house fire case study

833-672-0824

Sitemap Privacy Policy

Fire – Residential

ARCCA was asked to investigate a house fire.  Based on preliminary information, it was thought that the home had experienced a chimney fire which caused a total loss and a collapse to the basement level.

Steps Taken:

• ARCCA’s expert researched the internet for police, fire, social media photos and videos of the fire.
• The expert attended a joint inspection at the site of the fire.
• The expert performed an external fire pattern analysis of the home, followed by an interior room-by-room fire pattern analysis.
• The expert inspected the electrical panel for breaker trips.
• The expert used the breaker trips to isolate areas of the home in order to arc map.
• The expert inspected the propane service and storage tanks used to heat the home.
• The expert inspected out buildings and other structures built on the property.
• The expert assisted with evidence collection of the chimney and fireplace.

Final Findings:

Fire cause and origin is a subset of the overall fire investigation methodology as promulgated by NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigation.  In order to make a determination, the investigator is attempting to determine what the initial fuel was (typically the origin), the source of heat, the source of oxidizing agent (typically air), and if an uninhibited chemical reaction could occur (conditions).

Although the preliminary theory was that the home had experienced a chimney fire, there was no evidence, based on fire patterns, photos and videos of the fire in progress, that the chimney was the cause or origin of the fire.  The homeowners stated that the fireplace had not been used since the night before the fire.

The firefighting response was timely, and electrical service was cut to the home shortly after the report of fire.  Electrical breaker activity pointed to the center of the home or kitchen as the area of origin.  The lack of arcing or breaker activity around the chimney and first floor fireplace area or in the bathroom constructed directly underneath the chimney, showed that the fire did not originate at or about the chimney.

Laboratory examination of the fire patterns of the fireplace and chimney revealed no evidence that the fire originated as a result of improper fireplace construction and installation or from an insufficient clearance between the fire box, chimney flue system and the wood framing of the chimney.

• Our Company
• Our History
• Regional Contacts
• Our Experts
• Forensic Engineering & Expert Witness Consulting
• Sports Biomechanics & Human Performance
• Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation
• Submit Assignment
• Request A Seminar
• Educational Videos
• Evidence Storage
• Case Studies

Fire Incident: Investigation and the Analysis of the Site Report

• To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
• As a template for you assignment

Introduction and Curriculum Vitae

I work as a fire investigator for the Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service. I have previously completed my master’s degree in Fire Investigation at the University of Lancashire. After graduation, I took my current position as a fire investigator and have become a member of several professional organisations, including the Institute of Fire Engineers, the International Association of Arson Investigators, and the National Fire Protection Association.

I received the first information about the incident at 9:32 pm on November 27th, 2018 through a phone call from Fire Service Control. I arrived at the scene at 9:40 pm to begin a fire investigation, which commenced at 9:45 pm.

As part of the investigation, I took photographs of the scene. These are referenced in the report and can be found in the appendix section of this document. All comments and opinions included in the report are based on my examination of the scene, as well as on information obtained from witnesses and the facts that were available at the time of report completion. Hence, the report may be amended or extended if new details emerge and the additional information is reliable.

Before beginning a fire investigation, it was critical to address the hazards found during the initial risk assessment. The first hazard was the presence of sharp objects, and I took steps to control the risk by using Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), covering the victim’s injuries, and removing dangerous sharp objects from the scene. PPE was also used to protect from burning ashes and biological hazards.

There was a risk of slipping and tripping, which I addressed by securing the sliding material and removing clutter from the floor. The possibility of a secondary fire of electrical origin was also a concern, and I took steps to isolate open electrical wires and separate all electrical appliances from the system using the mains switch. Adequate ventilation of the scene was ensured to contain the hazards from burning ashes and toxic gasses.

Other precautions were also taken to ensure the reliability of the fire investigation results and prevent any harm to the crew. All members of the team used PPE and moved with caution to the scene of the incident. The scene was protected prior to evidence collection in order to eliminate any threat of tampering. The evidence was obtained by taking notes, photographs, and samples from the scene. The evidence was then analysed to determine possible causes of the fire and scenarios of the incident. The evidence and scenarios were then tested to recreate the most likely course of events before and during the incident. This report was based on an analysis of all information from the scene that was available at the time of completion.

Description of the Premises

The type of dwelling is a semi-detached house with no basement. The external size of the premises is 8 by 11 metres. The interior walls, floors, ceilings, and roof were constructed using concrete, whereas the exterior walls were made from brick. Based on the documents, the approximate date of construction is 2009. The last maintenance was completed about three months prior to the incident. The floor plan of the premises is provided in the appendix section of the report.

The main issue that was identified at the premises is the lack of a suitable fire protection system. There were no smoke alarms or smoke detectors in the house. The fire started in the kitchen area, originating near the oven and spreading to the dining table and the ironing board nearby. No active fire system was found at the scene, which is why the victim could not take necessary measures to extinguish the fire quickly.

Type of Incident

The incident was a domestic fire that originated in the kitchen area located on the ground floor of the premises. The fire did not spread to other rooms or floors and was contained in the kitchen. The incident started while the occupier of the premises (Steven) was cooking. He heated vegetable oil in a frying pan at a high temperature, which caused the oil to burn. As there was no fire extinguishing system in place, Steven attempted to put out the fire with water, but this did not help, as the cause was burning oil. The fire first spread to the garbage can, then to the food table and the ironing board. Steven was burned during the incident and was found dead in the kitchen area when the team arrived.

The police were alerted after receiving a 999 call from a neighbour who saw the fire approximately two minutes after the beginning of the incident. The police passed the information about the fire to the fire department. The team arrived at the scene after eight minutes and included two engines, an ambulance, the police, and a water tanker. I was equipped with all necessary tools to ensure adequate protection while handling the incident and investigating the scene, including PPE and breathing apparatus.

The premises did not have any fire prevention measures, such as fire alarms or smoke detectors. A witness report was collected from the neighbour, who stated that he last saw Steven in the morning on the day of the incident. Steven is the occupier of the apartment and had been living on the premises for 18 months before the event.

Discovery of the Fire

The fire was reported by Mr Paul Naubourl, who is Steven’s neighbour. According to the witness report, Paul saw the smoke coming out of the window of Steven’s apartment and called the police on 999 immediately. Paul said that there was a lot of smoke during the fire, which is also evident from the black smoke residue on the ceiling in the kitchen area. The witness also said that he realised that Steven was still inside the building and that he tried to rescue the victim. At the time of the control team’s arrival, Paul was contacting other people in the neighbourhood in an attempt to save Steven from the scene of the fire. The arrival of the police and the fire service prevented Paul from entering the premises, although he was still examined by medical personnel in the ambulance to confirm the lack of physical injuries.

Area where the Fire Started

As part of the investigation, evidence was collected to determine the area where the fire started. Based on the photographs of the scene, which can be found in the appendix, there was a lot of fire damage in the area near the kitchen. There were also black marks on the kitchen ceiling from the smoke. There was less fire damage in other areas of the premises, which points to the conclusion that the area where the fire started was the kitchen. The most likely source of ignition was burning oil, but it is also possible that the fire started from the iron, the stove, or a candle. The oil in the frying pan most likely started to burn due to the high temperature. The materials that ignited first were therefore the oil in the frying pan and other flammable items in the area next to the stove.

As evident from the photographs of the scene, the fire did not spread beyond the room of origin. Therefore, the fire only affected the victim’s apartment and did not damage the neighbouring premises. The fire spread rapidly due to the presence of flammable materials around the cooking area and the lack of a working active fire system. The victim was also inexperienced in extinguishing fires of different types, which explains why he tried to put out the oil fire with water.

Development of the Fire

The assessment of the scene showed that the origin of the fire was next to the cooking area and that the likely cause of ignition was the cooking oil. Once the frying pan with oil began to burn, there were several factors that contributed to the development of the fire. First, Steven attempted to pour water into the frying pan to extinguish the oil, but his clothes caught fire. Steven fell to the floor, and the fire spread further to the garbage can, the plastic table in the kitchen, and the ironing board. The second factor that assisted in the development of the fire was that the door into the kitchen was left open. This provided extra ventilation, thus contributing to the fire and enabling it to spread to other surfaces in the room, surrounding the victim.

Another apparent reason for the fire development was the high temperature of the frying pan. Apart from causing the oil to ignite, the hot pan also caused the fire to spread to nearby items when the victim put it down on the table. Finally, the fire could have been contained much faster if there were smoke alarms and an active fire system. These would have helped to alert the fire services sooner while also extinguishing the fire quickly and effectively.

Causes Considered

As part of the investigation, several alternative causes of fire were considered. First, smoking cigarettes could have caused the fire in the kitchen area. However, no lighters, cigarettes, or other smoking materials were found in the apartment, and the neighbour said that he had never seen Steve smoking before the incident. Second, the fire could have begun due to an electrical malfunction. Upon examination of the scene, it was found that the victim had a number of electrical appliances and sockets in the kitchen area, some of which were switched on during the incident. As electrical appliances are often a source of secondary fire, they could have also influenced the initial development of the fire in the apartment.

Additionally, the investigation also considered gas defect as a possible cause of the fire. Gas leaks can cause a fire to spread rapidly, and the materials gathered from the scene indicated the quick development of the fire. After examining the scene, I found that no LPG cans or gas supplies were present in the area, and therefore this possible cause appears to be unlikely. Some heating equipment can also cause ignition, which is why heating was considered among the possible causes of the incident.

Nevertheless, the team did not find any heating equipment in the kitchen area. Similarly, there was no paraffin or fuel found on the scene, so it is improbable that these substances contributed to the outbreak of the fire. Finally, arson was considered as part of the investigation process. Upon the team’s arrival at the scene, it was found that the doors into the apartment and the kitchen area were not locked. However, there was no sign of forced entry on the door, and thus it is more plausible that the fire occurred by accident.

Medical Information and Assessment of the Victim

As the fire did not spread to the neighbouring apartments and houses, the only victim of the incident was the occupant of the flat. His name was Steven, and he was a 32-year-old male. Steven was approximately 170 cm tall and weighed around 70 kg. The victim’s body was located at 9:45 pm after the fire has been fully extinguished. The area where the victim was found was the kitchen. The victim was discovered lying on the floor next to the stove, with face and chest facing up and visible injuries on his chest, stomach, and one leg. He appeared to have been fully dressed at the time of the incident, wearing casual clothes and shoes. Due to the location of the victim’s body and the cooking oil on the floor around him, it is likely that he was cooking when the fire began.

Steven was immediately removed from the scene by the fire investigators. He was examined on site by the ambulance team, who concluded that he had suffered burns over 28% of his body, causing muscle tissue destruction. There was no evidence of drug or substance abuse that could have influenced the victim’s actions during the fire and contributed to its development. The victim’s body was taken away from the site by the medical team and moved to the morgue at a nearby hospital.

This report was written based on the available evidence found on the scene, which included photos, visual examination, and material evidence. The analysis of the site enabled me to determine that the most likely cause of the fire was the burning oil. Although there were other factors that contributed to the fire, such as open doors and the improper steps taken by the victim, the primary cause of the fire was the accidental ignition of the oil in the frying pan. The ignition possibly occurred because the temperature on the stove was set too high. The investigation also determined other reasons that influenced the course of events during the incident.

The primary factor that impacted the spreading of the fire was the lack of adequate fire control measures in the apartment, such as smoke detectors, alarms, or an active fire system. This prevented the victim from extinguishing the fire successfully and delayed the arrival of the fire service. In trying to extinguish the fire with water, Steven caused his clothes to ignite, and thus when he fell to the floor, the fire spread to other items in the kitchen, surrounding the victim. Other causes of the fire, such as smoking, heating and gas defects, were found to be unlikely due to the absence of compelling evidence to support them.

• Hurricane Matthew: Communicating Health Risks
• Ferry Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan
• Fall-Preventing Technology: Bed Alarms
• Fire Prevention and Code Enforcement: Sprinkler Systems
• Definition of Ignition Interlock and Its Benefit
• Qatar's Disaster Risks at the 2022 World Cup
• Qatar's Disaster and Emergency Planning
• Chernobyl Catastrophe, Its Impacts and Regulations
• Weather and Climate: Tathra Natural Disaster
• Environmental Tragedy of Love Canal, New York
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2021, July 8). Fire Incident: Investigation and the Analysis of the Site. https://ivypanda.com/essays/fire-incident-case-study/

"Fire Incident: Investigation and the Analysis of the Site." IvyPanda , 8 July 2021, ivypanda.com/essays/fire-incident-case-study/.

IvyPanda . (2021) 'Fire Incident: Investigation and the Analysis of the Site'. 8 July.

IvyPanda . 2021. "Fire Incident: Investigation and the Analysis of the Site." July 8, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/fire-incident-case-study/.

1. IvyPanda . "Fire Incident: Investigation and the Analysis of the Site." July 8, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/fire-incident-case-study/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Fire Incident: Investigation and the Analysis of the Site." July 8, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/fire-incident-case-study/.

IvyPanda uses cookies and similar technologies to enhance your experience, enabling functionalities such as:

• Basic site functions
• Ensuring secure, safe transactions
• Secure account login
• Remembering account, browser, and regional preferences
• Remembering privacy and security settings
• Analyzing site traffic and usage
• Personalized search, content, and recommendations
• Displaying relevant, targeted ads on and off IvyPanda

Please refer to IvyPanda's Cookies Policy and Privacy Policy for detailed information.

Certain technologies we use are essential for critical functions such as security and site integrity, account authentication, security and privacy preferences, internal site usage and maintenance data, and ensuring the site operates correctly for browsing and transactions.

Cookies and similar technologies are used to enhance your experience by:

• Remembering general and regional preferences
• Personalizing content, search, recommendations, and offers

Some functions, such as personalized recommendations, account preferences, or localization, may not work correctly without these technologies. For more details, please refer to IvyPanda's Cookies Policy .

To enable personalized advertising (such as interest-based ads), we may share your data with our marketing and advertising partners using cookies and other technologies. These partners may have their own information collected about you. Turning off the personalized advertising setting won't stop you from seeing IvyPanda ads, but it may make the ads you see less relevant or more repetitive.

Personalized advertising may be considered a "sale" or "sharing" of the information under California and other state privacy laws, and you may have the right to opt out. Turning off personalized advertising allows you to exercise your right to opt out. Learn more in IvyPanda's Cookies Policy and Privacy Policy .

Burns and Smoke Inhalation

Authors: Mark Saks, MD, MPH, Pollianne Ward Bianchi, MD, FAAEM, Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Upland, Pennsylvania

Editor: James Ham, MD, University of Hawaii

Updated March, 2019

By the end of this module, the student will able to:

• List the basic function of skin
• Describe the initial evaluation and assessment of the burned patient
• List the different types of burns and their distinguishing characteristics
• Name the potential comorbid injuries in inhalational injury
• List the basic principles of burn management regarding:
• Minor burn treatment
• Fluid resuscitation
• Infection control
• Management of inhalation injuries

A patient presents to the Emergency Department with burns from a house fire. He was extracted by firefighters, and it has been two hours since the initial call. He is young, approximately 20-30 years old, unconscious, with burns to his face, trunk and extremities, with charred clothing, and covered in soot. How will you evaluate and treat this patient?

Introduction

Each year approximately 500,000 burn patients seek medical care in the US. Burn injury can result from heat (thermal burn), chemicals, cold (frostbite), or electricity (flash or internal). However, the clinical significance of a burn depends more on the depth of the burn, the total body surface area (TBSA) involved, the specific area involved, associated injuries, and the promptness of therapy than on the mechanism. Inhalational injuries may result from heat, carbonaceous particles, or the inhalation of abnormal gases such as smoke, carbon monoxide, or cyanide.

Quickly and accurately evaluating the burned or inhalational injured patient in the Emergency Department is difficult because the extent of injury is not always obvious, often evolves over time, and may mask other, more immediately life-threatening injuries. Therefore, it is very important for the emergency physician to understand the complex pathophysiology and clinical management of these patients.

Skin is the body’s largest organ system and is composed of three layers: the epidermis, dermis, and hypodermis. The epidermis is the outermost layer, does not contain any neurovascular structures, and constantly regenerates mitosis and keratinization. The dermis is the middle layer and contains hair follicles, sweat and sebaceous glands, and lymph and blood vessels. The hypodermis is the deepest layer, is comprised of adipose and larger neurovascular structures, and acts to anchor the skin to underlying muscle, bone, and fascia. For figure see here.

Intact skin has many functions including:

• Fluid retention
• Electrolyte homeostasis
• Thermoregulation
• Metabolic (vitamin D synthesis)

All of these functions are potentially disrupted with burns, regardless of the severity of injury, source of damage, or the mechanism of burn. In general, the extent of the burn injury worsens as temperatures that the skin is exposed to increases. For example, with temperatures between 40-44ºC, enzymes begin to malfunction, proteins denature, & cellular pumps fail. With temperatures above 44ºC, this damage occurs faster than the skin cells can heal and injury develops. This injury typically exhibits three zones:

• Zone of Coagulation: In this area, cell death is complete. This is usually nearest to the energy source and forms the eschar of the burn wound
• Zone of Stasis: In this area, cells are viable but circulation is impaired. If the injury continues, then increased damage and tissue ischemia may result
• Zone of Hyperemia: In this area, there is minimal cellular injury but there is increased blood flow due to vasodilatation. This tissue usually recovers without intervention

Initial Actions and Primary Survey

Burns often occur as a result of explosions, building collapse, or motor vehicle accidents. In addition, patients involved in fires will often go to extremes, including jumping out of tall buildings, to get out of harm’s way. Therefore, it is important to remember that ALL burn patients should be thought of as trauma patients and the initial assessment and stabilization should be conducted according to the principles of Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS).

• Primary Assessment: Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Disability, Exposure
• Secondary Assessment: Detailed head to toe examination, AMPLE history

The burn-specific assessment occurs during both the Primary and Secondary Assessments and is focused on the following areas (in addition to the ATLS survey):

• Airway: Is there carbonaceous sputum? Soot? Hair singed? Stridor? Airway edema? If noted, a patient may require prophylactic intubation or laryngoscopy/bronchoscopy.
• Breathing: Are there burns to the lung or chest wall? Gas/toxin inhalation? Check pulse oximetry. If noted, a patient may require a variety of interventions, including an ABG to check pH, a carbon monoxide level, or an escharotomy, a procedure to release tension due to scar formation.
• Circulation: Are there signs of decreased perfusion or circulatory collapse? Check pulses and perfusion in affected extremities. Monitor vital signs and volume input/output. All significant burns require IV access – obtain intraosseous access if indicated. The patient may require central line access for volume resuscitation, hemodynamic monitoring, etc. 
• Disability/Exposure: Carefully examine all skin areas to determine wound location & depth, remove all jewelry and clothing. This may require detailed drawings to document the injuries and to calculate the extent of burned tissue (discussed below in more detail). Decontaminate if the burn is from a chemical source.

Presentation

The classic presentation of a burn patient usually depends on the extent and depth of injury. The diagnosis is made based on a careful clinical evaluation, rather than specific laboratory or radiologic studies.

If possible, a burn history should be elicited regarding:

• The circumstances & mechanism of injury
• Type(s) of material burning and length of exposure to them
• Exact time of injury
• Actions taken prior to arrival
• Associated signs and symptoms

Classification of Burns

Rule of Nines

Burns are classified according to the percentage of the total body surface area (%TBSA) that they involve. This area can be estimated by either the “palm estimate” or the “rule of 9s.” The burned patient’s palm (ventral surface of the hand excluding the fingers) is estimated to be equal to 1% of the TBSA and then used to measure the size of the burn. The entire head and each arm are estimated at 9% of the TBSA while each entire leg, the anterior thorax plus abdomen & back is each estimated at 18% of the TBSA. The perineum is estimated at 1% of the TBSA. In children, due to their relatively larger head size, the head is estimated at 18% with the other areas adjusted for this change.

Figure 4. Estimation of Total Body Area.  Dibildox M., Jeschke M.G., Herndon D.N. (2012) Burn Injury, Rule of Nines. In: Vincent JL., Hall J.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Intensive Care Medicine. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg Accessed https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-642-00418-6_380

Classic Presentation of Inhalational Injury

The evaluation of inhalational injury is difficult since patients will often have few external signs of injury. Therefore, in addition to the detailed history and physical exam described above, a chest x-ray, detailed oropharyngeal exam, nasopharyngeal laryngoscopy, or bronchoscopy should also be considered in order to fully assess the extent of inhalational injury. Complete vital signs including continuous pulse oximetry are essential. Laboratory tests such as an ABG, carboxyhemoglobin level, or methemoglobin level may also be useful at detecting poisonings or metabolic disturbances. More specifically, inhalational injuries may be grouped as temperature-related, smoke-related, or gas-related.

Heat tends to affect the upper airway more than the lower airways. There are two likely explanations for this: Vocal cord spasm protects the lower airway from the heat or the air is cooled and moisturized as it enters through the nose and mouth.

Patients will develop edema, erythema, and ulcerations of lips, tongue, posterior oropharynx, and upper airway. Onset may be delayed for up to 24 hours and resolve in 4-5 days. Early signs include erythema and superficial burns to tongue, lips and pharynx and soot in mouth and nares. Stridor can develop quickly. There is generally a low threshold for early intubation before edema develops, and then tracheostomy if edema continues.

Smoke-related airway injuries

Smoke tends to affect the lower airways more than the upper airways. There are several explanations for this including: injury occurs when particles & soot settle in the medium and distal airways, direct thermal injury occurs when hot particles contact alveolar membranes and smaller airways are at increased risk of occlusion due to debris accumulation.

Smoke-related damage leads to reduced mucociliary function. Early signs and symptoms include wheezing and respiratory distress with increased work of breathing, hypoxia, and coughing or gagging. Patients may develop pneumonia as a complication, in part due to impaired clearance.

Gas-related airway injuries

Oxygen is consumed during combustion. Fires create hypoxic environments and patients may be hypoxic on scene as well as on arrival in the ED. Carbon dioxide (CO2) & carbon monoxide (CO) are produced by combustion. Symptoms of CO toxicity are related to the amount of carboxyhemoglobin present in the blood as well as age and health of the patient. Presentation can range from a slight headache, nausea, or confusion to chest pain and vomiting. Severe or prolonged exposure can cause seizures, coma, and death.

Burning of home furnishings and other synthetic materials release various toxins into the environment such as plastics releasing cyanide. Cyanide toxicity most often presents with depressed mental status or respiratory or cardiac arrest and should be suspected in any burn patient with change in mental status or hemodynamic instability.

Water-soluble chemicals (ammonia, chlorine, etc.) can lead to bronchospasm and airway edema causing wheezing and pneumonitis. Lipid soluble chemicals (phosgene, nitrous oxide, etc.) can cause direct cell damage and impaired ciliary clearance.

Diagnostic Testing

Given that the diagnosis of burns is largely clinical, there may be some testing that is helpful in the Emergency Department. Diagnosis of any traumatic injury may require radiologic imaging such as chest X-ray to assess for pneumothorax or rib fractures and CT scans to assess for intraperitoneal, cervical spine, or traumatic brain injury. 

Laboratory studies should include basic metabolic panel (BMP), creatine kinase (CK), complete blood count (CBC), and coagulation studies (PT and PTT). These may be helpful in diagnosing electrolyte abnormalities, such as hyperkalemia and rhabdomyolysis that can be associated with severe burns or coagulopathies and anemia that may be associated with hemorrhage and trauma. ABG or VBG with  carboxyhemoglobin levels are useful in diagnosing carbon monoxide toxicity and lactate will be significantly elevated in cyanide toxicity and severe burns.

Treatment of Minor Burns

The management of the patient with minor burns (either by extent of TBSA involved or by depth of burn) can be treated with basic local wound care and is focused on the following principles.

First, stop the burning process by removing clothes or other materials and running cool (not cold) water over the area until the skin temperature has normalized. Next, initiate pain control with NSAIDs (anti-inflammatory properties) and/or opioids. Follow this with washing the burned area thoroughly with soap & water before careful drying of the area.

Finally, apply topical ointment and sterile dressing. There are numerous options for this. Generally, bacitracin is used for burns on the face. A combination of bacitracin and petrolatum gauze dressings are used for many areas of the body. Silver sulfadiazine (SSD) used to be the mainstay for burn management for burns that can be easily and thoroughly washed off before reapplication. SSD should not be used on the face and can cause abnormal pigmentation. SSD has recently fallen out of favor for everything less than very deep burns as it can be messy to apply and also impair wound healing. 

A newer complement to burn management is the use of new, commercially-available skin-like dressings that are applied to the cleaned burn and remain in place as the burn heals. Each specific brand has its own indications and contraindications. Mepilex is one of the most common and can be impregnated with silver. As the burn heals, dressings should be changed at a minimum of once daily by the patient with the same procedure as above with careful monitoring for cellulitis and wound healing. Arranging for follow up may include returning to the ED for a wound check, with a primary care doctor, or at a regional burn center.

There is debate in the literature about whether to debride intact bullae. In general, intact bullae (blisters) have been considered to be sterile dressings and may be left intact unless they are quite large, painful, or in areas that interfere with functioning. However, recently there has been a trend to debride the bullae and then dress the wound under sterile technique as this also provides a sterile barrier and some evidence suggests that the material within the bullae is cytotoxic.

Tetanus vaccination status should be verified and may need to be administered. There is no need to treat with oral or IV antibiotics on initial presentation for prophylaxis.

Treatment of Significant Burns

The management of the patient with significant burns is focused on accounting for the impaired functioning of the damaged skin, especially regarding the role of skin in fluid retention and as a barrier to infection. Significant burns are considered partial thickness burns involving greater than 20% TBSA.

Fluid Resuscitation: Large, deep burns can lead to the loss of massive amounts of fluids and electrolyte imbalances for several reasons including: increased microvascular permeability that leads to extracellular edema and cell membrane defects that contribute to intracellular swelling. Additionally, burn patients have increased metabolic and respiratory rates that lead to increased evaporation and other insensible losses and often become hypoproteinemic leading to decreased intravascular oncotic pressures. Therefore, adequate fluid resuscitation is of paramount importance. The resuscitative fluid of choice is Lactated Ringer’s (LR) solution, given according to the Parkland formula:

• %TBSA burn x wt in kg x 4 mL/kg = volume of LR that should be administered over the first 24 hours

Half should be given in the first8 hours following the burn and the remaining half should be given over the next 16 hrs (24hrs total). Remember, this is extra fluid in addition to the patient’s baseline fluid requirements.

There is new evidence to suggest that we do not need to give fluids as aggressively as previously thought. Large amounts of fluids can create complications of their own such as third spacing with massive edema, heart failure, and electrolyte abnormalities. The modified Brook formula is the same as the Parkland formula except is 2 mL/kg instead of the Parkland formula’s 4 mL/kg and is aimed at prevention of over-resuscitation with fluids of burn patients. Clinicians also typically overestimate the size of burns, further leading to over-resuscitation.

Infection Control: Sepsis is the leading cause of death in patients with large burns, accounting for up to 75% of deaths. Although the specific pathogens vary from patient-to-patient and between burn centers, patients with large burns have increased susceptibility to infection for several reasons: the normal skin barrier is lost and they are in a hypermetabolic & catabolic state. Patients develop depleted energy stores and various metabolic deficiencies. The local release of cytokines, breakdown of normal tissues, and circulating cellular components contribute to a global immune system impairment. Burned tissue creates a favorable bacterial environment. Eschar has increased moisture, acidic pH, and little blood flow.

More specifically, the prevention and control of infection in the burned patient takes three main forms:

• Debridement of devitalized tissue: cut away dead, necrotic tissue and expose underlying viable tissue. A fasciotomy or escharotomy may be necessary in severe, circumferential burns that limit chest mobility or compress vital structures.
• Wound management : limit bacterial invasion by covering affected areas with antibiotic dressings and through early wound closure with skin grafting and/or commercial products.
• Preventing the delayed development of pneumonia and sepsis : universal precautions and general infection control practices are of paramount importance. Contact isolation with gown, gloves, and mask. Frequent changing of intravenous lines, etc. Aggressively evaluate fevers by pan-culturing and initiating broad-spectrum antibiotics.

Disposition: Patients with superficial or localized burns are generally treated in the Emergency Department and discharged with close outpatient follow-up with a burn surgeon. Adult patients with >20% TBSA burns are generally transferred or admitted to a regional burn center for evaluation. There are other criteria, usually elucidated by prehospital EMS, to determine transfer such as burns to the hands, face, feet and genitalia, chemical burns, inhalational injury, or the possibility of major trauma associated with the burn. Pediatric patients with >10% TBSA burns are generally transferred to a regional pediatric burn center for evaluation.

Treatment of Inhalational Injury

Patients with suspected inhalation injury should be placed on 100% oxygen by a non-rebreather mask as soon as possible. Patients with any signs of airway burns (soot in nares, burns to oropharynx) or impending edema (swelling of face or oropharynx, stridor, voice changes) should be intubated as soon as possible to avoid loss of airway. 

Non-invasive pulse oximetry is not a reliable method to diagnose CO toxicity, as levels can actually be normal. Carboxyhemoglobin levels greater than 4% in non-smokers and 10% in smokers should be treated for acute CO toxicity. Patients with carboxyhemoglobin levels greater than 25%, children, pregnant patients, older patients or those with significant comorbidities or altered mental status should be considered for hyperbaric oxygen therapy to prevent delayed neurologic sequelae.

Patients with altered mental status, respiratory or cardiac arrest should be considered for treatment of cyanide toxicity. There are two approaches to this. The old “Cyanide Antidote Kit” contained sodium thiosulfate and involved a two-step approach which included inducing methemoglobinemia. This has fallen by the way-side in favor of hydroxocobalamin administration, which is faster acting and safer.

Case Conclusion

You evaluate your burn patient using the burn classification system and rule of nines above after fully undressing him and performing the ATLS survey. Since he is unconscious, with a depressed mental status and signs of inhalation injury, such as soot in the airway and facial burns, you decide to intubate him in the resuscitation bay. A chest X-ray is performed, showing no pneumothorax and appropriate endotracheal tube placement. It is determined that he has 20% TBSA deep partial thickness and full thickness burns. You send laboratory studies including complete blood count, basic metabolic panel, arterial blood gas, carboxyhemoglobin, and coagulopathy studies. While he is in CT scan you calculate his fluid requirement using the Parkland Formula. His weight is 70 kg. 

(70 kg) x (20%) x (4 cc/kg) = 5,600 mL

Remembering that he gets half of this in the first 8 hours and half in the next 16 hours, you calculate he’ll need two boluses, each being 5,600 mL / 2 = 2,800 mL.

Since two hours of the first 8 hours has already passed from the initially injury, he will need to get that first bolus over the next six hours.

2,800 mL / 6 hrs = 467 mL/hr (additional fluid given over the next 6 hours)

The remaining 2,800 mL would have to be administered over the next 16 hours.

2,800 mL / 16 hrs = 175 mL/hr (additional fluid given over the next 16 hrs)

This is in addition to his maintenance fluids, which for a 70 kg man would be 104 mL/kg. So his final fluid orders would be:

467 mL/hr (bolus) + 104 mL/hr (maintenance) = 571 mL/hr (for the first 6 hrs)

175 mL/hr (bolus) + 104 mL/hr (maintenance) = 279 mL/hr (for the following 16 hrs)

Remember, these calculations are just a general guide. You must also monitor urine output to ensure adequate fluid resuscitation and adjust fluids as necessary to achieve a target urine output:

• Adult urine output: 0.5 mL/kg/hour
• Pediatric urine output: 1-2 mL/kg/hour

Pearls and Pitfalls

• Don’t be distracted by the sight and smell of the burns. Burn patients are trauma patients and often have concomitant injuries that must be addressed.
• Fully undress the patient to expose all skin and remove charred or burning clothing that can further contribute to burn injury.
• Be liberal with pain medications. Most patients with significant burns will require large doses of pain medications.
• Most patients may have burned areas with a mix of depths including superficial and deeper areas.
• Inhalation injuries are common but difficult to assess initially. Don’t forget to carefully assess burn patients for potential delayed airway compromise and have a low threshold for intubation as airway edema can progress within minutes.
• Altered mental status can be due to trauma injury or inhalational injury. Don’t forget to give oxygen, check carboxyhemoglobin levels and have a low threshold to treat for cyanide toxicity.
• Do not place moist towels, gauze, or sheets on burned areas as this will contribute to hypothermia. Clean burns cover burns with petrolatum gauze or antibacterial medications and gauze.
• Children have different total body surface area calculations compared to adults.
• Significant fluid losses only occur with deeper burns greater than 20% TBSA. Superficial burns do not generally require extra fluid resuscitation beyond maintenance fluids.
• Alharbi, Z, et al. Treatment of burns in the first 24 hours: simple and practical guide by answering 10 questions in a step-by-step form. World J Emerg Surg. 2012.7:13
• American Burn Association. Multiple educational resources and a listing of US burn centers is available on line at  http://www.ameriburn.org .
• Cuttle L, Pearn J, McMillan JR, and Kimble RM. A Review of First Aid Treatments for Burn Injuries. Burns. 2009. 35(6):768-75.
• Gomez R and Cancio LC. Management of Burn Wounds in the Emergency Department. Emergency Medicine Clinics of North America. 2007. 25(1):135-46.
• Hall, A, Dart, R, Bogdan, G. Sodium Thiosulfate or Hydroxocobalamin for the Empiric Treatment of Cyanide Poisoning. 2007. 49(6):806-813
• Hampson, N, et al. Practice Recommendations in the Diagnosis, Management, and Prevention of Carbon Monoxide Poisoning. Am J Resp Crit Care Med. 2012. 186(11): 1095-1101.
• Latenser BA. Critical Care of the Burn Patient: The First 48 Hours. Critical Care Medicine. 2009 37(10):2819-26.
• Singer AJ, Brebbia J, Soroff HH. Management of Local Burn Wounds in the ED. American Journal of Emergency Medicine. 2007. 25(6):666-71.

• Skip to main content
• Keyboard shortcuts for audio player

• LISTEN & FOLLOW
• Apple Podcasts
• Amazon Music
• Amazon Alexa

Your support helps make our show possible and unlocks access to our sponsor-free feed.

Arson Forensics Sets Old Fire Myths Ablaze

A fire burns in a scale model of a living room in the ATF's Fire Research Lab in Beltsville, Maryland. Until the development of the FRL, there were no fire measurement facilities in the U.S., or anywhere, dedicated to the specific needs of the fire investigation community. Courtesy of the ATF hide caption

A fire burns in a scale model of a living room in the ATF's Fire Research Lab in Beltsville, Maryland. Until the development of the FRL, there were no fire measurement facilities in the U.S., or anywhere, dedicated to the specific needs of the fire investigation community.

In 1990, a fire broke out in a house in Jacksonville, Fla., killing two women and four children. The husband of one of the women became the prime suspect, and that's when a fire investigator named John Lentini was called in.

At the time, Lentini says, the initial evidence pointed to a fire that was deliberately set. He calculated that it would have taken about 20 minutes for the house to become engulfed in flames — what's called a flashover — leaving plenty of time for someone to set the fire and get out.

But on a whim, Lentini noticed an identical house two doors down that was slated to be demolished. So he and his team refurbished the house and lit it on fire. It only took four minutes to get to flashover, and he realized the fire might not have been a set fire.

Firefighters in the ATF's Fire Research Lab battle a mock fire. The lab is the only facility of its kind in the world to provide the necessary facilities, equipment and staff to work on important fire investigation issues. Courtesy of the ATF hide caption

Firefighters in the ATF's Fire Research Lab battle a mock fire. The lab is the only facility of its kind in the world to provide the necessary facilities, equipment and staff to work on important fire investigation issues.

After the investigation, it was determined the fire was not arson and the charges were dropped against the husband.

For Lentini, that day was a seminal moment. He says that in the early days of arson forensics, the only science that happened was chemists looking for signs of gasoline on a piece of rug in the lab. In the field, investigators relied on anecdotal experience.

"If somebody would see an artifact and then find gasoline, they would make a connection," Lentini tells weekends on All Things Considered guest host Laura Sullivan. "And the next time they would see that artifact, they would just assume that gasoline must have caused [the fire]."

The problem was that anecdotal experience could lead an investigator to the wrong conclusion. In recent years, fire researchers and the changes to fire investigations have shattered dozens of arson myths as the science behind arson forensics continues to evolve.

"What I knew about arson, some of it was wrong," Lentini says. "What a lot of people thought they knew about arson was wrong."

Nobody ever set out to send an innocent person to prison for arson, Lentini says, but it absolutely has happened.

Old Cases, New Science

Doug Starr, the co-director of Boston University's Center for Science and Medical Journalism, recently wrote an article for Discover Magazine examining arson cases that relied on now-widely debunked theories about how fires start. In the few months of research he did on the story, Starr says he turned up at least two dozen cases.

One of the earliest cases was that of 16-year-old Louis Taylor, who was convicted of 28 counts of murder for setting the 1970 Pioneer Hotel fire Tucson, Ariz. Taylor was found with several matches in his pocket and fire investigators found what they believed to be evidence of two set fires in a hallway.

"Last year, at the behest of an attorney, several fire investigators looked back at the evidence and said it looked like a classic, accidental flashover fire," Starr tells Sullivan.

Taylor remains in prison, but Starr says the Arizona Justice Project is trying to get the case reviewed.

There might be hundreds of similar arson cases in the U.S., Starr says. In October, the Texas Forensic Science Commission asked that all arson cases in the state be reviewed. That amounts to between 750 and 900 arson cases in Texas alone.

Like Lentini, Starr says early fire investigations were based on apprentice-type knowledge passed down from the observations of previous investigators.

"The trouble is this is all based on observation and intuition, and science needs something more than that," Starr says. "Fortunately the new forms of investigation are based on actual laboratory science in which things are demonstrated to be true or not true."

Setting Fires At The ATF

Some of the newest research on how fires start and burn is now coming from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. The federal agency has always done a little fire research, but in 2003 it went all in with a new lab in Beltsville, Md., built just to burn things up.

On a recent visit, researchers were setting a diesel oil fire in their Fire Research Laboratory. The lab's chief, John Allen, says theirs is the largest forensic investigative tool in the world.

The room is massive and open, akin to an airplane hangar. Overhead, a 40-foot by 40-foot exhaust unit, similar to the one over your stove, sucks out the smoke and heat from the fires set in the lab to measure carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, among other things.

The large exhaust hood in the ceiling of the ATF's Fire Research Lab in Beltsville, Maryland is used to suck up smoke and heat from the fires set in the lab to measure carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, among other things. Courtesy of the ATF hide caption

The large exhaust hood in the ceiling of the ATF's Fire Research Lab in Beltsville, Maryland is used to suck up smoke and heat from the fires set in the lab to measure carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, among other things.

The lab also houses a quarter-scale model of a living room complete with a couch, TV, chairs and a baby crib and toys. Allen says they use this to test fires, take measurements and time flashovers – how long it takes for flames to go from "a fire in a room to a room on fire."

"I would say because the presence of this laboratory, there has been leaps and bounds in advances in scientific knowledge," Allen says.

In another part of the lab, an almost completely finished trailer will be used for the other half of what the ATF does now. The lab recreates fires to help local investigators with actual cases where arson is suspected. In a few days, they're going to burn the trailer down.

"Every day, we're doing something new and different," Allen says. "Many days it is something cutting edge that's never been done before."

This year alone, the ATF's lab has recreated fires from three murder cases. In all of them, prosecutors ended up dropping the charges against the suspects because the lab determined what officials thought might have happened, actually didn't.

Local Architects Direct

You are here, you are here: lakanal house - a case study, lakanal house - a case study, david ware - fire risk consultancy ltd.

In 2006 a serious fire resulted in the deaths of 6 people all of whom were not in the room of origin.  This case highlighted the importance of good fire safety management in premises and brought into question the “Stay put” policy. 

Lakanal House was constructed in 1950 and was considered a state of the art building. It was predominantly council rented with a dozen leasehold out of 98 flats in the building.  The building was 16 storeys high with 14 accommodation storeys.  1st floor through to the 14th were accommodation.  There was a undercroft at ground level, plant lift motor extraction and machinery on roof.  Access to building was on every other floor odd numbers . It had escape balconies on every even number floor providing  alternative escape from each flat.  The corridors and balconies all fed into a single staircase/single stair shaft.  There were two lifts , however, one of these lifts was undergoing refurbishment so was completely out of action.  There was also a dry rising main in the building.   All of the common spaces were cross ventilated.  This was a system that was accepted at the time of the build however not generally accepted. The flats were arranged in a scissor arrangements and the building had a single staircase.    The design principle of the flats were that every accommodation room except bathroom should have 2 means of escape to get you out of flat and out to a point of safety. 

The building was built to the  county council means of escape in case of fire 1954 guidance and this was the first piece of guidance that allowed a building of lakanal’s height to be built with one stairwell to get down and out of building.   This was on the proviso that you had cross ventilated corridors and that you had 2 means of escape from every accommodation.     

Refurbishment 

The building had serious refurbishment in the 1970s external façade of the building.  The existing façade was replaced with a timber framed set with asbestos panels.  In the 1980s couple of pieces of work carried out.  Security doors were installed between the lobbies and the corridors due to security issues. There was a requirement by the Local Authority that there was an open vent in the security doors that maintained the effectiveness of the cross ventilation.  It required in each of doors  ½ m2 of permanent open vent and an extra 1 m2   of manually openable vent in case smoke was need to be cleared.  The door had 2 smoke vents put in that look like georgain wired glass but these were actually the vents however the area was only 1/3rd of a square metre and no additional option of increasing the area another 1m2 which reduced the effectivess of the cross ventilation.    A suspended ceiling in the corridor was installed to accommodate the new services and hide them and this was continuos along the whole length of the corridor. The problem was, the false ceiling was also made of softwood with panels of unknown materials.  These panels were however replaced 12 months later with chipboard panels with a melamine laminate that were fire retarded and fixed onto the softwood timber boards.   

Refurbishment 2006 

Planned preventative maintenance project was proposed in 2006 and therefore there was NO full requirement for building regulation approval, no need to involve building control as there was to be no material alteration of the building.  However, at some point at the inception of this project it was upgraded to a decent homes project.  One serious issue was the removal of the façade of the building which was a timber and asbestos system and replacement with an aluminium system with a composite panel, particularly in the lower third of each flat.   

The fire started in flat 65 due to a faulty television and quickly spread up to flat 79. This was a severe fire and spread into the corridor. This fire ignited the suspended ceiling which did contain a high fire load. There was a wall flames down the whole length of the corridor.  The linings contributed to the fire spread due to the number of layers of paint.  The fire spread into flat 81 due to the fire size in the corridor.  Fire spread to lower flats 37 and 53 due to falling embers. 

Fire Safety Features

Composite panels.

The composite panels were in place at the lower third of the façade of the bedrooms and there were also present in the door between the flat and the balcony. The panel of a building required of a building of Lakanal’s size would expected to be of fire resistance to the old Class O system or the new European standard, in other words limited combustibility and surface spread of flame. They were actually found to be of class 3 when they were tested to BS476, clearly not acceptable.

Suspended ceiling.

The suspended ceiling posed serious risk to the occupants with a high fire load. This was a particularly low ceiling which caused another probl em as it only reached the top of the door. There was a lot of softwood boarding, insulation around the cables as well. The front doors of these flats were fire resisting but were missing smoke seals which not risk assessed to recommend any upgrade. These doors were very good in terms of fire spread but did allow a considerable amount of smoke to enter the door.   

The staircases in the flats were originally located in the flats linking the lower and upper parts, however it did not breach the compartmentation. There was a compartment floor separating the staircase from the staircase. The problem is that when they lowered the ceiling in the corridor it caused problems with the staircases They had 2 choices, they could either shift the whole staircase over in the flat and sacrifice a couple of feet in the flat or they cut a hole in the compartment floor and compartment wall. They decided on the latter and this was an after thought not the original intention. This resulted in a combustible staircase cutting through the compartmentation. It was not clear what was put in to bring the compartmentation back into play but clearly not acceptable.

Corridor walls

The walls offered about 60 minutes fire resistance. The problem is that they had to run services through the compartment walls such as the heating system, however, when you put a penetration through a wall you put in appropriate fire stopping to the same level as the wall. It was found that some of the fire stopping was good, some was patchy and some was totally incomplete. The pipes in the bathroom of flat 81 were particularly bad and allowed a significant amount of smoke into the bathroom.

Wall linings

It was identified that there were 13 layers of paint on the corridor walls which resulted in the linings not having adequate firer resistance and contributing to the fire spread.

Cross ventilation

This method of ventilation involves allowing air to enter at one end of a corridor and discharge at the other and was common when the building was first built. This method could have been maintained even though it is not very effective when there is not much wind. However, putting in security doors removed this technique and then by putting vents in them resulted in the worst of both methods. The occupants of flat 81 tried to stop smoke entering through the vent in the bathroom by using magazines and taped them up. However, it was not effective and in fact it started to burn the paper. The extraction system connected all the flats with a direct route from flat 53 to flat 81. This resulted in the deaths in the bathroom

Incident Timeline

4,15 fire started due to television flat 65 on 9th floor

4.16 fire alarm in flat 65 operates

Within 2 minutes of Fire Service arriving there was a flashover in the top floor. The flames were leaving the upper floor window and were burning the panels above to the bedroom in flat 79. The fact that there was a westerly wind didn’t help because the flames were being forced against the wall of the building towards the panels. These panels instantly ignite and within 4 ½ minutes they have burned through and allowed a flame to be introduced in flat 79 and ignited the contents. So we know have a fire on the 9th, 10th and 11th floor of the building.

The Fire Service set up a bridgehead on 7th floor

The Fire Service arrived at flat 65 very quickly and suppresses the fire.

Just over 30 minutes into the fire, we have fallen debris ignite flat 37 on 5th floor and flat 53 on 7th floor. We now have fires on the 5th, 7th, 9th 10th and 11th floor.

There was also a problem due to the grilles in the doors to the staircase allowing the smoke to enter into the staircase and the smoke was been drawn down to lower floors due to the negative pressure on the eastern side of the building. What they had was ground to floor smoke logging of the staircase. This was completely untenable for both residents and firefighters who were trying to maintain command and control at the bridgehead

At around 17.00 the decision was taken to move the bridgehead, their scene of forward operations.

17.02 Firefighters reached flat 53

They also sent a team to the 12th floor to carry out a snatch rescue.

17.22 The fire in flat 53 was dealt with.

17.30 The compartmentation in flat 81 is beginning to fail in particular the boxing in under the stairs. The corridor is out of action as is the internal staircase and therefore they are trapped in the bathroom

Lakanal house was considered the best that was available at the time it was built. It was a tragedy that we can learn from. We have learnt that cross ventilation is not effective. Over time buildings like this which have refurbishments carried out lose their initial compartmentation and fire safety strategy. There were a number of factors that led to their deaths and none in isolation was the cause. The information included in these notes is based on information provided to ourselves at various conferences and media coverage. They are to the best of our knowledge correct.

House Fire Case Study: Residential Fire at a Notable Artist’s Long Island Home

• September 29th, 2022

PERIL A fire occurred at the home of a notable modern artist, who was also a well-known advertising executive and author of children’s books, Norman Gorbaty. Since Mr. Gorbaty was late in his career, the collection of art was massive. Due to the fire, the extensive collection was exposed to heavy soot and humidity from […]

A fire occurred at the home of a notable modern artist, who was also a well-known advertising executive and author of children’s books, Norman Gorbaty. Since Mr. Gorbaty was late in his career, the collection of art was massive. Due to the fire, the extensive collection was exposed to heavy soot and humidity from the fire suppression.

Paul Davis of Long Island was called late at night to mitigate the loss. Once the art collection was identified, they placed a call to Prism Specialties Art of NYC & LI at 1:00 PM. Within two hours, the Prism Specialties Art team was on-site securing the artwork and developing a plan for pack out for Paul Davis to begin mitigation.

IMPACTED ITEMS

• Art Portfolios of works on paper: watercolors, charcoals
• Sculptures, objects, sketches for children’s books
• Carved wood panels and ornate wood furniture
• Over 5,000 pieces of art

THE CHALLENGE

Arrive at the loss as quickly as possible, arrive at the loss to begin containment of damage to artwork. Both Paul Davis of Long Island and Prism Specialties Art of NYC & LI had to coordinate closely. Art and collectibles had to be packed out professionally, room by room, for Paul Davis to follow closely with mitigation and containment.

Secondly, it was important for both companies to professionally guide the artist and his family through the process and gain their confidence that all would be taken care of professionally.

SOLUTION AND BENEFITS

• Prism Specialties was onsite 6 days over a two-week span; working within PDRs timeframe and mitigation process.
• Paul Davis needed speed and responsiveness to focus on mitigation and construction and trust that the art and collectibles were being handled professionally by a trusted preferred vendor
• On-site within 2 hours to protect and secure as much art as possible
• The artist and his family needed to trust and approve all art handling
• Less than 5% of the art was a total loss

Machine Fire Case Study: Finishing & Coating Company

Baseball stadium case study: baseball park management and technology vendor, minimize downtime with restoration experts.

© 2024 Prism Specialties . All right reserved. | Powered by Momentum

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings
• My Bibliography
• Collections
• Citation manager

Save citation to file

Email citation, add to collections.

• Create a new collection
• Add to an existing collection

Add to My Bibliography

Your saved search, create a file for external citation management software, your rss feed.

• Search in PubMed
• Search in NLM Catalog
• Add to Search

Assessing the home fire safety of urban older adults: a case study

• PMID: 25362758

Older adults are at a higher risk for fatal house fire injury due to decreased mobility, chronic illness, and lack of smoke alarms. The purpose of this illustrative case study is to describe the home fire safety (HFS) status of an urban older adult who participated in a large study funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). During a home visit with the participant, HFS data were collected from documents, observation, physical artifacts, reflective logs, and interviews. Numerous HFS hazards were identified including non-working smoke alarms, inadequate number and inappropriate placement of smoke alarms, lack of carbon monoxide (CO) alarms, inability to identify a home fire escape plan, hot water heater temperature set too high, and cooking hazards. Identification of HFS risk factors will assist in the development of educational materials that can be tailored to the older adult population to decrease their risk of fire-related injuries and death.

PubMed Disclaimer

Similar articles

• Intervention study for changes in home fire safety knowledge in urban older adults. Lehna C, Coty MB, Fahey E, Williams J, Scrivener D, Wishnia G, Myers J. Lehna C, et al. Burns. 2015 Sep;41(6):1205-11. doi: 10.1016/j.burns.2015.02.012. Epub 2015 Jun 15. Burns. 2015. PMID: 26088150
• Home fire safety beliefs and practices in homes of urban older adults. Coty MB, McCammon C, Lehna C, Twyman S, Fahey E. Coty MB, et al. Geriatr Nurs. 2015 May-Jun;36(3):177-81. doi: 10.1016/j.gerinurse.2014.12.013. Epub 2015 Jan 28. Geriatr Nurs. 2015. PMID: 25636195
• Perceived risk of home fire and escape plans in rural households. Yang J, Peek-Asa C, Allareddy V, Zwerling C, Lundell J. Yang J, et al. Am J Prev Med. 2006 Jan;30(1):7-12. doi: 10.1016/j.amepre.2005.08.045. Am J Prev Med. 2006. PMID: 16414418
• The effect of education and home safety equipment on childhood thermal injury prevention: meta-analysis and meta-regression. Kendrick D, Smith S, Sutton AJ, Mulvaney C, Watson M, Coupland C, Mason-Jones A. Kendrick D, et al. Inj Prev. 2009 Jun;15(3):197-204. doi: 10.1136/ip.2008.020677. Inj Prev. 2009. PMID: 19494100 Review.
• House fire injury prevention update. Part I. A review of risk factors for fatal and non-fatal house fire injury. Warda L, Tenenbein M, Moffatt ME. Warda L, et al. Inj Prev. 1999 Jun;5(2):145-50. doi: 10.1136/ip.5.2.145. Inj Prev. 1999. PMID: 10385837 Free PMC article. Review.

Publication types

• Search in MeSH
• Citation Manager

NCBI Literature Resources

MeSH PMC Bookshelf Disclaimer

The PubMed wordmark and PubMed logo are registered trademarks of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Unauthorized use of these marks is strictly prohibited.

• Emergency Services
• Construction
• Who We Serve

• 1 (800) 537-6151

Residential House Fire Case Study

Nearly a total loss, this house caught on fire in the middle of the night due to a malfunction in a ceiling fan. The fire was so intense smoke and soot seeped into every crevice. There were items that melted and 95% of the contents were non-salvageable.

The first stage of this major reconstruction was to remove all damaged materials down to the framing. Structural cleaning of the entire house was completed. Thermal fogging was performed to help with the odor and pigment shellac and sealant was sprayed on the structure to seal any smoke odor.

The next step was to replace the roof and siding. This is referred to as “drying-in”. As with any remodeling project, sometimes matching original materials can be challenging.

The stage referred to as the “rough-in” stage includes insulation, electrical, plumbing, and HVAC. Once all required inspections have been passed, the drywall is installed and the property owner begins to see transformation take place.

One of the keys to this stage is working closely with the property owner. Selections such as the paint, cabinets, trim, electrical fixtures, flooring and appliances are needed to keep the project on schedule. Once this stage is completed, the final inspection is performed.

The final stage of this reconstruction project is to conduct a walkthrough with the property owner. This walkthrough is to ensure the project was completed to the satisfaction of the property owner.

First Restoration Services 173 Rutledge Rd PO Box 2049 Fletcher, NC 28732

1 (800) 537-6151 LOCAL (828) 684-1582 CONTACT US

Support our work

As an independent publication, we rely on contributions from readers like you to fund our journalism. Please consider supporting us with a one-off or regular contribution.

Thanks for your contribution!

Stay in the know

Sign up to our free newsletter to get the latest news delivered straight to your inbox.

The Fifth Estate

Green buildings and sustainable cities – news and views

No smoke, no ash: here’s how one house survived the fires

Share this article

• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Mastodon (Opens in new window)
• Click to email a link to a friend (Opens in new window)

“When we first entered the house after our return from Canberra, four days after the fire, the air inside was cool and smoke-free in contrast to the outside air,” says Paul Whitington. “There was absolutely no sign of heat damage or ash accumulation inside the house. It was as if the house had been hermetically sealed, which in a sense it almost had been because of our no-gaps building approach.” Here’s how the house was designed and built.

Building a house in a natural environment such as the forest in which we live involves many decisions. Following the wildfire that swept through our forest on 5th January 2020, I’d like to share some of the key choices we made about our house construction.

Our house was exposed to an intense fire. The forest bears witness to this. Everything green is gone. The entire shrub layer has been destroyed along with many trees. The fire burnt right up the trunks of most of the trees still standing, leaving only brown leaves in their crowns. Kerri has provided a moving account of the massive destruction wrought by the fire.

Despite the ferocity of the fire, our house survived without any intervention. We were not here to defend it, having evacuated to Canberra two days before the fire impacted. There was no aerial water bombing and RFS brigade members were busy defending their own homes and the village. The building had to survive on its own merits.

The sight of the virtually unscathed house after the fire has astonished most people. We were greatly relieved but not surprised. The house was designed to withstand such a catastrophic event.

I am sharing my reflections on how and why our house survived to help others make appropriate design decisions when building or rebuilding in a bushfire-prone area. The events of the current Summer show that this includes most of the coastal areas of the Australian continent.

Design Objectives

We had three main objectives when designing our house. We discovered that in most cases, all three can be satisfied by a given design decision.

Objective No. 1 – Resistance to bushfire attack

Our block is heavily vegetated, with many mature tall eucalypt trees, a dense middle storey of bushes and a diverse ground cover of low-growing grasses, sedges and forbs – all highly combustible. We are surrounded for many kilometres around by dry sclerophyll forest in private land, state forests and national parks.

The possibility of bushfire attack is part of living in the Australian bush and Wonboyn is in an extremely high bushfire danger zone. A single, 10km long access road connects the village to the Princes Highway, making safe escape in the event of a fire problematic.

We sought to build a house that would survive a high intensity bushfire and in so doing, provide a refuge for us. A high level of bushfire resistance in house construction design also reduces the need for clearing of vegetation around the house, assisting Objective No. 2.

Objective No. 2 – Minimising the impact on the local, natural environment

We see ourselves as custodians of the patch of native forest in which we live. Many of the trees on the block are older than us and should outlive us by decades. So reducing the impact on the natural environment drove decisions about the size of the house and where on the property it would be sited.

The house has a relatively small footprint of 15×10 metres and is single storey. We selected the site of the house and in part its orientation, to minimise the number of large trees requiring removal.

In terms of aesthetics, we wanted the house to fit in – as much as possible – with the natural environment. We did not seek to make a design statement. Ideally the house would have been invisible!

Objective No. 3 – Minimising energy consumption

We sought to build a house that would minimise our energy consumption.

Features such as good insulation, high levels of thermal mass, flow-through ventilation, good solar access in winter and shading in summer are part of achieving this goal. The amount of embodied energy in building materials, their total lifetime and the amount of energy required to transport them to the building site are other factors that come into the equation.

Sometimes a trade-off must be made. For example, we did not use recycled components in the house construction. Doing so would have reduced the amount of energy needed to produce building components. But it would have compromised the tight construction tolerances required to achieve high levels of energy efficiency and resistance to bushfire attack.

Everything else being equal, a smaller house will require less energy to build and maintain. So the decision to minimise the size of our house to achieve Objective No. 2 also assists Objective No. 3.

How a bushfire burns a building

Extensive scientific research following the catastrophic Ash Wednesday bushfires in Victoria and South Australia in 1983 greatly advanced knowledge of how buildings are destroyed by bushfires. An excellent summary of these findings is provided in the following CSIRO publication.

Caird Ramsay & Lisle Rudolph (2003) “Landscape and Building Design for Bushfire Areas” CSIRO Publishing.

In most cases, fires that ultimately destroy a building start with small ignitions caused by embers landing on fine fuels on or around that building. These small fires in turn ignite heavier, combustible material that is part of the building construction. This can occur well before the fire front arrives and continues long after it passes as burning trees release new embers.

Heat radiation

Heat radiating from burning vegetation close to a building can directly ignite combustible materials, such as wood, on the building. More commonly, it will raise the temperature of those materials so they are more readily ignited by embers or flames. Radiant heat can also shatter windows, allowing embers to enter and burn the building from the inside.

Direct flame contact

Combustible materials on the outside of a building can also be ignited by direct contact with flames produced by burning of nearby vegetation. This typically occurs only as the main fire front passes through – a period usually lasting for only 10-15 minutes.

Selected design decisions for a bush-fire resistant house

We made a host of design decisions when planning our house construction, drawing on information in the Ramsay and Rudolph book about how bushfires attack a building. We also made extensive use of the following publication from the University of Technology, Sydney when deciding on building materials and methods.

Reardon, C., Milne, G., McGee, G. & Downton, P. (2004) Your Home Technical Manual 2nd ed.

This manual is now available on-line as an Australian Government publication: https://www.yourhome.gov.au

The rest of this post details some of our design decisions with an explanation of why, in theory, they should work. And since 5th January 2020 we know for sure that they do work. That is a gratifying feeling and vindication of a scientific, evidence-based approach to a particular planning challenge.

We engaged a sustainability-savvy draftsman, Will Dixon of MadCad to put together the house plans following our design brief. Will was well placed to carry this out task, having attended a workshop on building in bushfire prone areas in the wake of the 2009 Black Saturday fires in the Yarra Ranges.

Finding a builder who could actually realise our plans was not trivial, given the tight design specifications and the unconventional nature of some of the building materials. We were very fortunate to discover Jimmy Drakos from Drakos Brothers Constructions, who is a Hebel-specialist with a reputation for building excellence.

Although based in Bermagui, over 150km from Wonboyn, Jimmy agreed to take on the job. The fact that our house still stands in the wake of an intense bushfire is a testament to the skills and high standards of his building team.

House shape

We deliberately chose the simplest possible house shape – a rectangle. This shape might not have won us high marks in a Grand Design competition. However by eliminating re-entrant corners it reduces the risk of embers lodging and accumulating around the outside of the house. For the same reason, we chose a very simple hip roof design.

A roof slope of 20° was chosen. A flat roof can lead to the roof being lifted off in the strong winds experienced during a fire storm. Too steep a slope increases the surface area exposed to the fire’s radiant heat.

Fire-resistant external materials and no-gaps construction

All materials chosen for the external walls, roof and windows are non-combustible. This eliminates the risk that embers, heat radiation or direct flame contact can ignite the house from the outside.

Another key aspect of the building design was to eliminate gaps on the outside of the house through which embers could pass and potentially cause an internal fire.

External walls are constructed from 250mm thick blocks of Activated Aerated Concrete (AAC), marketed as Hebel. The walls are load-bearing, requiring no additional framing materials.

These Hebel blocks receive the highest rating on the CSIRO test score – at least 4 hours under flame conditions with no loss of strength or integrity. The millions of tiny bubbles in this material also gives it excellent insulating properties, helping us to achieve Objective No. 3.

The walls are rendered with Rockcote, rather than being painted.

Roof, Gutters and Eaves

We chose extra-thick colorbond steel for the roof and used closely-spaced trusses to provide extra strength.

The eaves and fascia are constructed from non-flammable materials. Metal mesh (gutter guard) is permanently fixed to roof gutters to prevent leaves and embers from collecting in the gutters.

Roof ventilators and other roof penetrations such as flues are fitted with fire-rated metal mesh to prevent embers entering the roof cavity.

A number of other measures were taken to prevent ember entry. Ridge capping is scribed to fit into the roof corrugations. All gaps between roofing sheets and ridge capping and between the steel sheets and fascia are filled with fire-retardant material. Fire-resistant sarking covers the entire roof area, including the ridges and extends into the gutters.

Protection of windows and doors

Windows and doors are potential weak points when it comes to fire protection. To address that weakness, we used double-glazed, aluminium-framed windows and sliding doors and metal flyscreens throughout the house.

However for even greater fire protection – particularly against radiant heat which might crack even two panes of glass – we fitted Block-Out fire-rated metal roll-down shutters to all windows and doors. The housings for these shutters are fitted within the wall cavity, rather than on the outside of the house (the norm in Australia), shielding the shutter mechanism from fire.

We use the shutters throughout the year. They provide shading in Summer, insulation in Winter and added security when we are away from the property.

Floor construction

To eliminate the possibility of embers lodging under the house, we chose a polished concrete slab-on-ground for the foundations and floor. A tiled extension of the slab provides an outdoor deck, with shading provided by a pair of large removable umbrellas.

Fire sprinklers

Late in the house design process, we decided to fit bushfire sprinklers to provide an extra layer of security against the threat of bushfire attack. We thought that they shouldn’t be necessary for building fire protection but that they might prevent damage to the shutters by radiant heat.

Sixteen Bushfire Pro sprinkler heads on the gutters spin under the centrifugal force of water from a diesel pump. Each has a spray pattern 17metres wide, overlapping to form a vertical wall of water droplets.

As it turns out, the importance of the sprinklers for fire protection remains untested as we were not present at the time of the fire attack to turn on the diesel pump.

The sprinklers generate a wall of cooling water around the house. I ran this test after the fire to check the sprinkers were not damaged.

How well did it all work?

The short answer is extremely well. One of only two apparent external signs of damage to the house following the fire of 5th January were the PVC downpipes, which melted and took on a Dali-esque appearance.

The other damaged external item is the roof-mounted hot water tank. The plastic cover on one end of that tank burnt – presumably because an ember lodged there. As a result, the adjacent solar hot water panel shattered.

That’s it. Our insurance assessor has said the roof will need to be replaced as the radiant heat generated by the fire will have damaged the colorbond paint on the roof sheeting.

We often wondered what it would be like inside the house during a bushfire. We can now be confident that it would have been reasonably comfortable – at least in terms of the environment. It would certainly have offered a safe refuge if the option of safe evacuation had not been available.

When we first entered the house after our return from Canberra, 4 days after the fire, the air inside was cool and smoke-free – in contrast to the outside air. There was absolutely no sign of heat damage or ash accumulation inside the house. It was as if the house had been hermetically sealed, which in a sense it almost had been because of our “no-gaps” building approach.

In fact, we deliberately kept the doors and windows closed for days afterwards as the air inside the house was of much better quality than outside.

The minimal damage to the house contrasts to the wholesale destruction of the natural environment around it.

This article by Paul Whittington first appeared in Life in a Southern Forest and republished with the author’s permission, read original .

Join the Conversation

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Notify me of follow-up comments by email.

Notify me of new posts by email.

only thing that saved our house in MT Tomah, majestically protected the cedar clad home. There wass nothing left on our property, but the house had a green ring around it, no real damages to the home whatsoever, everything else reduced to ash.

Sprinklers that is.

We've recently sent you an authentication link. Please, check your inbox!

Sign in with a password below, or sign in using your email .

Get a code sent to your email to sign in, or sign in using a password .

Enter the code you received via email to sign in, or sign in using a password .

• Subscribe to our newsletters:

Sign in with your email

Lost your password?

Try a different email

Send another code

Sign in with a password

Privacy Policy

The fire on a house facade: a case study

• October 2023
• Conference: The 18th Advanced Building Skins Conference & Expo, 30-31 October, Bern, Switzerland
• At: Bern, Switzerland

• University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland

Discover the world's research

• 25+ million members
• 160+ million publication pages
• 2.3+ billion citations

• Michał Wieczorek
• Klaudiusz Borkowicz
• PengKun Gao

• FIRE TECHNOL

• FIRE SAFETY J
• S. Klopovic
• Ö. F. Turan
• Igor Oleszkiewicz
• Recruit researchers
• Join for free
• Login Email Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google Welcome back! Please log in. Email · Hint Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google No account? Sign up

• WordPress.org
• Documentation
• Learn WordPress
• Shortcodes Cleaned List
• View Calendar
• Patent Research
• Consumer Products
• Label Design
• Evidence/Exemplar Storage
• Transportation
• Rapid Responder Services
• Transportation Group
• Maritime Accidents/Naval Architecture
• Railroad & Light Rail
• Engineering
• Biomechanical Engineering
• Mechanical Defects
• Industrial Machinery
• Mold/Industrial Hygiene
• Human Factors/Product Design
• Chemical Analysis
• Engineering Studies
• Materials Science
• Fire & Explosion
• Lighting Expertise
• Workplace Safety/OSHA
• Slip Resistance Testing
• Electrical/Electronic Failures
• Premises Liability Slip/Trip & Fall
• Video Surveillance Analysis
• Construction
• Civil/Structural
• Building Codes and Accessibility
• Construction Defect / Building Envelope
• Our Company
• CHARITIES WE SUPPORT
• Management Team
• News and Events
• Capabilities
• CED Drone Applications
• Technical Documentation
• CASE STUDIES
• We’re Hiring!
• CED Client Satisfaction Survey
• CED Webinar Sign Up
• Join the CED E-Newsletter
• SUBMIT ASSIGNMENT
• CED on the Scene , Fires: Cause and Origin

Case Study: House Fire Caused by Improper Usage of a Dehumidifier

• July 11, 2007
• Jeff Richard

CED Technologies Inc. was recently involved in a products liability case that demonstrated how important an innovation expert can be in effecting the outcome of the case.  This case involved a dehumidifier that was alleged to be responsible for a house fire where the assessed loss was in excess of two million dollars.  The home in this case was a very expensive and newly constructed residence that was located in Florida .  A year after the house was completed, the homeowner noticed condensation on the ceilings and rusting of the lighting fixtures located in the ceiling of the residence.   The homeowner contacted the HVAC contractor who installed the air conditioning equipment in the house and asked him to fix the problem.  The HVAC contractor discovered that the condensation problem was due to excessive humidity in the un-vented and ceiling insulated attic of the residence.  The HVAC contractor decided that the best way to solve the attic excessive humidity problem was to install two dehumidifiers in the attic and run the dehumidifiers continuously.  A year after the dehumidifiers were installed in the attic, a fire occurred in the attic.  The origin of the attic fire was traced to one of the dehumidifiers.

Subrogation related to the fire alleged that the dehumidifier was defective and that the defect in the dehumidifier had caused an attic fire.  The initial cause and origin examination of the fire was correct in that the house fire was in fact caused by one of the dehumidifiers in the attic.  A CED engineer was retained by the dehumidifier manufacturer and was asked to determine why the dehumidifier caused this particular fire.  A site inspection was conducted by the engineer and the inspection yielded significant information in this case.  First, the attic was constructed with no ventilation openings and/or attic fans which are typically installed in attics of this design. Secondly, the rafters of the attic were covered with a sprayed on insulating foam material.  Due to the south Florida location of the home and the un-vented nature of the attic, it was determined that the temperature in the attic could reach 140 degrees Fahrenheit during the summer afternoon hours.

Knowing that the typical use for dehumidifiers was not in an attic situation, the CED engineer immediately questioned why the HVAC contractor had elected to install dehumidifiers in an excessively hot, un-vented attic in a Florida residence rather than simply vent the attic by conventional means.  The CED engineer noted that continuously operating two dehumidifiers would significantly increase the electric consumption for this residence.  The CED engineer also noted that continuously operating dehumidifiers in an excessively hot attic would create major performance problems for the dehumidifiers that should have been known by a competent HVAC contractor.

The CED engineer decided to obtain an exemplar dehumidifier and to operate the dehumidifier in an un-vented space at excessive temperatures.  A test booth was constructed and instrumentation was placed both in the booth and on the exemplar dehumidifier.  The test booth was made very humid by placing water trays in the booth.  The dehumidifier was operated at the elevated temperatures in the test booth for only a few hours and the results that were collected were astounding.  As the temperature in the test booth, increased, the amount of electrical current used by the dehumidifier compressor increased drastically. As the test booth became excessively hot, the dehumidifier stopped removing any of the humidity from the air.  This experiment proved that operating the dehumidifiers in the hot attic of the Florida residence did nothing to remove humidity from the attic.  This experiment also proved that as the temperature in the attic became excessive, the dehumidifiers became electrically overloaded and operated beyond their design limits.

It was concluded in the engineering report that the dehumidifiers involved in this case did not have a design problem that caused fire.  It was also concluded that any competent HVAC contractor should have known that installing dehumidifiers in an un-vented attic of a south Florida residence could cause operating problems and potential fire problems with the dehumidifiers.

At CED/Accident Analysis Inc., engineers are encouraged to “Think Outside the Box”.  Innovative thinking and creative testing has helped many of our clients prove why and how an accident has occurred.  The use of engineering and science principles at a deposition or in a courtroom is a powerful tool in resolving litigation cases.  For more information , click Case Manager to send an E-mail Request or contact one of our regional offices or contact us at the telephone numbers listed.

Related Posts:

SEND INQUIRY

Recent news.

Drones, Sensors, and Smart Signs: The Future of Construction Zone Safety

Essential Boat Safety Tips: How to Prepare for the Unexpected

Hurricane Season Safety: Protecting Your Home from Carbon Monoxide Poisoning 

• Today's news
• Reviews and deals
• Climate change
• 2024 election
• Newsletters
• Fall allergies
• Health news
• Mental health
• Sexual health
• Family health
• So mini ways
• Unapologetically
• Buying guides

Entertainment

• How to Watch
• My watchlist
• Stock market
• Biden economy
• Personal finance
• Stocks: most active
• Stocks: gainers
• Stocks: losers
• Trending tickers
• World indices
• US Treasury bonds
• Top mutual funds
• Highest open interest
• Highest implied volatility
• Currency converter
• Basic materials
• Communication services
• Consumer cyclical
• Consumer defensive
• Financial services
• Industrials
• Real estate
• Mutual funds
• Credit cards
• Balance transfer cards
• Cash back cards
• Rewards cards
• Travel cards
• Online checking
• High-yield savings
• Money market
• Home equity loan
• Personal loans
• Student loans
• Options pit
• Fantasy football
• Pro Pick 'Em
• College Pick 'Em
• Fantasy baseball
• Fantasy hockey
• Fantasy basketball
• Download the app
• Daily fantasy
• Scores and schedules
• GameChannel
• World Baseball Classic
• Premier League
• CONCACAF League
• Champions League
• Motorsports
• Horse racing

New on Yahoo

• Privacy Dashboard

Large-scale fire in Novosibirsk, Russia: eyewitnesses report explosions

A large fire has broken out in warehouses in the Russian city of Novosibirsk; the fire covered an estimated 1,800 square metres, and witnesses reported explosions.

Source: Local news outlets – NGS, Novosibirsk News, Novaya Sibir; Russian Telegram channels

Details: Russian local outlets report that a two-storey warehouse building made of sandwich panels at 2nd Stantsionnaya street, 30 is on fire. The warehouse is completely engulfed in flames, the structures collapsed, and there is a threat to neighbouring buildings.

According to Russia’s Ministry of Emergencies, the fire is being put out by more than 70 people and 20 units of equipment.

Russian internet community Incident Novosibirsk posts many photos and videos of the fire and notes that there is a "terrible smell of plastic" on Stantsionnaya Street due to the fire.

As of 14:30 Kyiv time, there was no information regarding the victims.

– 1800 ². , . ³ Telegram- " " pic.twitter.com/gpUyyfxIX0 — ✌ (@ukrpravda_news) December 26, 2022

Background:

The number of large-scale fires has recently increased in Russia.

Only in the last two weeks there have been about a dozen of fires, including those at oil refineries in Siberia , oil depot in Surazh district of Bryansk Oblast , large shopping centres in Moscow and Moscow Oblast , thermal power plant in Perm , oil storage facility at the airfield in Kursk , Slava plant in Bryansk Oblast, etc.

Journalists fight on their own frontline. Support Ukrainska Pravda or become our patron !