps in our current understanding and directions for future research in behavioral business ethics are presented. By providing this important theoretical background information, targeted critical analysis, and directions for future research, this paper assists management scholars as they begin to seek a more unified approach, develop newer models of ethical decision making, and conduct business ethics research that examines the moral judgment-action gap.

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Scandals in business never seem to end. Even when one scandal seems to finally end, another company outdoes the prior disgraced company and dominates the public dialog on corporate ethics (c.f., Chelliah and Swamy 2018 ; Merle 2018 ). So, what is happening here? One common issue shows up repeatedly in cases of unethical behavior, which is that of knowing what is right yet doing what is wrong. This failure is classically understood as the moral judgment-moral action gap. Footnote 1

A main goal of behavioral business ethics is to understand the primary drivers of good and bad ethical decision making (Treviño et al. 2014 ). The hope is that with a better understanding of these drivers, organizations can implement structures that lead to more frequent and consistent ethical behavior by employees. However, business scholars are still working to discover what actually spurs ethical behaviors that improve profit maximization and corporate social performance.

This focus on understanding ethical decision making in business in a way that bridges the moral judgment-moral action gap has experienced an explosion of interest in recent decades (Bazerman and Sezer 2016 ; Paik et al. 2017 ; Treviño et al. 2014 ). These types of studies constitute a branch of behavioral ethics research that incorporates moral philosophy, moral psychology, and business ethics. These same interdisciplinary scholars seek to address questions about the fundamental nature of morality—and whether the moral has any objective justification—as well as the nature of moral capacity or moral agency and how it develops (Stace 1937 ). These aims are similar to those of prior moral development researchers.

However, behavioral business ethicists sometimes approach these aims without the theoretical or philosophical background that can be helpful in grappling with problems like the judgment-action gap (Painter-Morland and Werhane 2008 ). Therefore, this article provides a useful reference for behavioral business ethics scholars on cognitive moral development and its indirect but important influence on research today.

The first goal of this paper is to examine the moral development theory in behavioral business ethics that comes first to mind for most laypersons and practitioners—the cognitive approach. At the forefront of the cognitive approach is Kohlberg ( 1969 , 1971a , b , 1981 , 1984 ) with his studies and reflection of the development of moral reasoning. We also examine subsequent supports and critiques of the approach, as well as reactions to its significant influence on business ethics teaching, research, and practice. We also examine the affective approach by reviewing the work of Haidt ( 2001 , 2007 , 2009 ), Bargh ( 1989 , 1990 , 1996 , 1997 ), and others.

We then consider research that moves away from this intense historical debate between cognitive and affective decision making and may be better for understanding moral development and helping to bridge the moral judgment-moral action gap. For example, some behavioral ethics researchers bracket thinking and feeling and have explored a deeper approach by examining the brain’s use of subconscious mental shortcuts (Gigerenzer 2008 ; Sunstein 2005 ). In addition, virtue ethics and moral identity scholars focus on how individuals in organizations develop certain qualities that become central to their identity and motivate their moral behavior, not by focusing on cognition or affect but by focusing on the practice of behavioral habits (Blasi 1993 , 1995 , 2009 ; Grant et al. 2018 ; Martin 2011 ). Each of these groups of behavioral ethics researchers have moved the discussion of moral development forward using theorizing that rests on different—and often competing—assumptions.

In this article, we seek to make these various theories of moral development explicit and to bring different theories face to face in ways that are rarely discussed. We show how some of the unrelated theories seem compatible and how some of the contrasting theories seem irreconcilable. The comparisons and conflicts will then be used to make recommendations for future research that we hope will lead to greater unity in theorizing within the larger field of business ethics.

In other words, the second goal of this paper is to provide a critical theoretical review of the most pertinent theories of Western moral development from moral psychology and to highlight similarities and differences among scholars with respect to their views on moral decision making. We hope this review and critique will be helpful in identifying what is best included in any future unified theory for moral decision making in behavioral ethics that will actually lead to the moral judgment-moral action gap being bridged in practice as well.

The third goal of our paper is to question common assumptions about the nature of morality by making them explicit and analyzing them (Martin and Parmar 2012 ). Whetten ( 1989 ) notes the importance of altering our thinking “in ways that challenge the underlying rationales supporting accepted theories” (p. 493). Regarding the field of business ethics specifically, O’Fallon and Butterfield ( 2005 ) found that a major weakness in the business ethics literature is a lack of theoretical grounding—and we believe this concern still requires attention. In addition, Craft ( 2013 ) notes that “perhaps theory building is weak because researchers are reluctant to move beyond the established theories into more innovative territory” (p. 254). As recommended by Whetten ( 1989 ), challenging our assumptions in the field of behavioral ethics will help us conduct stronger, more compelling research that will have a greater impact on the practice of business ethics.

For example, many business and management scholars are heavily influenced by long-held assumptions reflected in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg ( 1969 , 1971a , b ), one of the most prominent theorists of ethical decision making (Hannah et al. 2011 ; Treviño 1986 ; Treviño et al. 2006 ; Weber 2017 ; Zhong 2011 ). Like Sobral and Islam ( 2013 ), we call upon researchers to move beyond these assumptions. We will review a selection of research that explores alternate ideas and leaves past assumptions behind, leading to unique outcomes, which are of value to the field of management. Thus, in addition to making long-held assumptions clear, we will present critical analysis and alternative ways of thinking to further enhance the scientific literature on the topic.

To accomplish this third goal, we will discuss links between definition, theory, and empirical study. This method of analysis is demonstrated by Fig.  1 .

Model for analysis of moral theory

Our fourth and final goal is to note gaps in our current understanding of ethical decision making and to present directions for future research. We discuss these opportunities throughout the paper and more specifically in our summary.

To accomplish these four goals, we begin with a review of the moral judgment-action gap and Greek and Kantian philosophy. After laying this theoretical background as a foundation for our discussion, we move deeper into a critical analysis. To begin this critical analysis, we discuss Piaget and Kohlberg, and the implications of their approaches. We then consider the Neo-Kohlbergian, Moral Identity, and Moral Domain research. The final section analyzes Moral Automaticity, Moral Schemas, and Moral Heuristics Research, as outlined in Fig.  2 .

Visual summary of review

Moral Judgment-Action Gap

As mentioned above, behavioral ethics research indicates that the mere ability to reason accurately about moral issues predicts surprisingly little about how a person will actually behave ethically (Blasi 1980 ; Floyd et al. 2013 ; Frimer and Walker 2008 ; Jewe 2008 ; Walker and Hennig 1997 ). This ongoing failure is not for a lack of many thoughtful attempts on the part of researchers (Wang and Calvano 2015 ; Williams and Gantt 2012 ). The predictive failure has led to expressions of disappointment and frustration from scholars (Bergman 2002 ; Blasi 1980 ; Thoma 1994 ; Walker 2004 ).

The gap has led to a call for a more integrated and interdisciplinary approach to the problem in business ethics (De Los Reyes Jr et al. 2017 ). In agreement with that call for greater integration, we suggest that if business scholars and practitioners are going to move forward the work on the moral judgment-moral action gap, then it will be helpful to return to the historical embeddedness of this gap problem.

Philosophical Background: Greeks and Kant

The study of ethics is concerned with the question of “what is right?” Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle examined issues such as right versus wrong and good versus bad. For these philosophers, morality found its meaning in the fact that it served to achieve personal needs and desires for happiness, avoid harm, and preserve goods required for the well-being of individuals and society. These goods include truth, safety, health, and harmony, and are maintained by moral, virtuous behavior. We call this a teleological approach because of its focus on results rather than on rules governing behavior (Lane 2017 ; Parry 2014 ).

One of the first of these moral philosophers was Socrates (470–399 B.C.). Socrates believed that through rational processes or reasoning we can discern truth, including universal moral truth. Thus, Socrates taught that a person’s essential moral function is to act rationally. He taught that “to know the good is to do the good” (Stumpf and Fieser 2003 , p. 42), meaning that if an individual knows what is right, he or she will do it. On the other hand, Socrates acknowledged that humans frequently commit acts that they know to be wrong. The Greeks called this phenomena—knowing what is right but failing to act on that knowledge—akrasia. Akrasia, from the ancient Greek perspective, is what leads to wrong or evil doing (Kraut 2018 ). Footnote 2

Another perspective that will be helpful later on in our examination of current literature is that of Aristotle. Regarding moral functioning, Aristotle focused on the development of and reliance on virtues: qualities, such as courage, that motivate a person’s actions (Kraut 2018 ). These virtues are developed through social influences and practice, and they become an essential part of who a person is. Thus, rather than learning to reason about actions and their results, as Socrates would emphasize as the core of moral functioning, Aristotle emphasizes virtues that a person possesses and that motivate ethical behavior (Kraut 2018 ).

Like Socrates, German philosopher Immanuel Kant ( 1785/1993 ) claimed that moral judgment is a result of reasoning. However, rather than taking a teleological approach to morality, he held to deontological views. For Kant, moral behavior is defined by an overarching obligation or duty to comply with strict universal principles, valid independent of any empirical observation. According to this deontological view, an action is right or wrong in and of itself, not as defined by end results or impact on well-being. Simply put, people are obligated out of duty to perform certain moral actions (Johnson 2008 ; Kant 1785/1993 ). In summary, for Socrates, Aristotle, and Kant, the emphasis is on knowledge and cognition.

Modern Influences: Piaget and Kohlberg

This reliance on knowledge and cognition continued on from Socrates to Kant and on to the American moral psychologist Kohlberg (1927–1987). Kohlberg advocated a theory that sought to describe how individuals mature in their abilities to make moral decisions.

Before discussing Kohlberg further, we note that his work has had an enormous impact on academic research as whole. His research has been cited over 70,000 times. In the last 5 years alone, he has been cited between 2000 and 3500 times each year. Within business, his theory of cognitive moral development is widely discussed, commonly used as a basis for research, and frequently covered in the standard textbooks for business ethics courses. Thus, to say that the field has moved past him is to deny the reality of the literature and experience of business ethics as a whole. With that in mind, any careful examination of how to better bridge the moral judgment-moral action gap in behavioral ethics must address Kohlberg’s ideas.

Socrates’ belief that “to know the good is to do the good,” which reflects the importance in Greek thought of arriving at truths through reasoning, influenced Kohlberg’s emphasis on the chief role of rationality as the arbiter for discerning moral universals (Stumpf and Fieser 2003 , p. 42). Kohlberg also embraced Aristotle’s notion that social experiences promote development by stimulating cognitive processes. Moreover, his emphasis on justice morality reflects Aristotle’s claims that virtues function to attain justice, which is needed for well-being, inner harmony, and the moral life.

Kohlberg’s thinking was heavily influenced by Jean Piaget, who believed that children develop moral ideas in a progression of cognitive development. Piaget held that children develop judgments—through experience—about relationships, social institutions, codes of conduct, and authority. Social moral standards are transmitted by adults, and the children participate “in the elaborations of norms instead of receiving them ready-made,” thus creating their own conceptions of the world (Piaget 1977 , p. 315).

According to Piaget, children develop a moral perception of the world, including concepts of fairness and ideas about right and wrong. These ideas do not originate directly from teaching. Often, children persist in these beliefs even when adults disagree (Gallagher 1978 ). In his theory of morality, presented in The Moral Judgment of the Child, Piaget philosophically defined morality as universal and obligatory (Ash and Woodward 1987 ; Piaget 1977 ). He drew on Kantian theory, which emphasized generating universal moral maxims through logical, rational thought processes. Thus, he rejected equating cultural norms with moral norms. In other words, he rejected the moral relativity that pervaded most research in human development at the time (Frimer and Walker 2008 ).

In the tradition of Piaget’s four stages of cognitive development, Kohlberg launched contemporary moral psychology with his doctoral paper in 1958. His structural development model holds that the stages of moral development emerge from a person’s own thoughts concerning moral issues. Kohlberg believed that social experiences play a part in moral development by stimulating our mental processes. Thus, moral behavior is rooted in moral and ethical cognitive deliberation (Kohlberg 1969 ; Levine et al. 1985 ).

Kohlberg investigated how people justify their decisions in the face of moral dilemmas. Their responses to these dilemmas established how far within stages of moral development a person had progressed. He outlined six discrete stages of moral reasoning within three overarching levels of moral development (Kohlberg 1971a ), outlined in Table  1 below. These stages were centered in cognitive reasoning (or rationality).

Kohlberg claimed that the moral is manifest within the formulation of moral judgments that progress through stages of development and could be demonstrated empirically (Kohlberg 1971a , b ). In this way, Kohlberg shifted the paradigm for moral philosophy and moral psychology. Up to this point, from the modern, Western perspective, most empirical studies of morality were descriptive (Lapsley and Hill 2009 ). Most research chronicled how various groups of peoples lived their moral lives and what the moral life consisted of, not what universal moral principles should constitute moral life. Kohlberg made the bold claim that individuals should aspire to certain moral universal principles of moral reasoning, and furthermore, that these principles could be laid bare through rigorous scientific investigation.

According to Kohlberg, an individual’s moral reasoning begins at stage one and develops progressively to stage two, then stage three, and so on, in order. Movement from one level to the next entails re-organization of a form of thought into a new form.
Not everyone can progress through all six stages. According to Kohlberg, it is quite rare to find people who have progressed to stage five or six, emphasizing that his idea of moral development stages was not synonymous with maturation (Kohlberg 1971a ). That is, the stages do not simply arise based on a genetic blueprint. Neither do they develop directly from socialization. In other words, new thinking strategies do not come from direct instruction, but from active thinking about moral issues. The role of social experiences is to prompt cognitive activity. Our views are challenged as we discuss or contend with others. This process motivates us to invent more comprehensive opinions, which reflect more advanced stages of moral development (c.f., Kohlberg 1969 ).

Reflecting Piaget and thus Kantian ethics, Kohlberg claimed that his stages of moral development are universal. His sixth stage of moral development (the post-conventional, universal principles level) occurs when reasoning includes abstract ethical thinking based on universal principles. Footnote 3

For Kohlberg, moral development consisted of transformations in a person’s thinking–not as an increased knowledge of cultural values that leads to ethical relativity, but as maturing knowledge of existing structures of moral judgment found universally in development sequences across cultures (Kohlberg and Hersh 1977 ). In other words, Kohlberg sought to eliminate moral relativism by advocating for the universal application of moral principles. According to him, the norms of society should be judged against these universal standards. Thus, Kohlberg sought to demonstrate empirically that specific forms of moral thought are better than others (Frimer and Walker 2008 ; Kohlberg 1971a , b ).

Lapsley and Hill ( 2009 ) discuss the far-reaching ramifications of how Kohlberg moralized child psychology: “He committed the ‘cognitive developmental approach to socialization’ to an anti-relativism project where the unwelcome specter of ethical relativism was to yield to the empirical findings of moral stage theory” (p. 1). Footnote 4 For Kohlberg, a particular behavior qualified as moral only when motivated by a deliberate moral judgment (Kohlberg et al. 1983 , p. 8). His ‘universal’ moral principles, then, were not so universal after all. Lapsley and Hill ( 2009 ) note that this principle of phenomenalism “was used as a cudgel against behaviourism (which rejected both cognitivism and ordinary moral language)” (p. 2).

Implications of Kohlberg for Today

This section of the article examines Kohlberg’s underlying assumptions and limitations. Although Kohlberg’s work is historically important and currently influential, this article proposes that business ethicists should avoid mis-application of and over-reliance on his framework.

To begin, Kohlberg assumes that the essence of morality is found in cognitive reasoning, mirroring Greek and Kantian thought. While such an assumption fit his purposes, we must move beyond this to understand ethical decision making more holistically (Sobral and Islam 2013 ). We know that the ability to reason does not always lead humans to act morally. Morality is more central to human existence, and reasoning is only one of multiple human activities that achieve the ends of morality (c.f., Ellertson et al. 2016 ). If we were to use Kohlberg’s assumption, we would assume that as long as someone is capable of advanced moral reasoning (as with Kohlberg’s use of hypothetical situations), we need not worry about that person’s actions. However, empirical studies by Hannah et al. ( 2018 ) indicate that although a person might demonstrate advanced moral reasoning in one role, the same person might show moral deviance in another role. Thus, recent research suggests that moral identity is multi-dimensional and ethical decision making is quite complex. Future work should consider the true, yet limited role of rationality in moral behavior and moral decision making (see Table  2 ).

Kohlberg also assumes that all humans proceed universally through moral development and that when fully developed—for those who do reach the highest level of reasoning—everyone will exhibit the same moral reasoning. If we are to build on this assumption, many questions are left unanswered about the easily observable differences both within and between individuals. For example, recent research by Sanders et al. ( 2018 ), suggests that in leaders who have high levels of moral identity, those who are authentically proud (versus leaders who are hubristically proud) are more likely to engage in ethical behavior. We call on researchers to study differences and limitations in moral processing that come from individual differences including past experiences, upbringing, age, personality, and culture. With such research, we will be able to better understand and reconcile differences regarding ethical issues and behavior.

Continuing to follow Kohlberg’s emphasis on universalism may limit our consideration of the real impact of social norms. We call on management scholars to investigate the importance of social, organizational, and individual norms rather than unwittingly assuming that universal principles should govern all organizational affairs. Certainly, some actions in business are universally unethical, but an assumption of absolute universal norms may limit organizational development, creative decision making, and the innovative power that comes from diversity of an individual’s social and cultural background. For example, empirical research by Reynolds et al. ( 2010 ) suggests that humans are moral agents and that their automatic decision-making practices interact with the situation to influence their moral behavior. Also, research by Kilduff et al. ( 2016 ) demonstrates how rivalry can increase unethical behavior. Future research on how situations and social norms affect behavior may help scholars to better predict, understand, and prevent moral judgment-action gaps and ethical conflicts between different individuals. Moral Domain Theory, which will be discussed later, provides one example of how to handle this question.

Kohlberg’s work does not directly address the moral judgment-action gap. For Kohlberg, until a person functions at the sixth stage of moral development, any immoral behavior roots from an inability to reason based on universal principles. However, his theory does not adequately explain the behavior of individuals who clearly understand what is moral–yet fail to act on that understanding (c.f., Hannah et al. 2018 ). This is yet another reason why as scholars we must question the claim that cognitive reasoning is central to the nature of morality. We call on business ethics scholars to design and test theoretically rigorous models of moral processing that connect gaps between judgment and action.

Moving forward, we do not disagree with Kohlberg’s notion that social interactions are important to moral reasoning, and we invite researchers and practitioners to consider what social experiences in the workplace could promote ethical development. Are some experiences, reflective practices, exercises, ethics training programs, or cultures more effective at promoting ethical behavior? For example, empirical research by Gaspar et al. ( 2015 ) suggests that how an individual reflects on past misdeeds can impact that person’s future immoral behavior. Future research could examine which experiences are most impactful, as well as when, why, and how these experiences affect change. Thus far we have reviewed the early work in moral development, including Socrates, Aristotle, Kant, Piaget, and Kohlberg. The remainder of the article discusses more recent theories.

Variations: Neo-Kohlbergians, Moral Identity, Moral Domain, and Moral Automaticity

The remainder of this paper will review how some researchers have built on Kohlberg’s assumptions and how others have successfully challenged them. In reviewing the theories of these researchers, remaining gaps in understanding will be discussed and future possible directions will be offered. Four areas of moral psychology research will be reviewed as follows: (1) Neo-Kohlbergian research, which builds upon Kohlberg’s original “rational moral judgments” approach, (2) Moral Identity research, which examines how moral identity is a component of how individuals define themselves and is a source for social identification, (3) Moral Domain research, which sees no moral judgment-action gap and assumes that social behavior stems from various domains of judgment, such as moral universals, cultural norms, and personal choice, and (4) Moral Automaticity research, which emphasize the fast and automatic intuitive approach in explanations of moral behavior.

Neo-Kohlbergian Research

Rest ( 1979 , 1984 , 1999 ) extended Kohlberg’s work methodologically and theoretically with his formulation of the Defining Issues Test (DIT), which began as a simple, multiple-choice substitute for Kohlberg’s time-consuming interview procedure. The DIT is a means of activating moral schemas (general knowledge structures that organize information) (Narvaez and Bock 2002 ). It is based on a component model that builds on Kohlberg’s stages of moral development—an approach he called ‘Neo-Kohlbergian.’ Rest ( 1983 ) maintained that a person must develop four key psychological qualities to become moral: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character. Without these, a person would have many gaps between his or her judgment and behavior. With 25 years of DIT research, Rest and others (Rest et al. 2000 ; Thoma et al. 2009 ) have found some support for the DIT and the model.

Although Rest built on Kohlberg’s work by emphasizing the role of cognitive moral judgments, he moved beyond the idea that the essence of morality is found in reasoning. Under the Neo-Kohlbergian approach, dealing with the moral became a more multifaceted endeavor, and many intricate theories of moral functioning—including moral motivation—have followed.

The work of Rest and his colleagues, along with Kohlberg’s foundation, has become a ‘gold standard’ in the minds of some management scholars (Hannah et al. 2011 ). Rest’s work has proven promising in its ability to explain the gap between moral cognition and behavior. However, his four-component model has also been criticized for assigning a single level of moral development to each respondent. Curzer ( 2014 ) points out that people develop at different rates and across different spheres of life, and that Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT) is not specific enough in its assessment of moral development. Future research could explore this criticism and analyze other methods for identifying, measuring, and improving moral development.

Moral Identity and Virtue Ethics Research

Blasi ( 1995 ) subscribed to a Neo-Kohlbergian point of view as he expanded on Kohlberg’s Cognitive Developmental Theory by focusing on motivation, an area of exploration not within the purview of Kohlberg’s main research. Though, toward the end of his career, Kohlberg did become more interested in the concept of motivation in his research (Kohlberg and Candee 1984 ), his empirical findings illuminate an individual’s understanding of moral principles without shedding much light on the motivation to act on those principles. According to Kohlberg, proficient moral reasoning informs moral action but does not necessarily explain it completely (Aquino and Reed 2002 ). Kohlberg’s own findings showed moral reasoning does not necessarily predict moral behavior.

Though his research builds on Kohlberg’s by emphasizing the role of cognitive development, Blasi’s focus on motivation represents a philosophical shift that provides a basis for moral identity research. Researchers in moral identity, though they agree with Kohlberg on some aspects of moral behavior, find the meaning of morality in characteristics or values that motivate a person to act. Because these components of identity are defined by society and deal with outcomes that a decision maker seeks, the philosophy of moral identity is more teleological than deontological. The philosophical definition of morality held by moral identity theorists influenced the way they studied moral behavior and the judgment-action gap.

Blasi introduced the concept of ‘the self’ as a sort of mediator between moral reasoning and action. Could it be that ‘the self’ was the source for moral motivation? Up until then, most of Kohlberg’s empirical findings involved responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas which might not seem relevant to the self or in which an individual might not be particularly engaged (Giammarco 2016 ; Walker 2004 ). Blasi’s model of the self was one of the first influential theories that endeavored to connect moral cognition (reasoning) to moral action, explaining the moral judgment-action gap. He proposed that moral judgments or moral reasoning could more reliably connect with moral behavior by taking into account other judgments about personal responsibility based upon moral identity (Blasi 1995 ).

Blasi is considered a pioneer for his theory of moral identity. His examination has laid a foundation upon which other moral identity scholars have built using social cognition research and theory. These other scholars have focused on concepts such as values, goals, actions, and roles that make up the content of identity. The content of identity can take a moral quality (e.g., values such as honesty and kindness, goals of helping, serving, or caring for others) and, to one degree or another, become central and important in a person’s life (Blasi 1983 ; Hardy and Carlo 2005 , 2011 ). Research by Walker et al. ( 1995 ) shows that some individuals see themselves exhibiting the moral on a regular basis, while others do not consider moral standards and values particularly relevant to their daily activities.

Blasi’s original Self Model ( 1983 ) posited that three factors combine to bridge the moral judgment-action gap. The first is the moral self, or what is sometimes referred to as ‘moral centrality,’ which constitutes the extent to which moral values define a person’s self-identity. Second, personal responsibility is the component that determines that after making a moral judgment, a person is responsible to act upon the judgment. This is a connection that Kohlberg’s model lacked. Third, this kind of self-consistency leads to a reliable, constant uniformity between judgment and action (Walker 2004 ).

Blasi ( 1983 , 1984 , 1993 , 1995 , 2004 , 2009 ) and Colby and Damon ( 1992 , 1993 ) posit that people with a moral personality have personal goals that are synonymous with moral values. Blasi’s model claims if one acts consistently according to his or her core beliefs, moral values, goals, and actions, then he or she possesses a moral identity or personality. When morality is a critical element of a person’s identity, that person generally feels responsible to act in harmony with his or her moral beliefs (Hardy and Carlo 2005 ).

Since Blasi introduced his Self Model, he has elaborated in more detail on the structure of the self’s identity. He has classified two distinct elements of identity: first, the objective content of identity such as moral ideals, and second, the modes in which identity is experienced, or the subjective experience of identity. As moral identity matures, the basis for self-perception transitions from external content to internal content. A mature identity is based on moral ideals and aspirations rather than relationships and actions. Maturity also brings increased organization of the self and a refined sense of agency (Blasi 1993 ; Hardy and Carlo 2005 ).

Blasi believes that moral identity produces moral motivation. Thus, moral identity is the source for understanding or bridging the moral judgment-action gap. However, some researchers (Frimer and Walker 2008 ; Hardy and Carlo 2005 ; Lapsley and Hill 2009 ) have noted that Blasi’s ideas are quite abstract and somewhat inaccessible. Furthermore, empirical research supporting his notions is limited. Moreover, Blasi’s endorsement of the first-person perspective on the moral has made it difficult to devise empirical studies. Empirical research on Blasi’s model often involves self-report methods, calling into question the validity of self-perceived attributes. In addition, the survey instruments that rate character traits often exhibit arbitrariness and variability across lists of collections of virtues hearkening back to the ‘bag of virtues’ approach that Kohlberg sought to move beyond (Frimer and Walker 2008 ).

On the other hand, some researchers have investigated the concept of ‘moral exemplars,’ presumably under the assumption that they possess moral identities. Colby and Damon’s ( 1992 , 1993 ) research on individuals known for their moral exemplarity found that these individuals experienced “a unity between self and morality” and that “their own interests were synonymous with their moral goals” (Colby and Damon 1992 , p. 362). Hart and Fegley ( 1995 ) compared teenage moral exemplars to other teens and found that moral exemplars are more likely than other teens to describe themselves using moral concepts such as being honest and helpful. Additional research using self-descriptions found similar results (Reimer and Wade-Stein 2004 ). This implies that to maintain ethical character in the workplace managers may want to hire candidates who describe themselves using moral characteristics.

Other identity research includes Hart’s ( 2005 ) model, which strives to identify a moral identity in terms of five factors that give rise to moral behavior (personality, social influence, moral cognition, self and opportunity). Aquino and Reed ( 2002 ) propose that definitions of self can be rooted in moral identity. This concept of self is organized around moral characteristics. Their self-report questionnaire measures the extent to which moral traits are integrated into an individual’s self-concept. Cervone and Tripathi ( 2009 ) stress the need for moral identity researchers to step outside the field of moral psychology, shift the focus away from the moral and engage general personality theorists. This allows moral psychologists to access broader studies in personality and cognitive science and to break out of what they see as the compartmentalized discourse within moral psychology.

In summary, the main concern of moral identity theory is how unified or disunified a person is, or the level of integrity an individual possesses. For moral psychologists, an individual with integrity is unified and consistent across all contexts. Because of this unification and consistency, that person experiences fewer lapses (or gaps) in his or her moral judgments and moral actions (Frimer and Walker 2008 ).

Moral identity theory represents a philosophical belief that morality is at the core of personhood. Rather than focusing simply on the processes or functioning of moral development and ethical decision making, moral identity scholars look more deeply at what motivates moral behavior, and they make room for the concept of agency. Similarly, Ellertson et al. ( 2016 ) draw on Levinas to explain that morality is more central to human existence than simply the processes it includes.

The philosophy of virtue ethics arose from Aristotle’s views of the development of virtues (Grant et al. 2018 ). Virtue ethics theorizes that any individual can obtain real happiness by pursuing meaning, concern for the common good, and the trait of virtue itself, and that by doing so such an individual will develop virtuous qualities that further increase his or her capacity to obtain real happiness through worthwhile pursuits (Martin 2011 ).

Virtue ethics also posits that individuals with enough situational awareness and knowledge can correctly evaluate their own virtue, underlying motivations, and ethical options in a given situation (Martin 2011 ). Grant et al. ( 2018 ) explain that researchers of virtue ethics explore virtue as being context specific, relative to the individual, and developing over a lifetime. Therefore, virtue ethics considers moral decision making to be both personal and contextual, and defines ethical decisions as leading to actions that impact the common good and contribute to an individual’s real happiness and self-perceived virtue.

Although empirical research has found evidence of the constancy of individuals’ virtue characteristics under different situations, research suggests virtues are not necessarily predictive of actual ethical behavior (Jayawickreme et al. 2014 ). Empirical evidence of the application of the theory of virtue ethics at the individual level is lacking; a recent review of thirty highly cited virtue ethics papers found only two studies that collected primary empirical data at the individual level (Grant et al. 2018 ). Thus, we call on ethics scholars to investigate the development and situational or universal influence of virtue states, traits, and characteristics, as well as their impact on happiness and other outcomes.

We invite management scholars to utilize the findings summarized in this section as they research how to effectively identify, socialize, and leverage candidates possessing virtuous characteristics and moral integrity. Future research can explore the feasibility of hiring metrics centered on ethical integrity. We note the difficulty scholars have had in designing a tool for accurately assessing ethical integrity and in separating the concept from ethical sensitivity (Craig and Gustafson 1998 ). We also note the opportunity for more research to discover and improve instruments and measures to assess ethical integrity and subsequent development of high moral character.

Moral Domain Research

As with most moral psychology research, ‘domain theory’ also stems from Kohlberg’s foundational research because it emphasizes the role of cognition in moral functioning. However, the work of theorists in this branch of psychology differs philosophically from the work of Kohlberg. Domain theory incorporates moral relativity to an extent that Kohlberg would likely be uncomfortable with. For them, the study of moral behavior is less about determining how humans ought to behave and more about observing how humans do behave. This ‘descriptive’ approach to morality is reflected in the majority of the theories through the end of this section.

Elliot Turiel and Larry Nucci are prominent domain theorists; they distinguish judgments of social right and wrong into different types or categories. For Nucci ( 1997 ), morality is distinct from other domains of knowledge, including our understanding of social norms. For domain theorists, social behavior can be motivated by moral universals, cultural norms, social norms, or even personal choice (Turiel 1983 ). Thus, social judgments are organized within domains of knowledge. Whether an individual behaves morally depends upon the judgments that person makes about which domain takes precedence in a particular context.

Nucci ( 1997 ) asserts that certain types of social behavior are governed by moral universals that are independent from social beliefs. This category includes violence, theft, slander, and other behaviors that threaten or harm others. Accordingly, research suggests that notions of morality are derived from underlying perceptions about justice and welfare (Turiel 1983 ). Theories of this sort define morality as beliefs and behavior related to treating others fairly and respecting their rights and welfare. In this sense, morality is distinct from social conventions such as standards of fashion and communication. These social norms define what is correct based on social systems and cultural traditions. This category of rules has no prescriptive force and is valuable primarily as a way to coordinate social interaction (Turiel 1983 ).

Turiel ( 1983 , 1998 ) elaborates on the differences between the moral and social domain in his Social Domain Theory. In contrast to Blasi, he proposes that morality is not a domain in which judgments are central for some and peripheral for others, but that morality stands alongside other important social and personal judgments. To understand the connection between judgment and action, Turiel believes it is necessary to consider how an individual applies his or her judgments in each domain—moral, social, and personal (Turiel 2003 ).

Turiel’s social-interactionist model places behaviors that harm, cause injustice, or violate rights in the ‘moral domain.’ He claims that the definition of moral action is derived in part from criteria given in the philosophy of Aristotle where concepts of welfare, justice, and rights are not considered to be determined by consensus or existing social arrangements, but are universally valid. In contrast, actions that involve matters of social or personal convention have no intrinsic interpersonal consequences, thus they fall outside the moral domain. Individuals form concepts about social norms through involvement in social groups.

Turiel and Nucci’s work does not accept the premise that a moral judgment-action gap exists (Nucci 1997 ; Turiel 1983 , 1998 ). They explain inconsistencies between judgment and behavior as the result of individuals accessing different domains of behavior. Thus, a judgment about which domain of judgments to prioritize precedes action. While an action may be inconsistent with a person’s moral judgment, it may not be inconsistent with that person’s overarching judgments that have higher priority. In other words, the person can know something is right, but in the end decide that he would rather do something else because in balancing his moral, personal, and social concerns, something else won out as seeming more important in the end. This particular aspect of Turiel’s model could be compared to Blasi’s personal responsibility component in which after a moral judgment is made, the person decides whether he has a responsibility in the particular moment or situation to act upon the judgment. Kohlberg’s research did not sufficiently address this element of responsibility to act.

Even though Turiel and Nucci recognize the prescriptive nature of behavior in the moral domain, they assert that the individual must make a judgment about whether it merits acting upon, or whether another sphere of action takes precedence. In other words, Turiel and Nucci may deem a particular moral action to be more important than action in the social or personal conventional sphere. However, unless the individual deems it so, there is no moral failure. The individual decides which sphere takes priority at any given time. The notions of integrity, personal responsibility, and identity as the origin of moral motivation (Blasi 1995 ; Hardy and Carlo 2005 ; Lapsley and Narvaez 2004 ) do not apply within Turiel’s social-interactionist model.

Dan Ariely, Francesca Gino, and others have discovered some interesting findings about activating the moral domain through triggers such as recall of the Ten Commandments or an honor code (Ariely 2012 ; Gino et al. 2013 ; Hoffman 2016 ; Mazar et al. 2008 ). However, research in this area is still in its infancy, and other scholars have not always been able to replicate the results (c.f., Verschuere et al. 2018 ). Future research could examine factors that determine why a certain sphere of action takes precedence over other spheres in motivating specific behaviors. For example, which factors impact an individual’s decision to act within the moral domain or within the social sphere? How can the moral domain be triggered? Why does or doesn’t one’s training or knowledge (such as the ability to recall culturally accepted moral principles such as the Ten Commandments) predict one’s ethical behavior?

In a similar vein to Turiel and Nucci, Bergman’s Model ( 2002 ) accepts an individual to be moral, even if that individual does not act upon his or her moral understanding. He finds the moral in the relationships among components of reasoning, motivation, action, and identity. With this model he seeks to answer the question raised by Turiel’s model, ‘If it is just a matter of prioritizing domains of behavior, why be moral?’ He asserts that his model preserves the centrality of moral reasoning in the moral domain, while also taking seriously personal convention and motivation, without succumbing to a purely subjectivist perspective (c.f., Bergman 2002 , p. 36).

Bergman strives to articulate the motivational potential of moral understanding as truly moral even when it has not been acted upon. He does not assume that moral understanding must have an inevitable expression in action as did Kohlberg. Thus, Bergman provides another context for thinking about the problem of the judgment-action gap. He focuses on our inner moral intentions. He believes that when people behave morally, they do so simply because they define themselves as moral; acting otherwise would be inconsistent with their identity (Bergman 2002 ).

The assumptions underlying domain theory present several dangers to organizations. Moral Domain Theory assumes, with Kohlberg, that the essence of morality is in the human capability to reason, and that there is no moral issue at hand unless it is recognized cognitively. This creates the possibility of excusing individuals from the responsibility of the outcome of their actions. Even though Kohlberg believed in universal moral rules, the fact that he based such a belief in reasoning and empirical evidence allows those who build on his theory to create a morally acceptable place for behaviors that one deems reasonable even when such behaviors negatively impact the well-being of self or others. The question for management scholars is if we are willing to accept the consequences of such assumptions. We call on scholars to challenge these assumptions, such as by researching on a deeper level where morality really comes from and what it implies for decision making in organizations.

On the other hand, Moral Domain Theory addresses the influence of social norms, which is an important moral issue that Kohlberg’s research did not address. For example, empirical research by Desai and Kouchaki ( 2017 ) suggests that subordinates can use moral symbols to discourage unethical behavior by superiors. As we suggested earlier, future research should examine the influence of organizational, cultural, and social norms, symbols, and prompts. Even where universal norms do not prohibit an action, a person may be acting immorally according to expectations established within organizations or relationships. We call on scholars to consider if and when certain norms specific to a situation, organization, community, relationship, or other context may or may not (and should or should not) override universal principles. Research of this nature will help clarify what is ethically acceptable.

Moral Automaticity Research

The philosophies of the researchers we will describe in this section begin to move away from Kohlberg’s assumption that morality is found in deliberate cognitive reasoning and the assumption that universal moral standards exist. For scholars in the moral automaticity realm, morality is based on automatic mental processes developed through evolution to benefit our individual and collective social survival. However, while they discuss moral judgments in terms of automatic rather than deliberate judgments, they still hold that the meaning of morality is found in the judgments that humans make.

Additionally, accounts of morality focused on automatic, neurological processes conflict with ideas of free will and personal responsibility. These accounts rely on the concept of determinism, or the belief that all actions and events are the predetermined, inevitable consequences of various environmental and biological processes (Ellertson et al. 2016 ). If these processes are really the basis of morality, some critics argue we are reduced to creatures without individuality. There is clearly a balance between automatic and deliberative processes in human moral behavior that allows for individual differences and preserves the idea of agency. We propose that while automatic processes certainly play a role in moral decision making, that role is to assist in a more fundamental purpose of our existence as humans (Ellertson et al. 2016 ). With this in mind, we summarize some of the most prominent research based on moral automaticity, summarize the research that argues for the existence of moral schemas and moral heuristics, then suggest directions for future research.

Narvaez and Lapsley ( 2005 ) have argued that John Bargh’s research provides persuasive empirical evidence that automatic, preconscious cognition governs a large part of our daily activities (e.g., Bargh 1989 , 1990 , 1996 , 1997 ; Uleman and Bargh 1989 ). Narvaez and Lapsley ( 2005 ) assert that this literature seems to thoroughly undermine Kohlberg’s assumptions. Bargh and Ferguson ( 2000 ) note, for example, that “higher mental processes that have traditionally served as quintessential examples of choice and free will—such as goal pursuit, judgment, and interpersonal behavior—have been shown recently to occur in the absence of conscious choice or guidance” (p. 926). Bargh concludes that human behavior is not very often motivated by conscious, deliberate thought. He further states that “if moral conduct hinges on conscious, explicit deliberation, then much of human behavior simply does not qualify” (c.f., Narvaez and Lapsley 2005 , p. 142).

Haidt’s ( 2001 ) views on the moral take the field in the intuitive direction. He focuses on emotional sentiments, some of which have been seen in the previous arguments of Eisenberg ( 1986 ) and Hoffman ( 1970 , 1981 , 1982 ) as well as the original thinking of Hume ( 1739/2001 , 1777/1960 ), who concerned himself with human ‘sentiments’ as sources of moral action. Haidt claims that “the river of fMRI studies on neuroeconomics and decision making” gives empirical evidence that “the mind is driven by constant flashes of affect in response to everything we see and hear” (Haidt 2009 , p. 281). Hoffman ( 1981 , 1982 ) provides an example of these affective responses that Haidt refers to. He gives evidence that humans reliably experience feelings of empathy in response to others’ misfortunes, resulting in altruistic behavior. In Hoffman’s foundational work, we see that altruism and other pro-social behaviors fit in with empirical findings from modern psychological and biological research.

Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), has brought a resurgence of interest in the importance of emotion and intuition in determining the moral. He asserts that the moral is found in judgments about social processes, not in private acts of cognition. These judgments are manifest automatically as innate intuitions. He defines moral intuition as “the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt 2001 , p. 818).


Haidt asserts that “studies of everyday reasoning show that we usually use reasoning to search for evidence to support our initial judgment, which was made in milliseconds” ( 2009 , p. 281). He believes that only rarely does reasoning override our automatic judgments. He does not like to contrast the terms emotion and cognition because he sees it all as cognition, just different kinds: (1) intuitions that are fast and affectively laden and (2) reasoning that is slow and less motivating.

Haidt focuses on innate intuitions that are linked to the social construction of the ethics of survival. He sees action as moral when it benefits survival (Haidt 2007 ). He argues that humans “come equipped with an intuitive ethics , an innate preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving other human beings” (Haidt and Joseph 2004 , p. 56). Haidt proposes two main questions that he believes are answered by his Social Intuitionist Model: (1) Where do moral beliefs and motivations come from? and (2) How does moral judgment work?

His answer to the first question is that moral views and motivation come from automatic and immediate emotional evaluations of right and wrong that humans are naturally programmed to make. He cites Hume who believed that the basis for morality comes from an “immediate feeling and finer internal sense” (Hume 1777/1960 , p. 2).

To answer the second question (‘How does moral judgment work?’), Haidt explains that brains “integrate information from the external and internal environments to answer one fundamental question: approach or avoid?” (Haidt and Bjorklund 2007 , p. 6). Approach is labeled good; avoid is bad . The human mind is constantly evaluating and reacting along a good-bad dimension regarding survival.

The Social Intuitionist Model presents six psychological connections that describe the relationships among intuitions, conscious judgments, and reasoning. Haidt’s main proposition is that intuition trumps reasoning in moral processing (Haidt and Bjorklund 2007 ). Moral judgment-action gaps, then, appear between an action motivated by intuition and judgments that come afterwards. Applied to Kohlberg’s empirical study, this would imply that the reasoning he observed served not to motivate decisions but to justify them after the fact.

This approach suggests that ethical behavior is driven by naturally programmed emotional responses. Recent research by Wright et al. ( 2017 ) suggests that moral emotions can influence professional behavior. Other work conducted by Peck et al. ( 1960 ) shows that social influences, especially in family settings, stimulate character development over time. They also dismiss the importance of the debate between automatic and cognitive judgments by showing that people who have developed the highest level of moral character judge their actions “either consciously or unconsciously” and that “the issue is not the consciousness, but the quality of the judgment” (Peck et al. 1960 , p. 8).

Monin et al. ( 2007 ) also strive to move beyond the debate that pits emotion or intuition against reason, vying for primacy as the source for the moral. They assert that the various models that seek to bridge the judgment–action gap are considering two very different proto-typical situations. First, those who examine how people deal with complex moral issues find that moral judgments are made by elaborate reasoning. Second, those who study reactions to alarming moral misconduct conclude that moral judgments are quick and intuitive. Benoit Monin and his colleagues propose that researchers should not arbitrarily choose between the one or the other but embrace both types of models and determine which model type has the greater applicability in any given setting (Monin et al. 2007 ).

Narvaez ( 2008a ) contends that Haidt’s analysis limits moral judgment to the evaluation of another person’s behavior or character. In other words, his narrow definition of moral reasoning is limited to processing information about others. She wonders about moral decision making involving personal goals and future planning (Narvaez 2008a ).

Narvaez ( 2008a ) also believes that Haidt over-credits flashes of affect and intuition and undervalues reasoning. In her view, flash affect is just one of many processes we use to make decisions. Numerous other factors affect moral decisions along with gut feelings, including goals, mood, preferences, environmental influences, context, social pressure, and consistency with self-perception (Narvaez 2008a ). We call on scholars to investigate whether, when, how, and with which level of complexity people wrestle with moral decisions. We also suggest researchers consider investigating whether there is anything that organizations can do to move people away from fast and automatic decisions (and toward slow and thoughtful decisions), and whether doing so motivates more ethical choices.

Moral Schemas Research

Haidt and Narvaez both believe that morality exists primarily in evolved brain structures that maximize social survival, both collectively and individually (Narvaez 2008a , b ). Narvaez asserts that Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model includes biological and social elements but lacks a psychological perspective. Narvaez ( 2008a ) finds the moral ultimately in “psychobehavioral potentials that are genetically ingrained in brain development” as “evolutionary operants” (p. 2). To explicate these evolutionary operants, she refers to her own model of psychological schemas that humans access to make decisions. She notes that Haidt’s idea of modules in the human brain is accepted by many evolutionary psychologists but that such assertions lack solid empirical evidence in neuroscience ( 2008a ).

In contrast, Narvaez’s schemas are brain structures that organize knowledge based on an individual’s experience (Narvaez et al. 2006 ). In general, Schema Theory describes abstract cognitive formations that organize intricate networks of knowledge as the basis for learning about the world (Frimer and Walker 2008 ).

Schemas facilitate the process of appraising one’s social landscape, forming moral identity or moral character. Narvaez terms this “moral chronicity” and claims that it explains the automaticity by which many moral decisions are made. Individuals “just know” what is required of them without engaging in an elaborate decision-making process. Neither the intuition nor the activation of the schemas is a conscious, deliberative process. Schema activation, though mostly shaped by experience (thus the social aspect), is ultimately rooted in what Narvaez ( 2008b ) refers to as “evolved unconscious emotional systems” that predispose responses to particular events (p. 95).

Narvaez’s ‘Triune Ethics Theory’ ( 2008b ) explains her idea of unconscious emotional systems. This research proposes that these emotional systems are fundamentally derived from three evolved formations in the human brain. Her theory is modeled after MacLean’s ( 1990 ) Triune Brain Theory, which posited that these formations bear the resemblance of animal evolution. Each of the three areas has a “biological propensity to produce an ethical motive” (Narvaez 2008b , p. 2). With these formations, animals and humans have been able to adapt their behavior according to the challenges of life (Narvaez 2008b ). Emotional systems, because of their central location, can interact with other cognitive formations. Thus, a thought accompanies every emotion, and most thoughts also stimulate emotion. Narvaez’s model is a complex system in which moral behavior (though influenced by social events) is determined almost completely from the structures of the brain.

Some researchers (Bargh and Chartrand 1999 ; Gigerenzer 2008 ; Lapsley and Narvaez 2008 ; Sunstein 2005 ) assert that intuition and its consequent behavior are constructed almost completely through environmental stimuli. Bargh and Chartrand ( 1999 ) assert that “most of a person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion by features of the environment and that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance” (p. 462). Our brains automatically perceive our environment, including the behavior of other people. These perceptions stimulate thoughts that lead to actions and eventually to patterns of behavior. This sequence is automatic; conscious choice plays no role in it (see, e.g., Bargh and Chartrand 1999 , p. 466).

Lapsley and Hill ( 2008 ) address Frimer and Walker’s original question of whether moral judgment is more deliberate or more automatic. They include Bargh and Chartrand ( 1999 ) in their list of intuitive models of moral behavior which they label ‘System 1’ models because they describe processing which is “associative, implicit, intuitive, experiential, automatic and tacit” as opposed to ‘System 2’ models where the mental processing is “rule based, explicit, analytical, ‘rational’, conscious and controlled” (p. 4). They categorize Haidt’s and Narvaez’s models as System 1 models because they are intuitive, experiential, and automatic.

Moral Heuristics Research

Gigerenzer ( 2008 ) believes that intuitions come from moral heuristics. Moral heuristics are rules developed by experience that help us make simple moral decisions and are transferable across settings. They are shortcuts that are easier and quicker to process than deliberative, conscious reasoning. Thus, they are automatic in their presentation. They are fast and frugal. They are fast in that they enable quick decision making and frugal because they require a minimal search for information to make decisions.

Heuristics are deeply context sensitive. The science of heuristics investigates which intuitive rules are readily available to people (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001 ). Gerd Gigerenzer is interested in the success or failure of these rules in different contexts. He rejects the notion of moral functioning as either rational or intuitive. Reasoning can be the source of heuristics, but the distinction that matters most is between unconscious and conscious reasoning. Unconscious reasoning causes intuition, and—as with Haidt’s theories mentioned earlier—conscious reasoning justifies moral judgments after they are made (Lapsley and Hill 2008 ). In general, Gigerenzer asserts that moral heuristics are accurate in negotiating everyday moral behavior.

Sunstein’s ( 2005 ) model also claims that intuitions are generated by ‘moral heuristics.’ However, in contrast to Gigerenzer, he notes that heuristics can lead to moral errors or gaps between good judgment and appropriate behavior when these rules of thumb are undisciplined or decontextualized. This happens when we use heuristics as if they were universal truths or when we apply heuristics to situations that would be handled more appropriately with slower rational deliberation. Sunstein ( 2005 ) supports the view that evolution and social interaction cause the development of moral heuristics. Also, recent research by Lee et al. ( 2017 ) suggests an evolutionary account for male immorality, providing some support for the existence of an evolutionary origin and for the use of moral automaticity. To investigate the disagreement between Sunstein and Gigerenzer, we call on researchers to further examine the frequency, depth, and accuracy with which humans use moral heuristics.

Lapsley and Hill ( 2008 ) categorize the theories of Sunstein ( 2005 ) and Gigerenzer ( 2008 ) as System 1 models because the behavior they describe appears to be implicit, automatic, and intuitive. These models emphasize the automaticity of moral judgments that come from social situations. A person with a moral personality detects the moral implications of a situation and automatically makes a moral judgment (Lapsley and Hill 2009 ). For this kind of person, morality is deeply engrained into social habits.

Though Lapsley and Hill categorize heuristics models the same as Haidt’s, we observe that ‘intuition’ in the sense of heuristics means something very different to them than what it means to Haidt. In Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model, learning structures developed through evolution are the source of automatic judgments. On the other hand, Sunstein’s ( 2005 ) intuitions come from ‘moral heuristics,’ which are quick moral rules of thumb that pop into our heads and can even be developed through reasoning. As researchers examine the roles of reasoning and intuition in moral decision making, they may consider breaking intuition into categories, such as intuitions that represent heuristics and intuitions that come from biological predispositions.

The models of moral functioning just described fall into the ‘intuitive’ category, though they are competing descriptions of how to meaningfully connect judgment and action. Frimer and Walker ( 2008 ) observe that on one hand, models based on deliberative reasoning may be the most explanatory in that they require individuals to engage in and be aware of their own moral processing; “The intuitive account, in contrast, requires a modicum of moral cognition but grants it permission to fly below the radar” (p. 339). In a way, it separates moral functioning from consciousness or the ‘self.’

Future Research Directions

The specialties of moral automaticity, moral schemas, and moral heuristics are interesting and promising areas for those interested in future research in ethical decision making. One reason is because these specialties are highly multidisciplinary. Philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, neuroscientists, and others, in addition to business scholars, are throwing themselves into this area. A second reason is because some of the most interesting future research questions in this multidisciplinary field are interdisciplinary. Many of the unanswered questions are complex and must be addressed from many different angles and with a variety of tools.

Consider just two research questions: (1) How does individual meaning-making actually take place if biological evolution is the primary driver and architect of both our personal moral choices and subsequent ethical interpretations? (2) What type of real accountability is possible if brains are programmed to make moral and/or immoral choices? These types of questions lie at the heart of what it means to be a human being, and these are just a few of the theoretical questions in moral automaticity research.

Future research directions in the empirical examination of moral automaticity are just as fascinating. For example, (1) Where, when, and why does the brain light up when ethical decisions are made and reflected upon? (2) Which areas of the brain fire first when confronted with a difficult ethical situation? (3) What is the sequence that the brain fires in when experiencing moral disengagement? (4) How plastic is the brain as it relates to rewiring and strengthening neural pathways that will lead to more prosocial behavior? (5) What are the predominant dispositional and situational factors that lead the brain to heal from moral injury? (6) How do various situations, social settings, and personality differences interact to activate automatic and deliberative processes?

In summary, we call for future research in moral automaticity, moral schemas, and moral heuristics to shed light on the roots of moral action. Given the research supporting the role of automaticity in moral processing, we caution against relying too heavily on models that emphasize the preeminence of rational thinking until research further examines this phenomenon. We also call for research examining the same subjects both in situations that require deliberative processing and in situations that are inherently intuitive. We suggest the use of fMRI studies to observe the activity of different sections of the brain—those associated with rational, cognitive processes and those associated with intuitive judgments—during unique situations.

Even in the earliest stages of moral philosophy, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle noted that people do not always act on the rational understanding they possess (Kraut 2018 ). They used the term “akrasia” to describe the phenomenon in which a person knows what is right but fails to act on that knowledge. This is commonly called the moral judgment-action gap.

Lawrence Kohlberg’s work (Kohlberg 1969 , 1971a , b ) is not only widespread in research, but also in business education today. His influential theory of cognitive moral development rests on the assumption that the ability to morally reason at a certain level is the primary core and driver of a person’s morality. Kohlberg’s work proposes that stages of moral development, which are defined at a universal level, are what is most fundamental. Although his ideas are important, recent research demonstrates his theorizing is insufficient in understanding and predicting the moral judgment-action gap (Hannah et al. 2018 ; Sanders et al. 2018 ). This article has provided various examples of other research that has successfully moved beyond Kohlberg’s assumptions (Aquino and Reed 2002 ; Grant et al. 2018 ). For this reason, we encourage ethics scholars to reconsider an overreliance on rationality in their research in behavioral business ethics. In Fig.  2 , we show the major theories and the relationships between them.

Many scholars have presented research that specifically addresses the judgment-action gap. For example, moral identity theory and virtue ethics explore how a person’s self-perception motivates moral behavior (Blasi 1983 ; Hardy and Carlo 2005 , 2011 ; Walker et al. 1995 ). However, more empirical evidence and better theories and models are needed that show how a person develops moral identity and moral character. Future studies can examine the ways in which moral identity leads to ethical decision making.

Moral domain theory suggests that the judgment-action gap does not exist and that the gap can be understood through additional domains of reasoning (ex. self-interest, social interest, etc.) used to evaluate the moral implications of a given situation (Bergman 2002 ; Nucci 1997 ; Turiel 2003 ). What we do not fully understand is what causes a person to recognize moral implications in the first place and how individuals apply different domains in decision making. Given the conflicting research findings (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008 ; Verschuere et al. 2018 ), we call for more research that shows what stimuli can trigger a person to view a decision as a moral decision as opposed to a decision in which social influences or personal preferences take precedence.

Some scholars oppose the idea that conscious reasoning governs most moral behavior. For example, Bargh ( 1989 , 1990 , 1996 , 1997 , 2005 ; Bargh and Ferguson 2000 ; Uleman and Bargh 1989 ) and Haidt ( 2001 , 2007 , 2009 ) have provided evidence that people make ethical decisions based on automatic intuitions. As Narvaez ( 2008b ) has pointed out, however, we would be wrong to assume that all decisions are based solely on flashes of intuition. What we do not know is how factors such as situation, personality, and cultural background influence the relative and complimentary roles of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral behavior. We call for research that investigates the influence of these factors on moral processing.

Even Haidt ( 2009 ) recognizes the existence of moral reasoning, though he claims that it occurs only to rationalize an intuitive decision after it has been made. Scholars who discuss the development and use of heuristics (Gigerenzer 2008 ; Sunstein 2005 ) show how past reasoning about moral situations—perhaps the kind of reasoning that Haidt refers to—can influence the development of behavioral rules of thumb. These rules, or “heuristics,” appear to function automatically after they have been developed through cognition over the course of a person’s experiences. What we do not understand is the extent to which heuristics are consistent with an individual’s conscious moral understanding. We call for research that explores the formation of heuristics and their reliability in making real-life ethical decisions that are consistent with a person’s moral understanding.

This article shows that different theories point us in different directions within the fields of moral psychology and ethical decision making. Thus, it is very difficult to form a holistic understanding of moral development and processing. With this in mind, our most urgent call is for scholars to develop a holistic framework of moral character development and a comprehensive theory of ethical decision making. These types of models and theories would serve as powerful tools to fuel future empirical research to help us understand why people do not always act on their moral understanding. More robust research is critical to understanding how to prevent devastating ethical failures and how to foster ethical courage.

For simplicity throughout this article, we also use “judgment-action gap.”

Akrasia relates to the moral judgment-moral action gap discussed throughout this article.

The individual considers laws valid and worthy of obedience insofar as they are grounded in justice.

“This principle asserts that moral reasoning is a conscious process of individual moral judgment using ordinary moral language (Kohlberg et al. 1983 ). The moral quality of behavior hinges on agent phenomenology; it depends solely on the subjective perspective, judgment and intention of the agent.” (Lapsley and Hill 2009 , p. 1)

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DeTienne, K.B., Ellertson, C.F., Ingerson, MC. et al. Moral Development in Business Ethics: An Examination and Critique. J Bus Ethics 170 , 429–448 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04351-0

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A research study on the Moral Development of Adolescents

The research that was conducted focused on measuring Identity and Kohlberg’s moral development stages with a specific focus on adolescents. The main reason is that during this time adolescents are in their prime developmental stage. They undergo both the moral dilemma of Identity vs. identity confusion and Moral development. The measuring of adolescents posed an ethical debate whether or not adolescents can be questioned in schooling hours and at school who has the responsibility of legal guardianship. All participating candidates were given questionnaires in which section B measured an identity scale and section C measured a moral development stage. These two scores were then correlated using the Pearson’s moment product correlation, an r of 0.84 and a p of 0.037 were found meaning that there is a strong correlation between the two factors and it can be considered to be statistically significant.

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Erikson has complimentaıy descriptions of personality and view mankind as a social being in nature, having a desire to belong and motivated for significance in their social environment in order to handle with inferiority. Also suggests that four main areas should be taken in consideration during the counseling process: Work, friendship, sexual love, and optimism. Erikson's key identity concepts: Identification, identity formation process, identity achievement, identity crisis. Erikson acknowledges the importance of personality development during childhood and also individual's personality may develop in a process involving ali defend life. But this development process is not so easy also individual is bound to live binary, opposite confiicts. According to Erikson crisis consisting of eight phases contain in each period (turning points) must be overcame in a healthy way. Each stage is binary because it represents two opposite poles. Erikson elaborated the stages and embrace the whole life with his psychosocial theory. Erikson has accented the theme of socio-cultural influences in human development. Erikson stressed the development of self-identity within a social context that provides an orientation toward or against constructive communal living. Erikson believed that human beings are rational creatures and their thoughts, feelings, and actions are largely controlled by the ego. Erikson consider the social as well as the creative self or ego processes as being not less important than biological-self. Erikson designated development as the evolution of "ego identity". The environment that children live in was one of the important aspects of his theories. Erikson in his studies, focused gave importance to child development in terms of interpersonal and cultural influences. Besides, Erikson, had emphasized the importance of the ability of social cooperation. According to Erikson, ego is their past. Each theorist advocates this by taking a different perspective from his own life. more than a medıator between the id and the superego. Erikson's developing "ego identity" incorporates structural influences, perceptions of the world and self, interpersonal orientations, and patterns of problem solving. Being a responsible and participating member of the society is often seen as a sign of maturity. By understanding the process of identity developement is better able to spot potential problems and provide early interventions that can result in better outcomes. As a result, Erikson focused specifically on "growth psychology", which makes Erikson assumed to be the members of the "third force" in psychology. in this handout, the basic concepts of Erikson's psychosocial model theory are summarized by focusing on the related aspects which in turn will contribute to the integration of that theory and psychological determinants of identity developement at the different life stages are researehed. Key words: Erik Erikson, identity, stages of psycho-social development, identity status, identity crisis, turning point.

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Essays on moral development. volume i: the philosophy of moral development . by lawrence kohlberg. san francisco: harper & row, 1981. vii + 441 pages. $21.95..

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A Developmental Perspective on the Origins of Morality in Infancy and Early Childhood

1 Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States

Melanie Killen

2 University of Maryland, College Park, College Park, MD, United States

Key constituents of morality emerge during the first 4 years of life. Recent research with infants and toddlers holds a promise to explain the origins of human morality. This article takes a constructivist approach to the acquisition of morality, and makes three main proposals. First, research on moral development needs an explicit definition of morality. Definitions are crucial for scholarly communication and for settling empirical questions. Second, researchers would benefit from eschewing the dichotomy between innate and learned explanations of morality. Based on work on developmental biology, we propose that all developmental transitions involve both genetic and environmental factors. Third, attention is needed to developmental changes, alongside continuities, in the development of morality from infancy through childhood. Although infants and toddlers show behaviors that resemble the morally relevant behaviors of older children and adults, they do not judge acts as morally right or wrong until later in childhood. We illustrate these points by discussing the development of two phenomena central to morality: Orientations toward helping others and developing concepts of social equality. We assert that a constructivist approach will help to bridge research on infants and toddlers with research on moral developmental later in childhood and into adulthood.

Introduction

Key constituents of morality emerge early in ontogeny: by their fourth birthday, most children express obligatory judgments based on moral concerns with others’ welfare, rights, and fairness through spontaneous reactions and reasoning about perceived violations ( Schmidt et al., 2012 ; Smetana et al., 2012 ; Dahl and Kim, 2014 ; Rizzo et al., 2016 ; for a review, see Killen and Smetana, 2015 ). How do newborns–seemingly unconcerned with moral issues–develop into preschoolers with moral capabilities that, in some ways, resemble those of adults?

Recent research on social cognitive abilities among infants and toddlers promises to shed light on how preschoolers come to reason about and judge moral issues. Most of the foundational work on cognitive developmental approaches to moral development focused on older children and adults ( Piaget, 1932 ; Kohlberg, 1963 , 1971 ; Turiel, 1983 ). In the last two decades, numerous researchers from social and moral developmental psychology ( Killen and Smetana, 2015 ), as well as other areas in developmental psychology, have explored the presence of morally relevant concepts and behaviors in infants and toddlers ( Bloom, 2013 ; Hamlin, 2013 ; Sommerville, 2015 ; Tomasello, 2016 ). Discussions about the origins of morality in infancy have often centered on whether some parts of morality are innate, or otherwise emerge independently of relevant experiences ( Hamlin, 2013 ; Wynn and Bloom, 2014 ; Warneken, 2016 ). In these debates, key terms like “morality” and “innate” are often left undefined ( Dahl, 2014 ).

In this article, we argue that explaining major transformations in early moral development requires a new lens, one that bridges the gap between infancy and childhood. This article makes three proposals for how to integrate research on very young children with research on moral development in later childhood. First, we propose that research on moral development needs explicit definitions of morality and other central concepts. Second, developmental acquisitions involve both genetic and environmental factors, and research on moral development would benefit from eschewing the dichotomy between innate and learned characteristics. Third, there are fundamental differences between the capabilities of infants and toddlers and the moral capabilities of older children. Within our framework, infants and toddlers demonstrate important precursors to morality, but lack core components of a developed morality. In elaborating on this third claim, we discuss age-related changes regarding young children’s orientations toward helpful behaviors and toward generalizing moral obligations to members of different groups. These three issues are fundamental (definitions, acquisition, and age-related change), but they clearly do not exhaust all major points of debate about a complex construct such as morality. We hope that addressing these concerns will help integrate research on how morality develops during the first year of life.

Research on Early Development Needs a Definition of Morality

We propose that an investigation of early moral development requires a definition of morality and other key concepts. In our view, explicit definitions of key terms are crucial to the accumulation of knowledge ( Dahl, 2014 ; Dahl and Killen, 2018 ). In contrast, some scholars have explicitly stated that morality does not need to be defined and that the inquiry of moral concepts necessitates asking participants what morality means to them, noting that the word “morality” is used in a variety of ways ( Greene, 2007 ; Haidt and Graham, 2007 ; Wynn and Bloom, 2014 ). We argue that morality, perhaps even more than other concepts, requires definition and criteria. One problem with defining morality in terms of what people label as moral is that morality can become relativistic; whatever action or belief any one person, group, or culture deems to be “moral” is so (for discussions, see Kohlberg, 1969 ; Turiel, 2002 , 2015a ). Moreover, when researchers do not define morality, it is difficult to determine whether disagreements among scholars result from different uses of the word “moral” or from different empirical claims. Indeed, explicit definitions of phenomena for investigation reflect the core of scientific analysis and are crucial for empirical evaluation of scientific claims.

In our work, we have defined morality as prescriptive norms concerning others’ welfare, rights, fairness, and justice ( Killen and Rutland, 2011 ; Turiel, 2015a ; Dahl and Killen, 2018 ). The research task is to determine when children’s judgments reflect these criteria. This definition of morality stems from neo-Kantian philosophical accounts of morality ( Turiel, 1983 ; Smetana et al., 2014 ). Within our framework, morality is not the only basis for evaluative judgments: children and adults also make judgments about conventional, religious, and personal safety considerations (see Killen and Smetana, 2015 ). The usefulness of defining morality in terms of others’ welfare, rights, fairness, and justice is now supported by a large body of research showing that children and adults distinguish moral considerations from considerations about social conventions, and from matters of personal choice ( Killen and Smetana, 2015 ). For instance, most children across different communities think that it would be wrong to harm others even when parents or teachers condone it. In contrast, most children view conventional issues, such as dress codes or forms of address, as alterable by authorities. We are not asserting that there is only one definition of morality; our main point is that an explicit definition of morality is crucial for avoiding major miscommunication, and promoting accumulation of knowledge, in research on early moral development.

Early Morality is Constructed, and is Neither Innate nor Learned

While psychological research in the first half of the 20 th century often framed one of the fundamental questions about psychological behavior as whether it was innate or learned, extensive research has subsequently undermined the dichotomy between innate and learned characteristics. In fact, all developmental transitions involve genetic, cellular, neural, behavioral, and environmental processes ( Gottlieb, 1991 ; Spencer et al., 2009 ; Moore, 2015 ).

Children construct morality through reciprocal interactions with their environments ( Dahl and Killen, 2018 ). The constructivist view does not seek to separate innate and learned elements of morality ( Piaget, 1932 ). This view is also supported by evidence that children have an abundance of morally relevant experience from early in life, involving helping and being helped as well as harming and being harmed ( Reddy et al., 2013 ; Dahl, 2015 , 2016a , b ; Hammond et al., 2017 ). Through these experiences, children come to critically evaluate norms from parents and others ( Dahl and Kim, 2014 ; Dahl, 2016b ; Dahl and Killen, 2018 ).

The constructivist viewpoint differs from contemporary nativist and learning views of moral development. In discussions of innate characteristics, it is often unclear how to determine whether some characteristic is “innate” ( Dahl, 2014 ; Turiel and Dahl, in press ). It is biologically implausible that any characteristic would develop irrespective of environmental processes. Some have proposed that we infer characteristics to be innate whenever the characteristics develop in the absence of relevant experience ( Bloom, 2012 ; Hamlin, 2013 ). However, for morality, virtually any social interaction is a relevant experience. From birth, most infants interact with people who help and comfort them, for instance by feeding them or responding to their crying ( Richards and Bernal, 1972 ; Tronick, 1989 ; Hammond et al., 2017 ). An infant who develops in the absence of morally relevant experiences would not develop at all.

Importantly, the constructivist view also differs from learning or socialization views of moral development. Socialization and learning views portray moral development as a process of complying with the norms and views of one’s community ( Kochanska and Aksan, 2006 ; Grusec et al., 2014 ), leading to a relativistic theory of morality. In contrast, the constructivist view proposes that children acquire generalizable obligations about the fair and equal treatment of others through an active process, one that involves abstracting, interpreting, and evaluating social experiences, sometimes agreeing and sometimes challenging the norms held by one’s community ( Nucci, 2005 ). Children also construct other evaluative concepts through social experiences, for instance by learning about social conventions or religious norms adopted by their parents, and other community members ( Turiel, 1983 ; Killen and Smetana, 2015 ).

In proposing a constructivist approach, we seek to reorient research on early moral development. Rather than asking whether a given capability is innate or due to experiential factors, research can investigate how children construct morality through reciprocal interactions.

Studying Developmental Change

Developmental research is the study of change. Yet, recent discussions of early moral development have often emphasized continuities concerning the presence of moral knowledge between infants and adults. Some researchers have proposed that infants make moral judgments, and possess altruistic motives, around the first birthday ( Warneken and Tomasello, 2006 ; Bloom, 2013 ; Hamlin, 2013 ; Wynn and Bloom, 2014 ; Warneken, 2016 ). Contrasting with this emphasis on continuity, researchers have recommended greater attention to developmental change in moral development ( Kagan, 2008 ; Killen et al., 2015 ; Dahl and Freda, 2017 ; Sommerville, 2018 ). These age-related changes include conceptual advancements, coordination of knowledge, and priority of certain moral principles over others. These gradual changes reflect new understandings about morality that were not present at younger ages. Here, we call for greater attention to developmental change in research on early moral development through discussions of helping behavior and research on children’s judgments of group-based social inequalities.

Developmental Changes in Orientations Toward Helping

How do judgments of helpful actions develop? We assert that helping behavior, alone, is not necessarily “moral” behavior but reflects a first step toward the acquisition of morality. In some contexts, individuals judge helping as morally good or even obligatory, such as when it involves helping others from harm. In other situations, however, helping is viewed as undesirable and morally repugnant, such as helping someone cheat or steal ( Miller et al., 1990 ; Kahn, 1992 ; Killen and Turiel, 1998 ; Turiel, 2015b ). Thus, evaluations of helping behavior incorporate the goal of the action, and the basis for the motivation to help another person.

Early in life, children have experiences with helping and being helped by others. Most infants help others around the first birthday ( Warneken and Tomasello, 2007 ; Sommerville et al., 2013 ; Dahl, 2015 ; Hammond et al., 2017 ). In one common laboratory paradigm, an adult accidentally drops a pen or a paperclip and unsuccessfully reaches for it. Infants commonly hand back the dropped object to the experimenter ( Warneken and Tomasello, 2006 ; Warneken, 2013 ). In everyday life, 1-year-olds participate in a variety of chores, including putting toys away, laundry, self-care, and cleaning ( Rheingold, 1982 ; Dahl, 2015 ; Hammond et al., 2017 ).

We propose that infants’ earliest helping behaviors are based on a desire to participate in social interactions, and are not accompanied by moral judgments that helping is good or required ( Dahl and Paulus , in press ; Miller et al., 1990 ; Kahn, 1992 ; Killen and Turiel, 1998 ; Turiel, 2015b ). First, infants are not very reliable helpers. Infants who help on one trial do not always help on another, and often opt to play instead of helping ( Warneken and Tomasello, 2006 ; Waugh and Brownell, 2017 ). Infants’ unreliable helping is striking because, in these studies, infants could help at minimal cost ( Rheingold, 1982 ; Warneken et al., 2007 ). Second, when infants begin to help, they do not appear broadly concerned with others’ welfare. While infants on average become more helpful early in the second year of life, they also use more interpersonal force in this period, sometimes hitting or kicking others for no apparent reason and without visible signs of anger or distress ( Hay, 2005 ; Dahl, 2015 , 2016a ).

Finally, infants do not make categorical judgments based on moral concerns ( Dahl, 2014 ; Dahl and Freda, 2017 ). Although infants and toddlers prefer to reach and look toward helpful puppets over hindering puppets, they also show such preferences based on non-moral characteristics such as food preferences ( Hamlin et al., 2013 ; Wynn, 2016 ). Moreover, infants’ preferences are relative, not qualitative: These studies show that infants prefer one puppet over another, but do not show that infants view some puppets as bad or wrong ( Vaish et al., 2010 ; Dahl et al., 2013 ).

Infants’ desire to participate in chores and other adult activities is an important developmental precursor to morality. Still, this desire does not constitute a moral concern. Orientations toward helping undergo transformations between infancy and later childhood ( Dahl et al., 2018 ). By 3–4 years of age, children make categorical judgments about right and wrong based on concerns with welfare and rights ( Nucci and Weber, 1995 ; Smetana et al., 1999 ; Schmidt et al., 2012 ; Dahl and Kim, 2014 ; Killen and Smetana, 2015 ; Josephs and Rakoczy, 2016 ). Hence, preschoolers have developed obligatory concepts and concerns regarding others’ welfare and apply these in social situations. Past research indicates that children make judgments of right and wrong about helping by age 8, and likely before ( Kahn, 1992 ; Nucci et al., 2017 ; Van de Vondervoort and Hamlin, 2017 ). More research is needed to explain the development of moral orientations toward helping, from a desire for participation to judgments based on concerns with welfare and rights ( Dahl and Paulus, in press ).

Developmental Changes in Intergroup Attitudes and Moral Judgments

As children grow older, they also encounter acts that involve members of other groups. Over the past decade, research in developmental psychology has examined the origins of morality in concert with the emergence of social equality, or how young children apply their moral judgments to intergroup contexts ( Schmidt et al., 2012 ; Hetherington et al., 2014 ; Weller and Lagattuta, 2014 ; Killen et al., 2015 ). Do young children distribute resources by giving more to their ingroup than to an outgroup when both groups are equally meritorious? Do moral judgments play a positive force, enabling children to reject peers who promote stereotypic or prejudicial attitudes ( Killen et al., in press ; Mulvey, 2016 ; Rutland and Killen, 2017 ). These are fundamental questions regarding how morality, defined as the fair and equal treatment of others, is applied in situations in which group identity is salient ( Nesdale, 2004 ).

Group affiliation is necessary for human survival ( Tomasello, 2016 ). At the same time, many forms of group loyalty are unfair, resulting in negative treatment toward others, and particularly those perceived as members of outgroups. Children and adults in many cultures view group norms related to societal conventions as contextually bound and consensus-driven whereas moral principles are generalizable and obligatory ( Smetana et al., 2014 ), reflecting continuity in thinking about group norms. As early as 3–6 years of age children, view moral norms as obligatory, and view group loyalty as relative to the type of loyalty required, such as whether the loyalty is conventional (wearing the team colors) or moral ( Liberman et al., 2018 ; Rizzo et al., 2018 ).

What changes with age is the recognition of the obligation and orientation to reject unfair group norms, which requires taking a number of contextual factors into account ( Mulvey, 2016 ). A series of age-related shifts has been documented during early childhood in which children begin to actively challenge unfair group norms and view exclusion from groups based on stereotypic expectations of individuals as wrong (see Killen et al., in press ). One finding that stands out is that, with age, knowledge about groups is related to children’s increased ability to rectify inequalities ( Elenbaas and Killen, 2016a ). Further, an increase in psychological knowledge about others’ intentions (such as theory of mind) enables children to reject exclusion as well as the denial of resource allocations based on stereotypic norms ( Mulvey et al., 2016b ; Rizzo and Killen, 2018 ).

Whereas 5 to 6-year-olds distribute resources equitably when faced with two characters, one who has lots of resources (e.g., wealthy) and one who does not (e.g., poor), 3 to 4-year-olds allocate equally (even though they recognize that equity would be legitimate if another child gave more to those who have less) ( Rizzo and Killen, 2016 ). When asked about whether others would reduce inequalities, 5 to 6-year-olds, but not 3 to 4-year-olds expect individuals to seek more for their ingroup if they are told that the group prefers their ingroup. Younger children do not take information about ingroup bias into account when asked what groups will do ( Elenbaas and Killen, 2016b ).

With increasing theory of mind abilities, 4 to 6-year-old children allocate resources based on merit in gender non-stereotypic contexts in contrast to children without theory of mind who fail to reward meritorious behavior when the activity does not conform to the gender stereotype (e.g., boys making dolls or girls making trucks) ( Mulvey et al., 2016a ; Rizzo and Killen, 2018 ). Moreover, children who pass false belief theory of mind are more likely than children who fail to expect others to challenge gender stereotypes about what toy to play with and were also more supportive of those challenges ( Mulvey et al., 2016b ). Further, with age (from 5–6 years to 10–11 years) knowledge about group inequalities based on race has been shown to be related to decisions to rectify inequalities when distributing resources, with younger children less aware and more likely to perpetuate the inequality than older children ( Elenbaas and Killen, 2016b ). Thus, the emergence of morality reflects age-related changes regarding incorporating information about group identity and group norms into moral decisions and judgments.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This article proposes a constructivist approach to early moral development. We made three main points. First, a definition of morality is key to studying morality: definitions guide empirical research questions and hypotheses. Second, transitions in early moral development involve genetic, environmental, and social-cognitive factors. Morality and its precursors cannot be split into some characteristics that are innate and others that are learned. Third, an account of the origins of morality requires investigations of the processes that lead to the acquisition of new forms of moral judgments, reasoning, and concerns. In the area of helping, research that connects early helping behavior with evaluative judgments about helping in childhood would be fruitful. To extend research on morality in intergroup contexts, documenting the factors that enable children to challenge inequalities and unfair treatment would be impactful. We believe that scholars would benefit from providing explicit definitions of key terms, abandoning the dichotomy between innate and learned characteristics, and considering developmental change in research on early morality and its precursors.

Author Contributions

Both authors contributed equally to the conceptualization and writing of this article.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding. The preparation of this article was supported in part by a grant from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (R03HD087590) to AD and by a grant from the National Science Foundation (BCS#1728918) to MK.

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Freud’s Theory of Personality: Id, Ego, and Superego

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Perhaps Freud’s single most enduring and important idea was the human psyche ( personality ).

Freud’s personality theory (1923) saw the psyche structured into three parts (i.e., tripartite), the id, ego, and superego, all developing at different stages in our lives.

These are systems, not parts of the brain, or in any way physical, but rather hypothetical conceptualizations of important mental functions.

According to Freud’s psychoanalytic theory , the id is the primitive and instinctual part of the mind that contains sexual and aggressive drives and hidden memories, the super-ego operates as a moral conscience, and the ego is the realistic part that mediates between the desires of the id and the super-ego.

Although each part of the personality comprises unique features, they interact to form a whole, and each part makes a relative contribution to an individual’s behavior.

What is the Id?

The id is the primitive and instinctive component of personality.

The id is a part of the unconscious that contains all the urges and impulses, including what is called the libido, a kind of generalized sexual energy that is used for everything from survival instincts to appreciation of art.

The id is the impulsive (and unconscious ) part of our psyche that responds directly and immediately to basic urges, needs, and desires. The personality of the newborn child is all id, and only later does it develop an ego and super-ego.

The id engages in primary process thinking, which is primitive, illogical, irrational, and fantasy-oriented. This form of process thinking has no comprehension of objective reality, and is selfish and wishful in nature.

The id operates on the pleasure principle (Freud, 1920), that every unconscious wishful impulse should be satisfied immediately, regardless of the consequences.

When the id achieves its demands, we experience pleasure, and when it is denied, we experience ‘unpleasure’ or tension.

The id comprises two kinds of biological instincts (or drives), including the sex (life) instinct called Eros (which contains the libido) and the aggressive (death) instinct called Thanatos.

Eros, or life instinct, helps the individual to survive; it directs life-sustaining activities such as respiration, eating, and sex (Freud, 1925). The energy created by the life instinct is known as libido.

In contrast, Thanatos, or death instinct, is viewed as a set of destructive forces in all human beings (Freud, 1920).

When this energy is directed outward onto others, it is expressed as aggression and violence. Freud believed that Eros was stronger than Thanatos, thus enabling people to survive rather than self-destruct.

The id remains infantile in its function throughout a person’s life and does not change with time or experience, as it is not in touch with the external world.

The id is not affected by reality, logic, or the everyday world, as it operates within the unconscious part of the mind.

What is the Ego?

Freud’s ego is the rational part of the psyche that mediates between the instinctual desires of the id and the moral constraints of the superego, operating primarily at the conscious level.

The ego is “that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world.” (Freud, 1923, p. 25)

The ego is the only part of the conscious personality. It’s what the person is aware of when they think about themselves and what they usually try to project toward others.

The ego develops to mediate between the unrealistic id and the real external world. It is the decision-making component of personality. Ideally, the ego works by reason, whereas the id is chaotic and unreasonable.

The ego develops from the id during infancy. The ego’s goal is to satisfy the id’s demands in a safe and socially acceptable way. In contrast to the id, the ego follows the reality principle as it operates in both the conscious and unconscious mind.

The ego operates according to the reality principle, working out realistic ways of satisfying the id’s demands, often compromising or postponing satisfaction to avoid negative consequences of society.

The ego considers social realities and norms, etiquette, and rules in deciding how to behave.

Like the id, the ego seeks pleasure (i.e., tension reduction) and avoids pain, but unlike the id, the ego is concerned with devising a realistic strategy to obtain pleasure.

The ego has no concept of right or wrong; something is good simply if it achieves its end of satisfying without causing harm to itself or the id.

Often the ego is weak relative to the headstrong id, and the best the ego can do is stay on, pointing the id in the right direction and claiming some credit at the end as if the action were its own.

Freud made the analogy of the id being a horse while the ego is the rider. The ego is “like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superiour strength of the horse.” (Freud, 1923, p. 15)

If the ego fails to use the reality principle and anxiety is experienced, unconscious defense mechanisms are employed to help ward off unpleasant feelings (i.e., anxiety) or make good things feel better for the individual.

The ego engages in secondary process thinking, which is rational, realistic, and orientated toward problem-solving. If a plan of action does not work, then it is thought through again until a solution is found.

This is known as reality testing and enables the person to control their impulses and demonstrate self-control, via mastery of the ego.

An important feature of clinical and social work is to enhance ego functioning and help the client test reality through assisting the client to think through their options.

According to Freudians, some abnormal upbringing (particularly if there is a cold, rejecting ‘schizogenic’ mother) can result in a weak and fragile ego, whose ability to contain the id’s desires is limited.

This can lead to the ego being ‘broken apart’ by its attempt to contain the id, leaving the id in overall control of the psyche.

What is the Superego?

Freud’s superego is the moral component of the psyche, representing internalized societal values and standards. It contrasts with the id’s desires, guiding behavior towards moral righteousness and inducing guilt when standards aren’t met.

The superego incorporates the values and morals of society, which are learned from one’s parents and others. It develops around 3 – 5 years during the phallic stage of psychosexual development .

The superego develops during early childhood (when the child identifies with the same-sex parent) and is responsible for ensuring moral standards are followed.

The superego operates on the morality principle and motivates us to behave in a socially responsible and acceptable manner.

The superego is seen as the purveyor of rewards (feelings of pride and satisfaction) and punishments (feelings of shame and guilt), depending on which part (the ego-deal or conscious) is activated.

The superego is a part of the unconscious that is the voice of conscience (doing what is right) and the source of self-criticism.

It reflects society’s moral values to some degree, and a person is sometimes aware of their own morality and ethics, but the superego contains many codes, or prohibitions, that are issued mostly unconsciously in the form of commands or “don’t” statements.

The superego’s function is to control the id’s impulses, especially those which society forbids, such as sex and aggression.

It also persuades the ego to turn to moralistic goals rather than simply realistic ones and strive for perfection.

The superego consists of two systems: The conscience and the ideal self.

• The conscience is our “inner voice” that tells us when we have done something wrong.

The conscience can punish the ego by causing feelings of guilt. For example, if the ego gives in to the id’s demands, the superego may make the person feel bad through guilt.

The superego is also somewhat tricky, in that it will try to portray what it wants the person to do in grandiose, glowing terms, what Freud called the ego-ideal, which arises out of the person’s first great love attachment (usually a parent).

• The ideal self (or ego-ideal) is an imaginary picture of how you ought to be, and represents career aspirations, how to treat other people, and how to behave as a member of society.

The assumption is that children raised by parents experience love conditionally (when they do something right), and the child internalizes these experiences as a series of real or imagined judgmental statements.

Behavior which falls short of the ideal self may be punished by the superego through guilt. The super-ego can also reward us through the ideal self when we behave ‘properly’ by making us feel proud.

Guilt is a common problem because of all the urges and drives from the id and all the prohibitions and codes in the superego. There are various ways an individual handles guilt, which are called defense mechanisms .

If a person’s ideal self is too high a standard, then whatever the person does will represent failure. The ideal self and conscience are largely determined in childhood by parental values and how you were brought up.

Examples of the Id, Ego, and Superego

Skipping a workout:

• The id : I want to skip my workout because I feel lazy and just want to relax.
• The superego : I shouldn’t skip the workout because it’s essential for my health and discipline.
• The ego : I can do a shorter workout today and make up for it with a longer session tomorrow.

Buying an expensive item:

• The id : I want this luxury bag now because it’s stylish and will make me feel good.
• The superego : I shouldn’t spend so much on a bag when I could save or use that money for more essential things.
• The ego : I’ll save a portion of my salary for a few months, and if I still want it, I’ll buy the bag as a reward.

Reacting to criticism:

• The id : I’m upset and want to snap back immediately because they hurt my feelings.
• The superego : I should remain calm and composed, taking criticism professionally and not personally.
• The ego : I’ll consider the feedback, see if there’s any truth to it, and respond diplomatically, asking for clarification if needed.

Therapeutic Implications

Freud believed that mental illness is caused by conflicts in the unconscious between the id, ego, and superego.

Neuroses, according to Freud, are caused by an overdominant superego, the resultant defense mechanisms implemented by the ego in an attempt to regain control.

Because the defense mechanisms are being over-used, too much psychic energy is used and allows the maladaptive behavior to emerge. Psychoses, in contrast, are caused by an overdominant id.

According to the psychodynamic approach , the therapist would resolve the problem by assisting the client in delving back into their childhood and identifying when the problem arose.

Identifying the problem can bring this into the conscious, where the imbalance can be resolved, returning equanimity between the id, ego, and superego.

Consequently, the defense mechanisms will only operate at the maintenance level, and the mental illness will be cured.

However, psychoanalysis , the method used to produce this new balance, is time-consuming and costly. Furthermore, no objective measurement can be taken to demonstrate that a cure has been effected; it is reliant on the client’s subjective report of their improvement.

There is concern that clients may claim they are better, not because they are, but because of the time and expense involved. 

Freud, S. (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle . SE, 18: 1-64.

Freud, S. (1923). The ego and the id . SE, 19: 1-66.

What is the difference between the ego and the id?

The id is the primitive, impulsive part of our psyche driven by instincts and desires, while the ego is the rational, conscious part that mediates between the id’s demands and the realities of the external world.

The ego balances the id’s desires with the superego’s moral guidance, striving to maintain harmony within the human psyche.

What is an example of the id ego superego?

An example of the id, ego, and superego interaction can be illustrated through a person on a strict diet who is tempted by a box of delicious donuts at work. The id impulsively desires immediate gratification by indulging in the donuts.

At the same time, the superego reminds the person of their commitment to a healthy lifestyle and instills feelings of guilt for considering breaking the diet.

The ego mediates between the id’s cravings and the superego’s moral standards, potentially allowing the person to eat just one donut as a compromise, demonstrating its role in maintaining psychological balance amidst conflicting desires.

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Home — Essay Samples — Entertainment — The Big Short — The Big Short: An Analysis of Financial Missteps and Moral Quandaries

The Big Short: an Analysis of Financial Missteps and Moral Quandaries

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On March 29-30, 2023, President Biden co-hosted the second Summit for Democracy with the governments of Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea, and Republic of Zambia. The second Summit assembled world leaders in a virtual, plenary format, followed by gatherings in each co-host capital with representatives from government, civil society, and the private sector. Together, we showcased progress made by Summit partners on commitments announced at the first Summit for Democracy hosted by President Biden in December 2021, and organized collective action to address emerging challenges to democracy. At the second Summit for Democracy, it was announced that the Republic of Korea will host a future, third Summit for Democracy.

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Galvanizing multi-stakeholder action to combat the misuse of commercial spyware, highlights from the second summit for democracy.

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Who owns your voice? Scarlett Johansson OpenAI complaint raises questions

• Nicola Jones

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Scarlett Johansson has said she believes the OpenAI chatbot voice was intended to imitate her. Credit: Samir Hussein/WireImage via Getty

A kerfuffle erupted last week after actor Scarlett Johansson complained that one of OpenAI’s chatbot voices sounded a lot like her. It isn’t hers — the company created it using recordings from someone else. Nevertheless, the firm has suspended the voice out of respect for Johansson’s concerns. But the media flurry has cracked open a broader discussion about peoples’ rights to their own personas. In the age of generative artificial intelligence (genAI), are existing laws sufficient to protect the use of a person’s appearance and voice?

The answer isn’t always clear, says Carys Craig, an intellectual-property scholar at York University in Toronto, Canada, who will be speaking on this topic next month during a Canadian Bar Association webcast .

Several members of the US Congress have, in the past year, called for a federal law to enshrine such protections at the national level. And some legal scholars say that action is needed to improve privacy rights in the United States. But they also caution that hastily written laws might infringe on freedom of speech or create other problems. “It’s complicated,” says Meredith Rose, a legal analyst at the non-profit consumer-advocacy group Public Knowledge in Washington DC. “There’s a lot that can go wrong.”

“Rushing to regulate this might be a mistake,” Craig says.

GenAI can be used to easily clone voices or faces to create deepfakes, in which a person’s likeness is imitated digitally. People have made deepfakes for fun and to promote education or research. However, they’ve also been used to sow disinformation, attempt to sway elections, create non-consensual sexual imagery or scam people out of money.

Many countries have laws that prevent these kinds of harmful and nefarious activities, regardless of whether they involve AI, Craig says. But when it comes to specifically protecting a persona, existing laws might or might not be sufficient.

Copyright does not apply, says Craig, because it was designed to protect specific works. “From an intellectual-property perspective, the answer to whether we have rights over our voice, for example, is no,” she says. Most discussions about copyright and AI focus instead on whether and how copyrighted material can be used to train the technology, and whether new material that it produces can be copyrighted.

Aside from copyright laws, some regions, including some US states, have ‘publicity rights’ that allow an individual to control the commercial use of their image, to protect celebrities against financial loss. For example, in 1988, long before AI entered the scene, singer and actor Bette Midler won a ‘voice appropriation’ case against the Ford Motor Company, which had used a sound-alike singer to cover one of her songs in a commercial. And in 1992, game-show host Vanna White won a case against the US division of Samsung when it put a robot dressed as her in a commercial.

“We have a case about a person who won against a literal robot already,” says Rose. With AI entering the arena, she says, cases will become “increasingly bananas”.

How to stop AI deepfakes from sinking society — and science

Much remains to be tested in court. The rapper Drake, for example, last month released a song featuring AI-generated voice clips of the late rapper Tupac Shakur. Drake removed the song from streaming services after receiving a cease-and-desist letter from Shakur’s estate. But it’s unclear, says Craig, whether the song’s AI component was unlawful. In Tennessee, a law passed this year, called the Ensuring Likeness Voice and Image Security (ELVIS) Act, seeks to protect voice actors at all levels of fame from “the unfair exploitation of their voices”, including the use of AI clones.

In the United States, actors have some contractual protection against AI — the agreement that in December ended the Hollywood strike of the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists included provisions to stop filmmakers from using a digital replica of an actor without explicit consent from the individual in each case.

Meanwhile, individual tech companies have their own policies to help prevent genAI misuse. For example, OpenAI, based in San Francisco, California, has not released to the general public the voice-cloning software that was used to make its chatbot voices, acknowledging that “generating speech that resembles people’s voices has serious risks”. Usage policies for partners testing the technology “prohibit the impersonation of another individual or organization without consent or legal right”.

Others are pursuing technological approaches to stemming misuse: last month, the US Federal Trade Commission announced the winners of its challenge to “protect consumers from the misuse of artificial intelligence-enabled voice cloning for fraud and other harms”. These include ways to watermark real audio at the time of recording and tools for detecting genAI-produced audio.

Broad scope

More worrying than loss of income for actors, say Rose and Craig, is the use of AI to clone people’s likenesses for uses including non-consensual pornography. “We have very spare, inadequate laws about non-consensual imagery in the first place, let alone with AI,” says Rose. The fact that deepfake porn is now easy to generate, including with minors’ likenesses, should be serious cause for alarm, she adds. Some legal scholars, including Danielle Citron at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, are advocating for legal reforms that would recognize ‘intimate privacy’ as a US civil right — comparable to the right to vote or the right to a fair trial.

Current publicity-rights laws aren’t well suited to covering non-famous people, Rose says. “Right to publicity is built around recognizable, distinctive people in commercial applications,” she says. “That makes sense for Scarlett Johansson, but not for a 16-year-old girl being used in non-consensual imagery.”

However, proposals to extend publicity rights to private individuals in the United States might have unintended consequences, says Rose. She has written to the US Congress expressing concern that some of the proposed legislation could allow misuse by powerful companies. A smartphone app for creating novelty photos, for example, could insert a provision into its terms of service that “grants the app an unrestricted, irrevocable license to make use of the user’s likeness”.

There’s also a doppelganger problem, says Rose: an image or voice of a person randomly generated by AI is bound to look and sound like at least one real person, who might then seek compensation.

Laws designed to protect people can run the risk of going too far and threatening free speech. “When you have rights that are too expansive, you limit free expression,” Craig says. “The limits on what we allow copyright owners to control are there for a reason; to allow people to be inspired and create new things and contribute to the cultural conversation,” she says. Parody and other works that build on and transform an original often fall into the sphere of lawful fair use, as they should, she says. “An overly tight version [of these laws] would annihilate parody,” says Rose.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-01578-4

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Responsible innovation in the age of generative AI

Image generated using Adobe Firefly.

Generative AI is changing the way we all think about creativity. Type “3D render of a paper dragon, studio style photography” and you’re instantly offered multiple variations of a portrait of a ferocious origami creature — or combine a few data points with simple instruction and a chatbot can spit out a compelling marketing email. It’s easy to see the power this technology can unlock for individual creators and businesses alike. Generative AI lets people paint with text instead of pixels (or paint). On the business side, it lets you connect with customers efficiently through auto-generated texts, emails, and content. And implemented the right way, generative AI brings precision, power, speed, and ease to your existing workflows — allowing people to focus on more strategic or creative parts of their work.

In this article

Grounded in ethics and responsibility, transparency builds trust, respecting creators’ choice and control, an ongoing journey.

Generative AI also opens the door to new questions about ethics and responsibility in the digital age. As Adobe and others harness the power of this cutting-edge technology, we must come together across industries to develop, implement and respect a set of guardrails that will guide its responsible development and use.

Any company building generative AI tools should start with an AI Ethics framework . Having a set of concise and actionable AI ethics principles and a formal review process built into a company’s engineering structure can help ensure that AI technologies — including generative AI — are developed in a way that respects their customers and aligns with their company values. Core to this process are training, testing, and — when necessary — human oversight.

Generative AI, as with any AI, is only as good as the data on which it’s trained. Mitigating harmful outputs starts with building and training on safe and inclusive datasets. For example, Adobe’s first model in our Firefly family of creative generative AI models is trained on Adobe Stock images, openly licensed content, and public domain content where copyright has expired. Training on curated, diverse datasets inherently gives your model a competitive edge when it comes to producing commercially safe and ethical results.

But it’s not just about what goes into a model. It’s also about what comes out. Because even with good data, you can still end up with biased AI, which can unintentionally discriminate or disparage and cause people to feel less valued. The answer is rigorous and continuous testing. At Adobe, under the leadership of our AI Ethics team, we constantly test our models for safety and bias internally and provide those results to our engineering team to resolve any issues. In addition, our AI features have feedback mechanisms so that when they go out to the public, users can report any concerns and we can take steps to remediate them. It’s critical that companies foster this two-way dialogue with the public so that we can work together to continue to make generative AI better for everyone.

On top of training, companies can build in various technical measures to improve the ethics of their products. Block lists, deny lists, NSFW classifiers can be implemented to mitigate harmful bias in the output of an AI model. If a company is still unsure or unsatisfied with the output, they can always add or require a human in the loop to ensure the output meets their expectations.

And whenever a company is sourcing AI from an outside vendor — whether they’re integrating it into company workflows or into their own products — making sure the AI meets their ethical standards should be part of their vendor risk process.

We also need transparency about the content that generative AI models produce. Think of our earlier example but swap the dragon for a speech by a global leader. Generative AI raises concerns over its ability to conjure up convincing synthetic content in a digital world already flooded with misinformation. As the amount of AI-generated content grows, it will be increasingly important to provide people with a way to deliver a message and authenticate that it is true.

At Adobe, we’ve implemented this level of transparency in our products with our Content Credentials. Content Credentials allow creators to attach information to a piece of content — information like their names, dates, and the tools used to create it. Those credentials travel with the content, so that when people see it, they know exactly where the content came from and what happened to it along the way.

We’re not doing this alone; four years ago, we founded the Content Authenticity Initiative to build this solution in an open way so anyone can incorporate it into their own products and platforms. There are over 900 members from all areas of technology, media, and policy who are joining together to bring this solution to the world.

And for generative AI specifically, we automatically attach Content Credentials to indicate when something was created or modified with generative AI. That way, people can see how a piece of content came to be and make more informed decisions about whether to trust it.

Creators want control over whether their work is used to train generative AI or not. For some, they want their content out of AI. For others, they are happy to see it used in the training data to help this new technology grow, especially if they can retain attribution for their work. Using provenance technology, creators can attach “Do Not Train” credentials that travel with their content wherever it goes. With industry adoption, this will help prevent web crawlers from using works with “Do Not Train” credentials as part of a dataset. Together, along with exploratory efforts to compensate creators for their contributions, we can build generative AI that both empowers creators and enhances their experiences.

We’re just scratching the surface of generative AI and every day, the technology is improving. As it continues to evolve, generative AI will bring new challenges and it’s imperative that industry, government, and community work together to solve them. By sharing best practices and adhering to standards to develop generative AI responsibly, we can unlock the unlimited possibilities it holds and build a more trustworthy digital space.

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