marawi war essay

The Battle of Marawi: A Brief Summary

Posted in: conflict , south & southeast asia | posted on december 24, 2017 january 15, 2018 by robert postings.

As the Islamic State (IS) was being driven from its stronghold of Mosul in Iraq and Kurdish fighters were preparing to attack its de-facto capital of Raqqa in Syria, many believed that IS had finally been defeated. However, following a botched raid by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to capture a wanted terrorist commander in Marawi, armed militants stormed the city. The AFP were driven out while militants burnt buildings, desecrated churches, freed prisoners and raised IS’s black standard more than 8,000km away from where they first declared their caliphate. Despite the Philippine government claiming the battle would be over in days it took five months of hard fighting to recapture the city, leaving over 1,000 dead and Marawi in ruins.

This is not the first instance of Islamic militancy in the country, armed groups have fought Spain, America, and the Philippines for over four centuries. The modern conflict started in the 1970’s with several groups fighting for independence in historically Muslim regions of the majority Christian Philippines. Treaties have been signed with the largest two of these groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), for varying degrees of autonomy. However more radical factions often made up of splinter groups or former fighters from MNLF and MILF continue to fight the government for independence such as the Maute Group, Abu Sayyef, Ansharul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters.

Although they lost this battle, ISEA militants are by no means a beaten force. They continue to clash with the AFP and MILF, while they have attempted to carry out multiple terror attacks. Marawi also gained them a significant propaganda victory, and signalled to the world just how deadly IS can be even in what are perceived to be weaker branches. So despite much jubilation among soldiers, civilians, and the government alike there must be great caution moving forwards. This battle will plague the Philippines for years, and could be the start of a much more dangerous phase of Islamic militancy in the country. For the Philippine government, this should be a much-belated wake-up call about the continued threat IS poses to the country, for all the innocents that would suffer under future violence, we must hope they heed it.

Robert Postings

Robert Postings is a writer for the International Review whose research focus is the Islamic State. As well as writing for the International Review he co-authored the 'Spiders of the Caliphate' research paper for the Counter Extremism Project and has published work with the Modern War Institute at West Point and The Defence Post.

• Robert Postings https://international-review.org/author/rpostings/ The Islamic State's Armed Drone Program
• Robert Postings https://international-review.org/author/rpostings/ Free Syria Police: Creating Security and Stability in North Aleppo
• Robert Postings https://international-review.org/author/rpostings/ Free Syria Police: A Difficult Road Ahead
• Robert Postings https://international-review.org/author/rpostings/ Mujahidat: The Female Fighters of the Islamic State

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The Lessons of the Battle of Marawi: An Urban Warfare Project Case Study

John Spencer , Jayson Geroux and Liam Collins | 05.23.24

Seven years ago today, at 2:18 pm local time, soldiers of the Philippine Army’s 4th Light Reaction Company approached a house on the western side of the city of Marawi. Intelligence indicated that inside the house were two leaders of the Islamic State in the Philippines—an Islamist group that had been formed in 2016 with the merger of several other militant organizations.

Hastily planned and executed, the raid triggered a firefight that lasted through the night and into the following day. By the afternoon, when the assaulting force finally secured the target building, the leaders had escaped. The failed raid accelerated the terrorist group’s plans for a major offensive in Marawi, for which the group’s leaders had facilitated the infiltration into the city of a large number of fighters, as well as stockpiles of weapons, explosives, drones, and other materiel. They quickly seized substantial portions of the urban area, including taking many of its residents hostage. A battle to recapture Marawi from the militants followed—an intense and challenging fight that took five months.

The eight installment of the Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series describes the Battle of Marawi, pulling lessons from it—at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels—that help to provide a better and more nuanced understanding of the unique complexities of urban warfare. You can read the case study here , and be sure to follow the Urban Warfare Project for future case studies and insightful analysis of challenges faced by military forces operating in cities.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the   Urban Warfare Project Podcast . He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq.   He is the author of the book   Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War   and coauthor of   Understanding Urban Warfare .

Major Jayson Geroux is an infantry officer with The Royal Canadian Regiment and is currently with the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre. He has been a fervent student of and has been involved in urban operations training for over two decades. He is an equally passionate military historian and has participated in, planned, executed, and intensively instructed on urban operations and urban warfare history for the past ten years. He has served twenty-eight years in the Canadian Armed Forces, which included operational tours to the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Afghanistan.

Liam Collins, PhD was the founding director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and a Fellow at New America. He is a retired Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America, with multiple combat operations in Fallujah in 2004. He is coauthor of  Understanding Urban Warfare .

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization with which the authors are affiliated, including the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Department of National Defence .

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The Modern War Institute does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Rather, the Modern War Institute provides a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Comments will be moderated before posting to ensure logical, professional, and courteous application to article content.

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Looking Back on Marawi: An Analysis of Islamic State Terrorism in the Philippines

By: Ben Schaefer, Columnist

Photo credit: Jes Aznar for The New York Times

On May 23, 2017 Philippine insurgents affiliated with the Islamic State captured the world’s attention when they seized the city of Marawi on the Philippines’ southern island of Mindanao.[ [i] ] Five months later, with little fanfare from mainstream media, Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte announced that the insurgency had been defeated, the group’s major leaders killed by government forces.[ [ii] ] Similarly, the Philippine National Defense Secretary assured reporters that all of the fighters involved in the siege were killed, yet hundreds of other militants still live on the Philippines’ less governed islands, creating future opportunities for these groups to make territorial advancements on Mindanao.

Mindanao and the other islands south of the Philippine mainland enjoy isolation from the central government’s security apparatus. Many groups involved with Southeast Asian terrorism find safe haven on the small islands near Mindanao, and porous borders with neighboring countries allow a free flow of fighters, arms, and supplies for insurgent groups. These fighters are unlikely to give up simply because the siege of Marawi failed, and further insurgent activities will almost certainly continue with Mindanao as a launching ground for the hostilities.

Islamist groups have long advocated for independence or autonomy from the rest of the Philippines. Mindanao, located in the country’s south, has a history of being an Islamic stronghold in Southeast Asia, and has been targeted for political and religious conversion since Spanish colonization in the 1500s.[ [iii] ] More recently, early twentieth century policies encouraged transmigration for Christians from other parts of the country and Mindanao’s once Muslim majority now represents only about twenty percent of the population.[ [iv] ][ [v] ] These demographic shifts caused deep feelings of resentment among the Muslim population, and in the 1970’s armed political groups began pushing—often violently—for greater autonomy. Today Mindanao is one of the poorest regions in the Philippines, and many inhabitants of the island feel their voices continuously go unheard by the government in Manila.[ [vi] ]

The Islamic State is not the first insurgent group to wreak havoc on Mindanao, nor is it even the most prolific. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the first highly organized Muslim self-determination movement, began waging a low-intensity insurgency in 1971.[ [vii] ] After peace talks with the Philippine government in 1996, the MNLF negotiated autonomous status for Mindanao and gained a stake in the Philippines political process, effectively ending its reign as the nation’s leading terrorist organization.[ [viii] ]

During the same period, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf followed suite, beginning violent confrontations with government forces in 1977 and 1989 respectively, based on more extreme versions of self-determination than those envisioned by the MNLF.[ [ix] ] These groups both continue to operate today, seeking more narrowly defined secessionist goals than the MNLF. Recently, the MILF began negotiations with government forces to generate political concessions regarding further autonomy for Mindanao.[ [x] ] Abu Sayyaf on the other hand, along with a network of other small secessionist terrorist organizations, aligned itself with the Islamic State.[ [xi] ] The Siege of Marawi grew out of a Philippine operation to capture Abu Sayyaf’s leader, Isnilon Hapilon, who took over the Islamic State in the Philippines and was reported to be hiding in the city.[ [xii] ] The ensuing five-month conflict demonstrated the resolve of terrorist forces not to back down to government security measures.

Marawi is now firmly back in the hands of the Philippine government, and the Islamic State is defeated in the Middle East, reduced to small pockets of resistance and cadres of support in its previously conquered provinces.[ [xiii] ] However, while President Duterte and the Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana announced that all of the insurgents had been killed or captured, there is reason to speculate otherwise.

Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group, the main organizations comprising the Islamic State in the Philippines, retained large bases of tacit supporters in the Southern Philippines, allowing a continuous flow of new recruits to swell the organizations’ dwindling ranks. Further, regional experts believe that President Duterte may have inflated the number of militants killed, meaning many fighters could have escaped back to their safe havens on less secure islands outside government control.[ [xiv] ] These experts also expressed concern that certain military tactics may have killed more civilians than actually disclosed, which could in turn increase the groups’ recruitment potential.[ [xv] ] Finally, the terrorist groups which started out as disparate and largely unrelated may have been driven closer together by the siege. Increased partnerships between terrorist organizations could facilitate a quicker resurgence of violence than might otherwise be expected.

In the eight months since Marawi was recaptured, there have been no signs of a major terrorist resurgence in the Philippines; however, officials are wary. Sec. Def. Lorenzana indicated at a conference in March that terrorist recruitment continues apace, aided by technological advancements and cryptocurrency.[ [xvi] ] The Philippine Army continues to launch operations aimed at IS-affiliated fighters in the area surrounding Marawi.[ [xvii] ] Meanwhile, the US State Department listed ISIS-Philippines as one of its newly designated terrorist organizations last February.[ [xviii] ] Finally, the entire Southeast Asian region is set to absorb potentially hundreds or thousands of returning foreign fighters from the Middle East, at a time when Muslim persecution, especially against Rohingyas in Myanmar, is at an all-time high.[ [xix] ] This confluence of circumstance, coupled with an already lax security apparatus in the islands of the Southern Philippines, could be the perfect mix to allow the Islamic State and its affiliates to regroup, recuperate, and launch more successful attacks in the future.

[[i]] Felipe Villamor, “Philippines Calls City ‘Liberated,’ Months After ISIS Allies Seized It,” The New York Times, October 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/asia/philippines-marawi-fighting.html .

[[ii]] Villamor, “Philippines Calls City ‘Liberated.’”

[[iii]] Angel Rabasa and Pater Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia , (RAND Corporation, 2001), 85.

[[iv]] Ibid. 85-86.

[[v]] “Philippines, International Religious Freedom Report 2004,” United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35425.htm .

[[vi]] Ralph Jennings, “Why The Philippine Fight Against ISIS-Backed Rebels Can’t End Even After Victory,” Forbes , October 17, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/10/17/why-the-philippine-fight-against-isis-backed-rebels-cant-end-even-after-victory/#1fccd8b47d5d .

[[vii]] Rabasa and Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia, 86

[[viii]] Ibid. 86-87

[[ix]] Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Sara A. Daly, and Brian A. Jackson, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Echange of New Technologies , (RAND Corporation, 2007), 28-30.

[[x]] Adam Desiderio, Isobel Yeung, Angad Singh, “A Muslim insurgency called MILF is close to getting a homeland in the Philippines,” VICE News, June 3, 2018, https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/zm8yve/a-muslim-insurgency-called-milf-is-close-to-getting-a-homeland-in-the-philippines .

[[xi]] Ted Regencia, “Marawi Siege: Army Kills Abu Sayyaf, Maute Commanders,” Al Jazeera , October 16, 2017,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/marawi-siege-army-kills-abu-sayyaf-maute-commanders-171016072551985.html .

[[xii]] Audrey Morallo, “AFP: Marawi Clashes Part of Security Operation, Not Terrorist Attack,” Philstar , May 23, 2017, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/23/1702885/afp-marawi-clashes-part-security-operation-not-terrorist-attack .

[[xiii]] Daniel L. Byman, “Where Will the Islamic State Go Next?” The Brookings Institution , June 25, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/25/where-will-the-islamic-state-go-next/ .

[[xiv]] Audrey Morallo, “Expert: Military Offensives vs Maute Can Fuel Recruitment,” Philstar , October 24, 2017, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/10/24/1752049/expert-military-offensives-vs-maute-can-fuel-recruitment .

[[xv]] Morallo, “Expert: Military Offensives vs Maute Can Fuel Recruitment.”

[[xvi]] Nyshka Chandran, “Family Terrorism is Southeast Asia’s Newest Threat, Defense Officials Warn,” CNBC , June 3, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/03/family-terrorism-is-southeast-asias-newest-threat-defense-officials-warn.html .

[[xvii]] “Philippines: Thousands flee as army hits ISIL-linked Maute group,” Al Jazeera, June 20, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/philippines-thousands-flee-army-hits-isil-linked-maute-group-180620065038477.html .

[[xviii]] “State Department Terrorist Designations of ISIS Affiliates and Senior Leaders,” United States Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, February 27, 2018,   https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/278883.htm .

[[xix]] Yaroslav Trofimov, “Islamic State’s Attacks Raise Threat of Southeast Asia Hub,” The Wall Street Journal , June 27, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-attacks-raise-threat-of-southeast-asia-hub-1528363801 .

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Published by Ben Schaefer

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One thought on “ Looking Back on Marawi: An Analysis of Islamic State Terrorism in the Philippines ”

Whilst the article is a very good overview of the situation in the Southern Philippines, one activity that is not mentioned is the current surrendering of many ASG militants to the Philippine authorities under the Philippine’s Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) and Comprehensive Local Integration Program (CLIP).

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• Rise to Peace blog

Five Years After the Philippines’ Marawi Siege: Lessons from Within

Residents check what is left of their building after the five-month war in the Philippines. (Photo: Manman Dejeto)

It has been almost five years since armed militants from two ISIL-affiliated organizations, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute, battled with Philippine government forces on May 23, 2017 . The siege ensued when the military attempted to arrest senior ISIL leader Isnilon Hapilon.

As a result, attackers retaliated, proclaiming the city a nascent caliphate of ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant, more commonly known as ISIS. Before capturing the city’s major thoroughfares and significant bridges, the armed militants caused severe damage to Catholic churches, the city jail, and two schools. Militants also beheaded a police officer and took churchgoers and residents hostage.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte imposed martial law across the entire island of Mindanao on the evening of the assaults. Initially, President Duterte expected the fighting to finish in a matter of weeks. However, he had no idea that this was simply the beginning of a more bloody and horrific assault.

Who Were the Perpetrators?

The main commanders of this unprecedented assault, Isnilon Hapilon, and brothers Abdullah and Omar Maute were members of the local armed groups, Abu Sayyaf and Maute. Both groups have historically been responsible for bombings, attacks on government forces, and hostage-taking in the Philippines. However, foreign militants participated in the war, including those from Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Chechnya. There is also evidence that the terrorist members involved in this attack enlisted a significant number of radicalized children and teenagers, many of whom were recruited from Marawi’s local schools.

During the conflict, an estimated 1,200 people were declared dead . Although the majority of these were militant extremists, Amnesty International claimed that the militants also carried out kidnappings and extrajudicial executions.

Mission Accomplished

The capture of Marawi prompted the Philippines’ most prolonged armed combatant insurgency. Government troops seized a stronghold on October 16, 2017, killing both Hapilon and Maute. After troops subdued the remaining ISIS fighters on October 23, 2017, five months after the siege began, Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said there were no more “militants” in Marawi, which ended the long, weary battle.

The Aftermath of the Marawi Siege

The Marawi crisis, which affected many residents, had a significant impact on the local market and the daily needs of Marawi families. According to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Philippines, the Marawi armed conflict between government troops and pro-ISIS insurgents has internally displaced 98% of the area’s overall population , as well as villagers from nearby municipalities, who were forced to flee due to severe food scarcity and political and economic restrictions.

How is Marawi Now?

After years of planning and reconstructing the country’s sole Islamic city, Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) is nearing the completion of the major rehabilitation operation for internally displaced families. Even within Marawi’s most impacted area, or “ground zero,” the Maranaws, particularly those displaced by the 2017-armed war, are now reaping the first dividends of the government-led rebuilding.

Meanwhile, the Marawi Fire Substation, a Maritime Outpost, the Rorogagus Barangay Health Station, the Marawi Central Police Station, and a solar power irrigation system were all completed, to help the Maranaws embrace a complete and secure community with peace and stabilization.

Furthermore, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) administration has set aside P500 million for Marawi’s reconstruction in 2021 as part of the newly-formed government’s 12-point priority plan.

Lessons Learned and Reflections as a Filipino Counter-Terrorism Practitioner

I have learned that the scars of this historic siege will undoubtedly persist in the hearts of those who were affected, as well as the troops who were determined to defend the people, even if it meant risking their lives. The standard narrative is that it is their job. However, I am referencing their fortitude in the midst of their weapons’ failure; terrorist groups have also leveraged technical advancement in plotting, recruiting, and networking, making it even more difficult to obverse.

Filipinos are known for their “resilience.” Most people define it as the ability to bounce back from setbacks, embrace change, and persevere in the face of adversity. It is meaningless to be resilient if the Philippine government’s response to these issues is ambiguous. How eager and probing is the government to promote research to fight atrocities in the aftermath of the Marawi Siege? Is this enough, if there is a movement at all? What was the intensity of the response to the Marawi crisis?

We should not box our belief that resilience is the only chance. There is also hope, the ability to recognize important goals, the measures required to achieve them, and the willingness to take those steps. This requires an extensive effort of the government to connect with the civil society in order to prioritize their goals in the field of local security. Although the resilient superhero is often thought to be preferable, it has a dark side ; it possesses the same characteristics that hinder self-awareness and, as a result, the ability to maintain a realistic self-concept.

As a Filipino, I believe we should start by assessing where we stand in terms of counter-terrorism operations, such as preventing and suppressing terrorism financing, and encouraging constructive dialogue on counter-terrorism challenges , particularly based upon the principles between state officials and the private sector, social service organizations, and news outlets. Although there is evidence of a deterrent , the government should always consistently take action to prevent such unprecedented happenings.

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

Chapter 2: Islamic City Under Siege | Marawi Siege: Stories from the Front Lines

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This is Chapter 2 of the book ‘Marawi Siege: Stories from the Front lines.’ Written by journalist Carmela Fonbuena, it provides context to the five-month battle in 2017 between Philippine security forces and Islamic State-inspired militant groups. It was one of 5 nominees to the 2021 Witold Pilecki International Book Award. 

PCIJ is republishing two chapters of the book to mark the 5th year of the siege. Read Chapter 1 here . For updates on the rehabilitation, read  this .

Marawi City was home to more than 200,000 residents, almost entirely Muslims who called themselves Maranaos or lake dwellers in the vernacular. Lake Lanao, a beautiful and fabled body of water straddling 19 of the towns of Lanao del Sur province, was the center of many people’s lives and livelihood, although in time fishermen woefully found there was not always enough catch. The lake was threatened by a growing population, siltation, water pollution, and global warming. The people of the lake had turned to trading for livelihood, selling garments and malong, wood carvings, and brassware. They worked in factories as machine operators and assemblers. They were sales workers. Despite the lake’s decay, however, it was Mindanao’s main source of power, generously sending water into the Agus River to turn the turbines of hydroelectric stations.

Marawi City was the largest urban center in the ARMM, and was the region’s center of commerce, services, and culture. It was host to government institutions, such as the Amai Pakpak Medical Hospital, a tertiary health facility that served patients from the entire region. It was host to dozens of educational institutions, including the main campus of the Mindanao State University (MSU) and the protestant-run Dansalan College, attended by thousands of students coming from as far as Davao City. It was host to the provincial capitol, a military headquarters, and a Catholic Church that served a small population of Catholics who found jobs in the city.

Marawi was busy and bustling, but it was surrounded by poverty. Six out of 10 persons in the city lived below the poverty line or less than $500 a year. The province was one of the country’s poorest, too.

Up to 99% of Marawi’s population was Muslim. They were very religious, just going by the ubiquity of mosques in the city. Visitors driving around would find them and their minarets coming into view every few blocks, making for a spectacular sight especially against the changing colors of the sky at sunrise or sunset.

On the fateful afternoon of May 23, residents were busy preparing for Ramadan when shots were fired in Barangay Basak Malutlut. Islam’s holiest month was to begin three days later. 

Marawi, whose old name was Dansalan, was no stranger to violence. The city has a rich history of conflict against invaders who tried to undermine the independence of the Maranaos, a clannish people who wanted to keep their way of life. They were said to be the last major tribe to be Islamized in the 13th century. They fought the Spaniards, the Americans, and the Japanese who colonized the country. They fought the Philippine government, too, in support of  the rebellion of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and, later, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Violence and conflict had become part of Marawi’s present. Gun battles were not uncommon in the city and nearby regions, which was why many Marawi residents largely ignored the fighting in Basak Malutlut on May 23. 

In recent months, the military had been aggressive in hunting down Marawi’s homegrown militants Omar and Abdullah Maute of the Maute Group, tagged as leaders of Islamic State-Lanao. The violence they started in Butig town 50 kilometers away, where they originally sought to establish a caliphate and engaged the military in gun battles, had spread to other towns in the province. In December 2016, elite troops from the police Special Action Force (SAF) also raided the Maute family compound inside the city. An improvised explosive device was set off, wounding one of the cops, but the occupants of the compound offered little resistance and the brothers were not found. In April 2017, clashes also erupted in Piagapo, a town near Marawi where foreign fighters were killed.

If it wasn’t a military operation, it could have been rido or clan war, which was pervasive in the ARMM provinces. These were outbursts of retaliatory violence between families which might have been triggered by multiple causes, but usually land disputes and deaths of loved ones. Experts had linked rido to people’s perception that the justice system was weak and courts were useless in any attempt to prosecute criminals. It had motivated people to take justice into their own hands.

In the years prior to the siege, clan-related violence was most frequent in Lanao del Sur. It recorded at least 24 incidents in 2016, following 36 incidents in 2015. It was an average of two or three incidents a month in the past two years, although it was assumed that many cases went unreported. Up to 100 people were killed from rido in 2016 alone. Families learned to live with the constant threat of violence. They stayed away from the conflicts of other families. They built their houses from solid concrete to make their homes impenetrable to small bullets. They also kept their own guns, many of them unregistered, creating a culture that continued to feed the violence. 

Residents didn’t really know what was happening in Basak Malutlut, but they expected the clashes to stop after a few hours. That was usually the case. As the afternoon turned into night on May 23, however, they were horrified to discover that the city had turned into a war zone. The rest was history.

Past 1 p.m. 

“Alex” was idling his time with his teenage son at a mosque inside the city center when they heard the heavy volume of gunfire from Basak Malutlut, about 10 kilometers away on the other side of Agus river. Later on the streets, he saw men distributing guns. They were telling people Islam was under attack and they needed to defend it. He grabbed a long firearm.

Alex was recruited a year earlier to join Dawlah Islamiyah — literally, Islamic State — by a local religious leader from his hometown of Piagapo, where he lived with his wife and six children. He said he was enthralled to imagine a place where everybody abided strictly by the Qur’an and Sharia because under them the sinful were properly punished. “We were told Dawlah Islamiyah was the true Islam,” Alex said. He claimed he didn’t know Dawlah Islamiyah had links to the Maute Group. He said he never met the Maute siblings nor were they ever mentioned to him.

Alex was probably recruited to join the group because of his experience as former combatant of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an MNLF breakaway group that also rejected ARMM and grew to become the country’s dominant Muslim rebel group. The MILF fought government forces viciously before it also sat down for talks. It signed a peace agreement in 2014 but it was yet to be implemented when the siege erupted.

Alex was no longer with the MILF, had long retired as combatant, and had lost his appetite for battles when he joined Dawlah Islamiyah. 

He embraced the teachings of the religious teacher, but swore that he ignored calls to join the fighting in Butig in 2016. He said he also ignored calls to join the fighting in his hometown Piagapo a month before the Marawi siege. What changed him? The religious leader he looked up to was killed in the clashes in April. “I was really angry at the soldiers who killed him,” Alex said. He wasn’t the only one in his neighborhood who joined the fighting in Marawi to avenge his death. 

What surprised Alex was seeing his teenage son, a student at an Arabic school in Marawi, also grab a firearm. He was told to follow one group while his son and fellow students followed another. 

Around 3 p.m.

From a CCTV screen on the second floor of the Amai Pakpak Medical Center, 23-year-old Jan Yamit saw how armed men in black clothing shot a police officer at the hospital gate. The armed men brought wounded comrades, whom Jan presumed came from the fighting in Basak Malutlut. He knew instantly they were local members of “ISIS,” acronym for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the original name for the Islamic State in international news. From the beginning, residents in Marawi referred to the black-clad fighters as ISIS. It was never the Maute Group, Dawlah Islamiyah, or Abu Sayyaf Group for them. 

Jan was a Christian. He and his new family moved to Marawi when he got a job at the hospital. Seeing the armed men kill the cop, he knew he had to leave the hospital immediately. He ran to his brother, an elevator operator at the hospital, before the armed men could get to them. They spent the next hour moving from one room to another, looking for the best place to hide. They found a way out on the third floor, where the windows of the hospital and the neighboring building were close enough to cross using a wooden plank. 

It was here, at the Amai Pakpak Medical Center, that the armed men flew the black flag of the Islamic State. It was one of the first images posted online and picked up by local and international media. It gave those who doubted reports of Islamic State influence on a small country oceans away in Southeast Asia something to think about. 

Jan called his wife and instructed her to take their son and proceed immediately to Kampo Ranao, where he believed they would be safe. He and his brother first sought refuge in a house neighboring the hospital, but the Muslim owner only allowed them to stay until 7 p.m. As the violence escalated, the house owner grew wary he might anger ISIS if he protected Christians. 

Jan and his brother navigated their way to Kampo Ranao. There was chaos in the streets. Gun battles could be heard erupting everywhere. Buildings — including the city jail where a hundred prisoners were released to join the fighting — burned against the night sky. At the gate of the camp, they found many Christians like them seeking the military’s protection.

From before 2 p.m. to evening

Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra was just leaving for a relative’s wake outside the city when he heard gunshots popping off early afternoon on May 23. There was heavy traffic when he reached Basak Malutlut. Vehicles were turning around because soldiers had blocked the road. People on foot, in different states of panic, were scrambling to get away. 

Gandamra ordered his driver to park the vehicle on the roadside and asked his police escort to coordinate with the military. “The raid in Basak Malutlut was not a total surprise,” he said. Weeks before May 23, there was a raid in a nearby town, where wounded armed men supposedly from the clashes in Piagapo were brought to Marawi to get medical attention. 

The military didn’t coordinate these kinds of activities with local leaders, which Gandamra said he understood. “These operations might be sensitive,” he said.  Civil society groups in Marawi ascribed it to the personality of the new Kampo Ranao commander, however. They noted that Fortes, since he assumed the post in January, had not convened a meeting with them despite their requests. They would have wanted better cooperation between the military and the local population amid the threats that the city was facing.

As early as December 2016, President Duterte himself revealed that the Maute Group had threatened to burn Marawi City if the military didn’t stop its operations in Butig. He said the message was brought to him by his emissaries to the Maute Group, which he hoped would agree to talk to his government.

Gandamra said he had been getting increasingly paranoid because the clashes were getting closer to Marawi. He got his updates from the local media, which closely monitored military operations against the Maute Group. 

Butig Mayor Jimmy Pansar, who was cooperating with the military to flush out the Maute Group from his town, had warned Gandamra to take the threat of the Maute Group seriously. He even suggested Gandamra should prepare the village officials to fight it out with the militants if they attacked the city.

Gandamra said he asked the city police to increase their presence in strategic areas, but he was told the cops didn’t have enough men and firearms. He said he also gathered village officials and the Barangay Peacekeeping Action Teams (BPAT), the civilian auxiliary force of the police, to prepare for the threat. “But what could they really do if a group of heavily armed men came to their areas? They couldn’t bring firearms to patrol the barangays because the soldiers might arrest them,” he said.

In Basak Malutlut, troops told the mayor’s police escort the situation was under control. But Gandamra said he had a bad feeling. He went home to gather men and guns. He returned to the city hall at around 3 p.m. and closed the gate of the compound. 

The situation escalated quickly. Soon he received reports of black-clad armed men massing up in various parts of the city. He called Fortes, but he was in Manila. He talked to Bautista, who said soldiers were on their way to protect the city hall.

As nightfall came, and the soldiers had not arrived, the mayor got nervous. The armed men had occupied the city center; the police and the military were not taking his calls anymore. Speaking in a phone interview on CNN Philippines, a distressed Gandamra appealed for reinforcement. “It’s just me and my relatives guarding the city hall. I hope they will send forces to the city center so people will feel their presence, and we can prevent any plans that [the militants] might have to occupy government offices,” the mayor said.

Troops didn’t arrive that night. They were ambushed on the way and fought throughout the night, surprised by the defenses of the enemy. First Lieutenant John Carl Morales, commander of a company under the 49th Infantry Battalion, was the first officer killed during the siege.

Around 4 p.m.

In Dansalan College, teacher Lordvin Acopio was preparing his schedule for the next school year when he heard the popping sounds from Basak Malutlut. “We couldn’t tell at the beginning if those were fireworks for a party or an exchange of gunfire. It became clear later on that it was a gun battle, but like most people we thought it was just another rido,” Acopio said.

A native of the Visayas, Acopio had not stayed in Marawi for long, but he had grown to like the city despite his parents’ concerns. He just completed one school year teaching math and history to Grade 7 pupils at the protestant-run school that the Maute siblings attended when they were younger. He liked teaching there and decided to stay another school year. 

He went back to his task, isolating himself to study the course loads of different classes to make sure his teaching schedule didn’t overlap. When parents started arriving to collect their children from their summer classes, he and fellow teachers realized the situation was more serious. 

The teachers locked themselves inside one of the buildings. It was almost evening when the armed men reached Dansalan College and ordered them to come out. “They’re coming inside!” a fellow teacher screamed as she watched from the window how the armed men broke through the school gate. Most teachers had gone home, but Acopio and others who lived faraway stayed.

“Come out!” the armed men shouted as they occupied the school grounds. “They’re barricading the building!” screamed the same teacher. A Maranao teacher approached the armed men and tried to talk them out of their plans, but to no avail. 

“Come out or we will burn the building!” the armed men growled. They made good on their threat and started burning the main building. 

Of all the violence that happened that day, it was this act against a symbolic institution for the Maranaos that offended the residents deeply. They couldn’t fathom how fellow Maranaos would destroy their city.

By then the teachers knew they didn’t have a choice. “We went out of the building. They ordered us to surrender gadgets and all electronic devices, but they told us they were going to bring us somewhere safe,” said Acopio. 

“They segregated the Maranaos from the Christians based on the way we spoke. We had teachers who knew Maranao, but they (the armed men) could detect the tone. They allowed the Maranaos to go home, but told them to tell the authorities and the military that they had us as hostages,” he said. Acopio and the remaining teachers, mostly women, were forced inside a van. They sat on the floor and began to cry as the vehicle rolled down the city streets. One of the armed men tried to give assurances that they would be brought somewhere safe; Acopio wanted to believe him. 

All of a sudden the vehicle stopped. Catholic priest Teresito “Chito” Soganub and church workers at the Saint Mary’s Parish joined them in the van. The vehicle continued to circle the city streets, as if waiting for something, and made a few more stops to change guards. 

“They later instructed us to reach out to powerful people and military officers we knew. They said, ‘Tell them we’ve taken you hostage. They should withdraw or we will hurt you.’ They tried to comfort us at first by saying they would bring us somewhere safe. But then they told us later they were going to kill us if the military didn’t withdraw. They said they’d start with the priest,” Acopio recalled.

Before 8 p.m.

Marawi Bishop Edward Dela Peña’s phone rang. It was his secretary’s number calling. The bishop was away and had been waiting for news all afternoon, praying fervently that church workers at the Saint Mary’s Cathedral in Marawi were safe from the violence unfolding in the city. 

“To my surprise, it was the voice of an angry man on the other line. He was already giving me his demands. I should tell the military it should declare a ceasefire. Troops shouldn’t run after the group and they shouldn’t attempt to go near them. Otherwise, they would hurt the hostages. They gave me one hour to do it. The accent was very heavy. I couldn’t tell if he was Maranao or he was from another ethnic group,” Dela Peña said.

The bishop froze in fear as he heard women crying in the background. He imagined the terror the church workers were going through. His silence frustrated the man on the other end of the line, who then gave the phone to Father Chito. “Bishop,” Dela Peña heard the shaking voice of his right-hand man, “we’re taken hostage, Bishop.” The phone was snatched from Father Chito as soon as he had relayed the demands of their captors. 

On May 23, the Catholics in Marawi were also busy preparing for the feast of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary the following day. Even with gun battles raging in Basak Malutlut, Father Chito proceeded with the ninth and final day of the novena. They cleaned the parish and prepared food while they prayed for the clashes to be over. They were ready to have dinner at the bishop’s residence when the militants stormed in and took them. 

The armed men also desecrated the cathedral — smashed statues of Jesus Christ and other Catholic figures, and then set the house of worship on fire — for a propaganda video they would release a few days later. 

The bishop was still trying to reach out to the military when Father Chito’s captors called again. He asked for more time. Finally another bishop got him connected to Lieutenant General Carlito Galvez Jr., chief of the Western Mindanao Command, who instructed him to contact the number again and ascertain that the hostages were safe. But the bishop was horrified to discover that he could not reach his secretary’s phone anymore.

 The final stop of the van carrying Father Chito, Acopio, and other hostages on May 23 was Banggolo, the central business district of Marawi. The armed men ordered them to disembark and join in the street the prisoners who had been freed from city jail. They were told to form separate lines for men and women. The hostages feared they were going to be executed, but they were brought to an outpost where they passed the night. 

Early evening in Russia

President Duterte had just arrived in Russia for a state visit and was looking forward to meeting President Vladimir Putin when he learned of the escalating violence in Marawi City. He convened an emergency meeting at his Moscow hotel, gathering Cabinet officials and major service commanders he had brought along.

It was early evening in the Russian capital, close to midnight in Manila, when Duterte declared martial law in the entire Mindanao.20 Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana and AFP chief Año immediately made plans to return home, but they didn’t yet grasp the gravity of the situation until they were back in the country.

They persuaded the President to stay in Moscow and complete the state visit, assuring him that the battles would only take a few days. Duterte refused. “Gentlemen, we’re all going home,” Duterte announced to his delegation.

In Marawi and many parts of Mindanao, the declaration of martial law struck fear among residents who still carried the trauma from the brutality that they experienced in the 1970s under dictator Ferdinand Marcos.

The MILF, a thousands-strong Muslim rebel group, did not know what to make of the declaration. Its leaders were afraid the government had blamed them for the siege and was throwing in the towel on the peace process. They feared a repeat of the Mamasapano tragedy in 2015, when the death of 44 elite cops in a “misencounter” inside an MILF enclave threatened to end the peace talks.

As MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim desperately sought clarification from the government, he ordered Sammy Al-Mansour, the chief of staff of the MILF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), to consolidate combatants all over Mindanao and tell them to wait for orders.

Top Photo by Baltazar “Bobby” Lagsa 

The book was funded by the Australian government through the Australian embassy in the Philippines and the non-profit German foundation Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES). The views expressed here are the author’s alone and are not necessarily the views of the Australian government nor FES. The Australian government and FES neither endorse the views in this book, nor vouch for the accuracy or completeness of the information contained within. The Australian government and FES, their officers, employees and agents, accept no liability for any loss, damage or expense arising out of, or in connection with, any reliance on any omissions or inaccuracies in the material contained in this book.

It is available in Kindle Version  here .

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Review– The Marawi Siege and Its Aftermath: The Continuing Terrorist Threat

Title: The Marawi Siege and Its Aftermath: The Continuing Terrorist Threat Author: Rommel C. Banlaoi Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing; (2019), 148 pages

The book is a welcome contribution to the study and appreciation of terrorism in the Philippines and its implications to Southeast Asia’s regional security.  Focusing on the case of Marawi City, the capital city of the province of Lanao del Sur of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), island of Mindanao, Philippines, inhabited by one of the highest percentage of Muslims among the 28 provinces of Mindanao, the research examines the persistent threat of extremism and terrorism instigated by non-state actors confronting regional peace, security, and stability.

Divided into five (5) chapters written by three (3) scholars on security and terrorism, namely: Kumar Ramakrishna (chapter 1, “’The East Asia Wilayah’ of ISIS and the Marawi City Siege: A Long Time in the Making); Rommel Banlaoi (chapter 2, “The Abu Sayyaf Group’s Persistence and the Marawi Siege: A Chronological Analysis of the Crime-Terror Nexus in the Philippines and the ISIS Connection in Southeast Asia,” and chapter 5,  “ISIS Threats After Marawi Liberation: Continuing Terrorist Threats and Emerging Security Challenges of Violent Extremism in the Philippines”); and Amparo Pamela Fabe (chapter 3, “Financing Terrorism: Following the Money Trail in the Marawi City Siege,” and chapter 4, “Dreams, Hopes, and the Future: Trauma Counselling and Human Capacity Building Among the Maranaw Muslim Women and Children of the Marawi City Siege.”),  the book encapsulates the significant historical milestones that shaped and transformed the economic, social, and cultural isolation and marginalization of Filipino Muslims to a political engagement that challenged the defence, tranquillity, and strength of the Philippine state. 

Chapter 2 of the book traces the birth, evolution, and mutation of the Philippines’ foremost Muslim terrorist organization, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). It analyses how it combines terrorism and crime/banditry and narrates the implications of shifting allegiances to al-Qaeda and ISIS to sustain itself and adapt to national and international challenges in advancing its Islamist ideology. Likewise, Banlaoi charts not only the linkages between ASG and other home-grown terrorist groups but also the network it develops with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other regional extremist organizations which have similar objectives with JI and ASG task to carve a “Daulah Islamiya or Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia” (p.58).

Fabe’s chapters 3 and 4 are, namely: an exposition of the modes of financing utilized by the ASG and the network of ISIS/al-Qaeda during the Marawi siege; and psychosocial response to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) especially the Maranaos (ethnic group of Marawi) women and children respectively. Finally, Banlaoi argues in the book’s concluding chapter that terrorism in Mindanao is far from resolved despite the military victory of Philippine security forces against a number of terrorist and jihadist groups. He suggests that the government should have an effective implementation of its anti-terrorism programs, raise public awareness on the threats of terrorism, and use of community-based approaches to address the causes of terrorism (p. 125).

While the study is a significant addition to the body of literature on terrorism in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, the book needs to enhance and deepen its investigation on chapters written by Amparo Fabe on financing terrorism (ch 3) and trauma counselling (ch 4). Chapter 3 discusses the methodologies and forms of financing terrorist activities in the Philippines and concludes that the success of terrorist groups in funding their endevours was due to the absence of a “strong counterterrorism finance strategy” (p. 86). However, there is no clear analysis in the chapter that evaluates the 2001 Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) which is the country’s foremost law intended to counteract terrorist financing. It is unfortunate that Fabe was unable to probe the relevance and implementation of the said law in addressing the issue of financing terrorism before making the aforesaid conclusion.

Similarly, Fabe’s chapter 4 is more of a psychosocial project design – identifying its conceptual framework, objectives, activities, training with its “preliminary findings” (pp. 92-101) — a work-in-progress rather than a complete study on the outcomes of psychosocial approaches in resolving emotional, social, mental, and spiritual issues among women and children affected by conflict in Marawi. Whist psychosocial responses in the 2005 and 2011 London and Norway respectively are cited in the chapter, there has been no exposition how these cases relate or are linked to the Marawi siege.

Limited to five (5) key informants – two (2) ASG members, two (2) Filipino scholars, and one (1) Maranao community leader in Manila — Ramakrishna’s chapter has been inadequate in providing any new information and more profound analysis of Islamic extremism in the region as it relates to terrorism in Mindanao. His heavy reliance on secondary information and seemingly intelligence reports from the Philippine military have generally restricted the study within the literature of Moro insurgency movement rather than a broader and thorough perspective of terrorism based on the worldview of direct and primary regional actors and informants. Moreover, Ramakrishna’s account does not appear to be much different from Banlaoi’s chapter 2 on the latter’s narrative on the history of ASG and ISIS in the Philippines and the region.

In spite of some weaknesses of certain chapters of the book, the study as a whole is a timely piece of scholarly composition which academics and policy makers engaged and involved in the study of terrorism and counterterrorism would hugely benefit from.

Rizal G. Buendia Independent Political Analyst, Consultant, and Researcher Wales, UK

Copyright © 2024 | Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia | All Rights Reserved

Battle of Marawi: A longest urban battle in Philippines modern history

December 23, 2019

The Battle of Marawi stands as the most extensive urban conflict in the history of the Philippines, also recognized as the Siege of Marawi and the Marawi Crisis. Commencing on May 23, 2017, and concluding on October 23, 2017, the battle marked a significant chapter in the nation’s history. Following the successful five-month-long campaign to reclaim Marawi, the Philippines Special Operations Command unveiled a remarkable video compilation elucidating the intricacies of the battle, accompanied by captivating visual footage captured during the siege.

The video provides a brief background on how the self-styled Islamic State managed to establish a presence in the Philippines. The country has grappled with issues related to Muslim insurgencies since the 1970s. Still, it is only in recent times that these insurgents have become the focal point of well-funded international jihadist groups.

Malaysia and Indonesia, similarly afflicted by radical Islamists, harbored rebel groups that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Through these alliances, they facilitated the flow of weapons, equipment, and foreign fighters into Marawi, the island where the city of Marawi is situated.

Battle of Marawi

Two local Islamist militant groups, namely “Maute” and “Abu Sayyaf,” sponsored by ISIS, initiated an assault to capture the city of Marawi. Intelligence operatives from the Armed Forces of the Philippines had detected early signs of this impending rebellion and launched a small unit raid to apprehend terrorist leaders for interrogation. However, they were unaware that they were entering a well-armed and well-entrenched stronghold housing several hundred insurgents.

The government’s raid inadvertently triggered an Islamic State assault on the city. The Maute group engaged in destructive activities, including burning buildings, demolishing churches, and taking Christians as hostages. Communication lines were severed, and the roads leading in and out of the city were blocked and guarded by snipers.

Over several decades, the Philippines’ special forces received consistent training and support from US Green Berets. Unlike some “allies” in other parts of the world, the Philippine military can be effectively trained, producing excellent soldiers. Their leadership, planning, and tactical execution are comparable to the best armies globally.

Over several months, the Armed Forces of the Philippines exhibited immense courage as they engaged in street-to-street, house-to-house, and room-to-room combat in intense close-quarters battles. Resourcefully, they crafted improvised RPG armor from wood for their vehicles, called in airstrikes as needed, and ultimately dislodged the Islamists from their fortified positions. This relentless effort resulted in the demise of nearly 1,000 insurgents, albeit at a significant cost of 165 of their personnel killed, as reported by Amnesty International .

Clint Emerson: Retired Navy SEAL Shares 100 Deadly Skills

1917: the most realistic war movie ever made, the last full measure: heroic story of william h. pitsenbarger, nato special operations forces, the only publicly available video of delta force, 1 thought on “battle of marawi: a longest urban battle in philippines modern history”.

Met Many Filipinos in the US Navy, shipboard and else…(CA). Discharged there, went to school close by, then had career in chemistry tech. If the women at work liked you, they would give you some of their home-cooked lunch. That happened fairly often. Love these people. In WW2 late ’44 my dad served as a 19 year old E6 in Luzon for 6 months until the bomb ceased his squad’s activities. He got a Purple Heart for yellow fever. My ship wasn’t attached to the 6th Fleet, so didn’t make it over there. Good Luck and keep up your magazine’s great work! CS

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The Major Lessons Learnt from The Marawi Conflict

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Marawi Battle Highlights the Perils of a Stalled Peace Process in the Philippines

Photo: NOEL CELIS/AFP/Getty Images

Commentary by Geoffrey Hartman

Published June 29, 2017

The ongoing battle for Marawi City—the capital of Lanao del Sur Province on the island of Mindanao—between Philippine government forces and Islamic militants with links to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seems increasingly an important bellwether of growing violence in the Philippines’ restive south. Fears that the breakdown of the government peace process with Islamic insurgents would lead to disillusionment and a return to violence, exacerbated by the influence of international jihadist movements like ISIS, appear to be coming to pass.

The importance of the Marawi battle was not obvious at its start and may not be clear for some time, given the mess of conflicting reports and likely propaganda that surrounds the battle. Fighting in Mindanao is a common occurrence, and even large-scale sieges of cities are not unprecedented. It has been only four years since a similar battle between government forces and Islamic militants for control of Zamboanga City.

While the fighting in Marawi is not a great departure from the norm in Mindanao, the ISIS links of the key groups involved are a new element that has sparked understandable alarm. The fighting is led by the local Maute group and an Abu Sayyaf group faction led by Isnilon Hapilon—the ISIS-anointed emir for Southeast Asia—which had relocated to Lanao del Sur last year after a government offensive against its original stronghold on the island of Basilan. Cooperation between the Maute and Hapilon groups—self-styled as IS-Ranao and IS-Basilan respectively—has been increasing since both declared their allegiance to ISIS in 2014, but the Marawi siege is a major step forward in coordination between this nascent coalition of ISIS-linked fighters in the southern Philippines.

Beyond their ISIS connection, the profile of the Maute and Hapilon groups makes them a more worrying long-term threat than previous Islamic militant groups. Both groups are on the rise and have cleverly utilized social media and the ISIS brand to boost their own profiles. The Maute group in particular represents the next generation of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia, with a leadership educated in Egypt and Jordan and ties to jihadist allies in both the Middle East and other parts of Southeast Asia. The vitality of the groups responsible make the Marawi attack a far cry from the attack on Zamboanga in 2013, led by fighters from the once-central Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) desperate for relevance after being excluded from government peace negotiations with the now-dominant Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The Maute-Hapilon coalition represents a threat to even the MILF, and there are indications that the Maute group has been successfully stealing away young MILF followers disillusioned with their leadership’s continued cooperation with the Philippine government despite the stalling of the peace process. The tabling of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)—the key outcome of the 2014 government-MILF peace agreement—by the Philippine Congress following the botched Mamasapano raid in January 2015 that killed 44 Philippine police has led to questions in MILF ranks about the wisdom of continuing to work with Manila.

This problem will get worse the longer the peace process remains stalled, and the Maute group is well-positioned to attract support from the MILF due to its family ties to elites in both the MILF and Lanao del Sur Province. In addition to this local support, the Maute-Hapilon coalition can hope to attract increasing numbers of foreign fighters, both veterans returning from fighting in the Middle East and younger Southeast Asians who choose to pursue jihad closer to home given the dimming prospects for ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

The battle for Marawi is a wake-up call for Manila on the threat posed by the Maute-Hapilon coalition, and the government should take steps quickly to constrain the ability of these groups to build further support. Much damage has already been done, as the Marawi battle has already boosted the profile of these groups and made them more attractive to aspiring fighters, both foreign and domestic. This will make the challenge of stemming the flow of foreign fighters into the Philippines that much more difficult, putting a premium on boosting cooperation with neighboring countries like Indonesia and Malaysia.

More importantly, the Philippine government should move forward on the BBL in order to preserve the central role of the MILF and prevent further defections to more extreme groups. Unfortunately, the Rodrigo Duterte administration has complicated an already fraught peace process by relying on a dual-track approach with both a revised BBL and a proposed federal system to address Moro desires for greater autonomy. The introduction of the MNLF into peace negotiations previously restricted to the MILF has also had the predictable impact of complicating talks thanks to having rival groups representing the Moro side.

Despite these difficulties, there are tentative signs that the BBL may be moving forward again after being stalled for more than two years. A new draft of the BBL was finalized on June 6 and is ready for Duterte’s approval and submission to Congress when it reconvenes on July 24. The BBL died in Congress once before and there is no guarantee that it will fare better this time around, but the fighting in Marawi may have convinced Philippine legislators about the imperative of moving forward on the peace process.

While Philippine political leadership tries to revive political solutions to the violence in Mindanao, Philippine security forces should also take stock of their military and law enforcement approaches to counterterrorism operations in Mindanao. The track record of Philippine counterterrorism operations in recent years is poor: the 2015 Mamasapano raid was a disaster great enough to derail the peace process, the 2016 Basilan offensive drove Hapilon’s group into greater cooperation with the Mautes, and the attempted arrest of Hapilon in Marawi City in May 2017 led to over a month of urban fighting. There is reason to think these operations are doing more harm than good, and Manila should consider ways to refocus its security operations to pursue terrorist leaders while minimizing the risk of future large-scale conflicts.

(This Commentary originally appeared in the June 29, 2017, issue of Southeast Asia from Scott Circle .)

Geoffrey Hartman is a fellow with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Geoffrey Hartman

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The Marawi Siege: Women’s Reflections Then and Now

Following the siege of Marawi in the southern Philippines, UN Women conducted a series of Listening Processes in the surrounding region, giving women survivors of the siege the opportunity to share their stories. The first Listening Process was held from September to October 2017 in the days immediately following the siege. The second Listening Process was held one year later in October 2018. During both sets of conversations, the women respondents discussed their experiences in the days leading up to the siege, their recollections of the battle, and the difficulties they face as evacuees and internally displaced persons. This publication seeks to capture these reflections to ensure the experiences of the women who lived through the siege and its aftermath are recorded in the history of Marawi and the Bangsamoro region. In addition, the women’s insights are invaluable for understanding how to prevent the recurrence of violent extremism in the region and how women can play a vital role in leading these efforts.

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'The Battle of Marawi' - Death and Destruction in the Philippines

• Document source : Amnesty International
• Date: 17 November 2017
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