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Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might give rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

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• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
• Free Speech Debate
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

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Freedom of Speech

By: History.com Editors

Updated: July 27, 2023 | Original: December 4, 2017

Freedom of speech—the right to express opinions without government restraint—is a democratic ideal that dates back to ancient Greece. In the United States, the First Amendment guarantees free speech, though the United States, like all modern democracies, places limits on this freedom. In a series of landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court over the years has helped to define what types of speech are—and aren’t—protected under U.S. law.

The ancient Greeks pioneered free speech as a democratic principle. The ancient Greek word “parrhesia” means “free speech,” or “to speak candidly.” The term first appeared in Greek literature around the end of the fifth century B.C.

During the classical period, parrhesia became a fundamental part of the democracy of Athens. Leaders, philosophers, playwrights and everyday Athenians were free to openly discuss politics and religion and to criticize the government in some settings.

First Amendment

In the United States, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech.

The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution . The Bill of Rights provides constitutional protection for certain individual liberties, including freedoms of speech, assembly and worship.

The First Amendment doesn’t specify what exactly is meant by freedom of speech. Defining what types of speech should and shouldn’t be protected by law has fallen largely to the courts.

In general, the First Amendment guarantees the right to express ideas and information. On a basic level, it means that people can express an opinion (even an unpopular or unsavory one) without fear of government censorship.

It protects all forms of communication, from speeches to art and other media.

Flag Burning

While freedom of speech pertains mostly to the spoken or written word, it also protects some forms of symbolic speech. Symbolic speech is an action that expresses an idea.

Flag burning is an example of symbolic speech that is protected under the First Amendment. Gregory Lee Johnson, a youth communist, burned a flag during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas to protest the Reagan administration.

The U.S. Supreme Court , in 1990, reversed a Texas court’s conviction that Johnson broke the law by desecrating the flag. Texas v. Johnson invalidated statutes in Texas and 47 other states prohibiting flag burning.

When Isn’t Speech Protected?

Not all speech is protected under the First Amendment.

Forms of speech that aren’t protected include:

• Obscene material such as child pornography
• Plagiarism of copyrighted material
• Defamation (libel and slander)
• True threats

Speech inciting illegal actions or soliciting others to commit crimes aren’t protected under the First Amendment, either.

The Supreme Court decided a series of cases in 1919 that helped to define the limitations of free speech. Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, shortly after the United States entered into World War I . The law prohibited interference in military operations or recruitment.

Socialist Party activist Charles Schenck was arrested under the Espionage Act after he distributed fliers urging young men to dodge the draft. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction by creating the “clear and present danger” standard, explaining when the government is allowed to limit free speech. In this case, they viewed draft resistant as dangerous to national security.

American labor leader and Socialist Party activist Eugene Debs also was arrested under the Espionage Act after giving a speech in 1918 encouraging others not to join the military. Debs argued that he was exercising his right to free speech and that the Espionage Act of 1917 was unconstitutional. In Debs v. United States the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Espionage Act.

Freedom of Expression

The Supreme Court has interpreted artistic freedom broadly as a form of free speech.

In most cases, freedom of expression may be restricted only if it will cause direct and imminent harm. Shouting “fire!” in a crowded theater and causing a stampede would be an example of direct and imminent harm.

In deciding cases involving artistic freedom of expression the Supreme Court leans on a principle called “content neutrality.” Content neutrality means the government can’t censor or restrict expression just because some segment of the population finds the content offensive.

Free Speech in Schools

In 1965, students at a public high school in Des Moines, Iowa , organized a silent protest against the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to protest the fighting. The students were suspended from school. The principal argued that the armbands were a distraction and could possibly lead to danger for the students.

The Supreme Court didn’t bite—they ruled in favor of the students’ right to wear the armbands as a form of free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District . The case set the standard for free speech in schools. However, First Amendment rights typically don’t apply in private schools.

What does free speech mean?; United States Courts . Tinker v. Des Moines; United States Courts . Freedom of expression in the arts and entertainment; ACLU .

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• School Education /

Essay on Freedom of Speech in English for Students

• Updated on  
• Jun 1, 2024

Article 19 of the Indian Constitution grants freedom of speech and expression to every citizen. This freedom guarantees us to express our thoughts, and opinions and share experiences. This freedom is not only related to an individual but to the media, political parties, and government also. As a student, you must know all about your fundamental rights and how to exercise them. Today, we will discuss an essay on freedom of speech and how it can be exercised.

Short Essay on Freedom of Speech

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Also Read: Essay on Freedom in 100, 200 and 300 Words

A.1 Freedom of speech is one of the constitutional rights of our democracy. The freedom of speech states, “All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.”

A.2 The concept of freedom of speech goes back to ancient times when many of our writers and artists displayed the freedom of their opinions and viewpoints through their writings or artworks.

A.3 Right to Speech faces several challenges in the modern world. One of the challenges is the misuse of this freedom. People associate this right with the freedom to say anything that comes to their mind. This gives rise to hate speech and the spreading of misinformation. The power of hate speech cannot be underestimated since it can instigate violence and undermine public trust.

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Literary World Grapples With Alice Munro’s Legacy After Daughter’s Revelation of Abuse

T ributes flowed in from across the literary world after the death in May at age 92 of Nobel Prize-winning Canadian writer Alice Munro, who is credited with perfecting the contemporary short story . But Munro’s many admirers must now grapple with a darker aspect of her legacy that has just come to light.

In a heart-wrenching essay by Andrea Robin Skinner, Munro’s youngest daughter who is now 58 years old— published on Sunday in the Toronto Star alongside a reported companion piece by the paper —Skinner reveals that she was sexually abused by her stepfather, Munro’s second husband Gerald Fremlin, since she was 9, and that when she informed Munro of the abuse years later, the celebrated writer turned a blind eye and stood by her daughter’s abuser.

The revelation of what until now had been a long-held family secret has rocked readers and colleagues of Munro, whose works often explored themes of women’s lives, complex familial dynamics, sex, trauma, and secrecy.

According to Skinner, Fremlin, a cartographer who died in 2013, climbed into bed with her when she was 9 and touched her inappropriately. She also detailed how, throughout her childhood when the two were alone, Fremlin would crack lewd jokes, press her about her “sex life,” describe Munro’s “sexual needs” to her, and expose himself and occasionally masturbate in front of her.

“At the time, I didn’t know this was abuse. I thought I was doing a good job of preventing abuse by averting my eyes and ignoring his stories,” Skinner writes.

Skinner says she first revealed her abuse by Fremlin to Munro when she was 25, having been hesitant to open up about it earlier, fearing her mother’s reaction. “I have been afraid all my life that you would blame me for what happened,” Skinner wrote in a 1992 letter, parts of which she shared with the Star .

According to Skinner, what inspired her to finally disclose her torment to her mother was Munro’s reaction to a short story in which a girl died by suicide after being sexually abused by her stepfather. At the time, Munro questioned to Skinner why the girl in the story didn’t tell her mother. 

But when Skinner revealed her own experience with Fremlin, Munro was shockingly unsympathetic: “As it turned out, in spite of her sympathy for a fictional character, my mother had no similar feelings for me.”

“She said that she had been ‘told too late,’ she loved him too much, and that our misogynistic culture was to blame if I expected her to deny her own needs, sacrifice for her children, and make up for the failings of men,” Skinner writes. “She was adamant that whatever had happened was between me and my stepfather. It had nothing to do with her.” Meanwhile, Fremlin denied wrongdoing and deflected blame onto Skinner.

Skinner says she and her family ultimately moved on, “acting as if nothing had happened,” until Skinner became pregnant in 2002. Skinner decided after the birth of her own twins to cut off contact with Fremlin—who she did not want near her children—as well as Munro, who Skinner says was more concerned about her own personal inconvenience by the move.

Skinner’s quiet estrangement continued until she read a 2004 New York Times story about Munro in which her mother heaped praise on Fremlin.

“I wanted to speak out. I wanted to tell the truth. That’s when I went to the police to report my abuse,” Skinner recalls. “For so long I’d been telling myself that holding my pain alone had at least helped my family, that I had done the moral thing, contributing to the greatest good for the greatest number. Now, I was claiming my right to a full life, taking the burden of abuse and handing it back to Fremlin.”

In 2005, Fremlin was charged with indecent assault and convicted without a trial after pleading guilty. He was sentenced to two years’ probation, a result Skinner says she was satisfied with because she wasn’t seeking for him to be punished nor did she believe he was still a threat to others given his old age.

“What I wanted was some record of the truth, some public proof that I hadn’t deserved what had happened to me,” Skinner writes in her essay. She had also hoped her story would “become part of the stories people tell about my mother. I never wanted to see another interview, biography or event that didn’t wrestle with the reality of what had happened to me, and with the fact that my mother, confronted with the truth of what had happened, chose to stay with, and protect, my abuser.”

But that’s not how things panned out. “My mother’s fame meant the silence continued,” Skinner writes. Munro retired in 2013 and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature a few months later. 

“Many influential people came to know something of my story,” Skinner writes, “yet continued to support, and add to, a narrative they knew was false.”

“Everybody knew,” Skinner’s stepmother Carole Munro told the Star , recounting being asked by a journalist at a dinner party years ago about rumors related to Skinner—and affirming that they were true. (Robert Thacker, author of an acclaimed biography of Munro, told the Globe and Mail on Sunday that he was aware of the allegations of what happened to Skinner, who had reached out to him directly before his book was published in 2005, but he declined to mention it because he didn’t want to overstep in a sensitive family matter.)

Skinner’s story stayed out of the public eye. But now, with her essay sending shockwaves through the literary world, the narrative surrounding her mother is beginning to change.

“I know I’m not alone in feeling deeply unnerved by what feels like a seismic shift in our understanding of someone who was formative to me and others as a writer,” Pulitzer finalist Rebecca Makkai said in a series of posts on X reflecting on the recent news.

“Lots of people reflexively denying that Alice Munro could have knowingly spent her life with the pedophile who abused her daughter, or rushing to say they never liked her writing,” Canadian magazine writer and editor Michelle Cyca posted on X . “Harder to accept the truth that people who make transcendent art are capable of monstrous acts.”

“The Alice Munro news is so completely and tragically consistent with the world she evoked in her stories—all those young people betrayed and sabotaged by adults who were supposed to care for them,” American novelist and essayist Jess Row posted on X .

American novelist and essayist Brandon Taylor shared his gratitude toward Skinner. “I’m so in awe of her courage,” he said in a series of posts on X , adding that her account was “personally devastating in that I recognize so much of my own story and history in her experience.” 

In a statement from Munro’s Books, which was founded by Jim and Alice Munro but has been independently owned since 2014, the company said it “unequivocally supports Andrea Robin Skinner as she publicly shares her story of her sexual abuse as a child.”

“Along with so many readers and writers, we will need time to absorb this news and the impact it may have on the legacy of Alice Munro, whose work and ties to the store we have previously celebrated,” the statement added. 

In a co-published statement from the Munro family, Andrea and her three siblings—Andrew, Jenny, and Sheila—thanked the owners and staff of Munro’s Books for “acknowledging and honoring Andrea’s truth, and being very clear about their wish to end the legacy of silence.”

While Skinner says she never reconciled with her mother before Munro’s death, she has with her siblings—who reached out in 2014 to seek understanding and healing together and have supported her coming out publicly with what is sure to put their mother’s reputation in a much different light.

Skinner, for her part, has made clear that this is not about Alice Munro’s reputation. “I just really hope that this story isn’t about celebrities behaving badly,” she told the  Star . While some will gravitate toward it simply “for the entertainment value,” she adds: “I want so much for my personal story to focus on patterns of silencing, the tendency to do that in families and societies.”

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The Misinterpretation & Misuse of Freedom in India: Civil Services Mentor Magazine February 2013

The misinterpretation and misuse of freedom in india.

India has enjoyed freedom over the last sixty four years, but has it actually savored it. It has come a long way since 1947. Political, judicial and administrative systems have all undergone drastic transformations. However, the only difference is that these transformations were more of a step forward and two backwards, making the progress complicated. If good things happened, they came at some price and so did freedom. Freedom meant a sense of responsibility, which unfortunately could not be displayed by its inhabitants. Hence, the country gave us everything, but in return asked for its price. The country gave freedom to its citizens and constantly reminded them of the price associated with it.

Freedom can be summarized as, “the Sequence of Setting Free of Multiple Domains into Motion”. Freedom means to excel and move on. But, unfortunately freedom is one of the most misinterpreted, misunderstood and misused word in English language. Freedom in most of the cases is interpreted or compared with irregularities in lifestyle. People think freedom means “Free from All”, that is, free from work, culture, tradition, nationality and in some instances enlightenment and total liberation from life. Above all what they never think of is that, freedom is nothing but ultimate responsibility in life.

In some instances in Indian society, people often misinterpret freedom as women equality. Some also raise their voice stating that women are being treated as donkeys, working both at office as well as home. But, they often tend to forget that Indian society has provided not equal, but higher rights to women than men. If one digs into the details, you can find that the responsibility of building a strong family and bond between its members have been placed on women’s shoulders, which is a stepping stone towards building a strong society and nation.

Women have given this responsibility because, they are more emotionally connected than men and their heart rules over the mind which is an essential ingredient to build a lovely family and society. For example, Mother Teresa was able work for the ailment for poor and diseased and thus with respect and love people called her Mother. There are many men who worked for ailment and betterment of society, for freedom. But, none are associated with the ailment and betterment of the poor and diseased in such a large scale. There is a common thought in India that a girl goes to husband’s house after marriage and servers her in-laws, but men do not have to come across this torture, share the burden or perform daily chores. But, the answer is in the society itself. In some parts of Karnataka state, especially among Tulu speaking community, there is a custom wherein the boy goes to wife’s house and looks after his in-laws. This is popularly known as Aliya Santana. There was also a matrilineal system followed in royal families of ancient Tulu Nadu. Rani Abbakka Devi of Ullala is an example provided by the history of India. She was the direct female heir to the throne of Ullala from where she ruled her kingdom and fought with the Portuguese for four decades. She is also regarded as the first woman freedom fighter of India.

Freedom is neither in misconceptualizing equality nor in fighting for over-freeness to visit pub, bar or in the name of socialization having free sex and corrupting the whole community or society by increasing the number of HIV AIDS infected population. Freedom is in understanding of duty and responsibility. The fundamental rights might be there, but its usage always carries “at your own risk” tag. If right to equality says no to discrimination based on caste, creed, religion and sex, then there are a few states which have gone ahead and ruined the sanctity of this statement. They proudly discriminated people based on native state and language. Hindi, officially our national language is still looked down upon when spoken in a few states. People ranging from common man to ministers are mercilessly beaten by the self-proclaimed local godfathers and their henchmen for either speaking in Hindi or from hailing from a different state.

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Right to Free Speech in India – Misuse and Reasonable Restrictions

From Current Affairs Notes for UPSC » Editorials & In-depths » This topic

Freedom of speech and expression and hate speech have become synonymous in India. The recent controversy that took place at the Haridwar religious assembly where few speakers advocated genocide against Muslims and the use of the Bulli Bai app to defame Muslim women are the best examples. Such incidents not only hurt those who are the targets of this hatred but also highlight how the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed in the Indian Constitution is misused in our country. The question now arises whether this right is absolute and if not, what makes it susceptible to misuse?

This topic of “Right to Free Speech in India – Misuse and Reasonable Restrictions” is important from the perspective of the UPSC IAS Examination , which falls under General Studies Portion.

• The concept of the right to free speech was established as a constitutional right in England’s Bill of Rights in 1689.
• In 1789, The Declaration of Man’s and Citizen’s Rights was adopted by the French Revolution reinforcing the idea of the right to free speech and expression by calling it the ” most precious rights of man. “
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948 also recognised freedom of speech and expression as a human right and stated that everyone has the right to freely express their thoughts and opinions.
• During the freedom struggle in India, the suppression of basic rights of speech and expression by the British made the Indians seek such rights for themselves that reached a culminating point with the insertion of the right to freedom of speech and expression as a fundamental right in the Indian Constitution (adopted on 26th November 1949).

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Right to free speech and the Indian Constitution

• Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India states that “all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression”. The philosophy behind this Article (fundamental right) lies in the Preamble of the Constitution, where it seeks to secure to all its citizens, liberty of thought and expression.
• The Article grants the citizens the right to express one’s convictions and opinions freely by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures or any other mode. It thus includes the expression of one’s idea through any communicable medium or visible representation, such as gesture, signs, and the like.
• Freedom of Press (grants freedom of publication, freedom of circulation and freedom against pre-censorship).
• Freedom of Commercial Speech (commercial advertisement or commercial speech).
• Right to Broadcast.
• Right to information .
• Right to criticize.
• Right to expression beyond national boundaries.
• Right not to speak or right to silence.

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• India is a democratic country and thus it calls for active participation of all the citizens in the decision-making process. To allow all the citizens to participate in the process, there needs to be a guaranteed right that people can exercise to express their opinion and conviction. Thus, freedom of speech has a major role to play in the smooth functioning of the Indian democracy.
• Freedom of speech allows dialogue and debate thus helping in the detection of truth. It also allows citizens to deliberate on various issues thus assisting in reaching a common ground and avoiding confrontations.
• Freedom of speech also allows one to achieve self-fulfilment and grow in various aspects of life. It helps an individual in self-development. If one is restricted from expressing oneself, it may hamper one’s complete personality development and growth that may further hinder the growth of the nation as a whole.

Is the right absolute?

• Although the right is crucial for the wholesome development of an individual and a nation yet the Constitution of India does not make it absolute. 
• The State has been authorized by the Constitution of India to impose “reasonable restrictions” for certain purposes under Article 19(2).
• Security of state refers to serious and aggravated forms of public disorder, e.g., rebellion, waging war against the state [entire state or part of the state], insurrection etc. 
• The Constitution of India has the provision of reasonable restrictions that can be imposed on the freedom of speech and expression, in the interest of the security of the State.
• The Constitution of India empowers the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression if it hampers the friendly relations of India with other State or States.
• The expression ‘public order’ stands for the public peace, safety and tranquillity.
• Anything that disturbs public peace disturbs public order and thus the State is empowered to impose reasonable restrictions to maintain public order.
• The Constitution of India limits the use of the right to freedom of speech on the grounds of decency and morality. 
• The State is empowered to impose reasonable restrictions when the sale, distribution or exhibition of obscene words is carried out.
• The term contempt of court refers to civil contempt or criminal contempt under Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In general, it refers to a legal violation committed by an individual who disobeys a judge or a judgement or otherwise disrupts the legal process in the courtroom.
• The fundamental right to freedom of speech does not allow any person or entity to carry out such acts that may be considered as contempt of court.
• The right to free speech is not absolute and thus nobody is allowed to hurt the reputation of other fellow citizens.
• Clause (2) of Article 19 prevents any person from making any statement that defames the reputation of another.
• The Constitution of India also prohibits a person from making any statement that incites people to commit an offence.
• The Constitution of India prohibits a person from making statements that challenge the integrity and sovereignty of India.

How is it misused?

• Although the right to free speech comes as a right with “reasonable restrictions” yet many citizens of India consider this right as absolute and sacrosanct.
• The concept of the right to free speech as being a non-negotiable necessity among the citizens of India results in hate speech against other fellow communities.
• Hate speech is often directed towards minorities and vulnerable sections of society.
• Such hate speeches eventually lead to clashes and hostility between different groups and communities in our country.
• Several secessionist groups and anti-state elements use this right as a free pass to spread their rebellious ideas among people and cause disruption and interference in the existing state of affairs and normal functioning of the nation.
• Fake news has no accepted definition. However, it refers to such information that may be perceived as news that has been deliberately fabricated and is disseminated to deceive others or spread falsehood.
• In recent times, fake news has become a regular affair in India. The main target of fake news creators and spreaders are minorities (spread false news implicating them in violent activities) and particular individuals (spreading false news to tarnish their credibility and reputation). 
• On the contrary, fake news is spread about public personalities and their supposed heroics to increase their standing and influence political outcomes.
• Such sensational and polarising fake news contents often lead to communal and social tensions, serious harm to individuals (lynching) and mistrust among people.
• In the era of developing thoughts and new culture, it is rather difficult to identify and classify any content as obscene or indecent. However, several entities in India are using the right to free speech as an instrument to spread obscenity.
• Social media is full of such content where indecent words, language and gestures have become a trend.
• These not only spread immorality in society but also negatively influence children and youth.

Misuse of the concept of “reasonable restrictions”

Governments at various levels in India have been trying to prevent the misuse of the right to free speech to prevent social disharmony and unrest. However, in the garb of doing so, the governments tend to misuse the concept of “reasonable restrictions”. This can be noticed in the following acts:

• Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code considers it an offence to speak, write or indicate by signs or visually represent anything that attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in [India].
• Although this law was enacted in 1860, under the British Raj, to prevent any offences against the State, it was reimposed by the Government of India through the First Amendment in 1951 and also strengthened by adding two expressions – “friendly relations with foreign state” and “public order” – as grounds for imposing “reasonable restrictions” on free speech.
• The law was supposed to be used rarely. However, governments from time to time have misused it to suppress political rivals, dissent and free speech.
• As per the National Crime Records Bureau, there has been a drastic rise in the cases of sedition in India from 47 in 2014 to 93 in 2019, around 163 per cent jump.
• This shows how the law is being widely used in recent times.
• News media and social media are major tools of free speech nowadays. They are also very powerful tools for disseminating information in society. They have become important platforms for voicing public opinions as well.
• However, there has been an increasing curtailment of the people’s right to free speech on what to express online, with the curtailment being at times highly selective.
• The Government in the guise of maintaining public morality and order often tries to censor such content that tends to convey and spread dissent against it.
• Internet ban has become a new weapon to curtail the right to free speech.
• Governments in the name of maintaining public order are misusing it exclusively to counter dissent.
• India is considered to be a ‘partly free nation’ in terms of Internet access and usage.
• India has the most cases of Internet shutdowns excluding the shutdowns in Jammu and Kashmir.
• As per recent data, there have been 455 shutdowns since 2012 out of which 134 shutdowns happened in 2018, 106 in 2019, and 77 in 2020.
• The bans not only harm common people but also the educational system and administration that eventually hinder people’s accessibility to basic facilities.

Way forward

There is a need for striking balance between ‘too much of freedom’ and ‘too little of freedom’. This can be done by doing away with ambiguities present in these provisions (right to free speech and “reasonable restrictions”). Judiciary can play a leading role in doing so. It will not only help India to secure to its citizens the liberty of thought and expression but also hinder the State from carrying out the arbitrary use of “reasonable restrictions”. Maintaining a perfect balance will go a long way and help India reach the much-revered goals of the Indian Constitution.

Practise Question

Q. Are “reasonable restrictions” on the Fundamental Rights in India justified? Comment.

• https://www.latestlaws.com/articles/freedom-of-speech-and-expression-exigency-for-balance/
• https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/contempt-court.asp#:~:text=Contempt%20of%20court%20is%20a,civil%2C%20and%20direct%20versus%20indirect .
• https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-572-constitution-of-india-freedom-of-speech-and-expression.html
• https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5162-freedom-speech-a-tool-for-governmental-misuse-.html
• https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/governance/banning-fake-news-endangers-free-speech-press-freedom-65594
• https://www.advocateshah.com/blog/freedom-of-speech-and-expression-need-to-protect-it/#:~:text=Freedom%20of%20speech%20is%20there,taking%20part%20in%20decision%2Dmaking .
• https://www.iilsindia.com/blogs/right-freedom-speech-expression-vis-vis-freedom-press/
• https://www-indiatimes-com.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/www.indiatimes.com/amp/news/india/freedom-of-speech-and-expression-in-india-554739.html?amp_js_v=a6&amp_gsa=1&usqp=mq331AQKKAFQArABIIACAw%3D%3D#aoh=16422269468936&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com&amp_tf=From%20%251%24s&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.indiatimes.com%2Fnews%2Findia%2Ffreedom-of-speech-and-expression-in-india-554739.html
• https://www.indialegallive.com/venomous-times/
• https://www.theleaflet.in/the-haridwar-hate-assembly-the-answer-to-divisive-politics-is-not-law-but-civil-society-mobilisation/

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Top Ten Abuses of Power Since 9/11

9/11: Six Years Later > Abuses of Power: Assaults on civil liberties > Victories for Democracy: Successes in the fight for freedom > The Road Not Taken: Security measures the Bush Administration has ignored > Voices: ACLU staff on 9/11 and the fight for freedom since 2001

RELATED FEATURES > The Challenge to Illegal Spying > Torture: Seeking Truth and Accountability > Extraordinary Rendition: CIA Kidnapping > Reform the Patriot Act > Video: Stop the Abuse of Power

1. Warrantless Wiretapping — In December 2005, the New York Times reported the National Security Agency was tapping into telephone calls of Americans without a warrant, in violation of federal statutes and the Constitution. Furthermore, the agency had also gained direct access to the telecommunications infrastructure through some of America’s largest companies. The program was confirmed by President Bush and other officials, who boldly insisted, in the face of all precedent and the common understanding of the law, that the program was legal. And, the agency appears to have been not only eavesdropping on the conversations of Americans in this country without warrants, but also using broad “data mining” systems that allowed it to analyze information about the communications of millions of innocent people within the United States. In August 2006, in a lawsuit brought by the ACLU, a federal judge in Detroit found the program both unconstitutional and illegal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned that decision because it found the plaintiffs could not prove with certainty they were wiretapped but they did not rule on the legality of the program. The ACLU is considering an appeal. In the meantime, the 110th Congress chose basically to sanction the exact same program in August of 2007. The law that makes the warrantless wiretapping program legal is scheduled to sunset in February 2008, although Congress plans to take up legislation before then. Learn More >>

2. Torture, Kidnapping and Detention — In the years since 9/11, our government has illegally kidnapped, detained and tortured numerous prisoners. The government continues to claim that it has the power to designate anyone, including Americans as “enemy combatants” without charge. Since 2002, some “enemy combatants,” have been held at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, in some cases without access by the Red Cross. Investigations into other military detention centers have revealed severe human rights abuses and violations of international law, such as the Geneva Conventions. The government has also engaged in the practice of rendition: secretly kidnapping people and moving them to foreign countries where they are tortured and abused . It has been reported the CIA maintains secret prison camps in Eastern Europe to conduct operations that may also violate international standards. Congress made matters worse by enacting the Military Commissions Act, which strips detainees of their habeas rights, guts the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions’ protections against abuse, and even allows persons to be prosecuted based on evidence beaten out of a witness. (See www.aclu.org/torture )

3. The Growing Surveillance Society — In perhaps the greatest assault on the privacy of ordinary Americans, the country is undergoing a rapid expansion of data collection, storage, tracking, and mining. The FBI’s Investigative Data Warehouse, as an example, has grown to over 560 million records. Over and above the invasion of privacy represented by any one specific program, a combination of new technologies, expanded government powers and expanded private-sector data collection efforts is creating a new “surveillance society” that is unlike anything Americans have seen before. Learn More >>

4. Abuse of the Patriot Act — Several provisions of the Patriot Act were set to expire at the end of 2005 and, despite opposition from across the political spectrum and more than 400 community and state resolutions expressing concern about the Patriot Act, Congress reauthorized the law without reforming its most flawed provisions to bring these extraordinary powers back in line with the Constitution. Since then, the Justice Department’s Inspector General found that the FBI has issued hundreds of thousands of national security letters, a majority against U.S. persons, and many without any connection to terrorism at all. In September 2007, the ACLU won a landmark victory when a judge struck down the national security letter provision of the Patriot Act because part of the statute violated both the First Amendment and the separation of powers doctrine. (See http://www.reformthepatriotact.org )

5. Government Secrecy — The Bush administration has been one of the most secretive and nontransparent in our history. The Freedom of Information Act has been weakened , the administration has led a campaign of reclassification and increased secrecy by federal agencies (including the expansion of a catch-all category of “sensitive but unclassified”), and has made sweeping claims of “state secrets” to stymie judicial review of many of its policies that infringe on civil liberties. It even refused to grant government investigators the security clearances they needed to investigate the illegal and unconstitutional NSA wiretapping program. The administration has also expressed interest in prosecuting journalists under the Espionage Act of 1917: essentially trying to quell the media’s role in exposing questionable, illegal and unconstitutional conduct, including the maintenance of secret CIA prisons abroad and the NSA wiretapping program. Learn More >>

6. Real ID — The 2005 Real ID Act, rammed through Congress by being attached to a unrelated, “must pass” bill, lays the foundation for a national ID card and makes it more difficult for persecuted people to seek asylum. Under the law, states are required to standardize their drivers licenses (according to a still undetermined standard) and link to databases to be shared with every federal, state and local government official in every other state. Conservative estimates place the cost of the program at $10 to 12 billion. Opposition to the bill and its implementation remains fierce, and comes from groups such as the National Governor’s Association and the National Council of State Legislators. (See http://www.realnightmare.org/ )

7. No Fly and Selectee Lists — The No-Fly list was established to keep track of people the government prohibits from traveling because they have been labeled as security risks. Since 9/11 the number of similar watch lists has mushroomed to about 720,000 names, all with mysterious or ill-defined criteria for how names are placed on the lists, and with little recourse for innocent travelers seeking to be taken off them. These lists name an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 people. The lists are so erroneous several members of Congress, including Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), have been flagged. www.aclu.org/nofly

8. Political Spying — Government agencies — including the FBI and the Department of Defense — have conducted their own spying on innocent and law-abiding Americans. Through the Freedom of Information Act, the ACLU learned the FBI had been consistently monitoring peaceful groups such Quakers, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Greenpeace, the Arab American Anti-Defamation Committee and, indeed, the ACLU itself. In August 2007 the Pentagon announced that it would be shutting down its TALON database program, which illegally gathered information on anti-war activists across the country. (See www.aclu.org/spyfiles )

9. Abuse of Material Witness Statute — In the days and weeks after 9/11, the government gathered and detained many people — mostly Muslims in the US — through the abuse of a narrow federal technicality that permits the arrest and brief detention of “material witnesses,” or those who have important information about a crime. Most of those detained as material witnesses were never treated as witnesses to the crimes of 9/11, and though they were detained so that their testimony could be secured, in many cases, no effort was made to secure their testimony. The government has apologized for wrongfully detaining 13 people as material witnesses. Some were imprisoned for more than six months and one actually spent more than a year behind bars. Learn More >>

10. Attacks on Academic Freedom — The Bush administration has used a provision in the Patriot Act to engage in a policy of “censorship at the border” to keep scholars with perceived political views the administration does not like out of the United States. The ACLU has filed a lawsuit challenging this ideological exclusion, charging that it is being used to prevent United States citizens and residents from hearing speech protected by the First Amendment. Additionally, government policies and practices have hampered academic freedom and scientific inquiry since 9/11, creating a system where science has come under siege. The government has moved to overclassify information and has engaged in outright censorship and prescreening of scientific articles before publication. (See www.aclu.org/exclusion )

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Internet censorship : misuse of the Freedom of Speech and Expression

This article is written by Devanshee Rai from NMIMS, School of Law, Bengaluru and is edited by Gitika Jain . This is an exhaustive article which focuses on internet censorship and misuse of freedom of speech and expression.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Internet is the largest public platform which is used for various purposes such as data and information sharing, doing business, etc. It is a worldwide platform for various networks. With so many different opportunities and information coming on a single platform there should be a medium to control or prevent its misuse.  To prevent misuse, the concept of internet censorship was introduced. Internet censorship can be defined as the control and/or suppression of what can be accessed, viewed and published on the internet. Mainly it is controlled by the governments of various countries, but this can also be carried out by private organizations and individuals for moral, religious or business reasons. The internet is censored just because it prevents any kind of outbreak in society, defamation, invasion of privacy, etc. The outbreak in society can be political, religious, or business-wise.

Earlier, the Internet’s informal name was ‘Information Superhighway’ because it was the way to provide limitless data to any person and any amount of data could be acquired. One of the many benefits of internet censorship is the prevention of children from adult content present on the internet that is very inappropriate for the children and their mental growth. The scope and intention of the authority is to attempt control over the nation’s access to information. According to Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution , all citizens have the right to freedom of speech and expression. Freedom of speech and expression means the right to express one’s own convictions and opinions freely by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures, or any other mode. The following are the areas of censorship:

• A legal concept, copyright that deals with the rights of the original work and save it from plagiarism.
• Censorship looks after the prevention of defamation that could bring down a person or their product’s reputation in the market.
• Censorship makes sure that a person does not face any kind of harassment that could affect him mentally as well as physically.
• Censorship also looks after the inappropriate content that could raise uproar in society with respect to religion, culture, or traditional aspects present in society.

The primary purpose of internet censorship

In today’s times, the internet has a plethora of information that can be accessed by anybody and at any time. The data that is available on the internet provides information, home delivery services, data that is important to multinational companies. The data that is present on the internet is not only beneficial to teenagers or adults but also to elderly people. People can share their views and opinions on any platform because of the internet. People have been provided with a great amount of freedom of speech and expression. They can give their opinion on any topic related to any field (for eg, politics, arts, entertainment, sports, philosophy, etc.) unless or until their opinion or views do not affect another person mentally or physically.  To handle such types of situations, Internet censorship is necessary. The amount of data that is present over the internet needs a check. One could not possibly keep a check on all the bad, obscene, dirty, and dangerous data that is present on the net.

Pros and cons of internet censorship

The pros of internet censorship are as follows:

• Internet censorship helps to eliminate misinformation present everywhere. Misinformation present online is basically fake because of the fact that people can easily give their opinions on the website without having proper knowledge about the particular topic.
• Internet censorship can help to limit trafficking activities and the adult content that is present on the net. In today’s times, privacy issues have reached an all-time high because many multinational companies have their eyes on an individual’s personal data for their respective beneficial purposes. A place on the internet is called a dark web where personal data(medical records, social security numbers, etc.) of people which are mostly stolen can be sold at a price. This place mostly contains child pornography, hate speech, sex trafficking, etc. Internet censorship can easily control and detect their place of origin.
• It plays a positive role in the security of an individual. The personal data that is available on the website can be sold at a certain price. Most of the data that is present online is not illegal but it can lead to more dangerous things but at the end of the day, it is still an invasion of privacy. 
• One of the many advantages of internet censorship is that it limits the content that is below the moral standards. The content that is available on the dark web might be offensive and disturbing to some individuals. On 15th March 2019, Facebook live video was streamed in which two consecutive mass shootings were shown by an individual in New Zealand that showed his anti-immigrant moves. These videos could easily disturb any individual’s mental health. Posts like these have been steamed online since forever. One more such post was that of a sexual assault by three men on a private Facebook group. Posts that are available on social media platforms can be offensive to some people or offensive to some communities which can be reported which is another blessing of internet censorship. 
• To cope up with today’s world, internet censorship guides us. As a part of the job of an international company, on the legal front, there are responsibilities that companies often try to comply with under the regulations of Internet censorship. To work according to the global norms, the companies should try to focus more on the local laws. For eg, in 2017 any website that was against national security and interest was banned in Egypt. These days even the popular social media platforms like WhatsApp are censored. There are certain rules for the message ‘forwards’ in these messaging apps. When it comes to national interest and security, freedom of speech and expression can be restricted. 
• Internet censorship plays a very important role when it comes to national security. Nobody can really stop such activities because everyday hackers come up with new technologies but the least internet censorship could do is to make laws when a certain provision is broken. Government/regulators via internet censorship can easily make laws and provisions that everybody has to follow and if not followed then that could lead to penalties.

The cons of internet censorship are as follows:

• A group of people, i.e. the regulators, get power over another set of people. There should be an organization that looks after the internet censorship where things can be reported, otherwise, it becomes a situation of monopoly. The person who sets the criteria of internet censorship cannot be censored or one cannot censor their views. The defect of this kind of authority is that a set of people get authority over another and there is nobody to monitor the things they do and what their ideas of social control and moral standard are.
• Internet censorship is very costly. The countries that have internet censorship, it costs them a fortune to maintain it.
• The information is controlled. According to a survey done by the World Economic Forum , internet censorship is common to one out of four people in the world who are using the internet. Many people face penalties because of their online conduct. If the nation has stricter laws with respect to internet censorship, then the people of that country face penalties for trivial actions also.
• Economic availability and opportunities get hindered by internet censorship. Any country that follows internet censorship, requires an individual to undergo the process for approval of their content so that it can get published. This means that any creative or business mind has to get approval for his project from a government official. There are chances that the official may not understand the work of the person. 
• Freedom of speech and expression gets restricted. In the context of internet censorship, the freedom of speech and expression comes on edge when the government sometimes makes internet censorship laws that are just beneficial for their party which leads to dictatorship. Political parties in order to politicize and promote their agenda, they snatch the freed44om of speech and expression from its citizens. 
• The intelligence level of the citizen gets lowered. When people are accustomed(which basically happens when they consume the same content again and again) to think in a particular way, a new normal is created which is what the regulators want the citizens to believe in. Society would become numb to the information they see all over the internet. 
• Citizens tend to behave in a certain manner that is just because they are socially controlled. In order to control citizens and want them to behave in a manner so that they would follow a standard social control, internet censorship comes in handy. 

One of the many examples of negative usage of internet censorship when Saudi Arabia made a request to takedown a certain show because it was not fit for society. Now it is the government who gives permission as to what type of content their citizens would consume and whether the show stands up to their societal norms or not. This is just a sheer way how a government controls its citizens and their mindsets. They are doing this just to be in power.   

After going through the pros and cons of internet censorship, societies need to understand that freedom of speech is just like a shell without a substance. Most of the time, the abuse of freedom of speech and expression can be a double-edged sword. There are numerous cons of internet censorship but for the pros, any cost is payable.

What are the restrictions on freedom of speech and expression

Owing to the restrictions that should be imposed on the freedom of speech and expression so that we can prevent unrest in the society, clause (2) of Article 19 lays down the required restrictions. Pertaining to these restrictions, the tool of internet censorship can be used to remove or alter the content available online.

State Security 

With respect to Article 19(2), when it comes to the security of the state, the freedom of speech and expression can be restricted. ‘Security of State’ means war against the State, rebellion, insurrection excluding any riot and unlawful assembly. This concludes that when it comes to the safety of our nation then freedom of speech and expression can be restricted. 

Incitement to an offence

Through the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, this provision was added. The right to incite people to commit offense cannot be protected by Freedom of speech and expression. 

Friendly relations with foreign states 

This criterion was added by the First Amendment itself in 1951. This was added so that people cannot misuse their right to freedom of speech and expression which may hinder the country’s relation with other foreign states. In India, the Foreign Relations Act(XII of 1932) , provides punishment for libel by Indian citizens against foreign dignitaries. However, the interest of friendly relations with foreign, would not justify the suppression of fair criticism of the foreign policy of the government. 

Public order

In the First Amendment Act itself, ‘public order’ was added. ‘Public order’ has a wide scope when it comes to the foundations of meaning. The resultant of internal regulation that has been enforced by the government is public order. Public order is not just the maintenance of law and order, it is much more than that. Civil peace, security, and tranquility are synonymous with public order. The test for certifying whether the act is up to the standards of public order is by monitoring whether the act is hampering the current life which the society has established or if it disturbs merely an individual then its not disturbing public order. 

Anything and everything that disturbs the functioning of society or disturbs public peace is disturbing public order. The absence of violence and in which people can lead a normal life peacefully is a mere implication of public order. Public safety is a subset of public order. ‘In the interest of public order’, it basically includes utterances as are directly intended to lead to disorder along with those that have the tendency to lead to disorder. 

Therefore, certain laws are made so that they could restrict the intention to hurt the feelings (religious, social, etc) of other people. Such laws restrict freedom of speech and expression of certain people or communities but are underdone to maintain public order. 

Defamation is basically when a person’s reputation comes to a stake or is triggered, that leads to defamation. It can be in a written or oral form.

Contempt of court

Contempt of court is basically when you insult or degrade the order of the court except when you analyze the judgment passed by the court. There are two types of contempt: civil contempt and criminal contempt as mentioned in Section 2.

Decency or morality 

From Section 292 to 294 of the Indian Penal Code , many restrictions have been laid down in the name of decency and morality. The word decency and morality have a bigger scope in terms of its meaning. These words have a particular standard that prevents the spread of obscene and questionable content. 

It is not mentioned under clause 2 of article 19 as a criterion for restriction on freedom of speech and expression. But in English Law, whenever a person or a group of people through their writing or action tries to subvert the government, then the community faces the penalties as per law for not abiding by the restriction on freedom of speech and expression.

Social media: a battleground for reckless use of free speech

Social Media has been a blessing when it comes to sharing views, opinions, and photos but few people have been misusing this platform. The victim of this misuse has been mostly women who face regular trolling which is mostly based on gender, religion, caste, or marital status. The problem of trolling is more problematic in India than in the United States and the United Kingdom. The trolling faced by Muslim women are 55% more.  

Fake news is one of the ‘curses’ of social media. Mob Lynching is also one of the results of fake news. It spreads fear among people and the government always tries to prevent it from spreading. Their methods of internet censorship include rebuttal, spreading awareness among citizens, fake news elimination, etc. Rebuttal basically means a method in which the authenticity of fake news is checked. If the news article is proven fake then the particular news is removed from the social media platforms. Companies such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Youtube, etc have been constantly pressurized to remove fake news from their platforms. One such effort was shown by WhatsApp when they introduced the concept of the forwarded message. 

Social media is often used to promote political parties’ authoritarian agendas which are mostly used to convert it into a positive public opinion. These agendas are used in elections which put democracy at stake. The propagation of such agendas really affects the results of the election. Such a thing happened a few years ago when a company named Cambridge Analytica took personal information of Facebook users without their consent to influence their voting preferences.

Challenges against internet censorship

Internet censorship has been present for about 67% of all internet users in one form or the other. The number of social media users has been increasing since forever and so are their activities, and among these social media users around 27% of users have been arrested because of the content they have posted online. Due to the misuse of social media platforms, there are many government organizations who are monitoring the activities of social media users. For the past six years, there has been a decline in freedom of speech and expression on social media platforms. This has taken a step further by monitoring the voice and video calls. With the decline of such activities, there has been a decline in the digital economy as well. 

The challenges against internet censorship are as follows:

There would be a decline in the digital economy

The digital economy can only grow when there is no fear of restrictions and backlashes and consequences to the business community. There should be a proper growth policy so that the companies can work without fear. Some countries have put forward some restrictions on the messaging apps so that the local telecom companies do not get affected. The fear is born from the thinking that the local telecom companies cannot progress with the old policies. But then they forget that these new apps can actually help these companies to grow because of their innovative ideas that are suitable for the new world.

Business innovation and technological innovation will face deterioration

The restrictions that are imposed to promote local companies, can actually lead to slower growth of other telecom companies. The restriction that is imposed on the new companies can actually harm the local companies as they will not be able to benefit from innovative ideas and do some progressive work. Maybe small businesses would not be affected by such restrictions but big businesses would be really affected and that would be shown by their hampered day to day work. 

Access to information would be restricted

Due to internet restrictions, citizens would not be able to have access to information that would obviously affect their careers, business adventure, or even when they want to gain knowledge about any topic. People who have power and money can only be able to access the internet without any restrictions.

Globally, the freedom of speech and expression has a long way to go and we are at a crucial point when it comes to technological advancements, innovation, and development. Having an open market environment is helpful for many startups for their success. 

Critical analysis of striking down internet censorship law

A judgment was passed by a two-judge bench in 2015 which struck down the Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 . In Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the terms used were vague which were being misused for personal and political motives. The freedom of speech and expression was completely at stake due to this section. 

In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India , Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 was struck down because it violated Article 19(1) of the constitution of India. The law was used by citizens for their personal and political motives to take advantage of its vague and broad meaning. This was a controversial law under which posting offensive comments, posts or messages could have led to jail. It was repeatedly used by police in a malicious manner. The term was approved by the president. One of many such cases was when a cartoonist was detained for making a cartoon of the Chief Minister of Bengal. In 2012, after the criticism of the shutdown of Mumbai two young women were arrested and one of them got arrested just for ‘liking’ the post. This type of law was a blot on the constitution. 

Due to Section 66A, citizens of India were not able to criticize the government or disagree with the government. The two hundred page judgment deals with the issues of online censorship. Almost 200 million are there in the South Asian region which is the third-highest of the total internet users but there are no such adequate laws have been made to stop the misuse of the internet.  

Internet censorship has been a roller coaster ride that has many ups and downs. Ups(pros) and downs(cons) have been discussed earlier. For a democracy, freedom of speech and expression is a very vital component. There should be a right balance between freedom of speech and expression and other components such as privacy, security, etc. So far, internet censorship has not been up to expectations and it is quite inadequate. Politicians and businessmen have always been benefited whether there is a law or not regarding freedom of speech and expression. Blocking of content for the political benefits or theft of personal information is also a violation of freedom of speech and expression. There should be a law that is transparent enough which citizens can trust with their personal information. Personal information of the citizens often gets stolen for their voting benefits, preferences, etc. To enable freedom of speech and expression properly in this country, there should be certain changes that a government should follow. 

To allow proper functioning of freedom of speech and expression through internet censorship are as follows:

• Citizens who give genuine information about politics or any other controversial topics should not be prosecuted. They usually voice their opinions or views on the internet through debates, posts, and discussions. 
• Posts that are about genuine and true content should not be taken down. This act is just violating the freedom of speech and expression in India. Mere disagreement with the government should not be a criterion for violating the freedom of speech and expression in India.
• The IT laws should be updated on a periodic basis to tackle the new issues.
• The government should not handle the takedown request without the order of the court. This right shall lie only with the court.
• Internet Censorship laws should be properly made after seeing the pros and how to tackle the cons.
• http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/946/Internet-Censorship.html
• https://telanganatoday.com/social-media-and-freedom-of-expression
• http://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-426-social-media-and-freedom-of-speech-and-expression.html
• https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resisting-internet-censorship
• https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Issues-04.htm

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S.p. anand vs. h.d. deve gowda and ors. (1997), internet violence and threats of internet privacy, kunhayammed and others vs. state of kerala and another (2000) , leave a reply cancel reply.

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Abusing Freedom

Our culture is changing fast. Things that would have seemed absurd to most people’s moral intuitions are now championed. Even some things that still seem odd are accepted because our culture accepted a definition of freedom some time ago that is playing out.

Radical moral relativism, the view that individuals can define their own morality, has led to radical relativism in general. People think freedom means they can define their own reality. There’s no objective moral standard. And now there’s no objective standard at all that should be imposed on an individual to restrict their freedom of choice. Every individual defines themselves.

So Bruce Jenner becomes Caitlyn Jenner. A white woman claims she’s black because that’s how she feels. People champion transableism and transspeciesism because they feel inside that they are disabled or cat or rabbit. One feminist said that freedom means the doctor has no right to declare the sex of a baby at birth, despite the body parts that are obvious, because that child should define that for themselves.

There’s nothing objective to constrain us. This has become established in U.S. law already, and it has serious implications. The Declaration of Independence, which is fundamental to all U.S. law including the Constitution, states that our rights are established by God. Because human rights are objective, governments must respect them and cannot violate them. But if there is nothing objective to constrain our freedom, then there’s nothing objective to constrain the government. Our rights become whatever we declare them to be and whatever the government at any time and place declares them to be, changing with the fashions of the day.

This is where we are in our culture now. It’s a very dangerous place to be in. As quickly as the court can bestow a new right, it can be taken away.

It reminds me of Sir Thomas More’s response to his pupil Roper: “And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast—man’s laws, not God’s—and if you cut them down—and you’re just the man to do it—d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?” It’s naïve and short-sighted to change the law unmoored from any objective standard because it can be changed in any way possible then.

The astounding thing about a very few documents in history is that government power was limited because citizens had rights above the government. But when societies no longer recognize this, the governments are back in the position of defining the rights of citizens. As Os Guinness has said, “When the fashionable new ‘right’ trumps the traditional rights, then rights merely arise from power.”

The tragedy of our culture celebrating the new definition of individual freedom is that it has also destroyed what has protected us from tyranny. We’ve abused our freedom and we’ve destroyed it.

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Freedom of speech is one of the basic pillars of democracy. In fact, the best quote till date in support of ‘freedom of speech’ comes from one of the founding fathers of one of the oldest democracies of the modern world (USA, that is), George Washington, the first US president: ‘If the freedom of speech is taken away then dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter’.

From the oldest (USA), let us now move to the largest (India). Freedom of speech is a constitutionally-guaranteed and constitutionally-protected right — under Article 19(1)(a) — bestowed upon every citizen of India. However, it is not an absolute right…in fact, freedom of speech as it traces its development through the course of history, has to be judged from two points of view. The first is the ‘harm principle’ that was proposed by John Stuart Mill; the second is the ‘offence principle’ that was added (in addition to the ‘harm principle’) by Joel Fienberg.

In fact, most countries take these two principles into consideration when defining the scope and setting the limit to ‘freedom of speech’…and that is the case with India too. According to Article 19 Clause 2 of the Indian Constitution, the legislature is empowered to impose certain restrictions on free speech under the following heads:

I. Security of the State II. Friendly Relations with Foreign States III. Public Order IV. Decency and Morality V. Contempt of Court VI. Defamation VII. Incitement to an Offence, and VIII. Sovereignty and Integrity of India

If one takes a closer look at these imposed restrictions, it becomes clear how often this very ‘Freedom of Speech’ is subject to misuse. There are two particular incidents that need to be mentioned in particular.

The first, of course, is the incident at JNU that has witnessed a huge divide amongst the people of this great big nation. Keeping the controversy surrounding the arrest of Kanhaiya Kumar aside (that alone is worthy of its own article hence it is advisable to keep him out of the present premise), consider what happened inside JNU on the eve of February 9th. A group of students [ex-DSU members, to be exact], on false pretext (which was asserted by a JNU professor, Prof. Makarand Paranjape), organised a cultural event titled ‘A Country Without A Post Office’. Once the administration got wind of what was planned for the event, the event was cancelled. However, ignoring the ‘cancellation’ order, the group of students proceed to an evening of sloganeering. It was this volley of slogans that has irked the “extreme nationalists” (whatever that word means)…which isn’t surprising if one looks at some of the slogans (as provided below):

# Bharat desh ho barbad, ho barbad. Afzal Guru amar rahe, amar rahe; # Kashmir ki azaadi tak jung rahegi. Bharat ki barbaadi tak jung rahegi; # Afzal tera karwaan hai adhura. Mil kar hum karenge poora; # Tum kitne Afzal maroge? Ghar ghar se Afzal niklenge. # Kashmir maange azaadi. Ladkar lenge azaadi. # Afzal hum sharminda hain. Tere qaatil zinda hain. # India Go back. India Go back.

As ABVP members assembled to prevent the event from taking place, a scuffle broke out between the students…and this was when the Delhi police was summoned to the campus. If one looked at the slogans being raised that fateful night, it isn’t difficult to see that it was a clear violation of the reasonable restrictions that have been laid down by the very constitution that gives the ‘freedom of speech’…if it is looked at from the angle of ‘I. Security of the State’, ‘III. Public Order’, ‘VII. Incitement to an Offence’, and ‘VIII. Sovereignty and Integrity of India’.

For those who feel that it does not qualify as ‘sedition’ and it was merely people exercising their constitutional right to ‘freedom of speech’, they need to go back in time to March 6, 2002. It was the day, a Supreme Court bench held Booker Prize winner Arundhati Roy guilty of criminal contempt of court. She was punished with imprisonment [it was mostly symbolic for she was sentenced to one-day simple imprisonment] and fine [of Rs. 2000…in case of failure to pay fine, the author would be required to undergo simple imprisonment for three months].

This particular incident needs to be mentioned…and highlighted! [Especially, since Arundhati Roy was once again booked in 2010 – this time for ‘Sedition’ – for an “anti-India” speech she delivered at an event in Delhi.] Given this background, it becomes an important question: “Lowering the dignity of the Supreme Court was found to be an offence, but it is alright (under the blanket of ‘freedom of speech’) to lower the dignity of the nation and shout slogans against its very sovereignty and integrity?”

This divisive politics is not only attempting to corrode the unity of India, it is attempting to drive a stake through the very heart of secular India. In 2012, there was yet another attempt to divide the students when the communists organised a “beef and pork festival” under the name of ‘Democratic Right to Choice of Food’. [The event was opposed by both Hindus and Muslims; and was later canceled after an order from the Delhi High Court].

To be honest, freedom of speech must always be accompanied by freedom of thought, where you must always think of your brethren!

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Social Media, Freedom of Expression and Right to Privacy: An Analysis

35 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2023

Nilima Rahman

Jahangirnagar University; Jahangirnagar University

Date Written: july 7, 2023

The rapid rise of social media platforms has transformed the way individuals express themselves and interact in the digital age. This technological advancement has raised concerns regarding the delicate balance between freedom of expression and the right to privacy. This paper begins by exploring the concept of freedom of expression in the context of social media, examining the legal and ethical frameworks that govern this fundamental right. Furthermore, the research delves into the right to privacy, addressing the complexities arising from the collection, storage, and analysis of personal data by social media companies. It critically examines the legal frameworks and privacy policies that govern these practices and assesses their adequacy in safeguarding individuals’ privacy rights. The study also investigates the role of social media platforms as intermediaries in facilitating and regulating online communication. It evaluates the practices employed by these platforms to moderate content and the implications for freedom of expression. It delves into the challenges of balancing the need to combat hate speech, misinformation, and other harmful content while respecting users’ right to express themselves freely. Additionally, this paper explores both the positive and negative perspective of social media in shaping our life, freedom of expression and privacy. It also shows the ways on how freedom of speech and right to privacy is infringed through social media. Finally, this paper explores who can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy and who can not through some case decisions.

Keywords: Digital Age, Ethical Frameworks, Freedom of Expression, Legal Frameworks, Personal Data, Privacy Policies, Right to Privacy, Social Media.

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Why the “freedom writers essay” is an inspiring tale of hope, empathy, and overcoming adversity.

Education has always been a paramount aspect of society, shaping individuals’ intellect and character. Within the vast realms of academia, written expressions have played a pivotal role in documenting and disseminating knowledge. Among these, the essays by Freedom Writers stand out as a testament to the importance of personal narratives and the transformative power they hold.

By delving into the multifaceted dimensions of human experiences, the essays penned by Freedom Writers captivate readers with their raw authenticity and emotional depth. These narratives showcase the indomitable spirit of individuals who have triumphed over adversity, providing invaluable insights into the human condition. Through their stories, we gain a profound understanding of the challenges faced by marginalized communities, shedding light on the systemic issues deeply ingrained in our society.

What makes the essays by Freedom Writers particularly significant is their ability to ignite a spark of empathy within readers. The vivid descriptions and heartfelt accounts shared in these personal narratives serve as a bridge, connecting individuals from diverse backgrounds and fostering a sense of understanding. As readers immerse themselves in these stories, they develop a heightened awareness of the struggles faced by others, ultimately cultivating a more inclusive and compassionate society.

The Inspiring Story of the Freedom Writers Essay

The Freedom Writers Essay tells a powerful and inspiring story of a group of students who were able to overcome adversity and find their own voices through the power of writing. This essay not only impacted the education system, but also touched the hearts of many individuals around the world.

Set in the early 1990s, the Freedom Writers Essay highlights the journey of a young teacher named Erin Gruwell and her diverse group of students in Long Beach, California. Faced with a challenging and often hostile environment, Gruwell used literature and writing as a platform to engage her students and help them express their own experiences and emotions.

Through the use of journals, the students were able to share their personal stories, struggles, and dreams. This essay not only became a therapeutic outlet for the students, but it also allowed them to see the power of their own voices. It gave them a sense of empowerment and hope that they could break free from the cycle of violence and poverty that surrounded them.

As their stories were shared through the Freedom Writers Essay, the impact reached far beyond the walls of their classroom. Their words resonated with people from all walks of life, who were able to see the universal themes of resilience, empathy, and the importance of education. The essay sparked a movement of hope and change, inspiring individuals and communities to work together towards a more inclusive and equitable education system.

The Freedom Writers Essay is a testament to the transformative power of education and the incredible potential of young minds. It serves as a reminder that everyone has a story to tell and that through the written word, we can create understanding, bridge divides, and inspire change.

In conclusion, the Freedom Writers Essay is not just a piece of writing, but a catalyst for change. It showcases the remarkable journey of a group of students who found solace and strength in their own stories. It reminds us of the importance of empowering young minds and providing them with the tools necessary to overcome obstacles and make a difference in the world.

Understanding the background and significance of the Freedom Writers essay

The Freedom Writers essay holds a notable history and plays a significant role in the field of education. This piece of writing carries a background rich with hardships, triumphs, and the power of individual expression.

Originating from the diary entries of a group of high school students known as the Freedom Writers, the essay documents their personal experiences, struggles, and remarkable growth. These students were part of a racially diverse and economically disadvantaged community, facing social issues including gang violence, racism, and poverty.

Despite the challenging circumstances, the Freedom Writers found solace and empowerment through writing. Their teacher, Erin Gruwell, recognized the potential of their stories and encouraged them to share their experiences through written form. She implemented a curriculum that encouraged self-expression, empathy, and critical thinking.

The significance of the Freedom Writers essay lies in its ability to shed light on the experiences of marginalized communities and bring attention to the importance of education as a means of empowerment. The essay serves as a powerful tool to inspire change, challenge social norms, and foster understanding among diverse populations.

By sharing their narratives, the students of the Freedom Writers not only found catharsis and personal growth, but also contributed to a larger discourse on the impact of education and the role of teachers in transforming lives. The essay serves as a reminder of the profound impact that storytelling and education can have on individuals and communities.

Learning from the Unique Teaching Methods in the Freedom Writers Essay

The Freedom Writers Essay presents a remarkable story of a teacher who uses unconventional teaching methods to make a positive impact on her students. By examining the strategies employed by the teacher in the essay, educators can learn valuable lessons that can enhance their own teaching practices. This section explores the unique teaching methods showcased in the Freedom Writers Essay and the potential benefits they can bring to the field of education.

Empowering student voice and promoting inclusivity: One of the key themes in the essay is the importance of giving students a platform to express their thoughts and experiences. The teacher in the Freedom Writers Essay encourages her students to share their stories through writing, empowering them to find their own voices and fostering a sense of inclusivity in the classroom. This approach teaches educators the significance of valuing and incorporating student perspectives, ultimately creating a more engaging and diverse learning environment.

Building relationships and trust: The teacher in the essay invests time and effort in building meaningful relationships with her students. Through personal connections, she is able to gain their trust and create a safe space for learning. This emphasis on building trust highlights the impact of positive teacher-student relationships on academic success. Educators can learn from this approach by understanding the importance of establishing a supportive and nurturing rapport with their students, which can enhance student engagement and motivation.

Using literature as a tool for empathy and understanding: The teacher in the Freedom Writers Essay introduces her students to literature that explores diverse perspectives and themes of resilience and social justice. By incorporating literature into her curriculum, she encourages her students to develop empathy and gain a deeper understanding of the experiences of others. This approach underscores the value of incorporating diverse and relevant texts into the classroom, enabling students to broaden their perspectives and foster critical thinking skills.

Fostering a sense of community and belonging: In the essay, the teacher creates a sense of community within her classroom by organizing activities that promote teamwork and collaboration. By fostering a supportive and inclusive learning environment, the teacher helps her students feel a sense of belonging and encourages them to support one another. This aspect of the teaching methods showcased in the Freedom Writers Essay reinforces the significance of collaborative learning and the sense of community in fostering academic growth and personal development.

Overall, the unique teaching methods presented in the Freedom Writers Essay serve as an inspiration for educators to think outside the box and explore innovative approaches to engage and empower their students. By incorporating elements such as student voice, building relationships, using literature for empathy, and fostering a sense of community, educators can create a transformative learning experience for their students, ultimately shaping them into critical thinkers and compassionate individuals.

Exploring the innovative approaches used by the Freedom Writers teacher

The Freedom Writers teacher employed a range of creative and groundbreaking methods to engage and educate their students, fostering a love for learning and empowering them to break the cycle of violence and poverty surrounding their lives. Through a combination of empathy, experiential learning, and personal storytelling, the teacher was able to connect with the students on a deep level and inspire them to overcome the obstacles they faced.

One of the innovative approaches utilized by the Freedom Writers teacher was the use of literature and writing as a means of communication and healing. By introducing the students to powerful works of literature that tackled relevant social issues, the teacher encouraged them to explore their own identities and experiences through writing. This not only facilitated self-expression but also fostered critical thinking and empathy, as the students were able to relate to the characters and themes in the literature.

The teacher also implemented a unique system of journal writing, where the students were given a safe and non-judgmental space to express their thoughts, emotions, and personal experiences. This practice not only helped the students develop their writing skills but also served as a therapeutic outlet, allowing them to process and reflect upon their own lives and the challenges they faced. By sharing and discussing their journal entries within the classroom, the students built a strong sense of community and support among themselves.

Another innovative strategy utilized by the Freedom Writers teacher was the integration of field trips and guest speakers into the curriculum. By exposing the students to different perspectives and experiences, the teacher broadened their horizons and challenged their preconceived notions. This experiential learning approach not only made the subjects more engaging and relatable but also encouraged the students to think critically and develop a greater understanding of the world around them.

In conclusion, the Freedom Writers teacher implemented a range of innovative and effective approaches to foster learning and personal growth among their students. Through the use of literature, writing, journaling, and experiential learning, the teacher created a supportive and empowering environment that allowed the students to overcome their adversities and become agents of change. These methods continue to inspire educators and highlight the importance of innovative teaching practices in creating a positive impact on students’ lives.

The Impact of the Freedom Writers Essay on Students’ Lives

The Freedom Writers Essay has had a profound impact on the lives of students who have been exposed to its powerful message. Through the personal stories and experiences shared in the essay, students are able to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges and resilience that individuals can possess. The essay serves as a catalyst for personal growth, empathy, and a desire to make a positive difference in the world.

One of the key ways in which the Freedom Writers Essay impacts students’ lives is by breaking down barriers and promoting understanding. Through reading the essay, students are able to connect with the struggles and triumphs of individuals from diverse backgrounds. This fosters a sense of empathy and compassion, allowing students to see beyond their own experiences and appreciate the unique journeys of others.

In addition to promoting empathy, the Freedom Writers Essay also inspires students to take action. By showcasing the power of education and personal expression, the essay encourages students to use their voices to effect change in their communities. Students are empowered to stand up against injustice, advocate for those who are marginalized, and work towards creating a more inclusive and equitable society.

Furthermore, the essay serves as a reminder of the importance of perseverance in the face of adversity. Through the stories shared in the essay, students witness the determination and resilience of individuals who have overcome significant challenges. This inspires students to believe in their own ability to overcome obstacles and pursue their dreams, no matter the circumstances.

Overall, the impact of the Freedom Writers Essay on students’ lives is profound and far-reaching. It not only educates and enlightens, but also motivates and empowers. By exposing students to the power of storytelling and the potential for personal growth and social change, the essay equips them with the tools they need to become compassionate and engaged citizens of the world.

Examining the transformation experienced by the Freedom Writers students

The journey of the Freedom Writers students is a testament to the power of education and its transformative impact on young minds. Through their shared experiences, these students were able to overcome adversity, prejudice, and personal struggles to find their voices and take ownership of their education. This process of transformation not only shaped their individual lives but also had a ripple effect on their communities and the educational system as a whole.

The transformation experienced by the Freedom Writers students serves as a powerful reminder of the potential within every student, regardless of their background or circumstances. It highlights the importance of creating an inclusive and supportive educational environment that encourages self-expression, empathy, and a belief in one’s own abilities. By fostering a love for learning and empowering students to embrace their unique voices, education can become a catalyst for positive change, both within individuals and society as a whole.

Addressing Social Issues and Promoting Empathy through the Freedom Writers Essay

In today’s society, it is important to address social issues and promote empathy to create a more inclusive and harmonious world. One way to achieve this is through the powerful medium of the written word. The Freedom Writers Essay, a notable piece of literature, serves as a catalyst for addressing social issues and promoting empathy among students.

The Freedom Writers Essay showcases the experiences and struggles of students who have faced adversity, discrimination, and inequality. Through their personal narratives, these students shed light on the social issues that exist within our society, such as racism, poverty, and violence. By sharing their stories, they invite readers to step into their shoes and gain a deeper understanding of the challenges they face. This promotes empathy and encourages readers to take action to create a more equitable world.

Furthermore, the Freedom Writers Essay fosters a sense of community and unity among students. As they read and discuss the essay, students have the opportunity to engage in meaningful conversations about social issues, sharing their own perspectives and experiences. This dialogue allows them to challenge their beliefs, develop critical thinking skills, and broaden their horizons. By creating a safe space for open and honest discussions, the Freedom Writers Essay creates an environment where students can learn from one another and grow together.

In addition, the essay prompts students to reflect on their own privileges and biases. Through self-reflection, students can gain a better understanding of their own place in society and the role they can play in creating positive change. This reflection process helps students develop empathy for others and encourages them to become active agents of social justice.

In conclusion, the Freedom Writers Essay serves as a powerful tool for addressing social issues and promoting empathy among students. By sharing personal narratives, fostering dialogue, and prompting self-reflection, this essay encourages students to confront societal challenges head-on and take meaningful action. Through the power of the written word, the essay helps create a more inclusive and empathetic society.

Analyzing how the essay tackles significant societal issues and promotes empathy

In this section, we will examine how the essay addresses crucial problems in society and encourages a sense of understanding. The essay serves as a platform to shed light on important social issues and foster empathy among its readers.

The essay delves into the depths of societal problems, exploring topics such as racial discrimination, stereotyping, and the achievement gap in education. It presents these issues in a thought-provoking manner, prompting readers to reflect on the harsh realities faced by marginalized communities. Through personal anecdotes and experiences, the essay unveils the profound impact of these problems on individuals and society as a whole.

Furthermore, the essay emphasizes the significance of cultural understanding and empathy. It highlights the power of perspective and the importance of recognizing and challenging one’s own biases. The author’s account of their own transformation and ability to connect with their students serves as an inspiring example, urging readers to step outside their comfort zones and embrace diversity.

By confronting and discussing these social issues head-on, the essay not only raises awareness but also calls for collective action. It encourages readers to become advocates for change and actively work towards creating a more inclusive and equitable society. The essay emphasizes the role of education in addressing these societal problems and the potential for growth and transformation it can bring.

In essence, the essay provides a platform to examine important societal problems and promotes empathy by humanizing the issues and encouraging readers to listen, understand, and work towards positive change.

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Essay on Freedom

Students are often asked to write an essay on Freedom in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Freedom

Understanding freedom.

Freedom is a fundamental human right. It is the power to act, speak, or think without restraint. Freedom allows us to make choices and express ourselves.

The Importance of Freedom

Freedom is vital for personal development. It helps us discover who we are and encourages creativity and innovation. Without freedom, our world would lack diversity and progress.

Freedom with Responsibility

However, freedom comes with responsibility. We must respect others’ rights and freedoms. Misuse of freedom can lead to chaos and conflict. Therefore, it’s crucial to use freedom wisely.

Also check:

250 Words Essay on Freedom

Freedom, a concept often taken for granted, is a cornerstone of modern civilization. It’s synonymous with autonomy, self-determination, and the capacity to make choices without coercion. Freedom, however, is not absolute; it’s a relative term, defined by societal norms, legal frameworks, and cultural contexts.

The Dialectics of Freedom

Freedom can be broadly categorized into two types: positive and negative. Negative freedom refers to the absence of external constraints, allowing individuals to act according to their will. In contrast, positive freedom is the ability to act in one’s best interest, which often requires societal support and resources. The dialectics of these two types of freedom form the crux of many political and philosophical debates.

Freedom and Responsibility

Freedom is inextricably linked with responsibility. Every choice made in freedom has consequences, and individuals must bear the responsibility for their actions. This interplay between freedom and responsibility is a key aspect of ethical and moral judgments.

Freedom in the Modern World

In the modern world, freedom is often associated with democratic rights and civil liberties. However, the rise of digital technology poses new challenges. Questions about data privacy, surveillance, and censorship have sparked debates about the boundaries of freedom in the digital age.

In conclusion, freedom is a complex and multifaceted concept. It’s a fundamental human right, yet its interpretation and application vary widely across different societies and contexts. Understanding the nuances of freedom helps us navigate the ethical and moral dilemmas of our time.

500 Words Essay on Freedom

Freedom, a concept deeply ingrained in human consciousness, is often perceived as the absence of restrictions and the ability to exercise one’s rights and powers at will. It is a fundamental right and the cornerstone of modern democratic societies. However, the concept of freedom is multifaceted, and its interpretation varies across different socio-cultural and political contexts.

The Philosophical Perspective

Freedom and democracy.

In the realm of politics, freedom is the bedrock of democracy. It ensures the right to express one’s opinions, to choose one’s leaders, and to live without fear of oppression. However, freedom in a democratic society is not absolute. It is balanced with the responsibility to respect the freedom and rights of others. This balance is often a source of conflict and debate, as societies grapple with the question of where to draw the line between individual freedom and collective responsibility.

Freedom and Human Rights

Freedom is also closely linked to human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations, recognizes freedom as a basic human right. It encompasses not only political and civil liberties but also economic, social, and cultural rights. However, the realization of these rights remains a challenge in many parts of the world, where freedom is curtailed by oppressive regimes, social inequalities, and cultural norms.

The Paradox of Freedom

Conclusion: the future of freedom.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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Essay on “The Misinterpretation and Misuse of Freedom in India” Complete Essay for Class 10, Class 12 and Graduation and other classes.

The Misinterpretation and Misuse of Freedom in India

Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the indisputable proponent of the freedom struggle against the alien rulers declared: “Freedom is my birthright, and I shall have it”. This idea emanated when our great motherland was endeavouring to dislodge the British rule from every speck of land of India and thereby reincarnated a feeling of profound motivation and colossa’ pride in the hearts of the countrymen. He had hardly fancied hat his under laid definition of freedom would be jettisoned and discarded within a span of a few years. Freedom for Tilak had a meaning, it was a divine message from the almighty, to a carve his motherland into an Elysium. Contrarily, in the present context the world has derogated its meaning and substance, the basic essence of the notion has been shamelessly liquidated and has been given a ‘modern’ definition. Freedom, today stands explicitly as a tool to carve and maximise personal expedience and shun the rights and interests of one’s counterparts.

What are the ground realities that we face today? It is common knowledge that freedom in India—as distinct from freedom for India—has been steadfastly abused through misinterpretation and misuse. At times, it has been gagged and suppressed. Although we have given unto ourselves a Welfare State, have we been able to live up to the promises enshrined in our Constitution? Are we truly socialist, secular and democratic—both in word and deed? This certainly calls for introspection.

Articles 19-22 of the Constitution of India deal with the rights of freedom that are flexible and broad-based. Although reasonable restrictions may be placed on the six fundamental freedoms in public interest, there is no ambiguity that may lead to their misinterpretation and misuse. In addition, the much-needed and expected Government bodies—an impartial judicial system and the police force—have acted as bulwarks against any curbs on freedom.

It goes without saying that recourse to law and the judicial system is a long-drawn process in India and the police force have, time and again, failed to do their duty to the common man. The police is by and large, inefficient and corrupt besides being terribly under-staffed. This puts our freedom in cold storage. These Government agencies have, time and again, thrown cold water on the lofty ideals of freedom cherished by all of us and enshrined in our Constitution; they have often been reduced to pious utterances.

The most important factor, however, for misinterpreting the ideal of freedom is the bulk of our population that is illiterate. It is the people’s ignorance of their rights and duties that leads to the misinterpretation and misuse of freedom. People tend to use and exploit their sense of freedom in a reckless manner by airing partial, personal and ambiguous views on every subject under the sun in the guise of freedom of expression, thus making a caricature of this Fundamental Right. Participation in public affairs can be effective only when the citizens are adequately educated and can distinguish between the right and the wrong. Their ignorance has spread to almost all areas of human activity. Education helps make democracy a success. Sadly enough, this has not happened in this country so far.

 This also explains the plight of women in our society. The rate of female literacy is much lower than male literacy. Although a few women have made their mark in their chosen areas of work, most of our womenfolk are treated as second-class citizens and deprived even of basic human rights. They are treated like dumb-driven cattle. They keep on bearing children because, on account of lack of adequate education and awareness that it generates, they keep on adding to the country’s population. The knowledge of contraception is woeful, if not altogether lacking.

The most lethal misinterpretation and misuse of freedom in India, however, comes from the elite and privileged few. They are a law unto themselves. Our political leaders and their progeny, the industry mughals, the highly placed officials and the nouveu rich are the culprits in this regard. They flaunt their power and pelf shamelessly. They feel—and in this, they are often right—that they can get away with anything they do because they have the right connections to flout every established norm and convention of civilised society. They have caused the maximum damage to the system. They have a one-point agenda—self-aggrandisement at the cost of everyone and everything else. This is how they misinterpret and misuse freedom. What further emboldens is the lack of an educated, aware and enlightened citizenry. Plato has defined the real tragedy of life as: “We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of dark; the real tragedy of life is when men are afraid of lights.”

Ironically, the mahouts of our nation—the politicians and the bureaucrats—are in cahoots to scuttle our fundamental freedoms. That a politician-bureaucrat nexus exists and flourishes in our country is an oft-repeated altruism. This nexus has misinterpreted and misused our freedom all through and done it an irreparable harm. Added to it is the failure of the masses to visualise every fundamental right accompanied with a fundamental duty that has led to the present state of affairs where freedom has been thoroughly misinterpreted, misused and abused by the powers that be. Democracy in India is a sad mockery of Abraham Lincoln’s famous description as “the government of the people, by the people and for the people”. Our freedom is not true freedom as the common people are not allowed to lead from the front because they do not realise that “freedom is the biggest responsibility”. Our Constitution may describe an ideal state of freedom as mainly people-oriented, liberal as well as flexible. Our rulers have, however, twisted and transformed it into something that strangulates the very concept. The concept of freedom may be Utopian, but we must all nurture it with honesty, integrity and dedication. We must be all committed to the realisation of the goal of freedom. Once that is done, there would be no scope for its misinterpretation and misuse.

The need of the hour is that the teachings of Gandhiji should reverberate in our minds. He used to say that freedom means freedom of the individual. As long as the individual does not learn to discipline himself, as long as he does not limit his needs, and as long as he does not imbibe a sense of social responsibility, he cannot be said to be free and so long as the individual is not free, the country is not free, political freedom notwithstanding.

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Alice Munro's daughter says her mom supported abusive stepfather

Munro's youngest daughter said she never reconciled with her mother.

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WARNING: This article contains details of abuse and may affect those who have experienced sexual violence or know someone affected by it.

The youngest daughter of celebrated Canadian author Alice Munro has opened up about the sexual abuse she experienced by her stepfather and the deep hurt she felt when her mother chose to support her husband instead of her child.

In a first-person essay published in the Toronto Star on Sunday, Andrea Robin Skinner described how the Nobel Prize-winning short story writer remained in her marriage to second husband Gerald Fremlin even after she learned of the abuse.

In the Star piece, Skinner said she opted to tell her story so Canadians could have a more nuanced picture of the Nobel Laureate, who was revered as a literary icon long before her death in May.

• OBITUARY Alice Munro, Canadian author who mastered the short story, dead at 92
• Canadian authors remember Alice Munro and her literary legacy

"I ... wanted this story — my story — to become part of the stories people tell about my mother," she wrote. "I never wanted to see another interview, biography or event that didn't wrestle with the reality of what had happened to me and with the fact that my mother, confronted with the truth of what had happened, chose to stay with and protect my abuser."

Skinner wrote in the Star that the abuse began in 1976 when she was nine and visiting her mother in Ontario for the summer after she spent most of the year in British Columbia with her father. She wrote that Fremlin climbed into the bed where she was sleeping and initiated sexual contact while Munro was out of the house.

On the final day of her visit, she said Fremlin began asking for details about her sex life and sharing aspects of his own while driving her to the airport.

Skinner said she initially told her father and stepbrother what had happened, but neither she nor her father informed Munro right away.

She said Fremlin continued to expose himself to her and proposition her for sex until he lost interest when she reached her teens.

Skinner said she experienced "private pain" for many years due to Fremlin's predatory behaviour, suffering from bulimia, insomnia and migraines, and dropping out of an international development program at the University of Toronto.

Daughter says she received no sympathy from Munro

In her 20s, Skinner wrote Munro a letter detailing Fremlin's abuse, but she said she received no sympathy from her mother.

"I ... was overwhelmed by her sense of injury to herself," Skinner wrote in the Star. "She believed my father had made us keep the secret in order to humiliate her. She then told me about other children Fremlin had 'friendships' with, emphasizing her own sense that she, personally, had been betrayed. Did she realize she was speaking to a victim and that I was her child? If she did, I couldn't feel it."

She reported the abuse to police in 2005 and Fremlin ultimately pleaded guilty to a charge of indecent assault.

But, Munro remained with Fremlin until he died in 2013. Munro said she had been "told too late" about the abuse, that she loved him too much to leave him and that she couldn't be expected to "deny her own needs," Skinner wrote in the Star.

Alice Munro’s daughter speaks out about sexual abuse by stepfather

She said the abuse she suffered remained an open secret in the Munro family for years and, for a time, led to estrangement from her entire family.

Now, as a meditation and mindfulness teacher, Skinner said she has reconciled with her siblings but never with her mother.

Bookstore supports daughter

Munro's Books, a bookstore Alice Munro founded in Victoria with her first husband, James, posted a statement on its website supporting Skinner. The bookstore has been independently owned since 2014.

"Munro's Books unequivocally supports Andrea Robin Skinner as she publicly shares her story of her sexual abuse as a child," the store said. "Learning the details of Andrea's experience has been heartbreaking."

The bookstore also released a statement on its website from Andrea, her siblings Jenny and Sheila, and her step-brother Andrew.

"By acknowledging and honouring Andrea's truth, and being very clear about their wish to end the legacy of silence, the current store owners have become part of our family's healing," they said. "We wholly support the owners and staff."

For anyone who has been sexually assaulted, there is support available through crisis lines and local support services via the Ending Violence Association of Canada database . ​​If you're in immediate danger or fear for your safety or that of others around you, please call 911.

With files from CBC News and Isaac Phan Nay

Related Stories

• Western University reconsiders ties with Nobel laureate-writer Alice Munro after daughter's disclosure

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Alice munro's daughter says her mother did nothing to stop abusive stepfather.

Jaclyn Diaz

Author Alice Munro in 2009. Her daughter, Andrea Skinner, has come forward with allegations her stepfather abused her as a child and that Munro was aware and stayed with him until his death. Peter Muhly/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

The daughter of renowned Canadian author Alice Munro has revealed that she suffered sexual abuse at the hands of her stepfather and that her mother, a Nobel Prize winner, turned a blind eye to it.

In an op-ed published Sunday in the Toronto Star, Andrea Skinner wrote that Munro’s husband at the time, Gerald Fremlin, started abusing her in 1976 when she was 9 years old.

She wrote that she was visiting her mother that summer at her home in Clinton, Ontario, when, while Munro was away, Fremlin “climbed into the bed where I was sleeping and sexually assaulted me.”

Alice Munro, Nobel Prize-winning short story author, dies at 92

Munro died earlier this summer at the age of 92. The author was best known for her short stories , often placing her characters in rural Ontario — where Munro grew up. She was called the "master of the contemporary short story" by the Swedish Academy that awarded her the Nobel in 2013.

Since Skinner's op-ed was published, the literary world has expressed shock and sorrow, with authors publicly grappling with the formative work of Munro with the impact of her daughter's allegations.

Rebecca Makkai, a Pulitzer Prize finalist for The Great Believers , posted on X of Munro and the allegations, "I love her work so much that I don’t want to lose it, but am also horrified to see the meanings of many favorite (foundational, to me) stories shift under us."

Skinner said she is coming forward now because she wants her story “to become part of the stories people tell about my mother. I never wanted to see another interview, biography or event that didn’t wrestle with the reality of what had happened to me, and with the fact that my mother, confronted with the truth of what had happened, chose to stay with, and protect, my abuser.”

The Swedish Academy, which awarded Munro a Nobel Prize in 2013, called her a "master of the contemporary short story." Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Skinner said the abuse continued for years, with Fremlin often exposing himself to Skinner, telling the young girl about her mother's sexual needs and the “little girls in the neighborhood” that he told her he liked.

Skinner confided in her stepmother, who told James Munro, Skinner's father. James Munro did not confront his ex-wife about the abuse, and the assault continued with no adult intervention, Skinner wrote.

The abuse, and the heavy secret and silence she was forced to keep, took a drastic toll on Skinner, who developed debilitating migraines and bulimia as an adult. When she was 25, she wrote a letter to Munro, finally coming forward about the abuse.

Munro told her she felt betrayed and likened the abuse to an affair, a response that devastated Skinner, she wrote.

Canadian Alice Munro Wins Nobel's Literature Prize

In response, Fremlin wrote letters to Munro and the family, threatening to kill Skinner if she ever went to the police. He blamed Skinner for the abuse and described her as a child as a "home wrecker." He also threatened to expose photos he took of Skinner when she was a girl.

Munro went back to Fremlin and stayed with him until he died in 2013, Skinner wrote. Munro allegedly said “that she had been ‘told too late,’ she loved him too much, and that our misogynistic culture was to blame if I expected her to deny her own needs, sacrifice for her children, and make up for the failings of men. She was adamant that whatever had happened was between me and my stepfather. It had nothing to do with her," Skinner wrote in her essay.

In 2005, Skinner could stay quiet no longer. She reported Fremlin, who was 80 at the time, to police in Ontario, using letters he sent to the family as evidence. He pleaded guilty to one count of indecent assault and received a suspended sentence and probation for two years.

Skinner said she never reconciled with her mother, but has since rebuilt a relationship with her siblings.

Munro's Books, the company that Alice and James Munro started together when they were married, issued a statement of support for Skinner. The company has been independently owned since 2014 and wasn't speaking on behalf of the family.

The company said, "Learning the details of Andrea’s experience has been heartbreaking for all of us here at Munro’s Books. Along with so many readers and writers, we will need time to absorb this news and the impact it may have on the legacy of Alice Munro, whose work and ties to the store we have previously celebrated. It is important to respect Andrea’s choices over how her story is shared more widely."

The statement continued, "This story is Andrea’s to tell, and we will not be commenting further at this time."

Correction July 8, 2024

A previous version of this story misspelled Rebecca Makkai's last name.

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A Silence Is Shattered, and So Are Many Fans of Alice Munro

Admirers said they were “blindsided” by revelations that Munro’s youngest daughter had been abused by her stepfather — and that Munro stayed with him even after she learned of it years later.

By Alexandra Alter ,  Elizabeth A. Harris and Vjosa Isai

Revelations by the author Alice Munro’s youngest daughter that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather as a child, and that Munro stayed with the abuser even after he was convicted of the assault, reverberated in Canada and across the literary world on Monday.

The story, told by Munro’s daughter Andrea Skinner in an essay in The Toronto Star and reported by the same newspaper, left many of Munro’s admirers reeling, wondering how a writer of her stature was able to keep such a secret for decades and how the revelations might impact her towering legacy.

“Alice was always kind of Saint Alice,” said Martin Levin, the former editor of the books section at The Globe and Mail. He heard “not even the faintest whisper or hint” of the news in his 20 years at the paper, he said.

For decades, Munro has been revered for her sharply observed short fiction and her insights into human nature and relationships. Even as she won the Nobel Prize in 2013, Munro remained private and unassuming, and described her life in a small town in Ontario as ordinary, quiet and happy.

That image of Munro, who died in May at age 92, shattered on Sunday.

The Canadian novelist Margaret Atwood wrote in an email that she was “blindsided” by the revelations. While she had learned a bit about the cause of the family rift a couple of years ago, from one of Munro’s other daughters, she never knew the full story until she read Skinner’s account.

“Why did she stay? Search me,” wrote Atwood of Munro’s decision. “I think they were from a generation and place that shoveled things under the carpet.”

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Alice Munro’s daughter alleges sexual abuse by the late author’s husband

FILE - Canadian author Alice Munro is photographed during an interview in Victoria, B.C. Tuesday, Dec.10, 2013. (Chad Hipolito/The Canadian Press via AP, File)

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TORONTO (AP) — The daughter of the late Nobel laureate Alice Munro has accused the author’s second husband, Gerard Fremlin, of sexual abuse, writing that her mother remained with him because she “loved him too much” to leave.

Munro, who died in May at age 92, was one of the world’s most celebrated and beloved writers and a source of ongoing pride for her native Canada, where a reckoning with the author’s legacy is now concentrated.

Andrea Robin Skinner, Munro’s daughter with her first husband, James Munro, wrote in an essay published in the Toronto Star that Fremlin sexually assaulted her in the mid-1970s — when she was 9 — and continued to harass and abuse her until she became a teenager. Skinner, whose essay ran Sunday, wrote that in her 20s she told the author about Fremlin’s abuse. Munro left her husband for a time, but eventually returned and was still with him when he died, in 2013.

“She reacted exactly as I had feared she would, as if she had learned of an infidelity,” Skinner wrote. “She said that she had been ‘told too late,’ she loved him too much, and that our misogynistic culture was to blame if I expected her to deny her own needs, sacrifice for her children and make up for the failings of men. She was adamant that whatever had happened was between me and my stepfather. It had nothing to do with her.”

Skinner wrote that she became estranged from her mother and siblings as a result. Shortly after The New York Times’ magazine published a 2004 story in which Munro gushed about Fremlin, Skinner decided to contact Ontario Provincial Police and provided them letters in which Fremlin had admitted abusing her, the Toronto Star reported in a companion news story also published Sunday. At 80, he pleaded guilty to one count of indecent assault and received a suspended sentence — one that was not widely reported for nearly two decades.

The news stunned and grieved the literary world, although some readers — and Skinner herself — cited parallels in the author’s work, for which she was awarded the Nobel in 2013 and dubbed a “master of the contemporary short story” by the judges.

Author Margaret Atwood, a fellow Canadian and longtime friend of Munro’s, told the Star that she didn’t know about Skinner’s story until after Fremlin had died and Munro was struggling with dementia.

“The kids probably wondered why she stayed with him,” Atwood said. “All I can add is that she wasn’t very adept at real (practical) life. She wasn’t very interested in cooking or gardening or any of that. She found it an interruption, I expect, rather than a therapy, as some do.”

The owners of Munro’s Books, a prominent independent store in Victoria, British Columbia, issued a statement Monday expressing support for Skinner and calling her account “heartbreaking.” The author co-founded the store in 1963 with first husband and Skinner’s father, James Munro, who continued to run the store after their 1971 divorce. Two years before his 2016 death, he turned the store over to four staff members.

“Along with so many readers and writers, we will need time to absorb this news and the impact it may have on the legacy of Alice Munro, whose work and ties to the store we have previously celebrated,” the store said in a statement issued Monday.

In Skinner’s account, she wrote that she had told her father — with whom she lived for most of the year — of the initial assault, but he told her not to tell her mother and continued to send her to Munro and Fremlin for summers.

“The current store owners have become part of our family’s healing, and are modelling a truly positive response to disclosures like Andrea’s,” reads a statement from Skinner and other family members posted on the store’s website. “We wholly support the owners and staff of Munro’s Books as they chart a new future.”

Although Skinner spent many years estranged from her siblings, they have since reconciled and her family spoke with the Toronto Star in support of Skinner. While they felt the world needed to know of the coverup and that sexual violence must be talked about, the Star reported, Munro’s children believe her acclaimed literary reputation is deserved.

“I still feel she’s such a great writer — she deserved the Nobel,” daughter Sheila Munro told the Star. “She devoted her life to it, and she manifested this amazing talent and imagination. And that’s all, really, she wanted to do in her life. Get those stories down and get them out.”

Sheila Munro, also an author, wrote of her mother in the 2002 book “Lives of Mothers & Daughters: Growing Up With Alice Munro,” a project suggested by Alice Munro. Sheila makes no reference to the abuse of Skinner, but does observe that her mother often drew upon her private life and that she struggled to separate Munro’s fiction “from the reality of what actually happened.”

Munro biographer Robert Thacker noted to The Associated Press that such Munro stories as “Silence” and “Runaway” center on estranged children. In “Vandals,” a woman grieves over the loss of a former boyfriend, Ladner, an unstable war veteran who we learn assaulted his young neighbor, Liza.

“When Ladner grabbed Liza and squashed himself against her, she had a sense of deep danger inside him, a mechanical sputtering,” Munro wrote, “as if he would exhaust himself in one jab of light, and nothing would be left of but black smoke and burnt smells and frazzled wires.”

Thacker, whose “Alice Munro: Writing Her Lives” came out in 2005 — the same year Fremlin was convicted — told the AP that he had long known of Fremlin’s abuse but omitted it from his book because it was a “scholarly analysis of her career.”

“I expected there to be repercussions one day,” said Thacker, who added that he even spoke to the author about it. “I don’t want to get into details but it wrecked the family. It was devastating in lots of ways. And it was something that she spoke deeply on.”

Italie reported from New York.